GW Modernisation Project - the mistakes and the future?'

[LNW-GW Joint]

This may not be the right thread, but I have just caught up with More GOBLin closures as wires delayedin the current Modern Railways. This is another indictment of Network Rail's competence regarding electrification:-
Now that electrification is back under way, it is to say the least depressing that it is not being delivered effectively.:cry::cry::cry:

All delays are regrettable, but it is more understandable in this case as it must be a very complex scheme on a per-mile basis.
It is also well on the way to completion, unlike the MML and TP schemes.
And it doesn't look like it will impact the start date of EMU operation.

 

[QueensCurve]

Ouch! The Committee pulled no punches and don't appear to support the Dft's view that 'yeah, it did turn out more expensive than anyone thought and we're years behind but it's ok as passengers won't care the last few miles are on diesel power'

They seem to be saying that DaFT is not an "intellegent customer" for Network Rail Projects. Damming indeed.

 

[QueensCurve]

Do they really have to be that massive? They look really big compared to other high speed lines.

The LGV Est européenne, with a maximum speed of 320 km/h:

This is what I can't understand. Other railway administrations seem to be capable of providing lightweight, affordable OHLE for very high speeds and make it reliable. Whey can't we be a bit more European - at least so far as electrification is concerned?

 

[QueensCurve]

A political lack of understanding of the costs involved.

I imagine the whole life costs of Series 1 and 2 will be significantly less than the Mark III design installed on the ECML once the number of de-wirements and un-planned renewals are taken into account but todays politicans cannot see this, being a here today and gone tomorrow type of character.

And we hope that the reduction in dewirements is delivered by the equipment in service.

 

[coppercapped]

This is what I can't understand. Other railway administrations seem to be capable of providing lightweight, affordable OHLE for very high speeds and make it reliable. Whey can't we be a bit more European - at least so far as electrification is concerned?

Four comments, as I understand the situation:

1. the electrical systems you see on the continent are (mostly) built to the then valid national standards and pre-date the introduction of the new European Technical Standards for Interoperability (TSI)
2. the TSIs require separations from the live overhead to (a) structures and (b) people on platforms which cannot easily be achieved with the constrained UK structure gauges. This size limitation does not exist to the same extent on the continent.
3. the DfT set requirements for multiple pantograph operation which were in excess of operations sometimes seen on the continent
4. The designers of the NR system wanted above all to avoid the incidence of dewirements seen over the last few years on the East Coast.

I have in the past been involved in the European standardisation processes via ETSI, the European Telecommunications Standardisation Institute, but my knowledge is not by any means complete. The main point of the standardisation process is to permit the single market to function in the trade of manufactured goods and to an increasing extent, services. However I am reasonably sure that the European standards and specification processes allow a country to not apply the standard or specification if it will be economically damaged especially if the thing concerned is not traded. It simply requires the countries representatives to make the correct approach.

The open question is which UK body was, or bodies were, represented on these standardisation committees (NR, DfT, ORR, the construction industry or the Department of Trade and Industry or whatever) and why did they they not clearly state that the separations required were economically damaging?

The point is - the standards as adopted by British law do make us 'more European'. Just 50 years too late!

 

[coppercapped]

Perhaps it is a little unfair to lay the blame with Gordon Brown.

Looking at the historical context, British Rail was constrained by the External Finance Limit which prevented borrowing in the markets to fund infrastructure enhancement. BR were forbidden from making infrastructure investments without the Government's permission. This frustrated electrification and other enhancements that might have been welcome.

The use of borrowing against the regulatory Asset Base by NR provided a method - albeit one described as "unsustainable" for funding investment in the infrastructure. During this period a number of substantial improvements were completed.

Now NR's debt is back in the Public Sector Borrowing requirement there is already the dead hand of the treasury putting the brakes on improvement.

Obviously it wasn't Gordon Brown alone, but he created the structure that made the loss of financial control possible.

In order to get Railtrack out of 'railway administration' into which it had been forced by Stephen Byers, the company needed more money. An 'interim review' was carried out by the Rail Regulator, Tom Winsor, in 2002 which awarded the company, IIRC, some £4 billion extra for the remaining part of the Control Period. The Treasury had not budgeted for such large sums and so the decision was made to permit Railtrack/Network Rail to borrow these sums on the open market.

Note that in the immediate aftermath of Hatfield little of the money was spent on enhancements, it was spent on renewals, replacements and general operations. Only later, as the new management started to get a grip on day to day expenditure - bringing track maintenance back 'in-house' for example - was the shift to enhancement spending noticeable.

And this is where the construct of the 'Regulated Asset Base' became pernicious - it meant that enhancement spending did not need to be very carefully planned as all parties turned a blind eye to cost overruns because it was expedient to do so. It meant that the DfT got its HLOS wish list fulfilled and so could claim success, NR could claim that it was delivering all these improvements and the ORR could claim it was successfully monitoring NR's finances - but the debt mountain continued to rise and the proportion of the Network Grant received from the Government which went to service the debt continued to increase. Long term the situation was untenable.

It is not a question of 'the dead hand of the Treasury' so beloved of railway enthusiasts being a problem but of Network Rail not, in the past, properly planning and controlling its expenditure on enhancements. BR's experience is not relevant to the current situation.

 

[4973]

And we hope that the reduction in dewirements is delivered by the equipment in service.

There is also the reduction in TSRs imposed to reduce the risk of dewirement. Probably a much more common situation although rarely mentioned and quite a large cause of delay minutes itself.