Yet all the failings to make the most of the resources and provide the best service Gareth Marston describes happened under a nationalised and supposedly "pure public service" organisation, not tainted by commercial profit motives.
Regardless of whether the railways and freight loadings did or didn't turn a corner post Beeching (and note his plan wasn't completed, either the cuts or the investment), the retention of the network as was into the 70s with rampant inflation, huge industrial unrest, energy shortages, IMF bailouts and the political switch to the right, well, I can't see any scope for a brighter future. At least in the historical context, the rubbish was cut out and the reaction to the rest happened at a time when when it could be accommodated to some extent.
Plus, the investment of the 70s (APT, HST) and into the 80s (Sprinters) was predicated on having baselined the railways to some degree into something that at least didn't lose too much, and that which remained, did have some kind of a future.
Beeching or no Beeching, Marples or no Marples, the only difference would be the date and the spelling of the author of the report for much the same result.
Although if later, the report might be a tad longer and a bit more descriptive, as the fashion seems to have become since. (I've written longer reports on the design of a single component of an aircraft, let alone something equivalent to the entire aiarcraft user and production industry !).
It seems to me that a lot of the failings outlined by Gareth Marsden accrued from the Regions sticking to their pre-nationalisation silos and that many of improvements came with BR organised Nationally along business lines.
It does seem to me a little unrealistic to suggest that any report on reshaping Britain's Railways would have came up with the same list of closures, particularly given that there are all sorts of variables that could have been different.
The passenger head counts may have been compiled over a longer period giving a more accurate reflection of passenger usage, the cost/benefit calculation may have been different, cost saving measures may have been implemented on the route in the intervening period, provision for the public support of socially necessary services may have been made. Any of these variables could have affected the decision on whether to include a marginal route such as York - Hull via Market Weighton in the list for closure.