HS2 Reset: Evidence to Transport Committee - 9 July 2025 "Total overspend on high-speed rail could be as much as 100%"

[HSTEd]

What is this, is 300 really pushing technology forward?

No?
The comment was that the argument that higher speeds didn't increase costs was based on HS1 era data of 300kph not being significantly more expensive than 200kph.

360kph is a long way from 300kph, as HS2 has now (once again) demonstrated.
360kph-400kph is pushing right up against the fundamental limits of steel rail technology and is expensive as a result.

Running the trains faster means more people use it, while there's lower capacity. When do these two numbers meet, is there room for decades of growth? Has any railway with a single operating speed (all trains at the same average speed on a common section) chosen to improve capacity by going slower?

That would depend on data which is very difficult to generalise.
I'm not aware of new lines specifically going slower to boost capacity, but plenty of new high speed lines don't try to push to 360kph or beyond.

Indeed in Japan most of the new lines in the pipeline are 260kph affairs.

Britain’s HS1 rail link was ‘poor value for money’, report finds

Britain’s HS1 rail link was ‘poor value for money’, report finds Government-backed study into high-speed project published as HS2 scheme is hit by delays and mounting costs Sixteen years after Britain’s first high-speed rail service was launched, an official government review into the...

www.railforums.co.uk

This thread about HS1's poor BCR makes me wonder whether we worry too much about a BCR being over 1, when we like the results of something apparently below 1.

HS1's business case was wrecked by EasyJet et al destroying the long distance rail market, whilst the emphasis on international operations has crippled St Pancras to the point that HS1 remains lightly utilised.
The airline thing probably won't happen again.

 

[E27007]

The whole point of it was capacity, that's why anything has happened. Yes, they did talk about the speed a lot, but that was never the key driver for creating the project in the first place

There is a paragraph in the Stirling review, the intention to expand capacity became subverted, the goal changed from capacity to biggest and fastest, the subversion of the goal meant the proven technology of HS1 was discarded, and HS2 became a clean-sheet high-risk project with escalating out-of-control costs. HS2 engineered as another HS1 would be far less controversial and probably succesful

 

[Nottingham59]

There is a paragraph in the Stirling review,

And there's now a Green Signals interview with James Stewart on Youtube.

 

[FMerrymon]

There is a paragraph in the Stirling review, the intention to expand capacity became subverted, the goal changed from capacity to biggest and fastest, the subversion of the goal meant the proven technology of HS1 was discarded, and HS2 became a clean-sheet high-risk project with escalating out-of-control costs. HS2 engineered as another HS1 would be far less controversial and probably succesful

I disagree with it and was surprised to see it.

1) The proposed frequency of service is the bigger risk and, with longer trains, is what required slab track. That's the biggest difference with hs1 on the open lengths of line. The high frequency was about capacity. Slab required additional piling and less tolerance in earth movements.

2) every single white paper talks about the strategic objective of capacity first then connectivity (which includes reduced journey times). The secondary objective of connectivity did not compromise capacity. Capacity was why the line was being built, connectivity the opportunity.

3) the speed helps capacity, encouraging passengers away from other direct services and freeing up those services. It's also cheaper to operate. The higher top speed over the operational speed helps maintain headways at a high frequency.

4) 1/2 cost of phase 1 is for the innercity bits and stations, plus delta and rolling stock. These would be needed anyway and might even cost more if slower. Most of it less than 200mph or even 140. Out of the remaining cost, how much really would it save to reduce the top speed?

5) EWR without wires and 100mph is 6.6bn for 36miles. Building any route in this country is expensive.

6) There were many changes made to the design during the hybrid bill and not just to the Chilterns part of the route everyone seems to focus on. Such changes would have happened with a slower line too and any different route would have annoyed locals, perhaps understandably.

7) a greater economic return was likely from speed, attracting more passengers from other modes and increasing economic returns from agglomoration.

8) the evidence given at the TSC that the bat shed was an example of a structure required due to the faster alignment was false.

I believe there may be a political element in this to push ahead with smaller bits to add to hs2, where they may feel it will go down better with the public and media if its slower to show they've learnt lessons.

 

[Nottingham59]

The proposed frequency of service is the bigger risk

Stewart says that too (my bold).

Most people I have spoken to have blamed the original vision for HS2 and the resultant requirements and scope for the high costs. A railway that was originally intended to increase capacity became a vision to build the best and fastest highspeed railway in the world. This effectively ruled out the cost savings expected from utilising HS1 design, which was tried and tested, and a completely new design was required.

The Business Case (2013)4 locked in the requirements and scope which required a
straight line between London and Birmingham and a design that enabled 17 trains
per hour at speeds in excess of 320kmph.

 

[ABen90]

Has anyone actually done the calculations of the power supply needed and the total cost of the electric energy used for running HS2 train services at these different speeds to see which speeds are affordable and deliverable?

With the power supply needed increasing as the cube of the speed and the total electric energy used and therefore the cost increasing as the square of the speed, small increments in speed lead to big increases in the total cost of the electric energy used and even bigger increases in the power supply needed. Selecting 360kph instead of 300kph leads to a 44% increase in the total cost of the electric energy used and a 73% increase in the power supply needed.

In view of the cost of generating more electricity and the cost of supplying it to the railway I think the trains will run on HS2 at 250kph or even 225kph because it will prove too difficult to supply enough electric power and too expensive in electric energy costs to run the trains at any higher speeds.

HS2 are definitely looking at electricity costs for running trains. It would be a real waste of infrastructure if they design the power network for 360kph and then run trains at 225kph. You could permanently rationalize the power design for a 300kph top speed but again you’re wasting all the time and effort put into the civil design which has been built for a faster railway. I imagine the bean counters are looking at all these different options now though.

 

[jfowkes]

How much of HS1 is actually at the 360kph maximum line speed (or above 300kph or whatever people think a reasonable speed is)? It seems like the some people basically think the whole route is that speed, but presumably not. If we're just talking about reducing the speed of those sections back down to 300 or whatever kph, how much would be saved?

 

[E27007]

How much of HS1 is actually at the 360kph maximum line speed (or above 300kph or whatever people think a reasonable speed is)? It seems like the some people basically think the whole route is that speed, but presumably not. If we're just talking about reducing the speed of those sections back down to 300 or whatever kph, how much would be saved?

In the past, I recall viewing predictions of speed vs time for an HS2 service train, presented as graphs , from memory, from a stand eg Old Oak Common, an HS2 train will take 30 miles to accelerate from 0 to linespeed, and 10 miles to decelerate and brake for a stop eg Birmingham.

 

[weeklycommuter]

There is a paragraph in the Stirling review, the intention to expand capacity became subverted, the goal changed from capacity to biggest and fastest, the subversion of the goal meant the proven technology of HS1 was discarded, and HS2 became a clean-sheet high-risk project with escalating out-of-control costs. HS2 engineered as another HS1 would be far less controversial and probably succesful

The design speed of HS1 is 300kph so to reuse HS1 design, which the following excerpt from the Stewart Review makes clear would have resulted in substantially lower costs, the design speed of HS2 needed to be 300kph. The message both from the Stewart Review and the Transport Committee session on 9 July is that building HS2 for a design speed of 300kph using the proven design and technology of HS1 would have resulted in substantially lower costs, this should have been done and setting a design speed higher than 300kph requiring new untried and untested design and technology was the wrong decision and resulted in far higher costs than necessary.

The 17 trains per hour were the result of adding the Eastern Phase 2b leg to Leeds which in the end proved unaffordable. Keeping HS2 as a West Coast Mainline only project means it only needs to support around 10 to 12 trains an hour.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/686cd3762cfe301b5fb67845/major-transport-projects-gov-assurance-review.pdf

7.1 The culture of cost control and affordability
F36. A culture of driving down cost to manage affordability has been absent from the Programme.
Most people I have spoken to have blamed the original vision for HS2 and the resultant requirements and scope for the high costs. A railway that was originally intended to increase capacity became a vision to build the best and fastest highspeed railway in the world. This effectively ruled out the cost savings expected from utilising HS1 design, which was tried and tested, and a completely new design was required.
The Business Case (2013)4 locked in the requirements and scope which required a straight line between London and Birmingham and a design that enabled 17 trains per hour at speeds in excess of 320kmph.

 

[stuu]

It's not just about engineering standards. The vast temporary land take and earthworks being built for no reason but to hide the line must have added a fortune to the costs. HS1 didn't do that, other high speed lines in Europe don't do that either. Pointless green tunnels like the one near Denham which hide the line from some scrap yards and old landfills don't seem a good use of money either

 

[Xavi]

Mark Wild: I wasn’t there, but, with the benefit of hindsight, the only way to mobilise the project was to remove the risk from the contractors, because, as has been envisaged, the crystallisation of the risk, even with some of the biggest contractors in Europe, could have destroyed their companies. I would have done the same if I was in their shoes. To proceed meant that the contractors could not price the risk. The risk, therefore, had to be priced and retained in the Government.

“Only way to mobilise” being the same as the Treasury wouldn’t sign off the Target Costs (including risk) that the contractors did submit for the civils.

 

[growse]

The tunnels are one of the few areas where construction is proceeding very satisfactorily and as they don't need the level of consents open air sections do it hasn't been the subject of local opposition and planning committees making excessive demands which has frustrated progress elsewhere and caused delays which is key driver in cost escalation.

Yes - my point is that putting more of the line in tunnels to appease the NIMBYs compromises operational performance.

 

[Nottingham59]

How much of HS1 is actually at the 360kph maximum line speed (or above 300kph or whatever people think a reasonable speed is)? It seems like the some people basically think the whole route is that speed, but presumably not. If we're just talking about reducing the speed of those sections back down to 300 or whatever kph, how much would be saved?

Almost all is at 360kph linespeed, with 8250m radius curves. Apart from the long tunnels, there is a minor kink just north of delta, where the speed drops to 350kph. The turnouts towards Birmingham and Handsacre are at 230kph. I think the Chiltern tunnel is 320kph, but I'll have to check that.

EDIT:
Didn't quite remember right. According to the HS2 Route maps, the "Design Speed" shown at the bottom of each map is 400kph for open line, but dropping to 360kph in every Green Tunnel. I understnad the current plan is to run trains at a maximum speed of 360kph.

The Colne viaduct and Chiltern Tunnel have a Design Speed of 320kph.
https://www.gov.uk/government/colle...ile-maps-between-london-and-the-west-midlands

 

[FMerrymon]

Almost all is at 360kph linespeed, with 8250m radius curves. Apart from the long tunnels, there is a minor kink just north of delta, where the speed drops to 350kph. The turnouts towards Birmingham and Handsacre are at 230kph. I think the Chiltern tunnel is 320kph, but I'll have to check that.

EDIT:
Didn't quite remember right. According to the HS2 Route maps, the "Design Speed" shown at the bottom of each map is 400kph for open line, but dropping to 360kph in every Green Tunnel. I understnad the current plan is to run trains at a maximum speed of 360kph.

The Colne viaduct and Chiltern Tunnel have a Design Speed of 320kph.
https://www.gov.uk/government/colle...ile-maps-between-london-and-the-west-midlands

360kph for catchup if late, but largely will run at 330kph.

One thing that surprised me was the Northolt tunnel is 320 to Greenford - by the time they're reaching Ruislip, I'd imagine they'd be slowing down - its only 8.5 miles to OOC. There must be some difference in cost for that section between a 225 capable bore and a 320.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 18 Jul 2025 ==

The design speed of HS1 is 300kph so to reuse HS1 design, which the following excerpt from the Stewart Review makes clear would have resulted in substantially lower costs, the design speed of HS2 needed to be 300kph. The message both from the Stewart Review and the Transport Committee session on 9 July is that building HS2 for a design speed of 300kph using the proven design and technology of HS1 would have resulted in substantially lower costs, this should have been done and setting a design speed higher than 300kph requiring new untried and untested design and technology was the wrong decision and resulted in far higher costs than necessary.

The 17 trains per hour were the result of adding the Eastern Phase 2b leg to Leeds which in the end proved unaffordable. Keeping HS2 as a West Coast Mainline only project means it only needs to support around 10 to 12 trains an hour.

I'd like to know what substantial means in this instance. The text says that he was told that it added costs, he did not investigate it. In terms of alignment, there is no difference in "design" between hs1 and hs2. The big difference that makes any difference to the design is the use of slab which was necessary for the tonnage, not the speed, and which may have had further impact on costs. Oakervee put the cost of speed AND capacity (the frequency) as costing an extra 10%, but the items necessary for the frequency were the big ticket items.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 18 Jul 2025 ==

Of course I understand that there are benefits to HS2. So specific examples of benefits don’t cut it. As I have tried to explain the real question is the scale of those benefits relative to costs and whether those or similar benefits could be delivered more cost effectively in other ways. So far, the only systematic assessment I have seen, the outline business case, indicates strongly that they could have. And that was based on what was, as we now know, massively underestimated costs for HS2, and was produced in a political context where the incentives were strongly to make the case stack up.

In fact the business case managed to - just about - make a case for HS2 on the basis of further unquantified benefits. But the detail is sketchy when such benefits would have needed to be very large and secure.

Clearly there were also unquantified costs and risks. These are not really considered.

There is a judgement to be made here. I think how events have unfolded supports my overall view that the business case was weak and did not provide justification for going ahead.

Perhaps there is other systematic analysis I have not seen, though.

The benefits to the existing network were never fully quantified and, as many others have pointed out and was pointed out at the TSC, the BCR is mostly reflective of transport benefits rather than the transformative effects on the economy which were largely excluded. The reason those benefits are not calculated is partly because its a difficult calculation, but also because they are evaluating the different transport solutions to achieve aims rather than the full benefits of the scheme.

The point about Lincoln and Lincolnshire is that HS2 would have improved their connection to pretty much anywhere in the country, in many cases substantially - to Wales, West midlands, South West, Heathrow, Scotland, East Anglia, London, South East, North East, East midlands... That brings in other benefits - more tourism, more desirable for housing, greater connectivity make it a more desirable place for business. Its a specific example of an area that seems miles away from the line but that would have benefitted, but too few people understood that. I feel its a good example of whether someone really understands HS2. There are far more examples of this and very few of these and their associated economic benefits were captured in the business case.

However, yes, that brings us to affordability. At the time of go ahead, it was considered affordable at the reset budget and advised by an independent review to continue. The Stewart review was tasked with what went wrong since - and there were unavoidable issues with Covid, Energy costs that have had a big effect on the whole construction industry. This is why I feel you're entirely wrong to dismiss it as a "con job".

 

[jfowkes]

The benefits to the existing network were never fully quantified and, as many others have pointed out and was pointed out at the TSC, the BCR is mostly reflective of transport benefits rather than the transformative effects on the economy which were largely excluded. The reason those benefits are not calculated is partly because its a difficult calculation, but also because they are evaluating the different transport solutions to achieve aims rather than the full benefits of the scheme.

The point about Lincoln and Lincolnshire is that HS2 would have improved their connection to pretty much anywhere in the country, in many cases substantially - to Wales, West midlands, South West, Heathrow, Scotland, East Anglia, London, South East, North East, East midlands... That brings in other benefits - more tourism, more desirable for housing, greater connectivity make it a more desirable place for business. Its a specific example of an area that seems miles away from the line but that would have benefitted, but too few people understood that. I feel its a good example of whether someone really understands HS2. There are far more examples of this and very few of these and their associated economic benefits were captured in the business case.

However, yes, that brings us to affordability. At the time of go ahead, it was considered affordable at the reset budget and advised by an independent review to continue. The Stewart review was tasked with what went wrong since - and there were unavoidable issues with Covid, Energy costs that have had a big effect on the whole construction industry. This is why I feel you're entirely wrong to dismiss it as a "con job".

I think it's also important to note that when you're considering a big project like HS2, the benefits are very dependent on other government policy. The government could say "OK, we have this new railway, let's really incentivise business and local government to really make the best use out of the capacity it's provided, let's encourage development around the stations, let's encourage modal shift" etc. Or, they could be very hands-off and not capture anywhere near as many potential benefits.

Transport policy interacts so much with housing policy, energy policy, business policy, that it's very hard to develop good estimates for the impact of a project because you're essentially guessing what governments are going to be doing for the next 50 years. So you kind of have to narrow your focus on just the raw transport impacts, which as you've said are not the whole story.

 

[Nottingham59]

I'd like to know what substantial means in this instance. The text says that he was told that it added costs, he did not investigate it. In terms of alignment, there is no difference in "design" between hs1 and hs2. The big difference that makes any difference to the design is the use of slab which was necessary for the tonnage, not the speed, and which may have had further impact on costs. Oakervee put the cost of speed AND capacity (the frequency) as costing an extra 10%, but the items necessary for the frequency were the big ticket items.

The big difference is that HS1 was designed with a minimum curve radius of 4000m, whereas HS2 is around twice that.

Looking at the detailed maps, nearly all of the alignment of HS2 was actually designed with the tightest curves at 8250m. (Though some sources say 7200m, I can't find that radius used in the 2016 design.) That suggests to me that curvature was a real constraint when laying out the route: the designers would have very little scope to weave around potentially sensitive areas and landscape features. They would just have to blast through, with deeper cuttings and higher embamkments, because they were already at maximum curvature for that section of line.

I note that North of Delta junction, passing Weeford and Middleton, there is an S-bend kink in the line that looks to me was to avoid the Belfry golf course. On this section, HS2 dropped the design speed to 350kph to accommodate horizontal curves of 6250m radius. Nowhere else between Ruislip and Cheshire has been given that treatment.

 

[erikvd28]

HS2 6-monthly report to Parliament: July 2025

Review of High Speed Two (HS2) including programme governance, delivery update, benefits, community impacts, land and property.

www.gov.uk

Land and property on the former Phase 2b Eastern Leg​

I am today formally lifting the safeguarding directions for the former Phase 2b Eastern Leg (between the West Midlands and Leeds), removing the uncertainty that has affected many people along the former route. Safeguarding along the former Phase 2b Western Leg (between Crewe and Manchester) is not being changed as part of this, and an update on future plans for safeguarding on this section will be provided in due course alongside broader plans for Northern Powerhouse Rail.

One small area to the south of the existing station in central Leeds, previously required for the new HS2 station, will remain safeguarded to allow for potential enhancements to the existing station, including for onward travel

It seems it's over for Phase 2b and Euston will start next year (another delay)

 

[NCT]

This country ...

 

[FMerrymon]

This country ...

Yep, shortsighted. At least get it to near Nottingham. East West across the midlands is a pretty dire journey currently.

 

[NCT]

First MMLE pause, now HS2E cancelled. You couldn't make it up.

 

[FMerrymon]

First MMLE pause, now HS2E cancelled. You couldn't make it up.

Don't forget that Midland Rail Hub is only the western side now. Nothing for East of Birmingham.

 

[chris2]

Don't forget that Midland Rail Hub is only the western side now. Nothing for East of Birmingham.

The spending review provided funding for the next stage, which is the western section. Has there been explicit confirmation the eastern stage has been cancelled? Or is this just being inferred from where the funding was allocated? As far as I understood, the western stage was always planned to happen first.

It seems it's over for Phase 2b

Doesn’t this simply put the eastern leg in the same status as Handsacre->Crewe which had its safeguarding removed in Jan 24? Hasn’t stopped us talking about that coming back… Also, as far as I know, north of delta will still include a spur to it.

 

[weeklycommuter]

The spending review provided funding for the next stage, which is the western section. Has there been explicit confirmation the eastern stage has been cancelled? Or is this just being inferred from where the funding was allocated? As far as I understood, the western stage was always planned to happen first.

HS2 phase 2b East, the proposed extension from the West Midlands to Leeds, was cancelled by the Boris Johnson Government in November 2021. All the talk about alternatives since then has been just talk because politicians wanted to pretend that it had not really been cancelled and it was going to continue in some form. It is only now that the current Government has finally admitted that it is not going to happen in any form.

Boris Johnson was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of HS2 and all sorts of rail and other transport schemes including a fixed link between Scotland and Northern Ireland. As even Boris Johnson was forced to conclude that it was just unaffordable to build HS2 phase 2b East in addition to the rest of the HS2 project I cannot see anyone else ever being interested in attempting to propose it in future.

Clearly the only workable way to improve rail connectivity on the Midland and East Coast Mainline routes and between the West Midlands and the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East of England is to improve and add capacity to the existing railways including electrification.

 

[NCT]

The ECML is already a highly capacity rationed railway - for such a densely populated corridor we can't provide a comprehensive Dutch style half-hourly connected timetable. Given hard-to-solve constraints that are King's Cross platform capacity, Welwyn viaduct, Peterborough and Doncaster freight movements and complex topography, West Riding Line, Leeds Whitehall Junction, and the utter tragedy that is the current Birmingham - Yorkshire rail infrastructure, I don't see any alternative solution that would have a lower quantity or works than a new line between Birmingham and Leeds / Church Fenton.

 

[The Ham]

Clearly the only workable way to improve rail connectivity on the Midland and East Coast Mainline routes and between the West Midlands and the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East of England is to improve and add capacity to the existing railways including electrification.

This is one area where HS2 could have made a significant impact on passenger numbers due to reducing journey times.

Of course in time (circa 27 years, assuming 2.5% growth per year) there's likely to be a doubling of passenger numbers, so as long as what's possible permits that without a new line, then that's fine.

Given the growth seen over the past few years, it's not looking good as West Midlands growth since 2009 (2.5% growth to 2023 would be 44.8%):
Yorkshire & Humber 1.0%
East Midlands 27.8%
North East -24.4% (so a fall of nearly 1/4)

Having said that between 2023 and 2024 all of those three had reasonable growth:
Yorkshire & Humber 14.3%
East Midlands 8.0%
North East 15.5%

 

[Sonik]

As even Boris Johnson was forced to conclude that it was just unaffordable to build HS2 phase 2b East in addition to the rest of the HS2 project I cannot see anyone else ever being interested in attempting to propose it in future.

It's not an unpopular opinion that the HS2 eastern leg was a flawed design, with too many spurs/loops and failing to pass both Derby and Notts. As such the IRP decision wasn't just about cost, and NIMBY MPs in Yorkshire certainly played a part too.

Clearly the only workable way to improve rail connectivity on the Midland and East Coast Mainline routes and between the West Midlands and the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East of England is to improve and add capacity to the existing railways including electrification.

IIRC that was essentially the scope of the study initiated following the IRP.

It was funded to the tune of £100m to be led by NR (which suggests pursuing mostly enhancements rather than new build) but I'm not aware if any conclusions have yet been published.

 

[NCT]

The eastern leg evolved from a through trunk route serving Toton and Meadow as parkway stations for the East Midlands and South Yorkshire on the way to Leeds, to then serving Sheffield with its own train to Sheffield Midland, to then (in a truncated form) classic compatible services to Nottingham and Derby (and in theory with Sheffield still served off spurs should the full eastern leg ever be reinstated)

All are valid models of constructing a HSL through an area of medium-sized cities.

In its very original form you could run 4tph London - Leeds with all 4 stopping at Toton and Meadowhall and frequent shuttles to city centres (Meadowhall - Sheffield is ready made). In its most recent (but completed form) you could still give Nottingham, Derby and Sheffield 2tph each using portion working out of a total 400m 6tph London - eastern arm leg.

Both concepts have pros and cons and both would ultimately deliver significant journey time and connectivity benefits to all of Nottingham, Derby, Sheffield, Leeds, York and Newcastle.

Westminster politics become dysfunctional since 2016 aside, there was a large element of parochial (largely) Yorkshire authorities squabbling and letting their own narrow vision of perfect be the enemy of good.

 

[weeklycommuter]

It's not an unpopular opinion that the HS2 eastern leg was a flawed design, with too many spurs/loops and failing to pass both Derby and Notts. As such the IRP decision wasn't just about cost, and NIMBY MPs in Yorkshire certainly played a part too.

It would be worth someone writing a book on the sorry saga of the HS2 eastern leg. It is a textbook example of how not to develop a proposal for a new railway.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Also, as far as I know, north of delta will still include a spur to it.

I think the turnout to the original eastern leg will be built in Phase 1, as the design is integral to the whole junction.
But it won't connect to anything, ending in a "ski-jump" situation.

 

[Snow1964]

Not sure if should start new thread, or continue this HS2 reset one.

Construction News has outlined that 2 of the main civil contracts will be prioritised (the Midlands ones), because need to test the trains. The Chilterns one is civil substantially complete. The London tunnels to Euston should start early next year and take around 18 months.

Seems there is a firebreak of about 9 months before starting on railway installation to allow for weather delays (but this might be reduced if progress is good.)

HS2 Ltd is prioritising the renegotiation of a pair of major civils contracts as part of a sweeping reset of the high-speed rail programme.

Alan Morris, the client’s director of construction delivery, confirmed that the phase one northern main works civils contracts, held by the Balfour Beatty Vinci (BBV) and Eiffage Kier Ferrovial Bam Nuttall (EKFB) joint ventures (JVs), are now the main focus.

“Basically, the two northern contracts, BBV and EKFB, are the most critical ones” for renegotiation and rebaselining, he told Construction News during a media briefing last Friday (3 October).

“Those are the ones that are our highest priority for us to ensure the programme is achievable.”

He said this was “because of the way that we test the trains and where the trains come out the depot”.

The BBV JV oversees civil engineering for the 90km West Midlands stretch of the high-speed line.

EKFB is responsible for civils on 80km of the HS2 route to the south of BBV’s section.

CN asked representatives of both JVs for further information.

HS2 chief executive Mark Wild said last December that the client planned to renegotiate contracts with all four civils JVs across the whole of the London-to-Birmingham phase one route, a message Morris reinforced in his briefing, saying the client would be “talking to all the contractors”.

The other two JVs are Skanska Strabag Costain (SCS), which is the main London tunnels contractor; and the Align JV (Bouygues Travaux Publics, VolkerFitzpatrick and Sir Robert McAlpine), which is delivering 24km of infrastructure in the Chilterns, including the Colne Valley Viaduct and the 16km Chiltern Tunnel.

Morris envisages a relatively simpler renegotiation process with the Align JV and SCS.

He said the former had “effectively finished their [main civil] works”, adding that “there won’t be a huge amount to renegotiate with them”.

He highlighted a major milestone passed by SCS in June with the completion of excavation work on the Northolt Tunnels, adding that renegotiating this JV’s contract was a third-place priority behind EKFB and BBV.

Morris said SCS benefited from using variable-density tunnel boring machines (TBMs) from German firm Herrenknecht, which reduced the risk of creating sinkholes during the tunnelling process.

“We’ve finished all the TBM drives in SCS, apart from the section between Old Oak Common to [Euston Station in] London. The TBMs will fire up early next year [from Old Oak Common and drive] towards Euston. It will probably take about a year and a half to finish those excavations.”

Morris said that his focus is to “effectively gain control back again” of the megaproject.

He acknowledged the Major Transport Projects Governance and Assurance Review by consultant James Stewart, who warned in June that HS2’s main civils contracts were “too large to manage effectively”.

The Stewart report identified political instability, unrealistic scheduling, cost overruns and fragmented governance as factors undermining the HS2 programme.

As a result, Stewart said, the HS2 supply chain was “constrained” and flexibility reduced while delays mounted. The report also said that construction work had begun too hastily in April 2020.

For the in-progress main civils jobs, Morris said his clear objective is to “get the contractors to achieve what they say they’re going to do” in order to complete work in four years’ time.

He insisted there had already been an impact. “The contractors have got enough drawings today to build the things they need to build tomorrow,” he said.

Morris – who joined HS2 Ltd in January, a month after the Department for Transport confirmed the programme reset – meets every week with contractors to track progress in detail.

These meetings give Morris “a warm, fuzzy feeling” that project directors are “now more attuned to what needs to be done on a weekly basis… I think that’s made a huge difference”, he said.

In addition, monthly Productivity Executive Leadership Team sessions require project directors to report directly to Morris and Wild. “Project directors from each of the stations and civils [schemes] sit in front of myself and Mark and explain what they’ve done, whether that’s achievements or not,” he added.

Morris also explained that HS2 was “purposely holding back” on the start dates for contracting on rail systems, “to ensure that the designs are in a good place so that when we physically start building, there’s less things to go wrong”.

A sequencing “firebreak” between the end of the civils plan and the start of the rail systems phase has been inserted to deal with variables such as weather conditions and to “give us a clean break opportunity to get the rail systems started”, Morris said. CN understands that this gap varies from nine months for SCS to 18 months for EKFB.

He added: “We may be able to move this forward a little bit in the event that things like weather work in our favour. But to make that decision today is an extremely challenging thing to do.

“If you mobilise all the rail system guys to start, and they’re twiddling their thumbs because of somebody not finishing because of weather [conditions], that’s a major problem.”

An HS2 Ltd spokesperson said details of revised cost and schedule ranges “will be shared in due course – we need to take the time to get it right”.

The spokesperson added: “A new reliable baseline is a critical output of the HS2 reset and we expect to have that in place next year.”

HS2 prioritises two civils contracts in reset negotiations

HS2 Ltd is prioritising the renegotiation of a pair of major civils contracts as part of a sweeping reset of the high-speed rail programme. Alan Morris,

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