SPAD at Loughborough, 20/3/2020

[O L Leigh]

According to RAIB the driver applied the brakes before the signal, so it would appear TPWS isn't particularly relevant to this accident. I mentioned it because it's normally effective in mitigating a high proportion of SPADs, but isn't much use if the train doesn't have enough brake force to stop within the required distance from the speed it was travelling.

Granted. My point was simply that TPWS enforces a stop.

As to your other points, these will all be explored by the RAIB and will be reported on. I will just mention that, although 200m is a decent overrun and quite probably well beyond the overlap and blocking point of the signal, it is still a very long way short of Loughborough South Junction. The chances of a head-on collision with the passenger train at Loughborough station was minimal.

 

[Taunton]

Indeed, I'd also call into question the available brake force should one of the locos find its self detached on the move (rare but splits do happen) and whether simply top and tailing an unbraked unit with a single loco either end is sufficient on safety grounds.

For many years up to the 1980s the Wirral emus (air brake) were taken from Birkenhead North depot round through Helsby to Horwich works for regular overhauls by a Class 24 (vacuum brake only) as an unbraked movement. Just 4 braked axles, not 12 as here. Match wagons (unbraked) both ends and a traditional guards van with a handbrake at the back.

 

[norbitonflyer]

There was another incident at East Didsbury in 2006 in which an AFT cock was not opened. This, together with a coupling failure on the adjacent wagon, resulted in a Class 66 running away through an engineering possession.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/547c904640f0b6024400019d/R132007_070524_East_Didsbury.pdf

 

[MotCO]

Granted. My point was simply that TPWS enforces a stop.

I will just mention that, although 200m is a decent overrun and quite probably well beyond the overlap and blocking point of the signal, it is still a very long way short of Loughborough South Junction. The chances of a head-on collision with the passenger train at Loughborough station was minimal.

I don't know thia area at all, but was the signal which was SPADed protecting a junction / points etc, or was it just a 'routine' signal? (Apologies for use of non-technical jargon; I'm not on the railways.) If a 'routine' signal was SPADed, then presumably this is less serious in consequences than a signal protecting a junction, although I acknowledge that any SPAD is serious.

 

[MarkyT]

I don't know thia area at all, but was the signal which was SPADed protecting a junction / points etc, or was it just a 'routine' signal? (Apologies for use of non-technical jargon; I'm not on the railways.) If a 'routine' signal was SPADed, then presumably this is less serious in consequences than a signal protecting a junction, although I acknowledge that any SPAD is serious.

From this photo, 507 is the down slow signal protecting junctions at the south of the station.

DSC05742 | Signalling Photos

DSC05742 - DSC05742.JPG

photos.signalling.org

Measured on Google Earth, the signal is around 740m from the conflict point of the trailing crossover that would have used by the other up train to cross to the up slow.

 

[greyman42]

If you google “Stafford SPAD” and read the official RAIB report all will be revealed.

So where does "eyes down for a full line" come into it?

 

[Efini92]

A loco can be braked off an external air supply without having to have the engine running. This may require certain valves to be changed from their normal settings - I don't know the specific case of a 57 but a few years ago it wasn't done correctly on a 66 and after a coupling broke it was rolling around south Manchester unbraked for some time (search RAIB for East Didsbury). No doubt RAIB will be looking into whether the rear loco was unbraked (in fact they should know this already) and if so why.

Luckily in that instance the railway was in a dip and it was the other line that had the possession on. The dead 66 rolled backwards and forwards a few times. IIRC the pway tried throwing sleepers under the wheels to stop it.

 

[pompeyfan]

So where does "eyes down for a full line" come into it?

Full route card?

 

[MarkyT]

The AFT valve scenario would be insidious. With residual air still in the dead loco's reservoir, brakes would continue to apply as expected early in the journey. An initial test could feel quite normal, but each time the brakes were applied then released, the reserve would be depleted a little more, until eventually, it was completely exhausted, when the engine would become an unbraked dead weight added to the formation. With the valve operated correctly, the dead loco should behave in exactly the same way as any single pipe wagon so the triple valve directs air to recharge the reservoir when above a set pressure, ready to apply the brake when pipe pressure drops below another lower set value.

Brakes | The Railway Technical Website | PRC Rail Consulting Ltd

www.railway-technical.com

 

[GB]

You won't find AFT cocks in 66's anymore (at least not changeable ones). They were made redundant when modifications were made to the brake pipe pressure control unit (E70). Now if the "E70" is not isolated on a DIT 66 you are not able to create the brake pipe.

 

[MarkyT]

You won't find AFT cocks in 66's anymore (at least not changeable ones). They were made redundant when modifications were made to the brake pipe pressure control unit (E70). Now if the "E70" is not isolated on a DIT 66 you are not able to create the brake pipe.

That's good news, and important, considering how many engineering trains run around top and tailed.

 

[bramling]

Could someone translate this into plain English, or would that be breaking some rules/law?

I presume he's implying that it's challenging for companies like ROG to maintain intimate route knowledge of wide areas.

Passenger TOCs have the advantage that drivers tend to work over the same routes on a regular basis, although even there people can go rusty with rare moves or shunts and the like.

 

[Ashley Hill]

Passenger TOCs have the advantage that drivers tend to work over the same routes on a regular basis, although even there people can go rusty with rare moves or shunts and the like.

There's a lot of truth in this as route learning ain't what it used to be. For example drivers may only be expected to know through or main aspect signalling at large stations,the TOCs not expecting them to have to perform shunts of any sort away from their own depot/station.
Also I'm reminded of when Virgin operated cross country services that Preston guards worked right through to Penzance and quite frankly many of them had no idea where they were.

 

[Ashley Hill]

Also in addition to my above post,it's not unknown for Drivers route learning to involve Google maps,route learning guides and DVDs. This can all be done from the comfort of there own front room. Only a handful of trips over the route are then necessary before signing. Likewise for route refreshing.

 

[rail-god]

I dont sign the route but ive had a look at the route learning video. LR503 is on a left hand curve but there is very good sighting of LR507 from the down slow.

 

[MarkyT]

I dont sign the route but ive had a look at the route learning video. LR503 is on a left hand curve but there is very good sighting of LR507 from the down slow.

Some problem with the brake function looking highly likely then, bearing in mind the info released so far states an application was made after passing the yellow.

 

[Merle Haggard]

Looking at Open Train Times at the schedule for this train; from Melton to Sileby the point to point actual times follow the schedule ones.
The curiosity, to me, is that the train continued its journey to destination from Loughborough about an hour late, and ran in accordance with the schedule.
I'm not speculating, just looking at the facts.

 

[MarkyT]

Looking at Open Train Times at the schedule for this train; from Melton to Sileby the point to point actual times follow the schedule ones.
The curiosity, to me, is that the train continued its journey to destination from Loughborough about an hour late, and ran in accordance with the schedule.
I'm not speculating, just looking at the facts.

Suggesting the problem, whatever it was and if there was one, was found easily and rectified, and the train quickly declared safe for onward movement.

 

[ComUtoR]

bearing in mind the info released so far states an application was made after passing the yellow.

I've been thinking about that and its not exactly clear when the Driver applied the brakes. Is this 4 Aspect ? A Driver should be braking within the capabilities of their train. There has to be questions asked about requirements for running brake tests and what other factors led to the incident. Stopping a train with in degraded conditions or defective equipment, in this case brakes, is part of our competence. This isn't my area so I'm reticent to comment but the rulebook does have brake regulations that also need to be adhered to. How that affects freight, I'm unsure.

My suspicion is it will be a number of factors. Potential lack of brake force (fault, mismanagement, safety regs) speeding (for policy/rules/regs), late braking (Driver competence) My biggest fear is the train was simply out of control, similar to Stonegate. Sliding a train or just not stopping is scary and not something I'd wish on anyone.

 

[MarkyT]

Is this 4 Aspect ?

Might be 4-aspect on the fasts and 3-aspect on the slows with same signal spacing. A common arrangement on schemes of this vintage. Possible because of the difference in line speed.

 

[Merle Haggard]

Suggesting the problem, whatever it was and if there was one, was found easily and rectified, and the train quickly declared safe for onward movement.

I'm wary of being accused of speculation, but the facts reasonably lead to that conclusion.
I retired long ago, but I think I remember that a driver has to be replaced after a SPAD; I don't know whether this applies when the SPAD is not due to driver error. If the driver can continue if no fault rests with him/her then the fact that the train continued at scheduled speed and with comparatively small delay may lead to a conclusion on that count, too.

 

[Meerkat]

I'm wary of being accused of speculation, but the facts reasonably lead to that conclusion.
I retired long ago, but I think I remember that a driver has to be replaced after a SPAD; I don't know whether this applies when the SPAD is not due to driver error. If the driver can continue if no fault rests with him/her then the fact that the train continued at scheduled speed and with comparatively small delay may lead to a conclusion on that count, too.

Or there was a second driver available onboard/nearby

 

[Ashley Hill]

TOCs aren't keen on allowing drivers from other TOCs driving each other's trains. Would there have been a ROG driver nearby? If not there's probably no option but to carry on if A. The drivers fit and happy to continue or B. There's no accusations of neglect or drink/drugs.

 

[GB]

Pretty sure ROG is either based or has offices at Derby.

 

[JN114]

Drivers don’t always have to be removed from duty following a SPAD

 

[rail-god]

Its 4 Aspect on D.fast from Barrow on Soar station. 3 Aspect on D.slow

 

[Tom Quinne]

So where does "eyes down for a full line" come into it?

Bingo driver, any line or a full house.

Saldy their out there.

 

[ComUtoR]

Might be 4-aspect on the fasts and 3-aspect on the slows with same signal spacing. A common arrangement on schemes of this vintage. Possible because of the difference in line speed.

Its 4 Aspect on D.fast from Barrow on Soar station. 3 Aspect on D.slow

My thanks, its helps build a picture of what happened.

 

[Wyrleybart]

Drivers don’t always have to be removed from duty following a SPAD

Largely depends on the company's competency regime. Forget what it is known as these days but the shidft Duty Manager generally holds a copy of the driver "at risk" register. If the driver in question is on the register, this helps make an informed choice as to whether the train needs relief on site etc. For cause screening would be arranged by most TOCs / FOCs too, but at a recognised location, and based on the facts available. This could involve the driver admitting to mishandling the brakes, and not making any allegation against the traction.

 

[JN114]

Largely depends on the company's competency regime. Forget what it is known as these days but the shidft Duty Manager generally holds a copy of the driver "at risk" register. If the driver in question is on the register, this helps make an informed choice as to whether the train needs relief on site etc. For cause screening would be arranged by most TOCs / FOCs too, but at a recognised location, and based on the facts available. This could involve the driver admitting to mishandling the brakes, and not making any allegation against the traction.

Indeed, thank you for expanding my point for me.