Cost effective alternative to Beeching.

[PeterC]

It is remarkable to think that when HM The Queen opened the Victoria Line in 1969 (complete with ‘automatic’ DOO trains and automatic gates opened by state-of-the-art magnetic tickets) she had to put a sixpence [a 2.5 pence coin for younger readers] in a ‘single fare’ machine. It didn’t work. Neither did the second one! Tells you all that you need to know about the sophistication of mechanised UK ticket issue in the 1960s.

The 6d coin was notorious for failing in any sort of coin operated machine. I would always use other denominations where possible be it for a tube fare or a bar of chocolate.

 

[PeterC]

My own family were part of the 1960's motorcar revolution. My father adored driving and still misses it. As you say, when we went anywhere as a family, we were more likely to take the car.

Yet, like I suspect the majority, we were a one car family. When my mother took me to visit relatives during the week, the train was the only sensible alternative. It was a similar story if we went shopping anywhere other than my home town. And when my sister went to University in London in the 1980's, guess how she came back and visited every weekend.

The narrative that 'everyone' in the 1960's/70's was getting a car was a very incomplete picture. I exect much more so than now, when families are more likely to have two or even more cars. But then what did mere housewives and students and people who couldn't afford cars matter to politicians in the 1960's and 70's, when they were busy building the future in concrete.

When I went to university in 1970 it was almost unheard of for people to be ferried there by their parents. Lugguage went in advance and we were all considered compitent to buy our own tickets. Come to that parents didn't go to the open days for prospective students and again we travelled by train.

These days parents who I have spoken to don't consider their 18 year old offspring as capapble of making their own travel arrangements and the need to transport more than a suitcase necesitates using the car anyway.

 

[yorksrob]

When I went to university in 1970 it was almost unheard of for people to be ferried there by their parents. Lugguage went in advance and we were all considered compitent to buy our own tickets. Come to that parents didn't go to the open days for prospective students and again we travelled by train.

These days parents who I have spoken to don't consider their 18 year old offspring as capapble of making their own travel arrangements and the need to transport more than a suitcase necesitates using the car anyway.

In the 90's my folks gave me a lift at the start of the year with all my stuff, but all other journeys were undertaken solo by train.

 

[coppercapped]

The "prevailing" view was not shared by a large proportion of the public

The 'prevailing view' at the time - having lived through it - was that most people were not affected and so most people didn't care whether the trains ran or not. Most of the people who used railways used the main lines or suburban services which were not significantly affected - but neither was this number a 'large proportion of the public'.

Several closure proposals raised no objections whatsoever.

People were sad that picturesque old branch lines were going - but it was the living museum aspect which troubled them, not the loss of a transport service.

 

[coppercapped]

When I went to university in 1970 it was almost unheard of for people to be ferried there by their parents. Lugguage went in advance and we were all considered compitent to buy our own tickets. Come to that parents didn't go to the open days for prospective students and again we travelled by train.

These days parents who I have spoken to don't consider their 18 year old offspring as capapble of making their own travel arrangements and the need to transport more than a suitcase necesitates using the car anyway.

Absolutely.

I went to Uni in 1962 - under my own steam and with my luggage sent PLA. In all the years I was in London my father drove me there once - and that was only because he had just bought a new car! And if I recall correctly none of the Unis to which I had applied even had such a thing as an 'open day'!

 

[yorksrob]

The 'prevailing view' at the time - having lived through it - was that most people were not affected and so most people didn't care whether the trains ran or not. Most of the people who used railways used the main lines or suburban services which were not significantly affected - but neither was this number a 'large proportion of the public'.

Several closure proposals raised no objections whatsoever.

People were sad that picturesque old branch lines were going - but it was the living museum aspect which troubled them, not the loss of a transport service.

Yes, several closures produced no objections. Several produced many. People who used them for shopping, people who used them to go to school, people who used them to visit residents. Shoreham - Christs Hospital was one such line that garnered considerable local support against closure, all to no avail.

 

[coppercapped]

Yes, several closures produced no objections. Several produced many. People who used them for shopping, people who used them to go to school, people who used them to visit residents. Shoreham - Christs Hospital was one such line that garnered considerable local support against closure, all to no avail.

How many people, in absolute terms, used the trains every day/week/month/whatever. How many people per train was that?

Was this number a 'large proportion of the public'?

 

[RT4038]

Then the prevailing view was wrong.

One could argue that the Government could and perhaps should have kept a tighter control of what the modernisation money was spent on (although as they hadn't reformed the common carrier legislation, it's hard to see that they would have made different spending decisions anyway) but that's no reason not to issue a tightly controlled grant for a specific purpose, such as realising scrap value or rationalising passenger routes.

You're happy to point the finger of blame for pretty much everything under the sun at the modernisation plan, yet in your eyes, the likes of Beeching/Marples/Fraser are absolved from responsibility for any poor decisions that they made because you've adopted uncritically the Establishment view of the railways as a bottomless pit, rather than a vital public service. The "prevailing" view was not shared by a large proportion of the public who could see that the cuts of the 60's went too far, and had the politicians been subject to the kind of scrutiny we would expect today, it's unlikely that they would have been able to get away with the extent of the cuts that they did.

Maybe the view was wrong in hindsight, but it was the prevailing view! And I can understand exactly why it was the prevailing view.

I am not sure how the Government could have kept a tighter control on what the modernisation money was spent on - 55 years on and they are pretty hopeless at keeping a tight rein on railway finances now! The railways had gone through a long period of investment starvation, and suddenly there was largesse. No doubt this was seen as a means of solving all sorts of problems of the previous years, replacing worn out equipment and in efforts in regaining the huge amount of traffic lost since the end of the war. However, before spending the money, no study was done to determine the future place of the railway in the transport mix. This could not have been done by Railwaymen - turkeys do not vote for Christmas - who would have been unable to do this dispassionately, especially if they were spending other peoples (taxpayers) money. This comment is not meant as an insult, just reflecting human nature. The politicians were still arguing about who should own the railways (and transport in general) and were not at that time worrying about which mode should do what. Whatever, the prevailing view by '61 was that the railways had their investment money, it had not solved the deficit and that no more money was to be spent. There was no question of spending more money to rationalise passenger routes. Some small grants were later on allowed to rationalise the trunk routes that were left, but this was to realise scrap value for investment elsewhere, not retaining more loss making mileage. The railways were starting to be micro-managed!

You raise an interesting question about criticism of the modernisation plan vs. criticism of the Beeching plan. I suppose the difference is that the railway management had a pretty clean sheet as to what they spent the modernisation plan money on. Whatever they did, there was an expectation (maybe unrealistic) that the investment would modernise the railways, reduce working expenses sufficiently to eliminate the deficit. They could do what they wanted. Their actions didn't eliminate the deficit - it actually got worse. I am not criticising their actions - I am sure they were tied up in their thinking and it was not realistic to expect them to propose elimination of sections of the business (even if they could from a legislative point of view) for which road transport had taken over. So it took a crisis to get the necessary legislative changes - not an unusual occurrence in all walks of life! By which time it was too late, the money had run out. Criticism of the Beeching plan almost exclusively presupposes that more money was going to be provided by Government to prop up hopeless lines / provide investment money to rationalise on the grounds of 'vital public service' or future proofing or some such. But there was no more money.

I do not accept your view that the majority of these lines were a 'vital' public service - this is hyperbole. They may have been vital to a very small number of people. Yes, their closure may have caused some inconvenience .... occasionally hardship, but the country did not stop, did not economically nose dive. Some people bought cars, some rode on buses, some changed jobs, some changed their travel habits and holidayed in those places still served by rail. Many, possibly the majority, of the population never went on a train (or only once or twice per year). Some of those will have objected at statutory closure proceedings but in spite of their protestations the country did not want to afford the 'Cuckoo' line carrying an average of 7 passengers per train. And there were many, many of these lines. The largest proportion of the public did not care about the closures. A bit of nostalgia here and there made up your large proportion. Actual train riders affected with ruined lives - hardly any!

There were a few (only a few) lines that closure affected the social fabric of the area. It was the politicians job to fund these if they felt it neccessary. Some they did and some they didn't.

 

[coppercapped]

RT4038 - thank you. This is exactly what I have been banging on about.

What Yorksrob doesn't seem to understand or accept is that decisions made in the past cannot be judged using todays values or knowledge of what has happened in the intervening years.

 

[RT4038]

RT4038 - thank you. This is exactly what I have been banging on about.

What Yorksrob doesn't seem to understand or accept is that decisions made in the past cannot be judged using todays values or knowledge of what has happened in the intervening years.

And I fully understand Yorksrob frustration that areas previously served by closed lines have now become very desirable areas to live, with expanded populations which would now make some of these lines more of an economical proposition. Ironically usually these areas have become desirable because of railway investment concentrated on the best routes (and better roads and road vehicles), rather than spreading the jam thinly over the no-hopers in 1964. But that is the rich tapestry of life. Even the fabled Market Weighton is quite desirable as a dormitory of York, in spite of no railway.

 

[Dr Hoo]

RT4038 - thank you. This is exactly what I have been banging on about.

What Yorksrob doesn't seem to understand or accept is that decisions made in the past cannot be judged using todays values or knowledge of what has happened in the intervening years.

+1 again.

Just come across Transport Statistics Great Britain for 1965.

Mode of travel to work in 'Provincial conurbations' (Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Manchester) was 3% rail, 55% bus.
In 'Rural' areas it was 1% rail, 23% bus.
In 'Small towns' (3,000-25,000 population) it was 2% rail, 20% bus.

So for every rail passenger distraught at the prospect of losing their frequently largely empty train there were typically 10-20 times as many neighbours whose response would be along the lines of "welcome to the way the rest of us have to manage" (rather than "I'd be happy to see my taxes go up so that you can carry on").

Incidentally, to give my two-pennyworth on the 'family student travel arrangements in the 1960s' sub-thread, my elder sister went to college in Worcester when we lived in the Birmingham area. Apart from the occasional journey in my dad's car with the start/end-of-year load of stuff she went on the nice new Midland Red M5 Motorway coach. In my youthful innocence I asked why she didn't use the train. Well, with an irregular mixture of services from either Snow Hill or New Street to either Shrub Hill or Foregate Street, with trains often late having come from far afield and typically taking an hour it was more frequent, simple, comfortable and cheaper. A no-brainer for my sister and a lot of others were making similar decisions at the same time.

 

[RT4038]

+1 again.

Just come across Transport Statistics Great Britain for 1965.

Mode of travel to work in 'Provincial conurbations' (Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Manchester) was 3% rail, 55% bus.
In 'Rural' areas it was 1% rail, 23% bus.
In 'Small towns' (3,000-25,000 population) it was 2% rail, 20% bus.

So for every rail passenger distraught at the prospect of losing their frequently largely empty train there were typically 10-20 times as many neighbours whose response would be along the lines of "welcome to the way the rest of us have to manage" (rather than "I'd be happy to see my taxes go up so that you can carry on").

Incidentally, to give my two-pennyworth on the 'family student travel arrangements in the 1960s' sub-thread, my elder sister went to college in Worcester when we lived in the Birmingham. Apart from the occasional journey in my dad's car with the start/end-of-year load of stuff she went on the nice new Midland Red M5 Motorway coach. In my youthful innocence I asked why she didn't use the train. Well, with an irregular mixture of services from either Snow Hill or New Street to either Shrub Hill or Foregate Street, with trains often late having come from far afield and typically taking an hour it was more frequent, simple, comfortable and cheaper. A no-brainer for my sister and a lot of others were making similar decisions at the same time.

Interesting.

I think it is difficult for many now to comprehend how few the passengers were on the lines proposed for closure, and indeed how much has changed both socially and economically since that era. For local journeys into market towns the omnibus was the mode of choice over branch line trains. Think of the current Newquay branch in the winter, all over the country!
An example, and quite topical with the proposed rebuilding of the East-West railway: a former work colleague in his younger days had been involved in the passenger census taking when the Cambridge-Bedford section closed at the end of 1967. The morning peak train 07h30 from Cambridge, arriving Bedford (St. John's) about 08h25 [for workers and schoolchildren] had about 20 passengers aboard. There was no comparable peak time bus available east of Sandy from Cambridge (i.e. the train had the entire public transport market), but 6-7 55-70 seater double deckers, all fully loaded, catering for Sandy, Blunham and Willington to Bedford peak passengers.

 

[yorksrob]

How many people, in absolute terms, used the trains every day/week/month/whatever. How many people per train was that?

Was this number a 'large proportion of the public'?

According to James Buckman "The Steyning Line" the route the figure in 1962 was 1087 per day, based on passengers embarking at or alighting at Steyning line stations (not through traffic). The route had 1215 season tickets in 1965 (this had been 1628 in 1959, however the closure decision probably put a lot of people off).

 

[yorksrob]

Maybe the view was wrong in hindsight, but it was the prevailing view! And I can understand exactly why it was the prevailing view.

I am not sure how the Government could have kept a tighter control on what the modernisation money was spent on - 55 years on and they are pretty hopeless at keeping a tight rein on railway finances now! The railways had gone through a long period of investment starvation, and suddenly there was largesse. No doubt this was seen as a means of solving all sorts of problems of the previous years, replacing worn out equipment and in efforts in regaining the huge amount of traffic lost since the end of the war. However, before spending the money, no study was done to determine the future place of the railway in the transport mix. This could not have been done by Railwaymen - turkeys do not vote for Christmas - who would have been unable to do this dispassionately, especially if they were spending other peoples (taxpayers) money. This comment is not meant as an insult, just reflecting human nature. The politicians were still arguing about who should own the railways (and transport in general) and were not at that time worrying about which mode should do what. Whatever, the prevailing view by '61 was that the railways had their investment money, it had not solved the deficit and that no more money was to be spent. There was no question of spending more money to rationalise passenger routes. Some small grants were later on allowed to rationalise the trunk routes that were left, but this was to realise scrap value for investment elsewhere, not retaining more loss making mileage. The railways were starting to be micro-managed!

You raise an interesting question about criticism of the modernisation plan vs. criticism of the Beeching plan. I suppose the difference is that the railway management had a pretty clean sheet as to what they spent the modernisation plan money on. Whatever they did, there was an expectation (maybe unrealistic) that the investment would modernise the railways, reduce working expenses sufficiently to eliminate the deficit. They could do what they wanted. Their actions didn't eliminate the deficit - it actually got worse. I am not criticising their actions - I am sure they were tied up in their thinking and it was not realistic to expect them to propose elimination of sections of the business (even if they could from a legislative point of view) for which road transport had taken over. So it took a crisis to get the necessary legislative changes - not an unusual occurrence in all walks of life! By which time it was too late, the money had run out. Criticism of the Beeching plan almost exclusively presupposes that more money was going to be provided by Government to prop up hopeless lines / provide investment money to rationalise on the grounds of 'vital public service' or future proofing or some such. But there was no more money.

I do not accept your view that the majority of these lines were a 'vital' public service - this is hyperbole. They may have been vital to a very small number of people. Yes, their closure may have caused some inconvenience .... occasionally hardship, but the country did not stop, did not economically nose dive. Some people bought cars, some rode on buses, some changed jobs, some changed their travel habits and holidayed in those places still served by rail. Many, possibly the majority, of the population never went on a train (or only once or twice per year). Some of those will have objected at statutory closure proceedings but in spite of their protestations the country did not want to afford the 'Cuckoo' line carrying an average of 7 passengers per train. And there were many, many of these lines. The largest proportion of the public did not care about the closures. A bit of nostalgia here and there made up your large proportion. Actual train riders affected with ruined lives - hardly any!

There were a few (only a few) lines that closure affected the social fabric of the area. It was the politicians job to fund these if they felt it neccessary. Some they did and some they didn't.

One way the Government could have kept a tighter control on Modernisation plan spending would have been to get rid of the common carrier obligation. That would have been a fairly strong signal not to invest in lots of marshalling yards etc. It didn't. It's hard to think of a stronger signal to industry to invest in a form of traffic, than to have a legal obligation to carry that traffic. It's not even as though we are talking about different Governments with different spending priorities - this was the one Conservative Government 1951 - 1964 that oversaw both the Modernisation plan and the Beeching cuts.

And if the Modernisation plan didn't eliminate the defecit, neither did the Beeching plan. It's accepted that the railway reached it's lowest point of passenger use in 1983, after twenty years of Beeching Plan "magic".

In terms of the Modernisation plan, it's worth reading this article from the Southern Electric Group about the Kent Electrification scheme. In particular the following paragraph:

"The electrification scheme produced a major increase in traffic on the lines covered. During the 9 months following the introduction of Phase One services, traffic levels as measured by numbers of tickets sold increased by 32%. Certain stations showed quite spectacular increases in ticket sales - at Canterbury West, for example, sales increased by 49.5% comparing the first 9 months of electrification with the previous 9 months, whilst at Teynham the corresponding figure was 155%."

A very good investment that increased passenger numbers and revenue. That the Government chose to paint the plan as a black hole was down to the political preference to spend public money on roads instead.

 

[yorksrob]

RT4038 - thank you. This is exactly what I have been banging on about.

What Yorksrob doesn't seem to understand or accept is that decisions made in the past cannot be judged using todays values or knowledge of what has happened in the intervening years.

And yet somehow it is allowed to judge the actions of railwaymen by today's values or knowledge of what has happened in the intervening years, but not politicians or paid consultants (which is effectively what Beeching was). You keep on judging the Modernisation plan and I'll keep on judging the Beeching one.

 

[RT4038]

According to James Buckman "The Steyning Line" the route the figure in 1962 was 1087 per day, based on passengers embarking at or alighting at Steyning line stations (not through traffic). The route had 1215 season tickets in 1965 (this had been 1628 in 1959, however the closure decision probably put a lot of people off).

And yet somehow it is allowed to judge the actions of railwaymen by today's values or knowledge of what has happened in the intervening years, but not politicians or paid consultants (which is effectively what Beeching was). You keep on judging the Modernisation plan and I'll keep on judging the Beeching one.

There is not much point in judging either! I have not judged the actions of the railwaymen - I am sure the decisions were taken in the circumstances of the time - the politicians of 1960 did judge them though. An interesting thought to muse on: What would have been the result of the Modernisation plan money in the hands of Doctor B?

 

[RT4038]

One way the Government could have kept a tighter control on Modernisation plan spending would have been to get rid of the common carrier obligation. That would have been a fairly strong signal not to invest in lots of marshalling yards etc. It didn't. It's hard to think of a stronger signal to industry to invest in a form of traffic, than to have a legal obligation to carry that traffic. It's not even as though we are talking about different Governments with different spending priorities - this was the one Conservative Government 1951 - 1964 that oversaw both the Modernisation plan and the Beeching cuts.

And if the Modernisation plan didn't eliminate the defecit, neither did the Beeching plan. It's accepted that the railway reached it's lowest point of passenger use in 1983, after twenty years of Beeching Plan "magic".

In terms of the Modernisation plan, it's worth reading this article from the Southern Electric Group about the Kent Electrification scheme. In particular the following paragraph:

"The electrification scheme produced a major increase in traffic on the lines covered. During the 9 months following the introduction of Phase One services, traffic levels as measured by numbers of tickets sold increased by 32%. Certain stations showed quite spectacular increases in ticket sales - at Canterbury West, for example, sales increased by 49.5% comparing the first 9 months of electrification with the previous 9 months, whilst at Teynham the corresponding figure was 155%."

A very good investment that increased passenger numbers and revenue. That the Government chose to paint the plan as a black hole was down to the political preference to spend public money on roads instead.

Just because you have a legal obligation to carry a traffic, (which railway management had been trying to change since the 30s) doesn't necessarily mean it must be invested in.

The Modernisation Plan didn't eliminate the deficit (which was probably unattainable anyway), but the Beeching plan certainly reduced the amount of money being thrown at the problem.

No doubt the Kent Coast electrification was a good investment - pity all the investment wasn't like that. The Government chose to paint the plan as a black hole because the outcome of the whole plan did not go as they intended. You keep banging on about road investment instead of rail - every country was doing that and that was what the people wanted - freedom from the tyranny of public transport timetables, staff and management. Sentiments which prevail to the present day.

 

[Dr Hoo]

One way the Government could have kept a tighter control on Modernisation plan spending would have been to get rid of the common carrier obligation. That would have been a fairly strong signal not to invest in lots of marshalling yards etc. It didn't. It's hard to think of a stronger signal to industry to invest in a form of traffic, than to have a legal obligation to carry that traffic. It's not even as though we are talking about different Governments with different spending priorities - this was the one Conservative Government 1951 - 1964 that oversaw both the Modernisation plan and the Beeching cuts.

And if the Modernisation plan didn't eliminate the defecit, neither did the Beeching plan. It's accepted that the railway reached it's lowest point of passenger use in 1983, after twenty years of Beeching Plan "magic".

In terms of the Modernisation plan, it's worth reading this article from the Southern Electric Group about the Kent Electrification scheme. In particular the following paragraph:

"The electrification scheme produced a major increase in traffic on the lines covered. During the 9 months following the introduction of Phase One services, traffic levels as measured by numbers of tickets sold increased by 32%. Certain stations showed quite spectacular increases in ticket sales - at Canterbury West, for example, sales increased by 49.5% comparing the first 9 months of electrification with the previous 9 months, whilst at Teynham the corresponding figure was 155%."

A very good investment that increased passenger numbers and revenue. That the Government chose to paint the plan as a black hole was down to the political preference to spend public money on roads instead.

I was always taught to be very suspicious of time series statistics in percentages alone! 32% of what, for example?

As a Kent railwayman I loved the electric services and rode on them (and helped to manage them) day after day. The overall Modernisation Plan projects made a huge difference.

But let's not forget what a rubbish service existed before. From Teynham it wasn't even realistically possible to commute by rail to the adjacent stations of Faversham and Sittingbourne for a conventional 9-5 (or 8-4) job until the third rail arrived. Canterbury West also had very poor and irregular services in steam days so there was inevitably a lot of suppressed demand. Sadly totally un-businesslike timetables were endemic across large parts of the network, often even after DMUs were introduced. Other regions tended to be worse than the Southern. No wonder many people had switched to buses or bought cars.

Whilst retention of the Common Carrier obligation undoubtedly inhibited a more commercial approach to freight it should not be forgotten that many lines were closed to goods traffic before Beeching arrived on the scene. Even quite a few between 1948 and 1951 in fact.

 

[Killingworth]

Nostalgia and hindsight.

Market Weighton, is now commuting territory for Hull as well as York, but not so by rail in 1961 when the earliest arrival in Hull from York was at 9.26, but taking only 20 minutes from Market Weighton. The service was aimed at York where the earliest trains arrived at 8.04 and 8.55 after taking 39 and 30 minutes respectively from Market Weighton. No Sunday service. I wouldn't have considered that a market driven service, more an anachronistic remnant of an earlier age. An end to end journey time of just under the hour was about the same as I allowed when travelling by car between the two cites about 1973. Yes,that line should have been taken in hand and revamped.

Back in the 1950s Penrith was a junction station for trains via Keswick from Whitehaven. I was taken along that line in 1957 soon after DMUs arrived. It was lightly used but if it had remained open I'm sure it would be doing well today.

Penrith also had a direct service of 65 miles to Darlington via Kirby Stephen taking about 2 hours and running 3 times a day. Who were routes like that being run for? In 1957 it was still steam hauled and our train was all but deserted, the two of us possibly the only passengers for the greater part of the journey up to Barnard Castle. 3 carriages, I think. No wonder it only remains from Barnard Castle to Darlington. Conversion to DMU in 1958 would have made far too little difference to the costs.

 

[yorksrob]

There is not much point in judging either! I have not judged the actions of the railwaymen - I am sure the decisions were taken in the circumstances of the time - the politicians of 1960 did judge them though. An interesting thought to muse on: What would have been the result of the Modernisation plan money in the hands of Doctor B?

Do you think that more money would have led the Dr to modify his view of the railway concentrating 'only on what it does best' ?

Personally, I suspect not. Ithink that Dr B probably believed too much in that idealised world where passengers package themselves up neatly on to buses, to be collected at the nearest trunk interchange. I don't believe that he would have been prepared to make the necessary messy compromises to be left with a functioning passenger network. Not every route can be a heavy commuter flow or InterCity trunk route.

 

[RT4038]

Nostalgia and hindsight.

Market Weighton, is now commuting territory for Hull as well as York, but not so by rail in 1961 when the earliest arrival in Hull from York was at 9.26, but taking only 20 minutes from Market Weighton. The service was aimed at York where the earliest trains arrived at 8.04 and 8.55 after taking 39 and 30 minutes respectively from Market Weighton. No Sunday service. I wouldn't have considered that a market driven service, more an anachronistic remnant of an earlier age. An end to end journey time of just under the hour was about the same as I allowed when travelling by car between the two cites about 1973. Yes,that line should have been taken in hand and revamped.

Back in the 1950s Penrith was a junction station for trains via Keswick from Whitehaven. I was taken along that line in 1957 soon after DMUs arrived. It was lightly used but if it had remained open I'm sure it would be doing well today.

Penrith also had a direct service of 65 miles to Darlington via Kirby Stephen taking about 2 hours and running 3 times a day. Who were routes like that being run for? In 1957 it was still steam hauled and our train was all but deserted, the two of us possibly the only passengers for the greater part of the journey up to Barnard Castle. 3 carriages, I think. No wonder it only remains from Barnard Castle to Darlington. Conversion to DMU in 1958 would have made far too little difference to the costs.

Market Weighton would have been hardly commuting territory from Hull at all in that era. In the 1962/3 timetable the first southbound train was at 08h22, arriving in Hull at 08h51. There were two commuting trains towards York, arriving at 08h01 and 08h51. But you are judging the service with 2019 eyes - people just didn't do long distance commuting then. If you lived in Market Weighton and got a job in Hull, you moved to Hull. Simple. There have been massive social and infrastructure changes since then which encourage commuting - better paying jobs, better roads, Ofsted reports, spouses in careers, house purchase and rental markets.

With 19 manned level crossings, the rolling stock capable of being transferred elsewhere to eliminate steam traction, and the end to end traffic able to transfer to another route, (5 trains each way were already scheduled via the alternate route already), splendid omnibus services already available for local trafic, it was an obvious candidate for closure. Rather spend that investment money elsewhere.

 

[yorksrob]

Just because you have a legal obligation to carry a traffic, (which railway management had been trying to change since the 30s) doesn't necessarily mean it must be invested in.

The Modernisation Plan didn't eliminate the deficit (which was probably unattainable anyway), but the Beeching plan certainly reduced the amount of money being thrown at the problem.

No doubt the Kent Coast electrification was a good investment - pity all the investment wasn't like that. The Government chose to paint the plan as a black hole because the outcome of the whole plan did not go as they intended. You keep banging on about road investment instead of rail - every country was doing that and that was what the people wanted - freedom from the tyranny of public transport timetables, staff and management. Sentiments which prevail to the present day.

Add to the Kent Coast, the Clackton line, the WCML, the Glasgow blue trains etc.

If Dr B had been in charge of the Kent electrification, I wonder would we have got Strood or Ashford to Maidstone, or Ashford to Ramsgate, or would the network in Kent today be as motheaten as that in Sussex or Hampshire.

The Beeching cuts didn't provide 'freedom from the tyranny of the public transport timetable'. If you were wealthy enough, you could already buy a car. They curtailed the freedom of those who didn't have access to motor transport.

 

[yorksrob]

I was always taught to be very suspicious of time series statistics in percentages alone! 32% of what, for example?

As a Kent railwayman I loved the electric services and rode on them (and helped to manage them) day after day. The overall Modernisation Plan projects made a huge difference.

But let's not forget what a rubbish service existed before. From Teynham it wasn't even realistically possible to commute by rail to the adjacent stations of Faversham and Sittingbourne for a conventional 9-5 (or 8-4) job until the third rail arrived. Canterbury West also had very poor and irregular services in steam days so there was inevitably a lot of suppressed demand. Sadly totally un-businesslike timetables were endemic across large parts of the network, often even after DMUs were introduced. Other regions tended to be worse than the Southern. No wonder many people had switched to buses or bought cars.

Whilst retention of the Common Carrier obligation undoubtedly inhibited a more commercial approach to freight it should not be forgotten that many lines were closed to goods traffic before Beeching arrived on the scene. Even quite a few between 1948 and 1951 in fact.

I don't doubt that you're correct that pre electrification timetables were erratic, but that's part of the reason why the scheme was so vital. The problem is that the Establishment at the time uncritically bought into the narrative thet the plan was 'money down a black hole', which in turn paved the way for the bad decisions later on. Going back to your previous post, I don't believe for one moment that reducing the service on the Marshlink from its hourly shuttle (two hourly on Sundays) would have achieved anything, other than run the line down.

 

[yorksrob]

Market Weighton would have been hardly commuting territory from Hull at all in that era. In the 1962/3 timetable the first southbound train was at 08h22, arriving in Hull at 08h51. There were two commuting trains towards York, arriving at 08h01 and 08h51. But you are judging the service with 2019 eyes - people just didn't do long distance commuting then. If you lived in Market Weighton and got a job in Hull, you moved to Hull. Simple. There have been massive social and infrastructure changes since then which encourage commuting - better paying jobs, better roads, Ofsted reports, spouses in careers, house purchase and rental markets.

With 19 manned level crossings, the rolling stock capable of being transferred elsewhere to eliminate steam traction, and the end to end traffic able to transfer to another route, (5 trains each way were already scheduled via the alternate route already), splendid omnibus services already available for local trafic, it was an obvious candidate for closure. Rather spend that investment money elsewhere.

If railway men were expected to foresee the death of the pick-up freight, perhaps the politicians and their consultants could have had a little more foresight about future trends. Longer distance commuting and road congestion were already known phenomena. It's not inconceivable that a route linking two or three medium sized population centres such as Market Weighton and Pocklington to the larger urban areas of Hull and York would build upon its existing customer basis. A small grant to get the route over the hurdle of automating its level crossings and get it covering its day to day costs in the meantime would have been money well spent.

Politicians and consultants are, afterall, paid to show some modicum of foresight and foreward planning.

 

[DerekC]

An important way Beeching could have been different in a positive sense would have been to value the transport corridors which lines up for closure represented and to keep the important ones free of development so that they could be re-used if needed. This was the approach adopted in France, but the UK government always seems to have lacked any kind of long term vision. As has been said many times, the best example is Oxford - Bletchley - Cambridge, which was closed as a through route at the same time as the announcement of Milton Keynes as a new city, but there must be many others. Selling off land piecemeal in places like Tavistock, making restoration of Exeter - Plymouth via Okehampton much more difficult, is another. That isn't hindsight because I can recall the issue being discussed at the time. Transport in and around London got much more attention - there were strategic studies done after WWII which set in place long term objectives and corridors to be protected which had big benefits for the future - but nothing similar seems to have been done for the rest of the country.

 

[d9009alycidon]

An important way Beeching could have been different in a positive sense would have been to value the transport corridors which lines up for closure represented and to keep the important ones free of development so that they could be re-used if needed. This was the approach adopted in France, but the UK government always seems to have lacked any kind of long term vision. As has been said many times, the best example is Oxford - Bletchley - Cambridge, which was closed as a through route at the same time as the announcement of Milton Keynes as a new city, but there must be many others. Selling off land piecemeal in places like Tavistock, making restoration of Exeter - Plymouth via Okehampton much more difficult, is another. That isn't hindsight because I can recall the issue being discussed at the time. Transport in and around London got much more attention - there were strategic studies done after WWII which set in place long term objectives and corridors to be protected which had big benefits for the future - but nothing similar seems to have been done for the rest of the country.

It all comes down to cash, as the railways have never been cash rich in the modern era, the option to put money in the coffers from sale of land, especially in urban areas, would always have been taken over some future possibility of reinstatement, which in the 1960s would have seems improbable

 

[Killingworth]

Market Weighton would have been hardly commuting territory from Hull at all in that era. In the 1962/3 timetable the first southbound train was at 08h22, arriving in Hull at 08h51. There were two commuting trains towards York, arriving at 08h01 and 08h51. But you are judging the service with 2019 eyes - people just didn't do long distance commuting then. If you lived in Market Weighton and got a job in Hull, you moved to Hull. Simple. There have been massive social and infrastructure changes since then which encourage commuting - better paying jobs, better roads, Ofsted reports, spouses in careers, house purchase and rental markets.

With 19 manned level crossings, the rolling stock capable of being transferred elsewhere to eliminate steam traction, and the end to end traffic able to transfer to another route, (5 trains each way were already scheduled via the alternate route already), splendid omnibus services already available for local trafic, it was an obvious candidate for closure. Rather spend that investment money elsewhere.

And that is exactly the point. Only in the mostly electrified London area was long distance commuting considered normal 50 years ago. Back in 1973 I was still expected to live within my local area commutable by public transport - normally a bus. When I moved to Hull in that year I was staying in hotels for almost 6 months and tried one in Market Weighton. My new work colleagues thought I was mad going that far out. I bought a house in the country and never commuted by bus into Hull, but that's another story. Brough was convenient for business trips to London and my parents were happy coming to visit via Selby.

Thinking of how many used some of those old trains, and recalling the long hours worked by all those level crossing keepers for the very few trains (although there would be an occasional freight working) plus the crew costs it was an economic nightmare even before track, rolling stock and other maintenance was considered.

 

[yorksrob]

And that is exactly the point. Only in the mostly electrified London area was long distance commuting considered normal 50 years ago. Back in 1973 I was still expected to live within my local area commutable by public transport - normally a bus. When I moved to Hull in that year I was staying in hotels for almost 6 months and tried one in Market Weighton. My new work colleagues thought I was mad going that far out. I bought a house in the country and never commuted by bus into Hull, but that's another story. Brough was convenient for business trips to London and my parents were happy coming to visit via Selby.

Thinking of how many used some of those old trains, and recalling the long hours worked by all those level crossing keepers for the very few trains (although there would be an occasional freight working) plus the crew costs it was an economic nightmare even before track, rolling stock and other maintenance was considered.

Actually the numbers quoted by Beeching and yourself show that the route was far from an economic nightmare. The route was well within reach of covering costs on an 'invest to save' basis, had the powers that be been prepared to invest in the regional railway at that time.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Actually the numbers quoted by Beeching and yourself show that the route was far from an economic nightmare. The route was well within reach of covering costs on an 'invest to save' basis, had the powers that be been prepared to invest in the regional railway at that time.

Over a long period of time some people’s ideas of an ‘economic nightmare’ have evidently differed.

If I had a collection of factories where some were only producing enough salable product to cover half their costs, sales were falling as customers found more attractive alternatives, the employees had just received a significant pay increase [Guillebaud implementation], I was already making overall heavy losses on an epic scale and my bank and shareholders were unwilling to advance me any more funds to ‘invest’ in the poor performers; I think that I would be having nightmares. (If it walks like a duck...)

It brings it into even sharper focus when I can see that some of my other factories are doing really well, have excellent future prospects and are crying out for further investment to build on success, and I can see that by scrapping some of the useless ‘assets’ I can actually raise funds internally. Now that would be ‘cost effective’.

 

[MarkyT]

I don't see the point in all this historical revisionism. They did what they did and we are where we are.

Whatever their motivation, a particular group of elected politicians, managers and maybe other actors behind the scenes decided (not conspired) to reshape the railways as they did over half a century ago. The architects knew they had to act very quickly as public resistance would grow and eventually bring the process to a stand, which it did, hence the large volume of near simultaneous closures. Maybe in modern eyes they went a little too far, too fast, maybe they didn't go far enough, maybe they didn't do enough to protect some of the more valuable alignments, but it all has to be seen through the prism of broader attitudes toward old 'Victorian Industries' as the railways were undoubtedly seen in the white heat of the post war technological revolution. While some may like to imagine a dastardly plot, the business community and thus the Tory party have by and large always recognised the importance of railways in their core applications, hence the reshaping report also contained many positive proposals for modernisation of what would be left. I have an official Conservative pamphlet from the period which sets out a strong argument that roads cannot be expected to meet all the heaviest freight, commuter and intercity traffic demands for various reasons so railways must continue to be supported for the sake of the economy. Governments of all colours have never given the railways an easy time, but there has not been a realistic existential threat at any time. The bonkers Serpell report emerged from a period of swivel-eyed lunacy in the DoT that by no means represented the broad view of business or the party. Whatever her personal position, Thatcher knew wide-spread closures at that time would have been political poison, and never followed up on Serpell, thank goodness, but the deep cuts to railway capital spending of the time were very challenging indeed.

Rather than continue to argue about the past, I think we all need to maintain vigilance, particularly at this difficult time, of shadowy influences who may wish to damage the industry or limit its development unreasonably in the future. The Conservative party, if it survives Brexit, might swing in alternative directions as to its positions on rail and public transport generally, under whatever new geopolitical interests the nation becomes aligned to, and of course in response to attitudes and behaviour of the public.

As to the past, "The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there".