Happy Beeching Anniversary

[The Planner]

I believe also if Kenilworth EVER reopens the Nuneaton - Coventry service will be extended to Leamington again too .

No it won't, unless there is a sudden drop of traffic on the WCML that will never happen. Considering Kenilworth failed in the new station fund the likelihood of it opening any time soon is now slim.

 

[yorksrob]

R.e. very useful cross country route.

But the GC served slightly different local markets going into Nottingham and Leicester, so if you add this to cross country services, that would add up to a well used route.

If you take Leicester, Loughborough and Nottingham together, you have a fairly substantial urban population which could probably support direct services to the North as well as the South amd South West yet this ia a market that really isn't very well served at the moment.

 

[corfield]

http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BRB_Beech001a.pdf

Is the report itself. Very interesting reading so far (page by page, it's slow !).


GC, sorry, but none of that stacks up to keeping a strategic mainline route when all those destinations are available anyway. It couldn't offer the same London bound services as the WCML/MML due to the shared ownership at that end (and limited terminus capacity at Marylebone) - something had to give, and "very useful" / "alternative" just dont cut it for me.

Maybe today with another 10-15 million people living in the UK, and longer commuting now becoming the norm - but it's not like the GC has been missed, and the money it would have sucked up just to provide alternative and local services has been better spent on what we do have.

 

[61653 HTAFC]

One advantage the GC would have now, were it still open, is how useful it would be for freight thanks to the generous loading gauge- though that couldn't possibly have been known in the 60s.

With hindsight, one of the problems with Beeching is the removal of what at the time was excess capacity- The BML2 would be very useful today, and even more so when the AC conversion happens. Likewise, the 'Leeds New Line' would be useful both for the places it served, and for diversions while the wires are going up. Additionally the Holmfirth branch would have a strong case for reopening if the trackbed was still available (and Thongsbridge viaduct was still standing!).

 

[tbtc]

R.e. very useful cross country route.

But the GC served slightly different local markets going into Nottingham and Leicester, so if you add this to cross country services, that would add up to a well used route.

If you take Leicester, Loughborough and Nottingham together, you have a fairly substantial urban population which could probably support direct services to the North as well as the South amd South West yet this ia a market that really isn't very well served at the moment.

There's not much stopping a direct service from Leicester/ Loughborough/ Nottingham to "the north" with today's infrastructure

 

[Philip Elliott]

He said north aswell as the south. Nothing like selective quoting.

Also you can't run a service to the north from Leicester via Nottingham without reversing with some very slow running.

 

[yorksrob]

R.r GC

When you say "strategic mainline route" you basically mean double track railway - with staffed stations at Victoria and Leicester Central at least. Now we have many double track railways in this country,a lot of which exist on a lot less than local services coverng local areas not reached by alternative routes, plus North/South cross country routes which aren't served by other cross country routes. This route would have easily looked after itself.

 

[tbtc]

He said north aswell as the south. Nothing like selective quoting

yorksrob mentioned the south west too - you're selectively quoting here Philip - I quoted yorksrob in full though.

Also you can't run a service to the north from Leicester via Nottingham without reversing with some very slow running.

Can Cross Country services not reverse?

Birmingham to Nottingham requires reversal at Derby. Most Manchester - Bristol services reverse at Birmingham, as do Newcastle - Reading ones.

 

[yorksrob]

According to Dr Beeching:



Then again, I'm sure you could argue something broadly similar today, when you consider how intensively used lines around London are when compared to many with just a handful of services elsewhere.

yorksrob mentioned the south west too - you're selectively quoting here Philip - I quoted yorksrob in full though.



Can Cross Country services not reverse?

Birmingham to Nottingham requires reversal at Derby. Most Manchester - Bristol services reverse at Birmingham, as do Newcastle - Reading ones.

The point is that whereas you can run a viable service from the North to the South coast and South West via Birmingham, you cannot, as Phillip Elliot has pointed out, run a similar srrvice via the East Midlands without a lot of slow running and awkward reversalls. There is likely to be a big market for such services based on the East Midlands just as there is for the West, however unlike for the West Midlands, without the GC, there isn't the infrastructure.

 

[tbtc]

The point is that whereas you can run a viable service from the North to the South coast and South West via Birmingham, you cannot, as Phillip Elliot has pointed out, run a similar srrvice via the East Midlands without a lot of slow running and awkward reversalls. There is likely to be a big market for such services based on the East Midlands just as there is for the West, however unlike for the West Midlands, without the GC, there isn't the infrastructure.

XC services from the North to the South Coast do reverse at Birmingham though- is that any more of an awkward reversal than one at Nottingham?

Maybe it's the proximity of the M1 (making the car very attractive), but there's been little from Leicester/ Nottingham to places north of Leeds - I really don't think reversal is the thing stopping this though.

(obviously Derby has a half hourly service to York/ Newcastle, Nottingham has an hourly service to Leeds - so there are some links from the East Midlands - no new lines required)

ETA: The electrification from Nottingham to Oxford/ Reading/ Bristol via Bedford may change demand patterns in a few years time I guess

 

[yorksrob]

Well you,ve got reversal at Nottingham, then if you're taking in Leicester and Loughborough, it's difficult to get further west. I really think that the East Midlands conurbations have a similar potential for generating longer distance cross country traffic as the West, but that the lack of suitable infrastructure has surpressed this.

 

[Darren R]

When I first had access to this new fangled t'interweb thingy one of the first things I did was download and read both sections of The Reshaping of British Railways. I was curious what the good doctor actually had to say and what his plans were. Quite frankly I was amazed at the difference (in my neck of the woods at least - Lancashire) between what was in the report and what subsequently happened. The problem with Beeching is that he immediately became a bogey man, and in the years that have followed any railway closure of the 60s and 70s is always referred to as 'a victim of the Beeching axe' or some such. Often this is ill-informed nonsense.

We can argue about his methodology, but in the days when tickets were still being written out by hand for all but the most common jouneys and routes, the only way passenger surveys could be undertaken was by people on the platform with clipboards. Yes, there are many stories about the people tasked with doing these surveys turning up at stations at quiet and unsocial hours, but the source of these stories is often local rail users and staff whose testimony should be treated with a little caution! The methodology used was all that was available at the time. The good doctor not only had his remit specified by the uniquely charming Mr Marples () but also the length of time he had to produce his recommendations. Some of the figures produced might have been a little rough and ready, but he didn't really have time for anything more robust unfortunately.

As far as my neck of the woods is concerned (East Lancashire) I can't help think that we would have a better railway service now if Beeching had been fully implemented. Although the recomendation was for everything north of Skipton to close (which would have had dire consequences now given the renaisance of the S&C over recent years), but the Colne to Skipton section would have been retained and modernised. The line into Blackpool North was to close, with all Blackpool traffic concentrated on the coastal and direct lines to Blackpool Central, but the Fleetwood line was to be retained. Given subsequent developments over the last 20 years or so, in my parallel universe we have electric trains running between Preston, Blackburn, Colne, Skipton and West Yorkshire. The S&C was to close and West Yorkshire - Scotland traffic diverted via the East Lancs Line. Regular electric expresses from Burnley Central to Glasgow Central anyone?!

An earlier post mentioned the decimation of the remaining L&Y network under Beeching. Again this isn't necessarily his fault: passenger services over the Calder Vally mainline through Sowerby Bridge to Wakefield Kirkgate and beyond were to be retained, as were the Bradford Exchange - Halifax - Huddersfield. These - along with Fleetwood and Skipton-Colne were all the fault of the Rt Hon Barbara Castle MP and erstwhile Transport Secretary - a woman practically revered as a Saint by some in the area and after whom Northern have named a 156. To my mind that's no better than naming a train after the good doctor himself!

I'm not necessarily defending everything Beeching recommended, but what he did was absolutley necessary. But we should remember that not all the closures of the period were anything to do with Beeching. And what he was charged with was absolutely necessary. By the mid 60s seven competing routes between Manchester and Liverpool or five between Manchester and Leeds just wasn't tenable (or affordable).

What I've noticed is that of the local services re-introduced or freight lines re-opened across the NW and West Yorkshire, most (although not all) were routes that were actually to be retained under Beeching.

Of course, if I lived in Scotland or Wales I might not be so forgiving!

 

[Mikey C]

Some sort of Beeching was needed, as assuming the pot of money available from the government stayed the same, then money spent keeping open 'uneconomic' lines is money not available for investment elsewhere, new trains, track improvement, electrification etc. It's a hard balancing act, but longer commuter trains into London benefit far more people than a branch line in Devon or Cumbria, even if in reality it's not a straightforward as that.

50 years ago, Britain was a very different country. There was real optimism about the car based economy, London was planning its ringways, new car based towns like Cumbernauld and Milton Keynes were springing up, and urban motorways were being torn through old city centres. Against that background, it's not surprising that the closed railways were considered surplus and built over.

 

[corfield]

Is there really demand for any of that ?

Earlier you were talking about Banbury and north of it. The GC was a strategic route in that it ran long distance through trains with large stations. The 2nd report (Reshaping) is very clear that it duplicated WCML/MML capability and these could handle all expected growth (even using optimistic figures which I doubt were ever realised).

EWRL will offer SW to EM/NE services at much less cost than retaining the GC ever could have. It will be interesting to see if these materialise and what the numbers are.

Sorry - I dont get it and the closure seems valid to me.



@ Gareth Marston
"The report in many ways failed to understand railway finances or the way people travel. If you look at the report it lists a number of passenger services to close and the claimed savings from them - the underlying assumption was that c85% of the contributory revenue would stay on the railway which we all know it practice didn't happen"

Failed to understand railway finances is a gibberish statement. You may as well call it a failure to understand bistro mathmatics.

Can you point to this 85% assumption in the report please as I've actually read it and dont recall seeing it anywhere.

Could you also identify how how the report thought people travelled and what these many failings were ?

Beeching wrote quite a lot in that report, there is ample evidence of what he did think and why.



As for the idea that because BR still made losses the concepts were wrong - surely that just illustrates how bad the losses would have been had they not happened, and that Beechings full plan was not implemented. Some unprofitable lines remaining open and investment in the "good" bits not being done (or not done so for several decades eg ECML). Beeching for instance saw all non intercity and high urban commuter services as unprofitable and to be withdrawn or at least, much modified - looking at say what Virgin Group bids for today, it suggests he was right !

One question I have is whether and how/to what extent road services were/are subsidised, thus giving bus services an unfair advantage in comparisons.

I also noted Beechings example of a rural lime did include a DMU based service, which even if it was relatively well used (10,000pax per week) still failed to cover more than 1/3rd of the operating costs.

Subsidies are lovely in principle - but someone has to pay. As long as it's someone else eh.

 

[yorksrob]

Noones denying that Barbra Castle gave the go ahead for some ill advised closures (including the GC which I've been going on about above) But it was Miss Castle who introduced the legislation allowing the Government to support socially necessary railways (as well as the setting up of the PTE's). That is easily worth the naming of a 158 in my book.

People are always looking to excuse Beechings closures by trying to find areas where he did improve the railway elsewhere. Well, that is a lot truer of Castle.

 

[fsmr]

Growing up in Birstall in the 60s next to the Great Central when it was still operational, my late father was on the local council. A little known fact was that before the weeds had even had time to grow over the abandoned tracks in the late 60s, plans were already affoot to use the formation. One was to infill the deep cutting at Greengate lane with rubbish. Now where have we seen that before:roll:

The other ws to construct a new trunk road from Leicester along the formation through Birstall to bypass the A6 onwards towards Loughborough.
Good job both plans were voted out and the rest is history, otherwise the Jewel in the East Midlands that is the GCR , would have only made it to Rothley or worse, had the road been pushed through

One line that i can never understand closing to Pax and finally to freight in 1982 was the 15 mile or so of Brampton valley line, a small part now being the Lamport railway, from the MML at Mkt Harborough to the WCML Northampton loop. Apart from the option of access to Northampton and MK from Leicester which currently means changing at Nuneaton, it would also have given a good diversion route to London.
In the 80s surplus to requirements, but certainly today shift to rail and with booming towns aong the Brampton valley would have been an ideal route for revenue generation

 

[LE Greys]

The Great Central London Extension, along with a number of other high-profile closures and heavy downgrades, were partly victims of inter-regional politics in BR. One thing Beeching highlighted was route duplication, which usually existed as a result of two companies fighting over traffic. The redrawing of regional boundaries in 1958 being the biggest, however there were more in (IIRC) 1949 and 1967. As a result of this, a number of former competitors were brought under the same management. Naturally, the London Midland Region was not too keen to develop the former LNER route right through the middle of its territory, nor the former GWR intruders heading up to Birmingham, especially when their big project was WCML electrification. They even used the GC as a dumping ground for old stock, with the line receiving worn out Royal Scots to replace its V2s (which should have been supplimented by extra Britannias early on, but there was probably not enough funding). The Western Region was hardly blameless, they did pretty much the same thing to the Waterloo-Exeter route, although that survived. I think the S&D ended up under Western management as well. Even taking things back to the Grouping, the L&Y lines mentioned earlier may well have seen less development than LNWR routes by LMS management. Even the Settle & Carlisle saw a run-down under non-traditional management, this Midland route under North Eastern (later Eastern) control. Scottish Region managed to maintain more of a balance, but there was a noted toll of Caledonian routes in some areas, particularly the old route from Kinnaber Junction to Bankfoot and the eastern half of the Callander & Oban. Now that we have a privatised railway again, some of the duplicate routes are once again competing successfully against their old enemy, with Chiltern carving out a nice slice of Birmingham from Virgin.

Also, I watched some of the news coverage earlier, and its interesting to see how the BBC chose to present the report from a line not closed by Beeching, namely the newly-reopened Bluebell extension to East Grinstead.

 

[Gwenllian2001]

Now that we have a privatised railway again, some of the duplicate routes are once again competing successfully against their old enemy, with Chiltern carving out a nice slice of Birmingham from Virgin

But we do not have a privatised railway. We do have a system that cannot go bust because it is propped up by the taxpayer and the franchisees are laughing at the gullibility of the British public who, somehow, believe that 'private enterprise' has improved things. What we do have is a situation where running the railways costs considerably more now than it ever did under BR.

Since privatisation nothing has yet been introduced on to our tracks that approaches the comfort of a BR Mk 4; Mk 3 or even Mk 1. All we have had are flashy flimsy designs without adequate legroom; toilets that stink and the decimation of restaurant services.

Incidentally, the GWR route from London to Birmingham was always competitive with Euston and was only run down to justify electrification of the LM route.

BR was far from perfect but, don't forget, it was a plaything of politicians. It should have been left to the railwaymen to run, not a department in Whitehall which was regarded as a stepping stone to better things. The exception, of course, being Marples who had his own personal agenda and, by God, didn't he just make a meal of it.

 

[Morgsie]

Lines that were closed back then, if they were open it would be good diversionary routes. People have mentioned the Great Central but another would be the old Southern line in the South West avoiding Dawlish.

Labour in the 1964 Election promised to reverse the Beeching cuts but when Barbra Castle was in charge the cuts accelerated.

 

[yorksrob]

@ Corfield

What you convenniently forget is that the GC was not just a strategic Intercity route but also an important local route, albeit one that was struggling towards the late sixties. Think about another local cross city route which struggled to the point of closure in the sixties.The Birmingham Snow Hill lines. These were removed as a wasteful duplication, and yet look at where they are now ! The GC would have performed the same function for both Leicester and Nottingham, only unlike with Snow Hill, this utility would have been boosted by North/South cross country services as well. The case for this section of the GC is obvious really.

Whilst the E/W link will provide connectivity in this respect, it will hardly be an Intercity standard link once you've taken a long detour East halfway towards London.

Regarding your point towards Gareth Marsden, we all know that examples such as Swaffham - Thetford would have had to have closed. This is presumably why the railway companies had been weeding out poorly performing routes since the 1920s. What is well known is that the case for closure in a lot of more marginal routes under the Beeching methodology was tainted by frankly shaky assumptions, for example expecting passengers to railhead to the nearest open station when connecting services were closed and not taking account of the loss to the railway when they didn't.

 

[A0]

One line that i can never understand closing to Pax and finally to freight in 1982 was the 15 mile or so of Brampton valley line, a small part now being the Lamport railway, from the MML at Mkt Harborough to the WCML Northampton loop. Apart from the option of access to Northampton and MK from Leicester which currently means changing at Nuneaton, it would also have given a good diversion route to London.
In the 80s surplus to requirements, but certainly today shift to rail and with booming towns aong the Brampton valley would have been an ideal route for revenue generation

Not sure which "booming towns" along the Brampton Valley you're referring to?

Between Northampton and Market Harborough, there is nowhere of significance - Brixworth's population is under 10,000 and that's easily the largest place.

Yes, it would mean easier journeys between Leicester & MK / Northampton, but as you point out there is the option of travel via Nuneaton, alternatively via Bedford and Bletchley - whilst both are slower than a direct route would be, I can't believe the traffic demand would justify an hourly MK - Northampton - Leicester service, particularly given the lack of sizeable places en-route.

Add to that the MML was much, much less well used 30 years ago - it's only really been since privatisation that the MML north of Bedford has started to see some decent service patterns and real passenger growth.

Having said that, the ultimate closure of this line, along with a few notable others - Bridport branch, Woodhead, Tunbridge Wells - Eridge spring to mind - were really the responsibility of BR who had no intention of trying to develop those lines, and they were all finally closed long after Beeching had left BR.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

But we do not have a privatised railway. We do have a system that cannot go bust because it is propped up by the taxpayer

Yes, it is supported with subsidies - perhaps a better model would be not to subsidise the rail network at all then and let passenger and freight receipts pay their way?

and the franchisees are laughing at the gullibility of the British public who, somehow, believe that 'private enterprise' has improved things. What we do have is a situation where running the railways costs considerably more now than it ever did under BR.

What the franchisees have tended to do is something BR only belatedly started to pay lip service to, which was to look at who their customer was and how they could best serve them - BR started the process with sectorisation, but many embedded managers resisted it.

In terms of the cost argument - you're not comparing like with like - your comparing the cost of the railway today at the prices of 20 years ago, whilst conveniently ignoring the fact far more trains are being run, carrying far more passengers than ever before. You've had significant investment into the infrastructure and the effects various pieces of legislation e.g. DDA etc which due to the sheer scale of the railway is very costly to implement. Add to that another current "social" problem, that of metal and cable theft - unheard of 30 years ago.

Since privatisation nothing has yet been introduced on to our tracks that approaches the comfort of a BR Mk 4; Mk 3 or even Mk 1. All we have had are flashy flimsy designs without adequate legroom; toilets that stink and the decimation of restaurant services.

In your opinion. And in my opinion I much, much prefer to travel from Northampton to Euston on a 350 than a 317 or 321 which is all BR offered.

Having used the Meridians on the MML, I personally find them far more comfortable than the HSTs and much better time-keepers as well.

Travelled on the North London line lately? Back in BR's day it was a dumping ground for initially 2 EPBs and later 313s - the new 378s are light years ahead in terms of passenger environment.

West Midlands commuter areas? How about the new 172s which have just replaced most of the 150s - again, far, far better units in terms of passenger environment.

Incidentally, the GWR route from London to Birmingham was always competitive with Euston and was only run down to justify electrification of the LM route.

Correct - it was run down by BR and it's renaissance has been because a PRIVATE franchisee has seen the potential, has sought and won investment and is reaping the rewards of it. Places like Banbury, High Wycombe and Aylesbury always needed a decent link to London - so why were BR hell bent on not developing it? Even in NSE days the only "improvement" was the replacement of the life-expired 115s with suburban units - there really was no appetite for developing an alternative London - Birmingham route.

BR was far from perfect

That's an understatement.

but, don't forget, it was a plaything of politicians.

True.

It should have been left to the railwaymen to run,

With what controls? What performance criteria? Accountable to who? Who would be responsible ?

Basically you'd have exactly what you claim to have now, a totally unaccountable railway hoovering up money with no regard for where it comes from. Only difference would be the private companies have a profit motive.

not a department in Whitehall which was regarded as a stepping stone to better things. The exception, of course, being Marples who had his own personal agenda and, by God, didn't he just make a meal of it.

And let's also point out a couple of relevant points:

The Labour party were unconcerned about the railways between 1948 and 1955 - their view was all workers would and should be able to own a car and railways were an anachronism.

The "Modernisation Plan" - large parts of which were an abject failure - was published in 1954 under a Labour government - the incoming Conservative government gave the railways a chance using the Modernisation plan to make themselves viable - the railways, then run by the BTC later BR, flunked it. Losses ballooned which is why something had to be done.

In 1964, Harold Wilson campaigned in the General Election against the Beeching closures, yet when he entered office, nothing was done to stop them.

Ministerial assent for the closure of:

Great Central Main Line
Somerset and Dorset
Barmouth - Ruabon

And the rundown of

GW mainline to Birkenhead
LSW mainline to Devon & Cornwall

were all given by a Labour government - so it's not a party political issue at all.

 

[corfield]

My post #63 specifically mentions local services. Hardly "conveniently forgetting".

Did you read my post or just copy in a preformed response from a preformed viewpoint?

Either way - since those routes are provided elsewhere then keeping an entire line is clearly daft. It hasnt been needed, and still isnt needed. There are no serious plans to reopen it or even reuse it - other than my reference to HS2 which draws the important catchment area of Birmingham and WM into the new trunk route.

Beeching was quite clear that it was the stopping (& rural plus wagonload freight) services that were the most horrendous in terms of losses, and the through trains which had a chance of being profitable (suburban being about equal). Duplication of the through route meant as mentioned previously the WCML/MML could handle even the most optimistic pax/freight loadings in the future. So arguing to keep what was a trunk route for local services misses the point anyway. And lines with just local services did indeed get savaged - isnt that the main outcome of Beeching anyway, which no doubt cost some ridership (say 1%), but which saved a fortune.

Could you also point to where in Beechings report he talks about railheading etc. that you claim underpinned his future assumptions (and what were they?). Also could you point out any evidence that this did/or didnt, happen.

Given how long and wordy the report is, and that it does contain multiple assumptions, some dodgy excuses (in my opinion) and almost certainly errors of fact &/or omission - is it too much to ask to expect crtitiques to be based on evidence rather than enthusiast and partisan wibble?

I really do suggest some people do as I, and Darren R, have done and read the damn thing rather than seemingly base opinions entirely on stories from old railwaymen told under swinging lamps with wisps of steam in the background...

 

[Gwenllian2001]

And let's also point out a couple of relevant points:

The Labour party were unconcerned about the railways between 1948 and 1955 - their view was all workers would and should be able to own a car and railways were an anachronism.

The "Modernisation Plan" - large parts of which were an abject failure - was published in 1954 under a Labour government - the incoming Conservative government gave the railways a chance using the Modernisation plan to make themselves viable - the railways, then run by the BTC later BR, flunked it. Losses ballooned which is why something had to be done.

In 1964, Harold Wilson campaigned in the General Election against the Beeching closures, yet when he entered office, nothing was done to stop them.

I'm not sure where you were in 1954 but Labour was out of office between 1951 and 1964; the infamous 'Thirteen years of Tory mis-rule', to quote Harold Wilson. What Wilson said, in opposition, was somewhat different to that which he did in government. He was a, sadly, typical politician.

Which parts of the Modernisation Plan were an 'abject failure'? If you're referring to diesel locomotives then you have a point but remember that many of those designs were ordered without evaluation. That was a government decision and not what BR wanted. The DMUs, on the other hand, were a great success and gave many years of service well beyond their expected lifetime.

As I have pointed out before, BR was not perfect but I have yet to meet anyone, apart from political ideologues, who believes that the present set up is better value for money.

As far as the Chiltern Line is concerned it has done well but it did have a head start having undergone total re-equipment under BR just prior to 'privatisation' and it was operated by a very good team of ex BR managers.

 

[yorksrob]

My post #63 specifically mentions local services. Hardly "conveniently forgetting".

Did you read my post or just copy in a preformed response from a preformed viewpoint?

Either way - since those routes are provided elsewhere then keeping an entire line is clearly daft. It hasnt been needed, and still isnt needed. There are no serious plans to reopen it or even reuse it - other than my reference to HS2 which draws the important catchment area of Birmingham and WM into the new trunk route.

Beeching was quite clear that it was the stopping (& rural plus wagonload freight) services that were the most horrendous in terms of losses, and the through trains which had a chance of being profitable (suburban being about equal). Duplication of the through route meant as mentioned previously the WCML/MML could handle even the most optimistic pax/freight loadings in the future. So arguing to keep what was a trunk route for local services misses the point anyway. And lines with just local services did indeed get savaged - isnt that the main outcome of Beeching anyway, which no doubt cost some ridership (say 1%), but which saved a fortune.

Could you also point to where in Beechings report he talks about railheading etc. that you claim underpinned his future assumptions (and what were they?). Also could you point out any evidence that this did/or didnt, happen.

Given how long and wordy the report is, and that it does contain multiple assumptions, some dodgy excuses (in my opinion) and almost certainly errors of fact &/or omission - is it too much to ask to expect crtitiques to be based on evidence rather than enthusiast and partisan wibble?

I really do suggest some people do as I, and Darren R, have done and read the damn thing rather than seemingly base opinions entirely on stories from old railwaymen told under swinging lamps with wisps of steam in the background...

I refer you to page 98 of the report and the Swaffham - Thetford case study.

The gross revenue accruing to other services, contributed by passengers using the Thetford - Swaffham service on part of their rail journey, amounts to some £16,000. Allowance must be made for the loss of £1,700 of this contributory revenue and, taking this into account, it is estimated that the loss in gross revenue will be £5,400.

In other words of the £16,000 contributed by Thetford-Swaffham passengers to other services, he is expecting them to continue to still contribute £14,300 of this after closure, i.e. by choosing different routes or railheading. This seems optimistic to me, and whilst it wouldn't have made a difference to the final conclusion, such assumptions could have had a detrimental effect on more marginal routes.

Also for the Market Weighton example (page 99 since you ask):

It is estimated that passengers using the service as part of their rail journey contribute £37,700 to the revenue of other services. Because the existance of services between Hull and York via other routes, only £4,900 of this is expected to be lost

In this case, as well as railheading, the report takes into account the likelihood that some end to end passengers would transfer to less direct trains via Selby. But even with this in mind, only losing £4,900 out of £37,700 seems mightily optimistic.

 

[tbtc]

Since privatisation nothing has yet been introduced on to our tracks that approaches the comfort of a BR Mk 4; Mk 3 or even Mk 1. All we have had are flashy flimsy designs without adequate legroom; toilets that stink and the decimation of restaurant services

So your main criticisms of privatisation include the comfort of seats (highly subjective, people on here argue about them, no clear winner) and the fact that fewer trains have restaurant facilities (mainly because over the last twenty years snacking is a much bigger industry - instead of eating a full meal on a train people buy food from the M&S Simply Food/ Costa Coffee etc at the station - the railway is just responding to changing demand patterns)?

I guess that the toilet "issue" is because modern trains don't just dump muck onto the tracks - progress?

 

[A0]

I'm not sure where you were in 1954 but Labour was out of office between 1951 and 1964; the infamous 'Thirteen years of Tory mis-rule', to quote Harold Wilson. What Wilson said, in opposition, was somewhat different to that which he did in government. He was a, sadly, typical politician.

Which parts of the Modernisation Plan were an 'abject failure'? If you're referring to diesel locomotives then you have a point but remember that many of those designs were ordered without evaluation. That was a government decision and not what BR wanted. The DMUs, on the other hand, were a great success and gave many years of service well beyond their expected lifetime.

As I have pointed out before, BR was not perfect but I have yet to meet anyone, apart from political ideologues, who believes that the present set up is better value for money.

As far as the Chiltern Line is concerned it has done well but it did have a head start having undergone total re-equipment under BR just prior to 'privatisation' and it was operated by a very good team of ex BR managers.

OK - point conceded on who initiated the modernisation plan - brain faded a bit there. But the point still stands that the government gave the BTC / BR a chance to modernise providing it gave a return - 5 years later losses had ballooned so a change of tack was necessary.

The Modernisation plan was, in my opinion, flawed in several ways:

- Firstly it assumed wrongly that the same if not more rolling stock would be needed despite the fact usage was falling.

- The wrong type of rolling stock was procured - and I don't just mean poor designs. That the Western region was allowed to deviate from the whole of the rest of the network and procure diesel hydraulics rather than diesel-electrics. That a huge number of Type 1 locos were bought, yet the work they were meant to do was drying up by the day.

- The misguided decision to eliminate steam entirely by 1968. Many post war standard classes could have been used for another 10 years before major overhauls would have been needed, which in turn could have lessened the need for so many unproved diesels - which is the approach that was used in Germany.

- The regions had far too much autonomy when it came down to rolling stock selection - which was the root cause of the problem above. The only region which could really claim they were different was the Southern due to the extent of its electrification and the need to dove tail some diesel services into already tight schedules - which DEMUs could achieve.

- The rail unions obstructed many improvements which would have saved costs in the 50s and 60s and could have saved many lines from being rendered unprofitable at the time of Beeching.

As for Chiltern - yes it had new signalling and new DMUs - but there wasn't the commercial imperative to start developing new services. BR were quite happy running their new DMUs between Banbury / Aylesbury and London - they weren't actively looking at developing it as a new WM - London route.

If you want a different example - then look at the Midland Mainline and what's been achieved there.

In BR days it was all HSTs running a mix of stopping patterns north of Bedford. No real consistency, which was a pain for passengers.

MML took over - tidied up the timetable, identified they could run services behind the HSTs if they gave the HSTs fewer stops to Leicester, so introduced the 170s - now OK, they weren't the best trains in the world, but they very quickly proved that there was a demand for a regular stopping service south of Leicester. Cue replacing the Turbostars with Meridians on a regular stopping pattern every 30 mins. Result they have full HSTs going to Leicester / Derby / Sheffield and full Meridians running to Leicester / Nottingham / Corby - carrying far more people than BR ever imagined.

 

[corfield]

and any evidence he was wrong about those numbers ?, which was the entire point of discussion...

Were those numbers/assumptions used across the board, or applied to those specific examples ?

Where did he discuss railheading as a concept that would retain passengers? Beeching waxes lyrical (ok, harsh but in a tone we wouldn't use even in a formal report today) about all of the concepts and logic - but I have still not found anywhere where this is discussed in the detail that all his other points do have.

Still waiting to hear where he failed to understand how people travelled (as in evidence of what he said verses evidence to the contrary...).


Parkway stations, and the development of car parks (and their continual expansion) at the stations that did survive do seem to point to significant railheading, even if only locally. I know, having had the local lines & stations near my childhood home in E.Dorset closed (before my time I should add), but we always drove to the surviving big stations (Bournemouth/Poole) to get trains further afield.

 

[yorksrob]

@ Corfield

With regard to railheading, he may not have named the phenomenum, but I have explained in my post exactly how the concept (whatever it was called at the time) featur ed in his calculations. I would also point out that the worked examples are far more relevant to discussions regarding route closures than any of the proceeding waffle.

With regards to the validity of the assumptions in those examples, it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative as you're asking for proof that journeys that weren't made would have been (and it wouldn't have been in the BRB's interest to prove such a thing anyway), however I believe careful consideration suggests that the underlying assumptions are optimistic.

Take Swaffham - Thetford.

The route is a short cross country route linking two cross country routes which themselves linked the Kings Lynn mainline to Norwich.

When the report mentions journeys on the route that contribute to other longer journeys on the network I think we need to consider these more closely.

I believe that there would have been very few long distance journeys not originating from intermediate stations between Swaffham and Thetford that would have used the route. People travelling those journeys would have travelled straight from Swaffham, Thetford or surrounding stations to the mainlines.

The only journeys using the route for trips further afield would have been long distance journeys to and from the intermediate stations between Thetford and Swaffham (which are likely to have been few in number) plus a large number of local journeys around the Kings Lynn/Norwich/Cambridge area. It is these intermediate length journeys which passengers are unlikely to try and go via another route. For example, someone travelling from Thetford or a station on the Cambridge-Norwich line to Swaffham or a station on the Kings Lynn Dereham route. These people are IMO far more likely to use alternative transport than to try and go via the long way rpund (say via Cambridge for example).

Given the above scenarios, I find it highly unlikely that the railway would retain such a high proportion of contributory revenue to other routes.

 

[LE Greys]

The Modernisation plan was, in my opinion, flawed in several ways:

- Firstly it assumed wrongly that the same if not more rolling stock would be needed despite the fact usage was falling.

- The wrong type of rolling stock was procured - and I don't just mean poor designs. That the Western region was allowed to deviate from the whole of the rest of the network and procure diesel hydraulics rather than diesel-electrics. That a huge number of Type 1 locos were bought, yet the work they were meant to do was drying up by the day.

- The misguided decision to eliminate steam entirely by 1968. Many post war standard classes could have been used for another 10 years before major overhauls would have been needed, which in turn could have lessened the need for so many unproved diesels - which is the approach that was used in Germany.

- The regions had far too much autonomy when it came down to rolling stock selection - which was the root cause of the problem above. The only region which could really claim they were different was the Southern due to the extent of its electrification and the need to dove tail some diesel services into already tight schedules - which DEMUs could achieve.

- The rail unions obstructed many improvements which would have saved costs in the 50s and 60s and could have saved many lines from being rendered unprofitable at the time of Beeching.

As for Chiltern - yes it had new signalling and new DMUs - but there wasn't the commercial imperative to start developing new services. BR were quite happy running their new DMUs between Banbury / Aylesbury and London - they weren't actively looking at developing it as a new WM - London route.

If you want a different example - then look at the Midland Mainline and what's been achieved there.

In BR days it was all HSTs running a mix of stopping patterns north of Bedford. No real consistency, which was a pain for passengers.

MML took over - tidied up the timetable, identified they could run services behind the HSTs if they gave the HSTs fewer stops to Leicester, so introduced the 170s - now OK, they weren't the best trains in the world, but they very quickly proved that there was a demand for a regular stopping service south of Leicester. Cue replacing the Turbostars with Meridians on a regular stopping pattern every 30 mins. Result they have full HSTs going to Leicester / Derby / Sheffield and full Meridians running to Leicester / Nottingham / Corby - carrying far more people than BR ever imagined.

To which I think we can add that it was rushed by various transport ministers keen to see results before the next election. Really, we needed the National Traction Plan before the Modernisation Plan rather than afterwards, but that is purely hindsight. The attempt to cover everything with mixed-traffic classes was possibly another mistake, although this was rectified later as 50s, 56s, HSTs and eventually 58s emerged. Still, it's easy enough to look at events today and develop scenarios that might have reduced the closures.

 

[yorksrob]

My family have just directed my attention to a Daily Mail article called "Dr Beeching Saved Our Railway".I await articles on how Sir Peter Parker and Sir Robert Reid saved the railway as they would seem to be a lot more deserving. I guess that wouldn't make as good copy though