Totally get all that, fine: All the blame cannot be out at NRs door, we agree on that. I'm actually on your side by and large, but..
Can you explain, why piles were driven into an area where the loss of documentation concerning signalling power, interlocking communication and tail cables. This isn't unusual in construction is it? Surely the normal course of action is to complete a laser site survey as to where utilities are.
Laser survey - not any use for finding signalling cables, that needs ground penetrating radar or other EM based cable detection methods, which unfortunately can compromise signal integrity, so the ability to use that sort of technology is limited.
Again BR undertook resignalling (north of Doncaster and south of Berwick mainly) when wring the ECML, with incredibly fragile 1930s signalling cables in situ. The same goes for the 60s and 70s on the WCML.
Claiming resignalling AND electrification is problematic when traditionally the two are carried out at once is a bit of an excuse.
ECML had less traffic in when it was wired, WCML like wise, loss of signalling integrity was less of an issue in the 1950s to 1980s, it wasn't until the Hidden Report and then things like Ladbroke Grove that really tightened up what can be done when there's a loss of signalling.
The ECML had its fair share of problems, don't think it was much better than the GWep, but the ability of the railway to work round it, to ignore speed limits and for drivers to really motor on to make up lost time following a signalling loss made things a lot easier to recover from than is the case today.
We forget what drivers on a mission could be like and how much time they could save when they needed to - HSTs doing 135mph, Class 47s coming in to platforms so fast then dumping the brake and coming to a halt with smoking brake blocks. There was a lot of drivers who earned every last penny during the ECML, keeping things running.
The ECML also used hand dug concrete foundations in many places, often done with lines still open, unfortunately concrete foundations have rotational issues and coupled with the refusal to allow hand digging of concrete foundations on open lines for GWep, the decision was made to use piled foundations.
This is why we don't like concrete foundations
https://www.flickr.com/photos/justindperkins/23102379859/
BR had certain advantages in possession arrangements granted, but the GWML tends to be 4 tracked or SIMBIDs. Shouldn't the problems of possessions be looked at before work commenced?
That's why Series 1 developed the twin track cantilever, the intention is to keep two out of the four tracks open. You think things have been disruptive, it's nothing compared to the disruption that would be caused by not keeping two roads open late on, no ECS movements, no later night services, more rail replacement services.
Shouldn't the factory train have been tested in the real world before writing a business case? Shouldn't there have been a geological survey first? Shouldn't local people have been consulted in problem areas a long time ago? Shouldn't the train operators/government and NR start talking with each other about the introduction of longer carriages before the product is signed off? Shouldn't the industry have identified the lack of skills in terms of OHL and signalling expertise before these business cases were written? Shouldn't the government and third parties be running more training courses to get railway engineering and operating skills up to speed a long time ago (say about 10 years ago when traffic was growing again). The HSTs have been due to replaced for a long time, saying nobody knew about electrification, which that was a distinct possibility of high speed trains, especially in a world of environmental concerns sounds like a lack of forward planning.
HOPS was tested by Windhoff before delivery and at High Marnham. When it works as intended, it's great. When it goes wrong in any way, it's too complex, slow and unwieldly to cope with problems.
The factory train is a combination of the individual components which work well on their own, there's generally not an issue with the individual components, it's a sum of it's parts conundrum which doesn't quite do as well as it should to.
The biggest issue with it is probably speed, it's so damned slow moving around in possessions, it could really have done with a bigger Movax vibrator tool, and probably a Kirow crane, but it's the same technology in a different package.
The problems with signalling cables and not being able to hit output rates initially has resulted in erratic piling, and now more time is being spent than is really necessary moving the stupid thing around in possessions.
The train will pile and wire twice its business case on a good night, if it gets bogged down, it'll do next to nothing a night. The business case itself was very cautious, it just didn't take into account getting next to nothing done each night as problems arose. It did slightly beat its business case over Christmas and into January, from what I've heard, getting an extra 1 or 2 piles per shift.
I know what I would have liked - a proper diesel loco powered pair of trains, one piling, one wiring but the wiring train was designed to try to keep adjacent lines open, doing more with some of the bigger Kirow crane designs needs adjacent line closures for the counterbalancing weights depending on crane size.
Geology - the results are why piles rather than dug concrete foundations are being used (there are some areas where the piles are backfilled with concrete too). There are a few areas where ground conditions are not as uniform as expected, but unless you drill bore holes and do survey work every 50 metres, it's possible to hit a boulder or water or some other feature. Ground conditions haven't been a massive problem, but they've stopped the HOPS from driving home every pile, requiring remedial visits from the higher powered Movax unit, which could have been part of the HOPS train but for the issues I've highlighted already.
Train length isn't an issue, train power was the issue, and for the best part of 20 years, we were told no electrification was going to happen, don't worry about it. That leads to ORR slapping down NR every time suggestions were made to electrification proof the network. It's only in recent years have we decided to use 25kV/750V DC compatible signalling equipment across the network, because 'you never know'.
Consulting local people is fine, but where do you start and stop, if I ask ****ed off commuters on Monday morning, alighting an overcrowded, slow and noisy Turbo at Paddington what they think of Goring residents, I can guarantee they'll be slated for NIMBYism, accused of being self centred and hypocritical, if I ask Goring residents what they think of their duty to people who commute, they'll say it's a lifestyle choice or personal decision and they might want to work locally, work from home etc. Consultation is fine, but the answers you get are beyond useless in many cases. What Goring has got, compared with the earlier F+F GE design of portal, is a good compromise.
OHL and signalling expertise has been building up for several years now, we're not blessed with over capacity, but projects aren't unduly being held up due to lack of staff. If things get out of sequence or behind, it can be an issue, we could do with more signalling staff but it's not something which would have made a massive difference to the GWep. There's generally not an issue with getting guys on the ground to erect wires and things either.
Training, of course, needs a long term plan of action. NR needs to know what it's going to be doing for the next 10 or 15 years to know how many people to train and in what disciplines. It all comes back to the 'no electrification' mantra we had from privatisation through to 2007/2008ish.
NR people wanted electrification, but the official line was no electrification, ORR critiques each spending plan, if we had been allowed more of a 'fitted for but not with' attitude for electrification, things would be much easier, but ORR didn't and doesn't allow NR to spend money or do things which are explicitly against government policy. We were all going to be using diesel trains powered by inexpensive bionic duckweed sourced biodiesel, if you remember the original HST2 documentation. That was government policy which NR focused on following.
I can't remember the precise story, but I believe DfT and NR people ended up on an MTU stall just after the first of the Euro IIIb engine designs were produced, for the then recently announced emissions legislation update, and realised that it wouldn't be possible to fit many diesel engines underneath trains without significant engineering challenges. It suddenly did not matter whether cheap biodiesel would be possible, it wouldn't be easy or cheap to build trains which could make use of it. That's when the official direction changed and the Electrification RUS was the result.
I have a funny feeling either Roger Ford or Ian Walmsley was involved manning the engine stall, and they might have pointed out the engine height/size issues to someone from DfT they knew.
Sounds like **** poor management all round to me, and we've all got to pick up the tab. Many thanks.
It's a catalogue of poor decisions, some are Government, some are DfT, some are ORR, some are industry, all are sitting at NR's door. We're the piggy in the middle.