GW Modernisation Project - the mistakes and the future?'

[Wilts Wanderer]

There will be very little commercial sense in routing any passenger services on a line that avoids Reading. As a connectional hub outside of London, it's now second only to Birmingham New Street.

 

[edwin_m]

Set to become even more important with the proposed Heathrow western link.

 

[HowardGWR]

There will be very little commercial sense in routing any passenger services on a line that avoids Reading. As a connectional hub outside of London, it's now second only to Birmingham New Street.

I know what you mean but that isn't by itself correct. London to Glasgow trains don't typically go via New St and the new IEP non-stop services to Paddington from Bristol won't stop at Reading. Whether a service should stop at a particular station is not due to the existence of a bypass, but indeed the commercial need you stress. Some services to Somerset (Taunton) and west of there to Devon go from Paddington via Bristol.

The earlier poster who opined that all XC trains should stop at Reading because half terminate there already, does not make any sense (by itself as a factor) to me, at all.

 

[coppercapped]

I know what you mean but that isn't by itself correct. London to Glasgow trains don't typically go via New St and the new IEP non-stop services to Paddington from Bristol won't stop at Reading. Whether a service should stop at a particular station is not due to the existence of a bypass, but indeed the commercial need you stress. Some services to Somerset (Taunton) and west of there to Devon go from Paddington via Bristol.

The earlier poster who opined that all XC trains should stop at Reading because half terminate there already, does not make any sense (by itself as a factor) to me, at all.

I don't think I entirely follow your argument. That a particular station functions as a connectional hub doesn't by any means imply that all trains should stop at it. It is sufficient that enough trains stop that the place is made attractive for use as a hub.

The point that should be made about trains from Oxford and points north being routed via a re-instated DN&S to the south coast rather than via Reading and Basingstoke is that such a routing only becomes attractive for the train operator if it makes more money than the alternative. In this case the increase in passenger numbers and the, possibly, lower operating cost of a slightly shorter route to Winchester and points south has to be in excess of the loss in fares of those wanting to reach Reading or Basingstoke or other places by connections at these stations.

There might also be an argument that the paths freed between Didcot and Reading could be better used for more highly rated traffic but that gets complicated by which organisation should capture the benefit.

 

[Elecman]

One train an hour Euston to Scotland does go via Birmingham, the other of course goes straight up the Trent valley

 

[tbtc]

To answer the original topic... I don't know. It's certainly a good and timely idea for a thread, but I’m not sure about an answer.

At the moment we are all complaining about thing being “gold plated”, but then people like to complain about other projects being built “on a shoestring” (since enthusiasts like to pigeon hole things in those two extremes).

For example, according to some posters on here, the Borders Line should have been fully double tracked, the Ebbw Vale branch should have been built straight through to central Ebbw Vale from day one, every new line should have been electrified, all 800/801s should be built ten coaches long, everything should be fully specced at the start (however expensive that would make it, even if it would ruin the business case).

So, whilst I appreciate the problems of increasing costs, I can at least understand why someone decided to try to "future-proof" the GWML. If we accept that lines only get properly upgraded every thirty/ fifty years then maybe it's understandable to try to build a GWML fit for the 2050s (even if there's no 140mph running etc required any time soon).

I'm not sure that there is any financial argument for electrifying the three Thames Valley branches. They are not very long, speeds are low and the trains are short.

And what, exactly, is the problem with 'diesel islands'? We are not talking Modernisation Plan diesels here. There are three short, effectively self-contained, branches in the Thames Valley. At 45/50mph maximum speed the trains won't wear out quickly so check the brake pads once a month and send a fuel bowser round to each of them once a week. Oh, and somebody to sweep up and clean the windows every night.

Don't over-complicate things.

Sounds like a job for D-stock in that case (if the token daily services to Paddington are withdrawn, as poor use of scarce GWML paths that could easily be filled by a two hundred metre Reading service?

Short, self contained branchlines, low top speed, no need to get up to main line speed, minimal maintenance…

What the débâcle has really shown is that (a) the requirements specification has to be fixed before one starts and (b) it should not be changed once work has started. This requires a project manager who can say NO.

But all this is well known in those companies that make things...

...I suppose civil servants don't make things.

True – the best point on the thread thus far.

One of the biggest weaknesses with the 800s is that they have become “camels” due to the changing specification requirements. There’s a lot of good in there, but a lot of compromise too. If we had come up with a great specification in the first place we could have had good trains in service already (rather than paying more for “great” trains that aren’t running yet, because designers have had to find room for lots of metaphorical bells and whistles).

Same goes for the electrification specifications, the decision on Crossrail coming to Reading, clearances, methods of getting the kit up etc.

But I don’t know how you’d get a major political project (that can’t neatly be completed within one parliament) funded/ designed/ built without elements of it being watered down, scope changing, different safety requirements etc.

Are there any “railway men” (to use that beloved phrase) capable of standing up to more than one Government, keeping a lid on costs, refusing to extend the scope beyond the initial brief etc?

I’m really not sure what the answer is here. Railways are so politicised that you couldn’t run such a big project without elected representatives sticking their noses in, trimming budgets, trying to extend the scope, throwing in other requirements, worrying about political pressure from angry groups like the Goring Gap folks.

**

As for the idea of avoiding Reading... I'm far from convinced.

There seems to be an obsession of some enthusiasts to try to build lines/ run services that avoid the biggest intermediate places. Carmarthen to Cardiff without actually serving central Swansea. Ayrshire to Edinburgh without actually serving central Glasgow.

I don't think that there's enough freight from Southampton/ south coast to the Midlands/ beyond to warrant a separate line.

I don't think that there'd be enough passengers to justify many trains.

If you accept that the paths through New Street are limited, I don't think we should be reducing the current half hourly Reading - Birmingham services (to accommodate some "direct to the south coast" services).

Whilst the current service isn't always competitive on time for long distance journeys from the south coast to the midlands/ beyond (compared to taking a fast train to Waterloo and changing for the ECML/ WCML or flying from Southampton up to Edinburgh etc), I don't think that avoiding Reading would speed the journey up by enough to make it competitive.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

As for the idea of avoiding Reading... I'm far from convinced.
There seems to be an obsession of some enthusiasts to try to build lines/ run services that avoid the biggest intermediate places. Carmarthen to Cardiff without actually serving central Swansea. Ayrshire to Edinburgh without actually serving central Glasgow.

And yet East West Rail, promoted by DfT, is a scheme for a new line to reach Oxford and points south, bypassing Birmingham and other big places.
I have my doubts about that business case too.

 

[455driver]

One train an hour Euston to Scotland does go via Birmingham, the other of course goes straight up the Trent valley

That is simply 2 services joined together, Euston to Wolverhampton and Birmingham to Scotland, hence the long dwell times at a couple of stations.

 

[edwin_m]

And yet East West Rail, promoted by DfT, is a scheme for a new line to reach Oxford and points south, bypassing Birmingham and other big places.
I have my doubts about that business case too.

East West Rail is to link a string of places across the south Midlands. If it diverted through Birmingham it would be far too indirect to provide that link, as well as just duplicating other services. It would probably also miss Milton Keynes entirely, which is one of the most important objectives (but unfortunately can't be served by through E-W services due to its location). Most of the places on East West Rail already have train services to and from Birmingham and for most of those that don't it will provide better connections. Extensive study of this route has demonstrated a business case good enough for Government to approve part of it and be strongly minded to approve the rest.

By contrast, the XC route from Birmingham to the south coast runs every hour and a stop at Reading serves a city of over 150000 with good onward connections to a highly-populated area to the east. Missing Reading would also miss Basingstoke (87000) with another set of connections. Some of these could be made similarly at Oxford or Didcot instead but most would be far slower, with only Newbury (31000) to compensate. Unless the DN&S was re-built as a 100mph+ railway journey times would be not much quicker.

 

[HowardGWR]

Nobody was arguing for missing Reading, full stop. Nobody argued for a new DN&S either. It was merely pointed out that the need for a GSJ at Didcot and down the road, possibly more tracks between there and Reading, originates in the shrinking of the railway in the 60s and the subsequent squeezing of a quart into a pint pot. That quart may become 5 pints in future.

That was all. It's about future capacity.

There are lots of strong local campaigns for new stations on the GW: Wantage, Steventon, Corsham, Saltford, Somerton, Langport, Wellington, Cullompton - to name but a few.

Down the road, I wonder whether the land near some of these stretches needs to be protected from development, to give space for passing loops, etc. We've covered the coast line in South Devon extensively on this forum, but, apart from weather influences, it's capacity that threatens this stretch too.

 

[coppercapped]

Nobody was arguing for missing Reading, full stop. Nobody argued for a new DN&S either. It was merely pointed out that the need for a GSJ at Didcot and down the road, possibly more tracks between there and Reading, originates in the shrinking of the railway in the 60s and the subsequent squeezing of a quart into a pint pot. That quart may become 5 pints in future.

That was all. It's about future capacity.

There are lots of strong local campaigns for new stations on the GW: Wantage, Steventon, Corsham, Saltford, Somerton, Langport, Wellington, Cullompton - to name but a few.

Down the road, I wonder whether the land near some of these stretches needs to be protected from development, to give space for passing loops, etc. We've covered the coast line in South Devon extensively on this forum, but, apart from weather influences, it's capacity that threatens this stretch too.

I accept your general point about the shrinking railway of the 1960s - but interestingly this stretch was never really shrunk. There were a couple of minor exceptions - the passing loops on the Didcot avoiding line were removed (but it is possible these only dated from the Second World War), the set of crossings at Pangbourne were lifted and some other small stuff but on the other hand capacity was added with the multiple aspect re-signalling in the 1960s. Bit of a mixed bag really!

My point is that delays on this stretch will be increased by the additional trains running on the Swindon route meaning that trains diverging or joining at Didcot East and Didcot East Junction - and indeed trains running through - are less likely to get a free run. There is capacity of both the Mains and Reliefs between Didcot East and Reading for more trains - the bottlenecks will be the places where trains join or leave these lines. This is the nub of my argument for a grade separated junction at Didcot, (most of) the Reading end has been done already.

 

[snowball]

Not sure what thread to put this in, as it's relevant to a number of discussions that have taken place on this site. It's a quote from Roger Ford's email preview of his column in the next issue of Modern Railways:

As is now generally acknowledged, the poor reputation for reliability of the East Coast Main Line electrification was in large part down to neglect. Only in the past decade has the British Rail Mk3a and Mk3b Overhead Line Equipment received the maintenance required for reliable operation.

 

[Taunton]

It was merely pointed out that the need for a GSJ at Didcot and down the road, possibly more tracks between there and Reading, originates in the shrinking of the railway in the 60s and the subsequent squeezing of a quart into a pint pot. That quart may become 5 pints in future.

What shrinking railway of the 60s/70s ?

New long-distance stock every few years - Mk 2, then Mk 2 aircon, Then HST. Complete CWR installation and ironing out speed restrictions. That investment cost money. Nowadays "investment" means squeezing up the seats. In fact it's in the recent decades that things have stood still. Increased frequencies, hourly-plus to South Wales, etc. Bristol Parkway station. Faster and faster each timetable - that doesn't happen any more. Freightliners to Southampton came along. The Somerset quarries expanded their rail loadings to London hugely.

I agree about the 5 pints into a pint pot, but this will be worst nearer Paddington. There are so many professional opinions that Crossrail will be swamped pretty much from the go, and the demands for increased service on the Reliefs will come from the start, both to Heathrow and Thames Valley. But there are ponderous freights as well (does this route have the heaviest tonnage into London?), already overloaded 125mph Inter-City services, and emus for Oxford etc services on the Mains specified at just 110mph, which would never have been allowed by a joined-up management. I can see the Mains timetable being optimised down to 110mph between Paddington and Reading.

 

[jayah]

Why don't we start by the SoS for Transport hiring a consultant - not obscene pay - say 500 pounds per hour (he may accept less) The services of an engineer who really knows what he is talking about - Roger Ford.

Wasn't it he going round telling us it could all be done for £500k per single track km?

The problem with GWEP is it was a daft concept that never paid for itself. The cost side had to be a work of fiction, ably assisted by snake oil salesmen peddling revolutionary yet unproven technology.

The lesson is don't bend the facts to build the Project you want - do it the other way around.

It is equally true of HS2 and these ludicrous value of time saved calculations. It is nonsense. Try charging the users £60/hr to save time and you will soon find out how bogus it all is.

Has anyone started the HS2 lessons learned thread?

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Wasn't it he going round telling us it could all be done for £500k per single track km?

That was Network Rail's figure in the 2009 electrification RUS.
(Actually £560K per stkm, but with "scope to improve" with factory methods).

 

[HowardGWR]

I agree that the original estimate for GWEP must have been concocted on the back of a fag packet. However, I see the dichotomy as follows:

If a real estimate for electrification means that the BCR becomes unattractive, then it has to be wondered if any project would be given approval. This then raises the question why other countries are continuing with these projects and expansion and modernisation generally, and we couldn't?

It seems to me that the root of this problem is the disadvantages that British railways have over others and the main factor of this is the loading gauge. Another factor appears to be 'Theme Park Britain' issues. It would be interesting to know what the GWEP costs would have been if the costs of these issues were deducted. These costs would have to include the knock-on effect of continuing planning argy bargy, such as the Steventon example.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

I passed some massive OHL masts today near West Drayton.
They needed 4 piles each to support them.
The masts were those needing a supporting anchor.
On older lines, the anchor is a wire, but on GW it is a large fixed rod.
Both mast and anchor were set on separate metal platforms, each needing 2 piles for support, so 4 all told.
It looks massively over-engineered.
Just saying...

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

I passed some massive OHL masts today near West Drayton.
They needed 4 piles each to support them.
The masts were those needing a supporting anchor.
On older lines, the anchor is a wire, but on GW it is a large fixed rod.
Both mast and anchor were set on separate metal platforms, each needing 2 piles for support, so 4 all told.
It looks massively over-engineered.
Just saying...

To my mind that is the consequence of going for a 140mph-capable catenary with a MASSIVE wire tension factor. At least it'll last!

 

[modernrail]

A quick question on this point if I may. Has the 140mph capable or in fact any speed equipment been ordered for stretches where the track speed can never realistically be upgraded to allow such speeds? If so, are we talking big stretches? To my mind, such a move would undoubtedly involve the incurring of costs that potentially could and should have been avoided. The follow on question is whether some of the postponed sections could be subject to the same over-specification in the original plan?

 

[swt_passenger]

A quick question on this point if I may. Has the 140mph capable or in fact any speed equipment been ordered for stretches where the track speed can never realistically be upgraded to allow such speeds? If so, are we talking big stretches? To my mind, such a move would undoubtedly involve the incurring of costs that potentially could and should have been avoided. The follow on question is whether some of the postponed sections could be subject to the same over-specification in the original plan?

When this question came up a few months ago there was no satisfactory answer as to whether the entire installation was 140 mph capable as installed, or not. I'd be surprised if it gets a firm answer now.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

A quick question on this point if I may. Has the 140mph capable or in fact any speed equipment been ordered for stretches where the track speed can never realistically be upgraded to allow such speeds? If so, are we talking big stretches? To my mind, such a move would undoubtedly involve the incurring of costs that potentially could and should have been avoided. The follow on question is whether some of the postponed sections could be subject to the same over-specification in the original plan?

As far as I can see, Series 1 equipment is being installed everywhere on the GW network, including lines limited to 100mph.
I don't know if Series 1 is inherently 140mph capable, or just a frame for possibly lower-spec kit where appropriate.
But the heavy-duty piles and masts seem to be universal west of Airport Jn, even on 2-track routes.
Philip Phlopp referred to a "master series" of designs which would cover all future electrification, but I've no idea where Network Rail are on its implementation.
MML was supposed to be an evolution of the GW design.

 

[modernrail]

They might be better with a revolution in this case.

 

[Pilning]

Although lacking in detail, the Public Accounts Committee report on the GWML electrification does highlight the fact that this project is a total disaster thanks to the utter incompetence of Network Rail. Some of the snippets of information, such as not using appropriate planning powers, beggar belief and would be quite amusing if it were not for the fact that the taxpayer is left to pick up the bill. Even more astonishing is the fact thatt Network Rail now say that electrification doesn't actually make much difference anyway, so perhaps instead they could have spent the cash on doing something more useful such as reopening much needed commuter lines around Bristol?
I'm sure that most Bristol to London travellers will be perfectly happy with new trains to replace the 40 year old HSTs with blocked up toilets and bits falling off and I doubt if they care much whether they are powered by diesel, clockwork or electricity.
As with most nationalised industries, I note that in spite of the damning report, responsible Network Rail bosses remain in situ due to lack of accountability.

 

[Dai Corner]

Join Date: 20 Jul 2015
Posts: 187
Default
The Public Accounts Committee is now online at https://www.publications.parliament..../776/77602.htm

The summary is as follows:

We reported in November 2015 on the staggering and unacceptable increase in the estimated costs of the Great Western Main Line electrification programme which rose by £1.2 billion in the space of a year. The extent of the serious failings in the Department for Transport’s (the Department’s) and Network Rail’s management of the Great Western modernisation programme which led to these cost overruns and a delay to completion of up to three years are now clearer. Both the Department and Network Rail accept that there were significant failings in the design, planning and cost-estimating of the programme. The case for electrification and new trains were seen as two linked programmes, rather than being managed as a whole and the accountability arrangements put in place were overly complex and failed to provide the assurance the Department needed to be an effective client of Network Rail. The serious management failings evident in this programme raise concerns about the Department and Network Rail’s ability to manage similar projects in the future, such as the planned electrification schemes on Midland Main Line and TransPennine routes. The Department’s claim that many of the passenger benefits of electrification can be obtained without electrifying the whole route raises questions about whether full electrification is the most appropriate way to achieve benefits for passengers, and value for money for taxpayers. But whilst the Department is taking this optimistic view this cannot detract from the £330m additional costs that the delays to electrification will incur.

Ouch! The Committee pulled no punches and don't appear to support the Dft's view that 'yeah, it did turn out more expensive than anyone thought and we're years behind but it's ok as passengers won't care the last few miles are on diesel power'

The report will probably be cited every time railway investment is proposed but it should be remembered that it's by no means the only Government project to be wildly over budget and only partially deliver.

 

[coppercapped]

Thanks for the welcome near neighbour. Yes of course I agree it's a bit if a rant but the previous 4,570 posts were almost all made prior to the publication of the PAC report, so I think that a comment highlighting the new information regarding mismanagement is well justified.

I would point out that the National Audit Office published a report on 9 November 2016 "Modernising the Great Western railway" (HC 781 Session 2016-17) which covered much the same ground. Not much of the PAC's report is really new.

 

[HowardGWR]

deleted

 

[Olaf]

I would point out that the National Audit Office published a report on 9 November 2016 "Modernising the Great Western railway" (HC 781 Session 2016-17) which covered much the same ground. Not much of the PAC's report is really new.

Yes, the NAO does the foot work, and produces reports that find their way to the Public Accounts Committee formed of MPs. So unless they have any additional findings from other sources, they will be on the same page, but they are elected officials that hold the Government to account.

 

[HowardGWR]

Yes, the NAO does the foot work, and produces reports that find their way to the Public Accounts Committee formed of MPs. So unless they have any additional findings from other sources, they will be on the same page, but they are elected officials that hold the Government to account.

Indeed. I don't like one aspect of the Select Committee system, which is the tendency for backbenchers, or indeed witnesses, to try and get their moment of glory, as they know that is the way to get on the box for the 6 o'clock news.

Still, I am glad that the late Norman St John-Stevas brought in the SCs. They have been useful in the rail scrutiny area. I think the problem with their reports, is that they don't themselves have to act on any recommendation and prove they were right. In this case their report could be used as an excuse to chicken out of further electrification and we need the latter, at least to have an opportunity to get away from fossil fuels. Arguing about BCRs deflects from that higher goal IMO.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Yes, the NAO does the foot work, and produces reports that find their way to the Public Accounts Committee formed of MPs. So unless they have any additional findings from other sources, they will be on the same page, but they are elected officials that hold the Government to account.

The PAC and other committees also get to interview the scapegoats in public, which can be revealing, although they rarely get to the bottom of the real issues in debates.
In the recent series of inquisitions, I thought NR came off quite well.
It was the DfT made to look incompetent (which is of course what the PAC likes to do).
But it is remarkable that there has not been a high-level casualty of the fiasco, bar the invisible NR Chairman (before Peter Hendy).

 

[dviner]

The report will probably be cited every time railway investment is proposed but it should be remembered that it's by no means the only Government project to be wildly over budget and only partially deliver.

I'm thinking that it wouldn't be too far from the truth that the list of Government projects that didn't go wildly over budget would be very short.