HS2 Reset: Evidence to Transport Committee - 9 July 2025 "Total overspend on high-speed rail could be as much as 100%"

[FMerrymon]

Long distance trains don't stop at Lincoln because they are going to Scotland. If the ECML didn't have Scotland trains because they were on HS2, more of those passing through Lincoln could stop, and would have seats free. Millions of people live in cities and towns that can be swapped in to that point, so the idea that Scotland is a small market is deceptive.

Yep, currently a direct service to London every 2 hours due to lack of capacity on ecml, and that would have become at least hourly after hs2 east, with express services out of the way.

There are a couple of other large benefits to Lincoln and Lincolnshire, which I wonder if people who call hs2 a "con job" would be aware of?

The point I'm trying to make here is that towns and cities many miles from the line would have significantly benefitted from hs2, but many of these aspects have not been understood.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 12 Jul 2025 ==

The question is what would it have taken to overcome some/most/all of those obstacles? What would have been the benefits compared to the costs? Ditto for other options including improvements to WCML. That is what a business case should do, whereas the actual business case was obviously a puff pice for the option favoured by the politicians and lobbyists. Basically, unless an option delivered all of the (exaggerated) benefits of HS2 it was dismissed. Much too high a bar.

At the end of a proper process HS2 may still have come out as the best option though I personally doubt it. And even if it did, if the costs had been assessed accurately it would have been dismissed as unaffordable. I suspect the proponent knew that.

Rail alternatives to HS2

Examining the case for conventional alternatives to HS2 and possible enhancements to the existing rail network.

www.gov.uk

 

[philosopher]

You just end up catching the train up in front, the Chilterns is a mainly a 90/100 mph railway running on 3 minute headways, unless you are building new infrastructure for 4 tracking etc..
The gains from 100 to 125mph are often discussed here and you don't gain any significant amounts. How do you replace the connectivity for stations with removed stops?

Pre Covid, there were trains that took an hour and 45 minutes between London Marylebone and Birmingham Moor street with stops at High Wycombe, Banbury, Leamington Spa, Warwick Parkway and Solihull. Chiltern were also running more trains too. So I assume it is possible to speed to London Marylebone to Birmingham Moor Street services to some extent.

 

[slowroad]

Yep, currently a direct service to London every 2 hours due to lack of capacity on ecml, and that would have become at least hourly after hs2 east, with express services out of the way.

There are a couple of other large benefits to Lincoln and Lincolnshire, which I wonder if people who call hs2 a "con job" would be aware of?

The point I'm trying to make here is that towns and cities many miles from the line would have significantly benefitted from hs2, but many of these aspects have not been understood.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 12 Jul 2025 ==

Rail alternatives to HS2

Examining the case for conventional alternatives to HS2 and possible enhancements to the existing rail network.

www.gov.uk

That report states directly that comparing that comparing the alternative packages to HS2 was out of scope. Interestingly, though, the report does suggest that speed (via its contribution to connectivity) was part of the strategic objectives set for HS2.

 

[ABB125]

Interestingly, though, the report does suggest that speed (via its contribution to connectivity) was part of the strategic objectives set for HS2.

As it should be. Speed should 100% be used as one of the benefits of high speed rail and should be an important objective.
However, in a small country like the UK, the capacity benefits are rather more significant; speed is simply a by-product.

 

[Noddy]

No one is arguing it does. I think what is being said is that negligent delivery does not suddenly remove the benefits of a project.

Exactly this. Folk are very quick to moan, very quick to call something a white elephant, and very quick to forget. All these projects have turned into successful pieces of infrastructure with further development proposed and/or happening at the last two.

That report states directly that comparing that comparing the alternative packages to HS2 was out of scope. Interestingly, though, the report does suggest that speed (via its contribution to connectivity) was part of the strategic objectives set for HS2.

No it doesn’t. It says it was not possible to make a ‘complete like-for-like comparison with HS2’ but that the comparisons were made using ‘the same set of objectives, using the same tools and methodologies and - as far as is possible - across the same geographical areas’.

 

[The Planner]

Pre Covid, there were trains that took an hour and 45 minutes between London Marylebone and Birmingham Moor street with stops at High Wycombe, Banbury, Leamington Spa, Warwick Parkway and Solihull. Chiltern were also running more trains too. So I assume it is possible to speed to London Marylebone to Birmingham Moor Street services to some extent.

Yes, but its not solving the WCML though, and the Chiltern route was not far off full once the Evergreen 3 timetable came in.

 

[NCT]

If anything, Birmingham needs its dedicated HS2 capacity so that it's off Chiltern's radar and that Chiltern can concentrate on serving Wycombe, Bicester, Banbury, Leamington Spa and Warwick.

 

[slowroad]

Exactly this. Folk are very quick to moan, very quick to call something a white elephant, and very quick to forget. All these projects have turned into successful pieces of infrastructure with further development proposed and/or happening at the last two.



No it doesn’t. It says it was not possible to make a ‘complete like-for-like comparison with HS2’ but that the comparisons were made using ‘the same set of objectives, using the same tools and methodologies and - as far as is possible - across the same geographical areas’.

Last sentence of para 6.1 on page 77: “The direct comparison of the performance of the packages against the HS2 investment case was outside the scope of this study.”

 

[Noddy]

Last sentence of para 6.1 on page 77: “The direct comparison of the performance of the packages against the HS2 investment case was outside the scope of this study.”

But that’s against the HS2 investment case. It still allows the different options to be compared as directly as possible, on a like-for-like basis.

 

[FMerrymon]

As it should be. Speed should 100% be used as one of the benefits of high speed rail and should be an important objective.
However, in a small country like the UK, the capacity benefits are rather more significant; speed is simply a by-product.

Yep, the connectivity strategic aim is secondary to the capacity. Capacity is always the main aim on every single white paper since 2009.

 

[The Ham]

The point I'm trying to make here is that towns and cities many miles from the line would have significantly benefitted from hs2, but many of these aspects have not been understood.

For example Southampton to Newcastle (both miles from any HS2 track and not even, assuming no change to the current timetable, with a direct service from Southampton to a HS2 served station) would have seen the journey time between the two stations fall by at least an hour.

Bottom line, again, if we want to cater for a doubling of rail use between now and 2055 or between 2009 and 2037 (or any other equal length of time) there's a need for new lines.

You can't facilitate that just by adding a few coaches or hoping that all the new rail travel will want to be on lines where there's lots of capacity which isn't being used (spoiler, there's not even that many of those).

If anyone wants to kill off HS2 it's easy, show that rail growth of nearly 2.5% per year hasn't happened since 2009.

Up to about 18 months ago there was data showing that growth for London to Northwest from 2008/09 to 2022/23 was 28.2% when for that period it should have been 41.3%.

However, the 2023/24 data shows it at 47.1% when it should have been 44.8%.

Here's some what about which might be put back to me:

- We're not even at pre COVID numbers - yes but in my posts pre COVID I was saying that we might have needed to do things like Rail Package 2 just to keep up with demand until HS2 was built, also pre COVID numbers were the same level as 2029/30 "should" have been, so even if we don't get there for another 5 years, it doesn't stop the fact that we are in track to double by around 2037 from 2009

- what about split ticketing - this is why I'm using travel between regions data not TOC data, if anything split ticketing might mean that growth was higher

- what about the West Midlands, that's only 40.5% that's lower than 44.8% - that is true however Scotland is 137.5% and if anything the West Midlands being behind the target should mean that if you were going to cancel a section it's the bit into Birmingham but keep the line towards the Northwest and Scotland (the opposite of what is happening) and anyway the average for those three regions is 52.2%, so is higher than 44.8%.

- there maybe another global event which upsets rail use - that's true, however given COVID is looking like a speed bump in terms of growth, I'm not sure that's much of an issue even if it were to happen

- we should be.... - fine but that still doesn't stop the fact that you'd likely need a new line to cater for the likely doubling in rail use between 2009 and 2037

 

[slowroad]

But that’s against the HS2 investment case. It still allows the different options to be compared as directly as possible, on a like-for-like basis.

Fair enough. But the comparison against the investment case was done in the outline business case and showed the alternatives to the full Y network had better BCRs:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7c2b6ded915d1d1741c8d6/hs2-economic-case.pdf

The economic case therefore needed some magic dust to rescue it. (More fundamentally, my concern is that much more limited alternatives should have been considered as well - the strategic objectives may have been over-ambitious.)

And a report by the House of Commons Library showed that for phase 1 alone the alternatives satisfactorily addressed capacity issues at much lower cost:

https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8601/

And all before the massive cost escalation.

 

[NCT]

The alternatives had marginally better BCRs but HS2 delivered far greater NPV (net present value).

Cost escalation could have happened to alternatives just as it has to HS2. Just imagine TRU levels of escalation.

Given that Paris - Lyon is pretty much 2tph point-to-point 400m TGV Duplex all day, 3tph London - Manchester and 3tph London - Birmingham will fill.

 

[slowroad]

The alternatives had marginally better BCRs but HS2 delivered far greater NPV (net present value).

Cost escalation could have happened to alternatives just as it has to HS2. Just imagine TRU levels of escalation.

Given that Paris - Lyon is pretty much 2tph point-to-point 400m TGV Duplex all day, 3tph London - Manchester and 3tph London - Birmingham will fill.

The alternatives were (IIRC) 3-ish compared to 2-ish. If so, more than marginal. The NPV was higher because costs were higher - better value would have been obtained overall by spending the difference on other projects with high VFM (there are plenty).

With a phased package you can prioritise the highest value projects and respond to cost escalation by amending scope and timing while still getting some benefits.

 

[The Ham]

The alternatives were (IIRC) 3-ish compared to 2-ish. If so, more than marginal. The NPV was higher because costs were higher - better value would have been obtained overall by spending the difference on other projects with high VFM (there are plenty).

With a phased package you can prioritise the highest value projects and respond to cost escalation by amending scope and timing while still getting some benefits.

What's the phased approach which would get you double the capacity for trains on the southern WCML?

Or are you going to suggest that we don't need to cater for doubling of passenger numbers?

 

[slowroad]

What's the phased approach which would get you double the capacity for trains on the southern WCML?

Or are you going to suggest that we don't need to cater for doubling of passenger numbers?

I don’t know whether we need to provide for a doubling. The advantage of a phased approach is you don’t have to know the exact destination. I’m not pretending I have the level of expertise to design and select specific projects - presumably the people who wrote the reports on alternatives linked above do have that expertise. But as a non-expert I’d suggest for starters:
1. Make all trains on WCML max length. This includes the stoppers and use pricing to shift less time sensitive travellers to trains with capacity.
2. Restore / extend / perhaps speed up / lengthen trains on the Moor St - Marylebone route and use pricing to shift travellers from WCML.
(I am sure someone will tell me this won’t work!)
3. Work out what in cab signalling could do for WCML.
4. Only then consider civils work.

 

[thomalex]

In 2019 the National Highways (Treasury) budget for four A66 construction packages was £600m, which had more than doubled to £1.3bn in 2022 and was deemed to be 'poor value for money' to widen 18km of existing carriageway saving 12 minutes on a typical full length journey. The spending review did not provide an update on the 2022 cost. The outturn cost will likely be c £2bn. Can't imagine how they worked the BCR...

Think is with the A66 is the main route to Scotland from the ports in the South East. Any developed country has motorways for this sort of essential infrastructure, never mind single carriageway roads. As always it is capacity not journey time that you need to look at.

Fortunately the scheme has finally got approval as of June this year and will go ahead. Should have been done 40 years ago but at least we've got there in the end.

 

[NCT]

I don’t know whether we need to provide for a doubling. The advantage of a phased approach is you don’t have to know the exact destination. I’m not pretending I have the level of expertise to design and select specific projects - presumably the people who wrote the reports on alternatives linked above do have that expertise. But as a non-expert I’d suggest for starters:
1. Make all trains on WCML max length. This includes the stoppers and use pricing to shift less time sensitive travellers to trains with capacity.
2. Restore / extend / perhaps speed up / lengthen trains on the Moor St - Marylebone route and use pricing to shift travellers from WCML.
(I am sure someone will tell me this won’t work!)
3. Work out what in cab signalling could do for WCML.
4. Only then consider civils work.

I welcome your humility in acknowledging the limit of your knowledge. Let me put to you very gently - you are not the first person to have considered these. What do you think the industry spent the last 17 years examining? Let me put to you even more gently - you are barking up all the wrong trees and flogging all the dead horses.

WCML trains - certainly those at the London end - are nearly all max train length. LNWR run 12-car 350s and soon 10-car 730s in the peaks; most Pendolinos are 11-car. That some diagrams are 8-car 350s and 9-car 390s is neither here not there - the existing demand suppression and natural growth are far greater than adding the last 2 cars on the handful of the not-quite-full-length trains.

In-cab signalling was meant to be part of the West Coast Route Modernisation and had to be abandoned. I'm sure ETCS Level 2 will be rolled out on the WCML at some point after the ECML, but that in itself isn't going to deliver plain-line capacity - it's mainly to deliver savings in not needing lineside physical assets and some performance benefits.

Speeding up Chiltern trains for the benefit of Birmingham would come at the direct expense of Wycombe, Bicester, Banbury, Leamington Spa and Warwick, which are real places with real people that need to access metropolitan opportunities in ever greater numbers. No business ever thinks how best can we suppress demand.

At some point we as a country needs to snap out of the mindset of Little England mediocrity.

 

[slowroad]

I welcome your humility in acknowledging the limit of your knowledge. Let me put to you very gently - you are not the first person to have considered these. What do you think the industry spent the last 17 years examining? Let me put to you even more gently - you are barking up all the wrong trees and flogging all the dead horses.

WCML trains - certainly those at the London end - are nearly all max train length. LNWR run 12-car 350s and soon 10-car 730s in the peaks; most Pendolinos are 11-car. That some diagrams are 8-car 350s and 9-car 390s is neither here not there - the existing demand suppression and natural growth are far greater than adding the last 2 cars on the handful of the not-quite-full-length trains.

In-cab signalling was meant to be part of the West Coast Route Modernisation and had to be abandoned. I'm sure ETCS Level 2 will be rolled out on the WCML at some point after the ECML, but that in itself isn't going to deliver plain-line capacity - it's mainly to deliver savings in not needing lineside physical assets and some performance benefits.

Speeding up Chiltern trains for the benefit of Birmingham would come at the direct expense of Wycombe, Bicester, Banbury, Leamington Spa and Warwick, which are real places with real people that need to access metropolitan opportunities in ever greater numbers. No business ever thinks how best can we suppress demand.

At some point we as a country needs to snap out of the mindset of Little England mediocrity.

I may well be wrong. I don’t have great confidence in the view of the “industry” though, based on its record of delivery. And Atkins, who prepared the alternatives study, presumably do have some relevant expertise.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 12 Jul 2025 ==

I may well be wrong. I don’t have great confidence in the view of the “industry” though, based on its record of delivery. And Atkins, who prepared the alternatives study, presumably do have some relevant expertise.

One other thing. Saying “no other industry talks of suppressing demand”is misleading - no other industry has prices that are subsidised like rail fares. This is the opposite of suppression.

 

[NCT]

I may well be wrong. I don’t have great confidence in the view of the “industry” though, based on its record of delivery. And Atkins, who prepared the alternatives study, presumably do have some relevant expertise.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 12 Jul 2025 ==


One other thing. Saying “no other industry talks of suppressing demand”is misleading - no other industry has prices that are subsidised like rail fares. This is the opposite of suppression.

European long-standing convention is state pays for infrastructure and passenger pays for train operation. The UK has the highest train fares in Europe, with inter-city operations making significant surpluses. That's demand suppressing profit maximising - and it's quite right the state recognises the need to invest that surplus back into the passenger.

The Atkins report presented the alternatives factually. Nothing in it contradicts the fact that HS2 delivers significantly higher NPV. The Strategic Alternatives report makes it very clear that delivering those alternatives would be highly disruptive, more so than the constant weekend closures that plagued the West Coast route mod that was still a fresh traumatising memory in the early 2010s.

There is a tonne of literature on HS2 in the public domain. You clearly know where to find it. You clearly have an aversion to actually examine the detail, as you prefer to make 'I don't know, but I'm sure ...' type statements in the comfort of your ignorance and prejudice.

 

[slowroad]

European long-standing convention is state pays for infrastructure and passenger pays for train operation. The UK has the highest train fares in Europe, with inter-city operations making significant surpluses. That's demand suppressing profit maximising - and it's quite right the state recognises the need to invest that surplus back into the passenger.

The Atkins report presented the alternatives factually. Nothing in it contradicts the fact that HS2 delivers significantly higher NPV. The Strategic Alternatives report makes it very clear that delivering those alternatives would be highly disruptive, more so than the constant weekend closures that plagued the West Coast route mod that was still a fresh traumatising memory in the early 2010s.

There is a tonne of literature on HS2 in the public domain. You clearly know where to find it. You clearly have an aversion to actually examine the detail, as you prefer to make 'I don't know, but I'm sure ...' type statements in the comfort of your ignorance and prejudice.

I’ll ignore your insult. You must feel your arguments are weak.

I have examined some of the detail, but not all of it. Hence I don’t want to pretend to the kind of certainty that you seem to have.

Irrespective of the position in other countries, it remains the case that rail in the UK is heavily subsidised (probably rightly). So it is hard to see how there is demand suppression. Using price to match demand to capacity is not an unusual practice - compare for example airlines. And rail already does it to some extent of course.

Your position now seems to be that the primary justification for HS2 is lack of commuter capacity on the part of the WCML near to London. Presumably such pressures have in any case greatly reduced since COVID. Building a new high speed line to Birmingham to address any remaining problem on Tue to Thur just looks like overkill, particularly as you have acknowledged that there is some scope to increase capacity on WCML and on the line into Marylebone - even if not as much as I may have thought.

Sure there would be disruption with more major alternative options. That is one factor to consider but it is not a knock down argument.

 

[NCT]

You wouldn't call ICWC anything other than highly profitable, or indeed the state over profiting, unless you took a British exceptionalist view.

Covid is just a blip. Other European countries are surprised we are still talking about it. It's not just the London end, but the Birmingham end too. The need to run the Avantis as fast as possible means intermediate stations between Coventry and Birmingham get a paltry service. HS2 means not only Coventry - Birmingham (two-way) demand is no longer supressed by the trains stuffed full of long-distance passengers, but the likes of Marston and Tile Hill could finally get something like a 4tph service that would be the baseline in a comparable European city.

When Covid happened the way suburbanists, carists, localists and hermits all got together in glee was simply bizarre.

 

[The Ham]

I don’t know whether we need to provide for a doubling.

Since 2009 passenger numbers between London and West Midlands/Northwest/Scotland have already increased by 52% to the 2023/24 regional passenger numbers (that's slightly more than 2.5% per year), even with COVID making them fall significantly.

If we see growth continuing at 2.5% then between 2009 and 2037 passenger numbers will double over that timeframe, if it carries on at that rate then passenger numbers will double from now until 2055.

If you look at the rate of growth at Avanti (6.6%) and West Midlands Trains (9.5%) then it's very likely that the regional numbers will be increasing by more than 2.5% when that's updated latest this year.

2.5% would mean passenger numbers double every 28 years, however small increases above 2.5% means that they doubling period reduces:
2.8% is every 25 years
3.6% is every 20 years
4.4% is every 16 years

Yes maintaining that level of growth isn't very likely, however if you have a high level of growth early on later years can be smallwe to still reach the same number.

1997 to 2024 (28 years, but with a global pandemic) has seen London to Northwest double, whilst 2005 to 2024 (19 years) has seen London to West Midlands double, and 2010 to 2024 (14 years) has seen London to Scotland double.

As such there's president that doubling could happen, which is why I asked the question.

Changing from 9 coach to 12 coach 390's is likely to only gain you about 40% (even with reducing first class provision), as such since 2009 (where we've already seen 52% growth) even they means the trains would (if they were already 12 coaches) would be busier than they were.

Yes they may have been quite in 2009, however that extra capacity will be being used up and so something more is needed, even going to 13 coaches (even if that were possible) isn't going to gain you very much extra time.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 12 Jul 2025 ==

Your position now seems to be that the primary justification for HS2 is lack of commuter capacity on the part of the WCML near to London. Presumably such pressures have in any case greatly reduced since COVID. Building a new high speed line to Birmingham to address any remaining problem on Tue to Thur just looks like overkill, particularly as you have acknowledged that there is some scope to increase capacity on WCML and on the line into Marylebone - even if not as much as I may have thought.

Do you have any data to confirm what this is and not just "presumably", as whilst COVID has had an impact, for long distance travel (especially to Scotland) even the 2023/24 data shows it's still likely to double over the period 2009 to 2037.

If a major pandemic doesn't stunt the growth enough not to result in passenger doubling over that period, then maybe there's a better case for a new line then you presume.

 

[slowroad]

You wouldn't call ICWC anything other than highly profitable, or indeed the state over profiting, unless you took a British exceptionalist view.

Covid is just a blip. Other European countries are surprised we are still talking about it. It's not just the London end, but the Birmingham end too. The need to run the Avantis as fast as possible means intermediate stations between Coventry and Birmingham get a paltry service. HS2 means not only Coventry - Birmingham (two-way) demand is no longer supressed by the trains stuffed full of long-distance passengers, but the likes of Marston and Tile Hill could finally get something like a 4tph service that would be the baseline in a comparable European city.

When Covid happened the way suburbanists, carists, localists and hermits all got together in glee was simply bizarre.

Just a detail, but Covid accelerated a pre-existing trend to remote working. There has been some reversion since the end of Covid, but a step down in commuting is still observable in the data. I don’t think anyone has a good handle on prospects.

 

[FMerrymon]

Just a detail, but Covid accelerated a pre-existing trend to remote working. There has been some reversion since the end of Covid, but a step down in commuting is still observable in the data. I don’t think anyone has a good handle on prospects.

Did you want to try the Lincoln test as to whether you understood the benefits of hs2?

 

[slowroad]

Did you want to try the Lincoln test as to whether you understood the benefits of hs2?

Of course I understand that there are benefits to HS2. So specific examples of benefits don’t cut it. As I have tried to explain the real question is the scale of those benefits relative to costs and whether those or similar benefits could be delivered more cost effectively in other ways. So far, the only systematic assessment I have seen, the outline business case, indicates strongly that they could have. And that was based on what was, as we now know, massively underestimated costs for HS2, and was produced in a political context where the incentives were strongly to make the case stack up.

In fact the business case managed to - just about - make a case for HS2 on the basis of further unquantified benefits. But the detail is sketchy when such benefits would have needed to be very large and secure.

Clearly there were also unquantified costs and risks. These are not really considered.

There is a judgement to be made here. I think how events have unfolded supports my overall view that the business case was weak and did not provide justification for going ahead.

Perhaps there is other systematic analysis I have not seen, though.

 

[The Ham]

Of course I understand that there are benefits to HS2. So specific examples of benefits don’t cut it. As I have tried to explain the real question is the scale of those benefits relative to costs and whether those or similar benefits could be delivered more cost effectively in other ways. So far, the only systematic assessment I have seen, the outline business case, indicates strongly that they could have. And that was based on what was, as we now know, massively underestimated costs for HS2, and was produced in a political context where the incentives were strongly to make the case stack up.

In fact the business case managed to - just about - make a case for HS2 on the basis of further unquantified benefits. But the detail is sketchy when such benefits would have needed to be very large and secure.

Clearly there were also unquantified costs and risks. These are not really considered.

There is a judgement to be made here. I think how events have unfolded supports my overall view that the business case was weak and did not provide justification for going ahead.

Perhaps there is other systematic analysis I have not seen, though.

One of the things which is overlooked is that HS2 isn't counting any secondary improvements which could then be delivered.

For example, the released platform capacity at places like Manchester isn't counted, but would make the business case for the local services which could then use that capacity significantly better. If those services had to fund extra platform capacity they would almost certainly not happen due to the high cost of building platforms.

Also, without new platforms at places like Manchester, it's unlikely that we could provide the capacity for the doubling of passenger numbers over the next (say) 25 years.

 

[Xavi]

Think is with the A66 is the main route to Scotland from the ports in the South East.

You need to update your SatNav.

 

[growse]

There is a judgement to be made here. I think how events have unfolded supports my overall view that the business case was weak and did not provide justification for going ahead.

Lots of "we shouldn't have done this", and very little "we should have done this instead".

It's easy to throw rocks at something in hindsight, whether they land or not. What's harder (and more intellectually honest) is to articulate a viable alternative.

(As above, the alternatives were examined in quite some detail and came out worse than HS2 based on the assessed criteria at the time).

You need to update your SatNav.

Up the A1 and across is pretty popular I believe.

 

[slowroad]

Lots of "we shouldn't have done this", and very little "we should have done this instead".

It's easy to throw rocks at something in hindsight, whether they land or not. What's harder (and more intellectually honest) is to articulate a viable alternative.

(As above, the alternatives were examined in quite some detail and came out worse than HS2 based on the assessed criteria at the time).


Up the A1 and across is pretty popular I believe.

It seems to me that some defenders of HS2 have an unhealthy attachment to the scheme. So far I have been accused of being intellectually dishonest, ignorant, and prejudiced simply for raising doubts which are based on issues that are plain to see from the business case. You don’t have to have worked up solutions to question whether a project should have gone ahead. The business case suggested viable alternatives were available. But even if the alternatives were limited in effectiveness it does not follow the project should have been implemented. Not all problems have affordable, complete solutions, whether in transport or any other field.