More detailed points from report 1:
Signalling
McNulty is also critical of signalling and control, citing, some countries have almost completely eliminated mechanical signalboxes and NR is comparatively far behind – the average route length controlled by a manned point is just 15 miles compared to 1,289 for one country.
NR has recently commenced the development of a national operations strategy which, in particular, addresses train control and signalling consolidation. This strategy concludes that there should be fewer control centres (circa 15 nationally) across the network, that traffic management (signalling) control should be consolidated and integrated within these centres, and that all elements of operational control and passenger information should be included:
Derby, Gillingham, Cardiff, Saltley, Edinburgh, Ashford, Didcot, Glasgow and proposed: Romford, Three Bridges, York, Manchester, Rugby, Basingstoke.
Regional Railways
The options for the provision of lower-cost trains could include a number of solutions:
• in exceptional circumstances new vehicles could be procured, but they will need to be
significantly cheaper than current heavy rail vehicles to be justified – for example, the average
rail vehicle cost is currently above £1m compared with an average cost of a road coach of
around £150k;
• there may be opportunities in some areas to convert from heavy rail to trams, or tram-trains,
although the economics of the latter have yet to be fully proven;
• cascading trains from other parts of the network or other rail undertakings – second-hand
foreign trains or trams, which are widely deployed in mainland Europe, may prove suitable for
routes that do not have loading gauge constraints; and
• refurbishment and life-extension of existing stock, but taking the opportunity to reduce greatly the operational costs and weight of the vehicle.
The cost of signalling assets could be significantly cut by reducing or eliminating the need for lineside signalling equipment. Initiatives to enable this removal include:
- operating on “drive on sight” principles as used in tram operations where the driver responds to the visual presence of vehicles and obstructions ahead – essentially this is the method of driving employed in a road vehicle, and with modern technology and low speeds can be regarded as a low-risk method of operation;
- equipping trains with improved braking to enable quicker stops – one application, found on trams, is the track brake, whereby braking is enabled by direct interaction between the vehicle and the track rather than via the wheel – this facilitates “drive on sight” operation; and
- moving to a dispatch-based signalling control where instructions to proceed are given to the driver over mobile phone or the GSM-R network. This would greatly reduce, but not eliminate, the need for lineside equipment. It would also enable control to be centrally located and would remove the need for manned signal boxes, which control only a small geographical area.
Other opportunities for lower cost infrastructure include:
• re-use and cascade of materials and equipment from main lines;
• simplify track layouts to remove redundant infrastructure; and
• remove the need for comprehensive maintenance of fence and boundary lines – it is
noteworthy that low-speed, low-frequency routes in mainland Europe are not fenced.
The use of a multi-skilled workforce covering commercial, operational and engineering needs, with salaries set by local benchmarks, would ensure that employment costs better reflected the economic circumstances of the regional railway. Part-time working would encourage a greater involvement from the local community, promote a diverse employment base and facilitate seasonal employment where this would be relevant.
People
McNulty is keen the railways should modernise their work practices and in some cases reduce staff:
The Study recommends that the industry needs to review:
- the limitations on work schedules that restrict the amount of work that can be undertaken during the working day;
- how to reduce the reliance on overtime;
- how to recognise that the railway is a seven-day operation;
- the timing, length and payment for meal and refreshment breaks;
- the amount of time required to prepare equipment for use;
- the maximum time that a person can work in a day, while recognising that there have to be objective tests as to whether fatigue will impact on effectiveness and safety;
- the time that staff require to rest between shifts; and
- the relationship of salaries to: − regional benchmarks; and − comparable jobs in other transport modes and other industries.
Study recommends: DOO as standard, closing Cat E station ticket offices and reducing the hours of D, more ticket barriers, more use of technology (smart cards and E tickets), reducing station dispatch staff (67% of passengers are dispatched without station staff).
There is an opportunity for a fundamental review of training techniques and the time needed to train specific work groups. The reduction in training time will have some financial benefit, but the true benefit of effective training is a better equipped, more flexible and productive workforce. A “new approach to the rule book” is being developed by the industry, and the benefits from a competence-based approach will simplify rules learning and reduce training time. The Study considers that current trends in training point in the direction of a move to college-based training of key industry skills, resulting in the award of a competence licence. This would increase the mobility of staff and encourage competition in training provision.
Implementation
Quarter 3, 2011
Determine the priorities in each area of change, including:
• the routes on which DOO could be introduced;
• the ticket offices that could be closed or where opening times could be reduced;
• the terms of employment that ought to be amended;
• the salaries and terms of employment for new starters; and
• the organisation changes needed to reduce overheads and administrative costs.
Quarter 4, 2011, to Quarter 1, 2012
Commence the consultation and negotiation process:
• with the trade unions on a company by company basis;
• with statutory consultees to advise of changes; and
• with contracting parties to change contractual terms and create more freedom for action.
Quarter 4, 2011, to Quarter 4, 2012
Undertake enabling work to permit changes to be made, including:
• equipping stations with cameras, mirrors and lighting to accept DOO services;
• modifying rolling stock to enable DOO;
• installing additional TVMs;
• training staff in DOO and other new methods of operation; and
• obtaining the relevant approvals to commence new methods of operation.
Quarter 1, 2013, to Quarter 4, 2013
Start to implement change:
• new DOO services introduced;
• ticket office closures and reduced opening hours;
• new terms of employment introduced; and
• new organisational structures or organisation mergers put in place.
In parallel to these initiatives, the changes proposed in the planning and allocation of work,
implementing efficiencies in the BTP, and the introduction of new approaches to training and
development should be implemented.
Nationalistaion
McNulty says: Given the cost reductions seen in other sectors from privatisation, it seems unlikely that renationalisation would lead to a reduction in costs. As argued elsewhere in this report, it is the extensive involvement of Government that has, to some extent, prevented the cost reductions seen elsewhere. Furthermore, where Government has taken control of aspects of the rail system, costs have tended to increase rather than decline.
As private firms aim to increase profits, it is argued by some stakeholders that this drains the rail industry of investment as dividends are paid to shareholders rather than being reinvested into the industry. Therefore, this argument suggests that the subsidies paid for the service are higher than necessary to cover its costs to allow companies to make a profit. However, this argument assumes that the cost of services would be the same if they were provided by a public- or private-sector company. Private companies should be incentivised to reduce costs to create a profit and it seems likely that the Government would need to pay the same, if not more, for these services due to inefficiency in a nationalised industry. This appears to be supported by the Study’s international benchmarking of TOC costs and evidence from other sectors.
Furthermore, the scale of TOC and Rolling Stock Company (ROSCO) profits is relatively small in relation to the overall costs of the industry. In 2009/10 combined profits of TOCs and ROSCOs were around £400m, which was around 3% of total industry expenditure.
Renationalising under a single body could in theory provide benefits in terms of economies of scale and scope, ensuring co-ordination, removing duplication and harmonising terms and conditions. However, there could also be significant drawbacks in terms of:
-even with one national organisation there is likely to be a need to develop disaggregated business units within this structure for management to be effective, reducing the potential saving in interface costs;
- budgetary certainty is likely to decrease as NR is unlikely to benefit from the security of funding currently provided by the High Level Output Specification (HLOS) and periodic review process;
- renationalisation would require the Government to incur huge costs from buying the industry and all its assets back from private firms;
- the Government would inherit the debts of the rail industry, with NR’s debts back on the Government’s balance sheet; and
- EU legislation is unlikely to allow the transfer of assets into a single (nationalised) public body, as separation will still be needed between train operations and timetabling, reducing some of the potential advantages
I skim-read those sections. Can anyone provide a pointer?
Thanks for the reminder though.
