McNulty report detail 2
Summary of points from report
Revenue
Train operating costs have increased by £1.7bn, £0.8bn of which can be attributed to the increase to the increase in train-km, most of the rest is staff costs. Rolling stock charges increased by £0.3bn reflecting the increase in train km. NR costs now largely the same as Hatfield. Infrastructure enhancement expenditure increased by £1bn, mainly because of large projects like Thameslink.
Since 1996/97, although rail passenger-km have increased by 59%, there has been little improvement in the cost per passenger-km.
Leadership
Leadership is defined as “How the behaviours and actions of the [industry] create the culture, values and overall direction required for long-term success.”
Problems:
- great uncertainty over who leads the industry
- the vacuum left by this lack of industry leadership has often been filled with civil service or political leadership. Government intervention in the day-to-day business of running the railway is at an unprecedented level.
Recommendations for cost reduction
The Study recommends that a Rail Delivery Group is established with responsibility for high-level cross-industry leadership supported in certain areas by a Rail Systems Agency.
As long as Government is providing significant amounts of subsidy, Government is bound to be involved in the industry’s affairs. The role of Government is discussed in Section 5 of this report. In summary, Government should:
• specify how much money it is prepared to provide (SoFA) and what outputs it expects in return (HLOS), including cost objectives; and • provide clear policy direction and high-level objectives for the industry, and should control financial outcomes against the SoFA/HLOS.
However, Government should not be involved in as much detailed specification as at present – a level of detailed involvement which it has been suggested is significantly greater than when the industry was run by the nationalised British Rail.
Planning
There needs to be less focus on capital and infrastructure solutions. Instead there needs to be a renewed focus on making better use of existing capacity, ensuring that a full range of solutions is considered at an early stage. A more whole-system approach needs to be taken to planning, whereby the whole-industry costs, revenues and benefits are fully considered.
Duplication in the planning process needs to be reduced or removed so that the industry is working together on one set of plans with cross-industry and Government buy-in.
Structures and interfaces
What is crucial in this respect, however, is not so much the number of entities as the fact that, at the interfaces where efficiency requires that different parties work closely together, this is not happening for many reasons, not least the structure of NR, ineffective or misaligned incentives, or the silo mentality of industry players.
The TOCs are commercial companies with normal responsibilities to their shareholders. Their behaviours are also conditioned by the fact that franchises have often been for a maximum of seven years and, inevitably, the operators are very conscious of how many years are left on those franchises. As a result of all these factors, TOCs understandably, and not infrequently, take positions that seek to exploit contractual positions to the maximum, or which reflect a very short-term view, when the real interests of the railway would be better served by a longer-term view or a more co-operative approach.
The Study considers that there is a strong case for having some independent ownership of Route IM concessions. Independent ownership would increase the effectiveness of comparative regulation by allowing Route IMs to be truly independent, with a sharper profit motive increasing the incentive to improve efficiency and new management giving the potential to accelerate innovation. It could also improve the interface with TOCs as, being independent, the infrastructure manage could be able to respond to local needs more effectively.
It is recognised that independent ownership of Route IMs could create additional interface issues. It is therefore important that independent ownership is considered only in reasonably self-contained parts of the network.
The Study sees the structural options analysed earlier as offering considerable potential to facilitate cost savings. The DfT and ORR, in consultation with industry, should ensure:
- that NR moves towards a fully-devolved and decentralised structure, based on 12 route-based units, as quickly as practicable and certainly in time to be the basis for CP5 regulation;
- that NR aims to put in place one independently-operated Route IM concession by 2014/15;
- that much closer alignment between NR and TOCs is secured through: − cost and revenue sharing as a minimum for all franchises and routes as quickly as is practicable; − joint ventures or alliances, with the aim of having at least two of these in place by 2013/14; and − vertical integration, with at least one vertically-integrated pilot in place for the beginning of CP5 in 2014/15;
- that existing regulatory protections for freight and other users of the network are retained and, where necessary, strengthened to reflect the new interfaces emerging as a result of industry restructuring.
Based on the analysis undertaken by LEK, the Study estimates net incremental cost savings of £100m–300m per year by 2018/19 from:
- independent ownership of one Route IM;
- a trial of vertical integration; and/or
- cost and revenue sharing and joint ventures or alliances in other areas of the network.
The Study considers that independent ownership of some Route IM concessions would provide a significant benefit to efficiency from the ability to compare performance across a number of different companies and the ability of local management to make local decisions, responding to local conditions and creating innovation. In the case of vertical integration there would be strong alignment between train operations and infrastructure.