SPAD at Loughborough, 20/3/2020

[MotCO]

Ah sorry I'd missed that bit where they'd referred to the section of line as well as the permissible speed for the type of train, clearly need to slow down my skim reading!

Since a few of us missed it, maybe the report could have been clearer?

 

[racyrich]

Is it normal at Loughborough for the up slow stoppers to use the down slow platform? I don't have recent knowledge of the station - I graduated in 87.

 

[ExRes]

Is it normal at Loughborough for the up slow stoppers to use the down slow platform? I don't have recent knowledge of the station - I graduated in 87.

I've not been through Loughborough station for 10 years now but surely it has only one slow line platform?

 

[theageofthetra]

If the driver had been speeding I would have expected the report to explicitly say that, but it's weirdly ambiguous as to whether they were or not.

Yes I thought that. It also seems to say about running brake tests not be adequate too but doesn't say if the test was done in compliance with that operators rules?

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 10 Nov 2020 ==

The thing that really struck me from the report was:



Now I accept it goes on to give mitigation by ROG for this but they wouldn't have been served an improvement notice by ORR a little over a month after the incident for no reason....

I do find it interesting that they in the initial measures to prevent the incident from reoccurring they didn't actually fix the issue at hand (i.e. the maximum speed of the consist being incorrectly stated) by missing out the configuration that caused the incident from the documentation entirely.

I strongly suspect that if people are pointing fingers at anybody at ROG it should probably be towards those who allowed a planning process which didn't follow industry best practice i.e.:

Paragraph 56:

Paragraph 60:

Could be viewed as more alarming than anything to do with the employment status of the driver or shunter.

Now I'm sure it could be argued that both members of staff should have argued about this further but it doesn't change the problem that this system itself wasn't very good to begin with.

Both taken from the report here: RAIB Report Link

Completely agree.

 

[43096]

Is it normal at Loughborough for the up slow stoppers to use the down slow platform? I don't have recent knowledge of the station - I graduated in 87.

Yes: there’s no platform on the up slow line.

 

[DerekC]

One question I ask myself for every SPAD-related report is "would ETCS have prevented it?" I think the answer here is "probably". It would certainly have enforced the line speed. Whether it would have supervised the reduced brake capability would depend on whether consist data was entered correctly at the start of the journey. You could argue that the need to do this would have prompted the driver to ask himself the right questions. You could equally well argue that in a badly organised operator it would have been very possible to enter it wrong.

 

[class 9]

To be pedantic, the driver was not given the correct documentation providing details of the maximum permitted speed of the train - he relied on a document which was not sufficient for this purpose.

If the Driver wasn’t in possession of the correct paperwork ie a Drivers Slip, then he should not have departed.

 

[pdeaves]

One question I ask myself for every SPAD-related report is "would ETCS have prevented it?" I think the answer here is "probably".

Personally, I am not convinced it would. ETCS would likely mitigate against the driver forgetting to apply the brakes; I don't know that it can do anything about the brakes not being as effective as everyone thought they should be. ETCS would work on the basis of whatever braking curve is input, surely? That's the fundamental issue here; 'they' (driver and others in his company) collectively forgot that the braking characteristic was less effective than normal.

 

[Bow Fell]

One question I ask myself for every SPAD-related report is "would ETCS have prevented it?" I think the answer here is "probably". It would certainly have enforced the line speed. Whether it would have supervised the reduced brake capability would depend on whether consist data was entered correctly at the start of the journey. You could argue that the need to do this would have prompted the driver to ask himself the right questions. You could equally well argue that in a badly organised operator it would have been very possible to enter it wrong.

Personally, I am not convinced it would. ETCS would likely mitigate against the driver forgetting to apply the brakes; I don't know that it can do anything about the brakes not being as effective as everyone thought they should be. ETCS would work on the basis of whatever braking curve is input, surely? That's the fundamental issue here; 'they' (driver and others in his company) collectively forgot that the braking characteristic was less effective than normal.

Slightly OT but I’m quite a fan of German PZB Signalling Safety system, again this wouldn’t have prevented the SPAD but would have got the trains speed right down, further in advance.(Look up 1000hz / 500 hz monitoring).

 

[Domh245]

Personally, I am not convinced it would. ETCS would likely mitigate against the driver forgetting to apply the brakes; I don't know that it can do anything about the brakes not being as effective as everyone thought they should be. ETCS would work on the basis of whatever braking curve is input, surely?

Not really. The RSSB report says that even at line speed (ie 4mph higher than it should have been) the train would have come to a stop without spadding in the configuration it was using full service braking. Like you say, it's dependant on what braking curve gets put into it, but I find the situation where the ETCS equivalent train goes to put the brake in and exceeds it's movement authority unlikely. I would hope that (especially with freight where braking performance is pretty variable in the first place) there's a safety margin baked in to whatever braking curve it is given anyway and so even if the train assumed it had more braking force than it actually did, it'd still be stopped within it's MA. There is potential for it to 'spad' the other way, where it's strictly limited to line/formation speed and then attempts to brake too late, but under manual driving that's something I wouldn't hope would happen (at least on this sort of service)

Come to think of it actually, is there anyway for ETCS to perform a "running brake test" to verify the curve it's been given? Would seem like a sensible precaution with freight at the very least

 

[mikestone1952]

The first thing I noticed was the reference on p.11 to three braked vehicles on the rear, which does not and never has applied to a class 5 ECS, which needs only have the rear vehicle braked, but should have not more than one in five in operative - I would have thought the report should explain why they dealt with this as a freight service when it was running as a class 5 ECS.

 

[GB]

The 3 braked vehicles at the back of a freight train rule hasn't been a thing for a few years so perhaps it made no difference to how it was dealt?

 

[4069]

The first thing I noticed was the reference on p.11 to three braked vehicles on the rear, which does not and never has applied to a class 5 ECS, which needs only have the rear vehicle braked, but should have one in five operative - I would have thought the report should explain why they dealt with this as a freight service when it was running as a class 5 ECS.

Because a class 5 train is just that: the rule book no longer links classification to train make-up, hence there are now class 9 passenger trains. The braking configuration showed that this was clearly a freight service, delivering a payload (a new train) to a customer, and the Working Manual is the relevant instruction.

 

[mikestone1952]

Class 5 is defined in the rule book and always has been as empty coaching stock with no reference to speed.
I realise that it no longer requires authority to convey passenger vehicles on freight trains - in fact as I see it if this train, and indeed all other unbraked unit movements, had been documented as a freight the confusion over speed would never have arisen, which to me makes it even more surprising that the RAIB did not mention it.
The guidance note refers specifically to freight trains i.e 3,4,6,7,8.

 

[Merle Haggard]

Class 5 is defined in the rule book and always has been as empty coaching stock with no reference to speed.
I realise that it no longer requires authority to convey passenger vehicles on freight trains - in fact as I see it if this train, and indeed all other unbraked unit movements, had been documented as a freight the confusion over speed would never have arisen, which to me makes it even more surprising that the RAIB did not mention it.
The guidance note refers specifically to freight trains i.e 3,4,6,7,8.

Many years ago I was directly involved in arranging for passenger stock to be conveyed by freight trains, and each move had to be cleared by the Civil Engineer. This was because lines used by freight trains (particularly goods loops and sidings) often had less distance between tracks, and between tracks and fixed structures, than on passenger lines - freight stock then being built to a narrower loading gauge than passenger carrying stock - and so coaches were 'OGLO' (telegraphic code) on freight trains. And it wasn't theoretical - an engineers coach had its handles neatly removed (leaving the doors swinging open) once, when it was forwarded without authority.
Presumably, every loop and siding must have the required clearance now, but that must have been quite a job...