Did Dr Beeching really do us wrong?

[poshbakerloo]

Did Dr Beeching really do us wrong?

My dad, who its also into his trains was ranting to me the other night about all the lines that closed under his control...

Whilst there were some stations and lines that closed that I don't think ever should have (Waverley route being one of them) I don't think it was all bad. There was a huge amount of modernisation went on aswell. Brand new multiple units, electrification of several lines, and even tho many hated the idea at the time, would it really have been so practical having 1000s of small branch lines going everywhere?

There may not have pretty (or that fast) but where would have been with out them...

 

[gordonthemoron]

god those DMUs were awful, although not as bad as Pacers

 

[eos]

The original DMU livery of green with whiskers and side stripes , suited 101's and others very well. Plain BR blue with thick yellow ends was awful. As regards not being fast , you have to compare it to what was available at the time . Much as I like steam, a flea ridden mark1 with powered coal coating throughout, which took an age for the loco to run around wasn't much for those wanting to travel. A clean DMU which acellerated well ( except when an engine failed) with all round 360 degree vision and ( relatively) clean windows was transforming travel.
Take a look at what was available in Germany as far back as the 1930's with their DMU and EMU compliments , and see just how archaic our railways were.

 

[37401]

Yes and no from me, yes because if we still had those branchlines traveling by rail vice car would be more convinent and no because some of those lines became heretage lines, cant imagine 170s and vomit comits on the SVR can you? id rather have Slug6 and the fiftys blasting down it

 

[Oswyntail]

Don't confuse Beeching with the Modernisation plan. The latter was in full swing before the "Good" Dr wielded his axe. Sadly, I believe he made one fundamental error in believing that trunk routes did not depend on feeder branches. Sure, there were many such that duplicated each other, and these were ripe for rationalisation. If he had concentrated on making the remaining branches more productive then the exercise could have worked. Instead we have the road dominated transport infrastructure of today which is nigh on impossible to roll back. And don't forget the other two who were perhaps more responsible; Ernest Marples, the Transport Minister, who commissioned Beeching with very tight parameters. And the other villain. whom everyone conveniently overlooks, Barbara Castle, who was the ministare responsible for implementing most of the recommendations.
And let us not forget that Beeching was also responsible for pushing block trains. Now, if he had done this alongside wagonload rather than instead of....

 

[150219]

Well, it's an interesting debate!

However it's worth pointing out that Beeching wasn't appointed until 1961, by which time the wheels of the Modernisation Plan implemented in the mid-50's had already been set in motion.

It's documented that as a consequence of the Modernistation Plan, that British Rail were very heavily in debt. One of the easiset methods of recouping that money was to close the lightest revenue earning lines. Duplicate lines were also easy to justify closed. Marylebone to Rugby, Nottingham, Sheffield and Manchester were all served from Euston and St. Pancras.

I wouldn't argue that the country has lost many railway lines that would certainly be a vast benefit now!

 

[Kneedown]

god those DMUs were awful, although not as bad as Pacers

They were fantastic, i used to love driving em. You were actually constantly doing something unlike on sprinters nowadays.
Mmmmm, the smell of parrafin and stale fag ash, the cramps in your left wrist, the whooosh of the vacuum brake, the dent in your thumb from constant attempts to relight the cab heater, the curses when you swopped ends realised you'd forgotten to bring the handles...happy days!

 

[NSEFAN]

Beeching only did what was politically acceptable at the time. He alone can't be made a scapegoat, as 150219 has pointed out, the drive to bring the railways forward had already been around for some time. Considering a huge amount of BR was terribly innefficient, cutbacks were needed to bring the railways out of the terrible mess they were in after the war. Okay, some closures were wrong, and the full scale plan of closing nearly all railways was ridiculous, but it wasn't seen as such as big issue at the time. Forward thinking has always been a skill our leaders tend to lack...

The thought of closing a line these days is generally unnacceptable, but in those days, the motorcar was seen as the way forward. However, as most families had only one car, traffic jams were not as common as they are now. Also, there were a lot more buses than there are now in rural areas, so if a railway closed, people could still get from A to B somehow.

In terms of trains, steam powered locomotives may be more impressive than a DMU or non-steam loco, but they are filthy, need much more attention and cost a lot more to run. Many of them were also very old and being pushed to their limit just to keep them running. There was also the problem of journey times and acceleration, with steam locos not being able to keep up with a modern DMU.

That's my understanding anyway. I personally think any closed lines should have had their routes safeguarded and not been built on. Selling the land was probably the only way to try and recover some of the money lost. Also, the number of experimental classes at the start of the diesel era was silly, as many non-standard types were only in service for a few years before being withdrawn and scrapped.

 

[Drsatan]

Also, the number of experimental classes at the start of the diesel era was silly, as many non-standard types were only in service for a few years before being withdrawn and scrapped.

Many of the experimental classes of locomotive were ordered under the Modernisation Program. Ideally, BR would have followed the German practice of electrifying all main lines while keeping some steam locomotives in service for the time being to avoid over-investment in diesels. However, by the time the Modernisation Plan was published, BR was running at a loss and decided that costly and wasteful 'panic buying' of lots of different locomotives was the way forward. However, this was very inefficient and wasteful because many steam locomotives, like the Standard class 5s, were only withdrawn after about 10 years of service; in fact the Standards were originally built to last into the 1970s.

BR also faced political pressures in that British locomotive builders were struggling due to lack of export orders. While it would have been cheaper to order, and then license produce (in fact, the Swindon-built class 42s and the NBL-built class 43s were scaled-down versions of the DB V200 class) American diesel-electrics or German diesel-hydraulics, that was considered politically unacceptable. Therefore, BR had to order lots of untried designs from a variety of manufacturers, some of which were complete disasters (e.g. the class 14, class 17, class 21 'Baby Deltics', many of the first-generation DMUs) that lasted for only a few years. Having lots of different classes meant that due to different coupling systems many couldn't work in multiple.

The Modernisation Plan failed to take into account changing requirements for the railways. Quite sensible options of reducing the costs of operating branch lines like line-singling, building 'bus stop' type halts, abolishing freight traffic and de-staffing rural stations weren't considered, even though BR was, IMO, heavily overmanned. Instead, the class 14s, 20s, and other type-1 diesels were intended as a direct replacement for steam locomotives on local passenger trains and pick-up goods, even though pick-up goods trains by then were becoming extinct because road haulage was cheaper for small consignments.

Finally, the Regions had far too much autonomy, IMO, of what they ordered. For instance, the WR went for diesel-hydraulics, the LMR went for big diesel-electrics, while the SR bought 'Thumpers' and the 73s. This duplication was pretty expensive, given that under the National Traction Plan of 1968 the diesel-hydraulics were to be gradually withdrawn even though many had only seen 10-15 years service. If BR had been more sensible with rolling stock procurement (for instance, by only ordering a few types of diesel and electric locomotive for various duties, and maybe only two or three classes of DMU for rural services), retained some classes of steam locomotive until the 1970s in order to avoid over-investment in diesels, and considered more carefully the role of the railways in years to come, then maybe BR wouldn't have become so indebted the government in the early 1960s came to view BR as a liability, which made the Beeching Plan, at the time, an attractive prospect.

But maybe hindsight shouldn't be taken so seriously...

 

[yorksrob]

The Modernisation Plan failed to take into account changing requirements for the railways. Quite sensible options of reducing the costs of operating branch lines like line-singling, building 'bus stop' type halts, abolishing freight traffic and de-staffing rural stations weren't considered, even though BR was, IMO, heavily overmanned. Instead, the class 14s, 20s, and other type-1 diesels were intended as a direct replacement for steam locomotives on local passenger trains and pick-up goods, even though pick-up goods trains by then were becoming extinct because road haulage was cheaper for small consignments.

Yes, thats certainly true. The failure to contemplate economy measures for whatever reason on some of the secondary routes and those branchlines with more potential in the run-up to the Beeching era definately added to the railway's financial problems and partly led to the axe.

That said, there are some definate failings which Dr Beeching and the political establishment of the time shouldn't be let off of the hook for:

1) Further failure to contemplate rationalisation rather than closure - this was simply not on the agenda at the time.
2) The strategic usefulness of secondary duplicate routes for flexibility.
3) the importance of loss making routes as feeder routes to the network.
4) The failure to safeguard trackbeds and structures where closure was inevitable.

Hindsight can be a marvellous thing - but there were plenty of voices at the time who warned the establishment of the potential loss to communities and problems with congestion for the future who were ignored at the time.

the Regions had far too much autonomy, IMO, of what they ordered. For instance, the WR went for diesel-hydraulics, the LMR went for big diesel-electrics, while the SR bought 'Thumpers' and the 73s

To be fair to the Southern, the Thumpers and 73's made sense from an efficiency point of view on account of their technical similarities to the Mk1 EMU's then being built.

 

[Domeyhead]

I have never seen an analysis where all the best modernisation practices since Beeching have been restrospectively modelled to see whether they could have saved any or all of the lines. My belief is that the huge percentage upturn in passenger numbers since the mid nineties could be fairly applied to all lines as an average, and coupled with dieselisation, single manning, colour light signalling, automated track maintenance etc etc a compelling business could have been made for much retention. Of course that does not mean that closed lines could now be reinstated but it does mean that if measures were taken to preserve routes or maintain skeleton services many lines would now be quite buoyant.
In Hampshire this clearly applies to Hythe<->Totton, Fareham<->Gosport, Alresford<->Winchester, and Ringwood<->Bournemouth West, but I do wonder whether it might also have saved Andover-Romsey, Bishops Waltham<->Botley, the Fareham diversion and even Lee on Solent<->Fareham which actually closed in about 1935!
Everyone will have their own local list but I reckon modern practices could (and should) have saved them.

 

[Helvellyn]

Of course rationalisation continued after Beeching. BR wanted to close the S&C throughout the 1980s, and now look at the line - a major freight route getting investment and gradually being built up.

Other factors were at work too. The Penrith-Keswick branch survived into the 1970s. Keswick Cockermouth closed earlier, and a big chunk of the route was used for the A66 east-west route. It's been said that closing the Penrith-Keswick section was to allow land to help dual that section of the A66 too. If the route had survived it'd have actually stood a chance of doing quite well, providing feed to the West Coast mainline.

There are also routes that closed that today many in the railway wish had survived. One of these is Alton-Winchester, which would have provided a brilliant diversion route for SWT during engineering works, as well as some local demand for say a Guildford-Southampton service. I think the fact the route was never electrified was its downfall, as it made justifying closure easier.

Domeyhead, Fareham to Gosport would seem a logical one in many ways. Especially given the congestion you get in Fareham too. Yet the plans seem to come back again and again to a guided busway, or the aborted tram scheme for Portsmouth. If the line was reinstated (and you'd have to replace the bridges countryside of Fareham to do this) I'd be proposing moving the 1Txx services between Portsmouth and Waterloo (via Eastleigh) to serve Gosport. Keep a Portsmouth to NW Hampshire link by running an hourly Portsmouth-Basingstoke service (which could serve Reading if third rail were extended). And if demand (and paths) were there run an hourly Gosport-Southampton service too to drive patronage up on the Netley line by having a half-hourly service. It'll never happen, and not just because 3-car EMUs would be best for a lot of the local services in Hampshire!

Of course, putting closed routes back is a lot harder. Costs are high, and benefits need to be equally so for serious consideration. You also need as much of the route to have survived as possible. If closure was originally driven in part to provide a routeing for a road scheme, then it is so much harder, and much less likely to happen.

 

[furryfeet]

Also, there were a lot more buses than there are now in rural areas, so if a railway closed, people could still get from A to B somehow.

Do not forget that one of the erroneous assumptions made during closure proceedings was that there would be a bus service that would adequately replace the train. More often than not, the replacement bus service would disappear because of low patronage shortly after it was introduced.

Can anyone think of the WORST replacement bus service that was offered in replacement of a railway that was closed due to Beeching ?

S&D and Haverhill to Sudbury spring to mind as two examples, where the replacement bus service was clearly inferior !

Haverhill is now one of the largest towns in the country without any rail links !

 

[Spagnoletti]

Beeching wasn't the real villain, he was working to a very clear brief.
Marples owned a construction company that was bidding for motorway work, not sure whether that kind of conflict of interest would be so easily overlooked these days, maybe he would have had to do more than just transfer his shares to his wife.
If anyone in 1961 could have foreseen the huge explosion in car ownership and consequently road traffic, then maybe they would have thought twice. As it is, they didn't and we are where we are. The upside is there is loads of preserved kit all over the country that would have been scrapped if the heritage railways hadn't existed to give them homes.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

BR also faced political pressures in that British locomotive builders were struggling due to lack of export orders. While it would have been cheaper to order, and then license produce (in fact, the Swindon-built class 42s and the NBL-built class 43s were scaled-down versions of the DB V200 class) American diesel-electrics or German diesel-hydraulics, that was considered politically unacceptable. Therefore, BR had to order lots of untried designs from a variety of manufacturers, some of which were complete disasters (e.g. the class 14, class 17, class 21 'Baby Deltics', many of the first-generation DMUs) that lasted for only a few years. Having lots of different classes meant that due to different coupling systems many couldn't work in multiple.

A politcal decision had been made to remove steam from the network, and there was a real rush to get the plan underway, which meant there was no time to test the different designs properly.
AFAIK it also became plain that fleets of small traction units (eg type 1 & 2) that could be worked in multiple for larger trains was not as cost effective to maintain as fewer, larger locos, so for the classes that weren't a complete disaster (see above) BR had effectively stranded costs maintaining the fleet it was left with after clearing out the real crap. It might have been more sensible to invest in improving RA on the routes at the edge of the network. Or just standardise on 37's

 

[paul1609]

Domeyhead, Fareham to Gosport would seem a logical one in many ways. Especially given the congestion you get in Fareham too. Yet the plans seem to come back again and again to a guided busway, or the aborted tram scheme for Portsmouth. If the line was reinstated (and you'd have to replace the bridges countryside of Fareham to do this) I'd be proposing moving the 1Txx services between Portsmouth and Waterloo (via Eastleigh) to serve Gosport. Keep a Portsmouth to NW Hampshire link by running an hourly Portsmouth-Basingstoke service (which could serve Reading if third rail were extended). And if demand (and paths) were there run an hourly Gosport-Southampton service too to drive patronage up on the Netley line by having a half-hourly service. It'll never happen, and not just because 3-car EMUs would be best for a lot of the local services in Hampshire!

Of course, putting closed routes back is a lot harder. Costs are high, and benefits need to be equally so for serious consideration. You also need as much of the route to have survived as possible. If closure was originally driven in part to provide a routeing for a road scheme, then it is so much harder, and much less likely to happen.

I cycle on the path that replaced the railway from Gosport to HMS Sultan. Whilst the cycle route is threaded through on more or less the original route re-opening to heavy rail would not be easy without considerable demolition. The original Fareham to Gosport curve on the junction with the Lee on Solent branch was lost under an industrial estate many years ago. Just past there a school has been built right up to where the track would have been and on the final stretch to Gosport Station a 1970s housing estate has been built over the line. Gosport Station itself is currently being rebuilt in to flats.

The line north of Military Road up to Fareham is more or less clear as royal Navy ammunition trains continued to RNAD Frater up until the mid 90s. However as an overall project I would say reopening is a non starter.

 

[Oswyntail]

... Therefore, BR had to order lots of untried designs from a variety of manufacturers, some of which were complete disasters (e.g. the class 14, class 17, class 21 'Baby Deltics', many of the first-generation DMUs) that lasted for only a few years. ....

I think this highlights a problem with a lot of the responses. The Class 14 was actually very successful, and not a "Modernisation Plan" design, but short-lived because of the move from hydraulic transmission; many examples had long and honourable industrial careers. No, the problem is that there is confusion between three phases:"Modernisation Plan" which produced the first generation diesels of which there were very many classes, and started in the mid-50s; "Beeching", which refers to the [over]rationalisation of the network and modernisation of some industrial practices, early to mid 60s; and "post-modernisation standardisation" when the results of the modernisation plan were "analysed" and standard classes agreed on (These were: Type 1 - Class 20; Type 2 - Class 25; Type 3 - Class 37; Type 4 - Class 47, not itself a Modernisation Plan class. There was no agreed need for a standard Type 5) late 60s/early 70s. It was as a part of this last phase that the decision to abandon hydraulics was made.
The real problem was that, post-war the railways were in a confused mess, and no one really knew what nationalisation was meant to achieve. Unlike much other industry, the basic infrastructure had not been destroyed, so its replacement and renewal was not seen as a priority. This allowed the developing road lobby to steal a march and become the dominant transport voice, so that, by the time it was realised what a mess railways were in they were fighting a losing battle.
It is worth remembering (if slightly off-topic) that the standardisation of classes was made very easy by the fact that the chosen classes were really the only ones that actually worked as intended. Even then, mistakes had been made such as the expanded order for class 31s and 45s.

 

[j0hn0]

In response to the first question, I don't think he did all that badly, although he could've done one or two things differently.

There were so many routes and so many duplicates that I think that he did pick the wrong ones in some cases. Like the Great Central through Nottingham to Sheffield and Manchester.

Also the Great Central south of Rugby could now serve as a high speed line, were the french planning that in 1961? Perhaps Japan were but that wouldnt ve been on our agenda at that time because it was cost cutting, not investment that was the purpose of the plan.

Branch lines well, its different. More straightforward really as they dont serve as diversionary or freight links.

 

[Fincra5]

What Beeching deffinately did wrong was to close the line from Uckfield-Lewes. Leaving the brighton mainline very busy.

 

[furryfeet]

It might have been more sensible to invest in improving RA on the routes at the edge of the network.

not just the edge either !

How about the main lines ? Although this was probably outside Beechings brief.

I seem to recall that the Macmillan govt imposed cost cutting measures during the WCML electrification in 1962 that restricted the height under the wires to 13ft 1 inch, which is still the "go anywhere" height today.
So in this instance Beeching was only partly responsible - did he actually resist the govt on this as he was the BR chairman at the time ?

Can anyone shed light on what happened here ?

 

[A0]

In response to the first question, I don't think he did all that badly, although he could've done one or two things differently.

There were so many routes and so many duplicates that I think that he did pick the wrong ones in some cases. Like the Great Central through Nottingham to Sheffield and Manchester.

Also the Great Central south of Rugby could now serve as a high speed line, were the french planning that in 1961? Perhaps Japan were but that wouldnt ve been on our agenda at that time because it was cost cutting, not investment that was the purpose of the plan.

Branch lines well, its different. More straightforward really as they dont serve as diversionary or freight links.

Beeching is often cited as the villain where the GCR is concerned - incorrectly.

The Beeching report actually had the GCR mainline retained as a secondary route. The closure of that one lies fair and square with the BR Midland managment of the time who, coincidentally, where all ex-London Midland men - for whom the GCR was "the opposition".

Had the GCR stayed under the control of BR Eastern Region (where it was originally assigned) or passed to BR Western Region (where the southern section was assigned to latterly) is in interesting question.

Such parochialism wasn't unique to BR London Midland - it's no coincidence that in the West and South West ex Southern routes suffered a far greater level of closures than their ex GWR counterparts.

And some other non-Beeching closures which were enacted by BR include - The Varsity Line (Oxford - Cambridge), Lewes - Uckfield, Bridport branch, Tunbridge Wells - Eridge.

Anyone who thinks BR was a friend to the railways is mistaken.

 

[paul1609]

What Beeching deffinately did wrong was to close the line from Uckfield-Lewes. Leaving the brighton mainline very busy.

Although Beeching did list the Hurst Green to lewes line as being unrenumerative the closure of Lewes to Uckfield was not Beechings plan it was down to BR and East Sussex Council

 

[Drsatan]

In Hampshire this clearly applies to Hythe<->Totton, Fareham<->Gosport, Alresford<->Winchester, and Ringwood<->Bournemouth West, but I do wonder whether it might also have saved Andover-Romsey, Bishops Waltham<->Botley, the Fareham diversion and even Lee on Solent<->Fareham which actually closed in about 1935! .

The Andover-Romsey line, also known as the 'Sprat and Winkle' was closed in 1964 under the Beeching Axe. Although the track had been relaid with CWR and 'Thumpers' had replaced M7s, Standard class 5s and other steam locomotives on local services BR decided the route was unprofitable and had to close. This was despite the fact that revenue for the route, IMO, was calculated from ticket sales from the Andover stations to intermediate stations as far as Romsey, whereas in fact most ticket sales were to Southampton and Pompey.

The line lost most of its traffic anyway when the former Midland and South West Junction Railway line to Swindon and Cheltenham closed in 1961 ( I think). The line currently survives from Andover to the MOD depot at Ludgershall. Prior to that many freight and cross-country services used the line.

There was a lot of opposition to the closure of the line, although one of the main arguments in favour of the line's closure was that whenever a down train left Andover Town station, it passed over the main road which resulted in huge traffic jams! IMO the line shouldn't have been closed because now it's impossible to travel between Andover (which since the 1960s has grown to a population of about 50000) and the Solent area (with a total population of about 250000), so quite a big market was loss. Now there isn't even a bus between Andover and Romsey

Other than that, Botley-Bishops Waltham closed to passengers in the early 1930s due to lack of use, but remained open for freight until the 1960s. I don't think reopening could be justified given the small size of the town; besides demand would be greatest for travel to Winchester which can be done by bus (Peter Symonds college kids, OAPs and the like). Lee on Solent - Fareham closed because the trams to Gosport provided a better service. If the Fareham-Gosport tram was built (which it now won't because DafT would rather see a guided busway built along the trackbed), then an extension from Gosport to Lee-on-Solent would probably be feasible.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

No, the problem is that there is confusion between three phases:"Modernisation Plan" which produced the first generation diesels of which there were very many classes, and started in the mid-50s; "Beeching", which refers to the [over]rationalisation of the network and modernisation of some industrial practices, early to mid 60s; and "post-modernisation standardisation" when the results of the modernisation plan were "analysed" and standard classes agreed on (These were: Type 1 - Class 20; Type 2 - Class 25; Type 3 - Class 37; Type 4 - Class 47, not itself a Modernisation Plan class. There was no agreed need for a standard Type 5) late 60s/early 70s. It was as a part of this last phase that the decision to abandon hydraulics was made.

Admittedly the class 20s were ordered for pick-up goods and local passenger services on the LM (I've seen photos of them on use on Euston-Tring locals in the early 60s) but because the traffic they were designed for disappeared, the LM decided to double-head them for use on MGR trains.

And, as part of the modernisation plan BR should have decided whether to standardise on diesel-hydraulics or diesel-electrics. If BR had decided on that rather than allowing each of the regions to do its own thing (although there are exceptions - for instance the SR needed an electro-diesel hence the 73, which has had a long and honourable career), then this would have been avoided. Moreover the mass scrapping of diesel-hydraulic locomotives in the late 60s/early 70s would have been avoided.

 

[gingerheid]

I think I would have to concede that times moved on and some of the lines had to close. Better roads and more cars meant that certain types of railway became as viable for moving passangers as the canals became for moving freight.

Railways had gone through a something similar to a dot com boom, and there were also railways in places that probably never should have had them, and competing railways in places that should only have had one.

However I think the axe swung too heavily, and it is regrettable that a lot of lines that should have stayed didn't (and many of them are still difficult to give the re-opening they deserve even thought they survived until the beginning of the 1980s ). His initial plans were also just plain barmy; the number of lines he initially wanted to close was worse than stupid.

 

[darkpowers]

Much of the blame is down to the double act of Beeching and Marples than Beeching alone. But Beeching himself wanted to go further and cut the trunk routes, but thankfully, his follow up plans were rejected and he went back to ICI.

I grew up in South East Wales where the passenger service on the Eastern Valley line from Newport to Pontypool and Blaenavon was axed in 1962. The closure cut off the then rapidly growing new town of Cwmbran from the passenger network. Not everybody had a car back then.

My father worked on several stations on the line in the late 50s and early 60s. He can recall, just prior to the closure, when timetables were suddenly altered to a very different pattern and as a result the train services no longer met with connecting services at Newport or Pontypool Road, and also were no longer convenient for workers travelling to and from shifts at Panteg steelworks or the Girlings Factory in Cwmbran. The changes put people off using the trains, which I suspect was the intention all along.

Edit: Another trick BR used, according to my father, was for all ticket revenues for longer distance journeys to be credited to Newport instead of the valley stations.

 

[swissrailpassion]

I live in Yorkshire which was brutally saveged by rail closures in the 60's. Many useful routes were closed.
It is essential in a transport system to have a network with wide access to many communities. Beeching cut this network and left many without a local railway.
In the 60's timetables were cut on many lines (eg Scarborough-Whitby the first train from Scarborough was 1045!) to enable a drop in numbers and then closure.
Rationalisation should have been the answer. Keep the track and routes but provide the services in a new way. Unfortunately this was not possible.
Beeching admitted that he wanted to close more lines and this ideology persisted throughout the 70's until the Settle and Carlisle rescue.

Thankfully Bob Reid (the first) turned things round.
Today the problems are still around but rather than line closures it is capacity which is the problem. We need to buy more trains and quickly to cope with demand and grow the business. A bus company would buy more buses to operate a busy service yet rail is very constrained. Pacers and Sprinter 150's are now ready for retirement. 25 years is surely long enough for these.

 

[Old Timer]

Anyone who thinks BR was a friend to the railways is mistaken.

BR had to live within budgets set by the Treasury.

You cannot spend what you dont have :roll:

 

[Katherine]

In the 60's timetables were cut on many lines (eg Scarborough-Whitby the first train from Scarborough was 1045!) to enable a drop in numbers and then closure.

I think the reason for this line closure was the unstable nature of the terrain the line was sited on. Prone to coastal erosion and landslides.

 

[A0]

BR had to live within budgets set by the Treasury.

You cannot spend what you dont have :roll:

True, but many in BR management weren't commercially minded, consequently many actions which might have reduced costs, thereby ensuring more lines remained viable, weren't pursued.

Example - how many lightly used branch lines retained their fully staffed stations rather than move to fare collection on the train ?

How many "spanish practises" existed in BR of the 1960s and 70s ?

How about the ordering of steam locos which were built as late as 1960 which saw less than 8 years use? How about the ordering of locos to support traffic which was in terminal decline ?

Beeching brought about some basic disciplines which if BR had adopted from its inception in 1948, would have prevented some of the Beeching closures.

 

[dhutch]

.. he made one fundamental error in believing that trunk routes did not depend on feeder branches...

Thats it wasnt it.
- That and closing the central line.

 

[Ivo]

Beeching himself though wasn't the only threat to the railways, as we all know. Even after his second plan was rejected the situation was barely any better, courtesy of all the various reasons stated before and more. But what of one David Serpell, who came to prominence twenty years after Beeching? What if his proposals had been passed, especially his idea of having a "commercial" railway?