You have mentioned route maps.
I would expect the logic is that if the theatre box always illuminated then expectation bias would lead to the content being overlooked on occasion.
It allows a theatre indicator to be used in situations where the permissible speed on the fastest route exceeds the speed at which a theatre indicator is deemed to be readable.
A junction indicator is considered to be readable at 800 metres, so the junction signalling would have been designed on that basis. Stepping up the aspect as soon as the junction indicator and main aspect are both visible and readable is desirable so that a driver who's become used to seeing the signal clear as their train approaches it has more opportunity to stop without SPAD-ing if it doesn't.
It does indeed. 50mph. There's also a route to platform 1 via the 15mph crossover out onto the Up Fast then back across through Lumo's crossovers, and you *do* get a "1" in the indicator for that move.
As the report mentions somewhere (only had chance to skim read most of it), part of the problem here is the combined distance from release point to signal, and signal to turnout. Current standards provide stipulations for both of those separately but don't, so far as I am aware, consider the combination.
How reasonable is it to spend significant money on mitigating this issue when in about five or six years this problem will disappear for good though?
It's interesting because there aren't such luggage limits on Hull Trains or LNER, whose onboard luggage stowage is very very similar to Lumo's i.e. there's not much other than overheard but lots of space overhead. Grand Central's overhead space is much smaller but it's still true there's lots of space there and little space elsewhere.
I think that in general the driver wouldn't be able to look at a book or tablet while their train is moving anyway.
Oh yeah, that'll be great comfort to people if a train does overturn there in the interim. "Yeah we knew that was a risk but nah mate we thought we'd just leave it for a few years. Soz."
Is GPS precise enough to detect which line a train is on when the lines are a couple of metres apart?
It's good enough to lockout doors on platforms (mostly) .
The signalling system doesn't have the ability to control train speed, that's one of the reasons this incident occurred. It only has the ability to check train speed has not exceeded a certain value at certain locations.
If it doesn't already have the ability to do it, then it has the potential to do it with additional TPWS or ATP/ATO etc. That's why I wrote "capability or potential".
It absolutely isn't. GPS is useless for knowing if a train has stopped short on a platform. It's fine for knowing what station you're at but it won't enable ASDO to lock out unplatformed doors based on how the train stops.
That's how it works currently. The junction indicator has to be proved lit before the signal will clear, causing a delay of a second or two.
How would it know which route the train was going to take? It would have to be linked to the signalling system to get that information. Suitable mitigation could probably be had using TPWS, avoiding all the development and safety case issues and costs of interfacing to 'something new', there's also the cost of fitting whatever you need to the rolling stock.
Well its not as if a solution can instantly poof into existance tomorrow.
There are far cheaper mitigations for this than designing some sort of bespoke signalling solution though.
Well given that ETCS has been widely deployed in similar situations elsewhere, if it can't be done it will be more the fault of the railway industry than the standard.
There isn't any "just" about this. The TD feed from sigbalboxes to sites like traksy is wildly off levels of reliability that you could use for safety. Adapting that to exchange data via WiFi would add a whole new layer of complexity and failure.
Aircraft pilots are also expected to be able to take their vehicle off the planned route with little-to-no notice, and be able to safely get back on the land even with zero outside communication.
A lot of effort has gone into understanding human factors and how they apply to drivers, guards etc. with the result that NTS are now very much integrated into training and assessment. But there hasn't been as much progress in ensuring that designers of signalling, trains etc. understand human factors and how design, done well, can mitigate the risk of human error, and done badly can increase it. So it's good to see that someone gets it - thank you.
That's what ETCS is for, albeit using balises for position data not GPS. It would be better to concentrate on expanding the use of ETCS across the network, rather than coming up with another new technology.
