Cost effective alternative to Beeching.

[RT4038]

"Similarly, there is a wealth of difference between running a service efficiently - de-staffing stations, pay trains, well considered track rationalisations, and running a service down, i.e running the trains at pointless times, reducing the time between first and last trains to make them unusable for a day trip, running at times that destroy meaningfull connections.

There is a wealth of difference, but this 'running the service down' was not really a deliberate act; it often had its origins in the bus competition of the 20s/30s (passengers deserted local/branch trains and the railway cut the service accordingly); followed by wartime curtailments, then coal shortages post war, then economy drives in the later 50s (due to the urgency of the situation and the size of the job, often these curtailments were merely removing services from timetables rather than recasting, leaving long gaps). Running trains at 'pointless' [to whom?] times, but I guess that some trains ran at times convenient for Royal Mail connections, parcels traffic, or connecting with main line trains, which did not make sense to the local travel market etc, or merely because it was too expensive to run at other times . I should think that many lines were realised to be no-hopers already, so the timetable became a 'minimum to get away with, with minimum costs. ' [The Selby-Market Weighton-Driffield line timetable at closure would be an example of this, although still performing some purpose]. With lots of criss-crossing lines, all with relatively (to today) infrequent services, would have made comprehensive meaningful connections well nigh impossible.
Even introduction of Diesel Railcars and more frequent services did not help many lines (Buckingham-Banbury, Bristol Suburban services, Eastern Valleys for instance) but some it did and these are still with us. Just because some lines closed still steam operated does not necessarily mean that a trick was missed with no conversion to m.u. trains.

 

[Killingworth]

[The Selby-Market Weighton-Driffield line timetable at closure would be an example of this, although still performing some purpose]. W

I used to stay near that line between Market Weighton and Driffield every summer in the 1950's and early 1960s and spent many a Saturday spotting at Bainton or at a level crossing nearer Middleton. There were no passenger trains stopping at intermediate station on that section after about 1954. It came into its own on those summer Saturdays.

Long 4-6-0 hauled trains of elderly corridor coaches came from the West Riding regularly every 15 minutes on those Saturday mornings heading towards Bridlington, Filey for Butlins, and Scarborough. In the late afternoons they'd be going back. Those coaches would be among the 8,000 or so Beeching identified as being used very rarely each year. They had to cross several manned level crossings, that manning being needed very little at other times of the week and year.

By the mid-1950s there was a parallel traffic of coaches taking up increasingly more of the load. Being more flexible in the places and times they could both start and finish, and the smaller numbers of passengers involved for each, the change was very quick. By 1960 the jams of coaches through Market Weighton and Driffield were considerable. (Same went for Malton to the north.) The railway failed to respond - what could they have done differently? Loadings dwindled fast. No surprise the line was cut in 1964.

In the early 1950s car traffic even on Saturdays was still light. By the mid-1960s coaches were already losing their market to cars. Market Weighton and Drffield have been by-passed. The world moves on.

There was little goods traffic and I recall two or three rusting old wagons abandoned in Middleton yard for many a year.

I took pin hole Box Brownie pictures of all this but sadly they've gone awol after several house moves.

 

[yorksrob]

There is a wealth of difference, but this 'running the service down' was not really a deliberate act; it often had its origins in the bus competition of the 20s/30s (passengers deserted local/branch trains and the railway cut the service accordingly); followed by wartime curtailments, then coal shortages post war, then economy drives in the later 50s (due to the urgency of the situation and the size of the job, often these curtailments were merely removing services from timetables rather than recasting, leaving long gaps). Running trains at 'pointless' [to whom?] times, but I guess that some trains ran at times convenient for Royal Mail connections, parcels traffic, or connecting with main line trains, which did not make sense to the local travel market etc, or merely because it was too expensive to run at other times . I should think that many lines were realised to be no-hopers already, so the timetable became a 'minimum to get away with, with minimum costs. ' [The Selby-Market Weighton-Driffield line timetable at closure would be an example of this, although still performing some purpose]. With lots of criss-crossing lines, all with relatively (to today) infrequent services, would have made comprehensive meaningful connections well nigh impossible.
Even introduction of Diesel Railcars and more frequent services did not help many lines (Buckingham-Banbury, Bristol Suburban services, Eastern Valleys for instance) but some it did and these are still with us. Just because some lines closed still steam operated does not necessarily mean that a trick was missed with no conversion to m.u. trains.

On the contrary, in many cases dieselification did make a difference to service usage, increasing passengers. Just not enough to satisfy those who thought a line should cover its operating costs (or more accurately its operating costs based on revenue taken at the routes intermediate stations alone).

You state that "the introduction of diesel rail cars did not help many lines - but some it did, and these are still with us" as though eventual closure or not was based upon the success of such introductions. The truth was that in most cases it wasn't.

The lines that are still with us are so largely because the board couldn't get through its plans for closure, i.e the bus service couldn't be arranged, the roads were too windy, the children used the the train to get to school.

Dieselification would have improved the usage of both the Marshlink and the Mid-Hants routes. That the one was closed and not the other, was because they couldn't get away with closing the one, so the other had to go to satisfy the ideological belief in slashing route milage at any cost.

 

[yorksrob]

I used to stay near that line between Market Weighton and Driffield every summer in the 1950's and early 1960s and spent many a Saturday spotting at Bainton or at a level crossing nearer Middleton. There were no passenger trains stopping at intermediate station on that section after about 1954. It came into its own on those summer Saturdays.

Long 4-6-0 hauled trains of elderly corridor coaches came from the West Riding regularly every 15 minutes on those Saturday mornings heading towards Bridlington, Filey for Butlins, and Scarborough. In the late afternoons they'd be going back. Those coaches would be among the 8,000 or so Beeching identified as being used very rarely each year. They had to cross several manned level crossings, that manning being needed very little at other times of the week and year.

By the mid-1950s there was a parallel traffic of coaches taking up increasingly more of the load. Being more flexible in the places and times they could both start and finish, and the smaller numbers of passengers involved for each, the change was very quick. By 1960 the jams of coaches through Market Weighton and Driffield were considerable. (Same went for Malton to the north.) The railway failed to respond - what could they have done differently? Loadings dwindled fast. No surprise the line was cut in 1964.

In the early 1950s car traffic even on Saturdays was still light. By the mid-1960s coaches were already losing their market to cars. Market Weighton and Drffield have been by-passed. The world moves on.

There was little goods traffic and I recall two or three rusting old wagons abandoned in Middleton yard for many a year.

I took pin hole Box Brownie pictures of all this but sadly they've gone awol after several house moves.

Little could have been done to save Selby - Driffield, however the railway could have put in place its plans to rationalise York - Beverley. With increasing traffic congestion in the area caused by all these coaches, more residents going into Hull and York would probably have chosen the train.

 

[Killingworth]

Little could have been done to save Selby - Driffield, however the railway could have put in place its plans to rationalise York - Beverley. With increasing traffic congestion in the area caused by all these coaches, more residents going into Hull and York would probably have chosen the train.

As others have said, there was a degree of panic at this time. The rate of rail's decline was very swift and the need to cut costs fast was imperative. That line was being very lightly used, but it had a very infrequent service, probably still basically what had been there since 1938 with deletions. The building encroachment at Pocklington, Stamford Bridge and elsewhere, plus road use of the alignment, makes that line's reinstatement incredibly difficult, probably impossible at realistic levels of expense. The Business Case would fail at an early stage.

Marketing of rail was having to move with the times. Works week specials like from Glasgow to Whitley Bay survived for a year or two with DMU replacement, just, but the ambience wasn't quite the same as a compartment coach. Here in Sheffield we had the Rail Riders club to encourage children. We got as far as places like Portsmouth, Salisbury, and Bath or through the Woodhead tunnel on a round tour returning via Cowburn and Totley. It died like the old lines and the steam age rolling stock.

My recollection is that the tide didn't start to turn until the early 1980s. (A diversion - maybe we should give Rev Awdry a little credit for keeping the railway alive?) For me the marker might be about when the Student Railcard was launched. It was immediately very popular. The bus equivalent has never gained as big a following. At the time it wouldn't have been known that the tide was turning. The momentum of closure and cuts took time to swing back. By then some lines like Hull - York via Market Weighton had gone too far and track beds sold off, many now used for road by-passes and parts of housing estates

Less well appreciated are where tracks were reduced or slewed, over bridges removed, platforms shortened, station buildings sold off or demolished, lineside structures built on potential new track alignments, and swathes of yard and trackside sold off for other uses. Restoration has been made incredibly more expensive, maybe impossible.

The example I'd use is the Midland Mainline between Dore and Sheffield. 4 tracks from 1903. Stopping passenger services withdrawn 50 years ago. Two tracks lifted and the others slewed to get better speeds by the late 1980s. The one remaining active station at Dore reduced to a single platform on a single track in 1985 and a bottleneck ever since.

HS2 imminent, possibly. Restore all 4 tracks? Build a park and ride at Millhouses? Good idea? Virtually no chance, 3 is the best that can be done thanks to this supermarket and Friends Meeting House development on the old track bed and site of the old steam sheds that were here.

 

[coppercapped]

SNIP
Dieselification would have improved the usage of both the Marshlink and the Mid-Hants routes. That the one was closed and not the other, was because they couldn't get away with closing the one, so the other had to go to satisfy the ideological belief in slashing route milage at any cost.

With the greatest respect I would suggest that the sequence you paint in your last sentence is back to front.

The imperative was to cut operating costs as quickly as possible. The quickest way to do this was to withdraw services and close lightly used lines as soon as possible. As BR had to operate within cash limits the more money that went into operating services that did not cover their direct operating costs the smaller the amount that was available for investment.

The 'ideological belief' was that throwing money down a pit was a bad idea - especially for the taxpayers taken as a whole. Closing lines was NOT the objective - reducing the deficit was.

 

[yorksrob]

With the greatest respect I would suggest that the sequence you paint in your last sentence is back to front.

The imperative was to cut operating costs as quickly as possible. The quickest way to do this was to withdraw services and close lightly used lines as soon as possible. As BR had to operate within cash limits the more money that went into operating services that did not cover their direct operating costs the smaller the amount that was available for investment.

The 'ideological belief' was that throwing money down a pit was a bad idea - especially for the taxpayers taken as a whole. Closing lines was NOT the objective - reducing the deficit was.

To an extent (and only to an extent) you are correct, because the Governments of the day were as in thrall to the ideological belief in reducing track milage. Alas, the railway industry and Government were egging eachother on at the time.

Sensible people at the time knew, as we do that subsidising necessary railway lines wasn't 'throwing money down a pit'.

The railway had its own examples of how the defecit could be reduced without the ultimate calamity of closure. G Fiennes own example of the East Suffolk line is a case in point. But they had to be forced to rationalise when closure was turned down.

 

[yorksrob]

As others have said, there was a degree of panic at this time. The rate of rail's decline was very swift and the need to cut costs fast was imperative. That line was being very lightly used, but it had a very infrequent service, probably still basically what had been there since 1938 with deletions. The building encroachment at Pocklington, Stamford Bridge and elsewhere, plus road use of the alignment, makes that line's reinstatement incredibly difficult, probably impossible at realistic levels of expense. The Business Case would fail at an early stage.

Marketing of rail was having to move with the times. Works week specials like from Glasgow to Whitley Bay survived for a year or two with DMU replacement, just, but the ambience wasn't quite the same as a compartment coach. Here in Sheffield we had the Rail Riders club to encourage children. We got as far as places like Portsmouth, Salisbury, and Bath or through the Woodhead tunnel on a round tour returning via Cowburn and Totley. It died like the old lines and the steam age rolling stock.

My recollection is that the tide didn't start to turn until the early 1980s. (A diversion - maybe we should give Rev Awdry a little credit for keeping the railway alive?) For me the marker might be about when the Student Railcard was launched. It was immediately very popular. The bus equivalent has never gained as big a following. At the time it wouldn't have been known that the tide was turning. The momentum of closure and cuts took time to swing back. By then some lines like Hull - York via Market Weighton had gone too far and track beds sold off, many now used for road by-passes and parts of housing estates

Less well appreciated are where tracks were reduced or slewed, over bridges removed, platforms shortened, station buildings sold off or demolished, lineside structures built on potential new track alignments, and swathes of yard and trackside sold off for other uses. Restoration has been made incredibly more expensive, maybe impossible.

The example I'd use is the Midland Mainline between Dore and Sheffield. 4 tracks from 1903. Stopping passenger services withdrawn 50 years ago. Two tracks lifted and the others slewed to get better speeds by the late 1980s. The one remaining active station at Dore reduced to a single platform on a single track in 1985 and a bottleneck ever since.

HS2 imminent, possibly. Restore all 4 tracks? Build a park and ride at Millhouses? Good idea? Virtually no chance, 3 is the best that can be done thanks to this supermarket and Friends Meeting House development on the old track bed and site of the old steam sheds that were here.

View attachment 60438

Rail Riders was all over the country - I was a member in Kent at one stage. In truth, I might never have been a rail enthusiast and life long rail passenger at all, had the decision to close the Marshlink gone ahead.

 

[Dr Hoo]

To an extent (and only to an extent) you are correct, because the Governments of the day were as in thrall to the ideological belief in reducing track milage. Alas, the railway industry and Government were egging eachother on at the time...

In the context of this thread - about cost effective alternatives to the Beeching-identified closure candidates - can you provide any reasonable ‘political’ evidence of the supposed “ideological belief” in reducing track mileage?

I have regularly demonstrated that Dr B had a clear understanding of how the railways could continue to provide a major contribution to the transport needs of Britain - through Inter City, modern freight methods and integration with other modes in major conurbations. Dr B and Marples were fully open to new ideas of cost-benefit analysis and were indeed pioneers in its use.

Copper Capped has continued to point out that the real drive was to reduce the deficit and free up cash for urgently-needed capital investment in worthwhile areas. You have still to come up with a realistic alternative.

 

[yorksrob]

In the context of this thread - about cost effective alternatives to the Beeching-identified closure candidates - can you provide any reasonable ‘political’ evidence of the supposed “ideological belief” in reducing track mileage?

I have regularly demonstrated that Dr B had a clear understanding of how the railways could continue to provide a major contribution to the transport needs of Britain - through Inter City, modern freight methods and integration with other modes in major conurbations. Dr B and Marples were fully open to new ideas of cost-benefit analysis and were indeed pioneers in its use.

Copper Capped has continued to point out that the real drive was to reduce the deficit and free up cash for urgently-needed capital investment in worthwhile areas. You have still to come up with a realistic alternative.

On the contrary, in (I think) my first post of this thread, I came up with the rationalisation of the Marshlink line as a rationalisation that involved almost no capital investment.

Singling, de-staffing of stations, reduction in singling.

No new infrastructure
No fancy rolling stock
No fancy new signalling.

Dr B and Marples might have been open to cost-benefit analysis, but they were blind to the social value of the regional railway. To be fair, Beeching alluded to it in "The Reshaping" but he did little to put it into practice.

 

[Dr Hoo]

On the contrary, in (I think) my first post of this thread, I came up with the rationalisation of the Marshlink line as a rationalisation that involved almost no capital investment.

Singling, de-staffing of stations, reduction in singling.

No new infrastructure
No fancy rolling stock
No fancy new signalling.

Dr B and Marples might have been open to cost-benefit analysis, but they were blind to the social value of the regional railway. To be fair, Beeching alluded to it in "The Reshaping" but he did little to put it into practice.

Quite apart form the fact that you have completely sidestepped the question about "ideological belief", I hardly think that the Marshlink line was a particularly convincing case study. (I was fairly familiar with the line before it was rationalised as I had friends in Rye.)

For a start the route was only (partially) singled in about 1979, over 15 years after the Re-shaping report and after the line had already been reprieved from closure. It was only a very partial rationalisation with Rye, Appledore and Ham Street retaining staffed stations buildings with two platforms. (The DMUs were not suitable for conductor guard operation.) A lot of expenditure went into the later (and safer) designs of automatic level crossings. The signalling was converted to tokenless block. Signalboxes remained at both Rye and Appledore. Some level crossings retained keepers for a while longer.

I was a local operations manager elsewhere in Kent when the scheme was executed and frankly it was rather a pathetic affair. The single line was 'stitched' together out of the best bits of track, much of which was almost falling to pieces after years of indecision. Semaphore signalling was retained and the arrangements were rather primitive. The derailment of an empty DMU train at Appledore (with the death of its driver and after dark) not long after the work was done exposed the fact that whilst the installation might have been technically compliant with the standards of the time it was desperately cheap. A relatively new 20mph crossover had been dismantled and re-positioned on a 60mph line with no warning of the change in speed apart from the old design of 'cut-out' sign in the days before headlights and retro-reflection. Neither the line nor the unit were fitted with AWS. The scheme saved very little money beyond avoidance of plain line renewals.

If it was the best efficiency scheme that BR could come up with after 15 years of practice (and all the investment that could be afforded) there is no doubt that Beeching made the right call in relation to many lines in 1963.

 

[yorksrob]

Quite apart form the fact that you have completely sidestepped the question about "ideological belief", I hardly think that the Marshlink line was a particularly convincing case study. (I was fairly familiar with the line before it was rationalised as I had friends in Rye.)

For a start the route was only (partially) singled in about 1979, over 15 years after the Re-shaping report and after the line had already been reprieved from closure. It was only a very partial rationalisation with Rye, Appledore and Ham Street retaining staffed stations buildings with two platforms. (The DMUs were not suitable for conductor guard operation.) A lot of expenditure went into the later (and safer) designs of automatic level crossings. The signalling was converted to tokenless block. Signalboxes remained at both Rye and Appledore. Some level crossings retained keepers for a while longer.

I was a local operations manager elsewhere in Kent when the scheme was executed and frankly it was rather a pathetic affair. The single line was 'stitched' together out of the best bits of track, much of which was almost falling to pieces after years of indecision. Semaphore signalling was retained and the arrangements were rather primitive. The derailment of an empty DMU train at Appledore (with the death of its driver and after dark) not long after the work was done exposed the fact that whilst the installation might have been technically compliant with the standards of the time it was desperately cheap. A relatively new 20mph crossover had been dismantled and re-positioned on a 60mph line with no warning of the change in speed apart from the old design of 'cut-out' sign in the days before headlights and retro-reflection. Neither the line nor the unit were fitted with AWS. The scheme saved very little money beyond avoidance of plain line renewals.

If it was the best efficiency scheme that BR could come up with after 15 years of practice (and all the investment that could be afforded) there is no doubt that Beeching made the right call in relation to many lines in 1963.

Oh dear.

That you were a local operations manger in the area and you say that the rationalisation was "a pathetic affair" ?

Are you saying that it would have been better to have not had such a 'pathetic' rationalisation and to have had the line closed ?

If not what would have been your preferred way of keeping the line open ?

 

[Adsy125]

I think, like many, that some lines were completely unnecessary and closure was inevitable from the day they were opened, however in some places BR didn’t, and never had tried. For example if you lived in Blandford and wanted to commute by train, could you? No, the timetable was largely unchanged for over 50 years and the first train got to Poole far far too late, and the line was steam to the end, why? The middle bit of the line may have been crazy but I think the at least Blandford-Poole could have been made to work.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Oh dear.

That you were a local operations manger in the area and you say that the rationalisation was "a pathetic affair" ?

Are you saying that it would have been better to have not had such a 'pathetic' rationalisation and to have had the line closed ?

If not what would have been your preferred way of keeping the line open ?

It pains me to say what follows because in general terms I admired (and enjoyed working on) the Southern Region rather more than the parts of the London Midland where I had initially worked and done my training.

Having joined BR in 1973 I had seen various lines 'paytrain-ised' and had made numerous visits in my own time and and at my own expense to see routes in East Anglia that had been rationalised under Gerard Fiennes. These had shown that it was possible to cut a lot of the cost and protect much of the (limited) revenue. Watford Junction-St Albans was another line with which I was very familiar that had been ruthlessly pruned but still functioned well within its new parameters. We even 'made up' and 'broke down' the DMU with another driving trailer to deal with peak loads but minimise wear and tear and fare evasion off-peak.

In contrast I saw the Rye line dealt with very belatedly in a way that left a lot of costs in signalling and station staffing to continue; carried on running the same level of train service with un-necessarily long, non-gangwayed units, staffed with guards toting nothing more sophisticated in the revenue protection armory than a BR4407 pad (coupled with little opportunity or motivation to use it).

Does that help?

 

[yorksrob]

It pains me to say what follows because in general terms I admired (and enjoyed working on) the Southern Region rather more than the parts of the London Midland where I had initially worked and done my training.

Having joined BR in 1973 I had seen various lines 'paytrain-ised' and had made numerous visits in my own time and and at my own expense to see routes in East Anglia that had been rationalised under Gerard Fiennes. These had shown that it was possible to cut a lot of the cost and protect much of the (limited) revenue. Watford Junction-St Albans was another line with which I was very familiar that had been ruthlessly pruned but still functioned well within its new parameters. We even 'made up' and 'broke down' the DMU with another driving trailer to deal with peak loads but minimise wear and tear and fare evasion off-peak.

In contrast I saw the Rye line dealt with very belatedly in a way that left a lot of costs in signalling and station staffing to continue; carried on running the same level of train service with un-necessarily long, non-gangwayed units, staffed with guards toting nothing more sophisticated in the revenue protection armory than a BR4407 pad (coupled with little opportunity or motivation to use it).

Does that help?

For starters, three carriages is hardly "long". They were presumably left that way as they had to be interchangeable with the Uckfield service.

It had the same level of train service - and very good to. An hourly shuttle between Ashford and Hastings (two hourly on Sundays) is quite frankly the minimal you can get away with to maintain a useable service. Any less, and you would have been running the service down.

Signalling - one signal box at Rye, necessary to control the passing loop, another at Appledore to control the junction to Dungeness. i don't see how you could have gotten rid of these, other than moving them to Ashford panel - but this would have been one of those capital investment costs that you keep banging on about.

As for the guard, yes - they could have put a gangway in and given them a fancy ticket machine, but again, this would have been capital investment, which you have been at pains to tell us wasn't available (actually, they did eventually put gangways in, but later on).

You ask for evidence of an ideological belief in cutting route milage at any cost. There was a document pulished once called "The Reshaping of British Railways" by someone called R Beeching.

What if the Marshlink had been rationalised ten or twenty years earlier to G Fiennes specification. Would the savings have been used to retain other routes such as the Mid Hants or Swanage ? I suspect not. Those routes were in someones sights for closure.

"If it was the best efficiency scheme that BR could come up with after 15 years of practice (and all the investment that could be afforded) there is no doubt that Beeching made the right call in relation to many lines in 1963"

I disagree wholeheartedly. The logic of your argument is that the Marshlink shouldn't have been retained. As someone who's used the line regularly over thirty years, I'm glad someone else did undertake the necessary actions retain it because it has left us with a working railway.

If this was the best that BR could come up with, they should have done it to a lot more routes, because it might have left us with the network the country actually needs, rather than the moth eaten affair that Beeching and his ilk have foisted the country with.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Having joined BR in 1973 I had seen various lines 'paytrain-ised' and had made numerous visits in my own time and and at my own expense to see routes in East Anglia that had been rationalised under Gerard Fiennes. These had shown that it was possible to cut a lot of the cost and protect much of the (limited) revenue. Watford Junction-St Albans was another line with which I was very familiar that had been ruthlessly pruned but still functioned well within its new parameters. We even 'made up' and 'broke down' the DMU with another driving trailer to deal with peak loads but minimise wear and tear and fare evasion off-peak.

The closure file at Kew shows some very interesting material. The line was extremely expensive to run - (St Albans Abbey had about 15 staff , including a Station Master) , passing loop - several other on line staff and was resourced fairly heavily. The inwards gas coal traffic was around a 100 loaded wagons a day , including Sunday's. This was expected to continue , so taking off the passenger services would have meant retention of a basic freight railway.

A vigerous attempt was made , to cost an alternative bus service , using long suffering LT staff , who came up with a heavy plan , with about 3 combinations of routes and a comment that bus labour shortages would have made this rather challenging. I suspect that the excercise was a trojan horse to aid retention of the basic passenger railway.

This was done - de-staffing , "pay trains" etc - whilst the character of the line was materially changed , economically it flourished. A clever timetable retained most user requirements and it was dovetailed into the "new" WCML electric suburban services , a very cheap new station / halt was constructed at Garston - Herts (for around £500) , and passenger counts showed a decent increase in passenger traffic. Overall a good example of a proactive management in action.

There is an article here , if I can motivate myself to write it up.

 

[yorksrob]

Having joined BR in 1973 I had seen various lines 'paytrain-ised' and had made numerous visits in my own time and and at my own expense to see routes in East Anglia that had been rationalised under Gerard Fiennes. These had shown that it was possible to cut a lot of the cost and protect much of the (limited) revenue. Watford Junction-St Albans was another line with which I was very familiar that had been ruthlessly pruned but still functioned well within its new parameters. We even 'made up' and 'broke down' the DMU with another driving trailer to deal with peak loads but minimise wear and tear and fare evasion off-peak.

The closure file at Kew shows some very interesting material. The line was extremely expensive to run - (St Albans Abbey had about 15 staff , including a Station Master) , passing loop - several other on line staff and was resourced fairly heavily. The inwards gas coal traffic was around a 100 loaded wagons a day , including Sunday's. This was expected to continue , so taking off the passenger services would have meant retention of a basic freight railway.

A vigerous attempt was made , to cost an alternative bus service , using long suffering LT staff , who came up with a heavy plan , with about 3 combinations of routes and a comment that bus labour shortages would have made this rather challenging. I suspect that the excercise was a trojan horse to aid retention of the basic passenger railway.

This was done - de-staffing , "pay trains" etc - whilst the character of the line was materially changed , economically it flourished. A clever timetable retained most user requirements and it was dovetailed into the "new" WCML electric suburban services , a very cheap new station / halt was constructed at Garston - Herts (for around £500) , and passenger counts showed a decent increase in passenger traffic. Overall a good example of a proactive management in action.

There is an article here , if I can motivate myself to write it up.

Please do, that sounds interesting.

 

[coppercapped]

You ask for evidence of an ideological belief in cutting route milage at any cost. There was a document pulished once called "The Reshaping of British Railways" by someone called R Beeching.

The Reshaping of British Railways report has this to say on page 2:

It is, of course, the responsibility of the British Railways Board so to shape and operate the railways as to make them pay, but, if it is not already apparent from the preceding paragraphs, it must be clearly stated that the proposals now made are not directed towards achieving that result by the simple and unsatisfactory method of rejecting all those parts of the system which do not pay already or which cannot be made to pay easily.
On the contrary, the changes proposed are intended to shape the railways to meet present day requirements by enabling them to provide as much of the total transport of the country as they can provide well. To this end, proposals are directed towards developing to the full those parts of the system and those services which can be made to meet traffic requirements more efficiently and satisfactorily than any available alternative form of transport, and towards eliminating only those services which, by their very nature, railways are ill-suited to provide.

How does your claim square with what was actually written?

 

[yorksrob]

The Reshaping of British Railways report has this to say on page 2:


How does your claim square with what was actually written?

My claim squares with this passage by the way in which "services which, by their very nature, railways are ill-suited to provide" were selected.

As an example, I don't for one minute believe that the railway was/is "ill-suited" to provide a public transport service between York and Beverley via Market Weighton, or between Ashford and Hastings for that matter. The fact that the report claims that they were/are amply illustrates an ideological predisposition towards the closure of passenger routes.

 

[RT4038]

My claim squares with this passage by the way in which "services which, by their very nature, railways are ill-suited to provide" were selected.

As an example, I don't for one minute believe that the railway was/is "ill-suited" to provide a public transport service between York and Beverley via Market Weighton, or between Ashford and Hastings for that matter. The fact that the report claims that they were/are amply illustrates an ideological predisposition towards the closure of passenger routes.

It might not be your belief, but it clearly was of the people taking the decisions at the time, in the circumstances of the time. The closure process was always intended as a political process - the 1962 Transport Act indeed made it so. Beeching was aware of the social aspect of railway services, but that was for the politicians to decide, not him. And decide they did - as you point out the Ashford-Hastings line was saved by this process (amongst others, such as the East Suffolk line). That didn't make it any more profitable, so if it is to be retained then it needed to be run as cheaply as possible. The railwaymen only came up with this cost cutting when presented with this burden of reprieved hopeless lines. So a few lines were 'saved' as a compromise to successfully implementing the rest. Such is politics. This should tell you something of the political mood at the time.

I would dispute that your kind of 'rationalisation' does not still require capital investment - sooner or later the rationalised infrastructure will require replacing. (Ask the French, who are finding this out on their rural lines at present). You are not seriously suggesting that steam trains would not have been replaced, surely? Your kind of rationalisation would have been insufficient if manned level crossings, signalboxes etc had not been mechanised (capital expenditure), plus the management, design and implementation time and resources have to be paid for and distracted away from more profitable tasks.

And so you will keep on arguing that the Beeching cuts were not inevitable, and it was all a great conspiracy with Beeching as a master criminal; while better informed people will keep telling you why they were and there was none. Whatever, the lines were shut and in the current circumstances most will never come back.

 

[yorksrob]

It might not be your belief, but it clearly was of the people taking the decisions at the time, in the circumstances of the time. The closure process was always intended as a political process - the 1962 Transport Act indeed made it so. Beeching was aware of the social aspect of railway services, but that was for the politicians to decide, not him. And decide they did - as you point out the Ashford-Hastings line was saved by this process (amongst others, such as the East Suffolk line). That didn't make it any more profitable, so if it is to be retained then it needed to be run as cheaply as possible. The railwaymen only came up with this cost cutting when presented with this burden of reprieved hopeless lines. So a few lines were 'saved' as a compromise to successfully implementing the rest. Such is politics. This should tell you something of the political mood at the time.

Goodness, you sound almost wistful that they couldn't get on and destroy all the routes they wanted to.

I'm under no illusion as to the political situation at the time, which is why Marples/Fraser are rightly derided as being amongst the worst transport ministers to hold that title. That said, it's a pity that the railway at the time was so subservient to Governments and their nefarious intentions. If the railway had been more pro-active and tried to reduced costs before asking to close, they might have saved some more.

I would dispute that your kind of 'rationalisation' does not still require capital investment - sooner or later the rationalised infrastructure will require replacing. (Ask the French, who are finding this out on their rural lines at present). You are not seriously suggesting that steam trains would not have been replaced, surely? Your kind of rationalisation would have been insufficient if manned level crossings, signalboxes etc had not been mechanised (capital expenditure), plus the management, design and implementation time and resources have to be paid for and distracted away from more profitable tasks.

As you well know, we are discussing the capital costs to turn a traditionally staffed railway into a basic railway. I'm not sure why you are trying to muddy the waters by bringing in replacement costs which will fall over the life-cycle of the railway, typically around forty years. The majority of routes closed from 1962 onwards had already been provided with new diesel trains from the much maligned modernisation plan. That cost had already been "sunk", so talk about "replacing steam trains" is at best irrelevant, at worst deliberate misinformation.

And so you will keep on arguing that the Beeching cuts were not inevitable, and it was all a great conspiracy with Beeching as a master criminal; while better informed people will keep telling you why they were and there was none. Whatever, the lines were shut and in the current circumstances most will never come back.

I will not argue that "the Beeching cuts were not inevitable" as some clearly were. I can't see much that could have been done for Church Fenton - Harrogate and Selby - Driffield for example.

However, I will continue to argue that the closure programme from 1962 onwards, and the way it was carried out, was nothing short of an ill thought out, unplanned disaster for the country, and that there are some routes which should have been persevered with.

I also have no doubt that the Doctor's fellow travellers will continue to argue that black is white, in defence of their "saviour" with messianic zeal.

 

[RT4038]

Goodness, you sound almost wistful that they couldn't get on and destroy all the routes they wanted to.



I'm under no illusion as to the political situation at the time, which is why Marples/Fraser are rightly derided as being amongst the worst transport ministers to hold that title. That said, it's a pity that the railway at the time was so subservient to Governments and their nefarious intentions. If the railway had been more pro-active and tried to reduced costs before asking to close, they might have saved some more.



As you well know, we are discussing the capital costs to turn a traditionally staffed railway into a basic railway. I'm not sure why you are trying to muddy the waters by bringing in replacement costs which will fall over the life-cycle of the railway, typically around forty years. The majority of routes closed from 1962 onwards had already been provided with new diesel trains from the much maligned modernisation plan. That cost had already been "sunk", so talk about "replacing steam trains" is at best irrelevant, at worst deliberate misinformation.


Other replacement costs, such as track, signalling, would have been required long before 40 years were up. Indeed the condition of the track was cited in the reasoning behind some closure proposals.

I will not argue that "the Beeching cuts were not inevitable" as some clearly were. I can't see much that could have been done for Church Fenton - Harrogate and Selby - Driffield for example.

However, I will continue to argue that the closure programme from 1962 onwards, and the way it was carried out, was nothing short of an ill thought out, unplanned disaster for the country, and that there are some routes which should have been persevered with.


I also have no doubt that the Doctor's fellow travellers will continue to argue that black is white, in defence of their "saviour" with messianic zeal.

Not at all wistful. But I am dealing with the history, not what I would have liked.

If you are under no illusion as to the political situation of the time, why is it that you cannot grasp the view of the time that the railways were considered outdated, inefficient and a bottomless pit for funding? I must laugh at the very thought that 'it's a pity that the railway at the time was so subservient to Governments'! Thank goodness it wasn't private shareholders, as far more would have been closed and/or slipped into such arrears of maintenance as to be unusable. As the Government were paying the bills, surely they would expect to 'call the shots' and expect subserviency? You certainly couldn't leave the decision making to career railwaymen - look at the financial mess that had got the railways to?

You are being disingenious: many lines closed whilst steam operated (Eridge-Polegate, Guildford-Horsham, Salisbury/Brockenhurst-Wimborne, SDJR, Taunton-Barnstaple, Exe Valley, Gloucester-Hereford, Ruabon-Barmouth, Great Central Main Line, Stirling-Crianlarich, Dumfries-Stranraer to name a few). Other lines had already been modernised, but on closure the new stock moved to lines or services that were steam operated. Yet more lines the new stock moved to replace diesel locos hauling carriages on other lines, which in turn (or directly) replaced steam locos on passenger and freight services. Beeching cancelled a large order of DMUs when it was realised that there was going to be surplus. However, some of the early types were going to require extensive capital expenditure for bodywork rehabilitation and were scrapped instead. Same for some early diesel types that would have had to be replaced but this was not needed due to displaced stock from the closure program. There was a huge capital saving as a result of the line closures.

Undoubtedly there were lines that could have been treated differently, but where was the political will.......... And don't just blame the Ministers of Transport - MPs weren't exactly shouting in defence of lines in their own constituencies, let alone the national network. Perhaps they understood the financial issues of the day better than you?

 

[yorksrob]

Not at all wistful. But I am dealing with the history, not what I would have liked.

If you are under no illusion as to the political situation of the time, why is it that you cannot grasp the view of the time that the railways were considered outdated, inefficient and a bottomless pit for funding? I must laugh at the very thought that 'it's a pity that the railway at the time was so subservient to Governments'! Thank goodness it wasn't private shareholders, as far more would have been closed and/or slipped into such arrears of maintenance as to be unusable. As the Government were paying the bills, surely they would expect to 'call the shots' and expect subserviency? You certainly couldn't leave the decision making to career railwaymen - look at the financial mess that had got the railways to?

You are being disingenious: many lines closed whilst steam operated (Eridge-Polegate, Guildford-Horsham, Salisbury/Brockenhurst-Wimborne, SDJR, Taunton-Barnstaple, Exe Valley, Gloucester-Hereford, Ruabon-Barmouth, Great Central Main Line, Stirling-Crianlarich, Dumfries-Stranraer to name a few). Other lines had already been modernised, but on closure the new stock moved to lines or services that were steam operated. Yet more lines the new stock moved to replace diesel locos hauling carriages on other lines, which in turn (or directly) replaced steam locos on passenger and freight services. Beeching cancelled a large order of DMUs when it was realised that there was going to be surplus. However, some of the early types were going to require extensive capital expenditure for bodywork rehabilitation and were scrapped instead. Same for some early diesel types that would have had to be replaced but this was not needed due to displaced stock from the closure program. There was a huge capital saving as a result of the line closures.

Undoubtedly there were lines that could have been treated differently, but where was the political will.......... And don't just blame the Ministers of Transport - MPs weren't exactly shouting in defence of lines in their own constituencies, let alone the national network. Perhaps they understood the financial issues of the day better than you?

You're incorrect about Eridge - Polegate. That was run by DEMU's at the time of closure.

What is it about railway history that means that we are supposed to be uncritical about bad decisions that were made ? You are clearly happy to criticise the modernisation plan (even though it included many very good and necessary investments) yet we are expected to just accept the closure programme in its entirety. Yes, there were social and economic circumstances that led to the closure programme, but that doesn't excuse every poor decision that was made.

The OP asked whether there were cost-effective alternatives to Beeching. There clearly were options that have been extensively talked about on this thread that could have enabled a less damaging reduction to the network. That they weren't considered for the more marginal routes is down to ideology.

 

[RT4038]

You're incorrect about Eridge - Polegate. That was run by DEMU's at the time of closure.

What is it about railway history that means that we are supposed to be uncritical about bad decisions that were made ? You are clearly happy to criticise the modernisation plan (even though it included many very good and necessary investments) yet we are expected to just accept the closure programme in its entirety. Yes, there were social and economic circumstances that led to the closure programme, but that doesn't excuse every poor decision that was made.

The OP asked whether there were cost-effective alternatives to Beeching. There clearly were options that have been extensively talked about on this thread that could have enabled a less damaging reduction to the network. That they weren't considered for the more marginal routes is down to ideology.

Sorry, I thought that the Eridge-Hailsham section was steam worked on Monday-Friday up to closure, although the weekend service had been taken over by DEMUs before then. I found a newspaper article on the closure of the line; apparently an average of 250 passengers per day [28 using season tickets] were travelling in 1965 [I think the timetable had 18 trains each way = 36 trains] which works out as an average of 7 passengers per train, if the figures are to be believed. What possibly could have been done to bring that kind of loss to an acceptable level? A one-man-operated 'bus could not have survived on that kind of business.

Of course the closure programme can be criticised, but for the criticism to be fair it has to be based on options that were open - Should the Government have paid higher sums of subsidy to the railways to maintain the services, or more money to invest in cost saving measures by cutting other activities such as welfare state or something? Should the railways have used all/more of their capital investment money on preserving marginal lines rather than modernising and speeding up inter-city routes, eliminating the costs of steam traction, developing 125s etc? Was there anything else that could be done?

It is a fallacy to think that 'rationalisation' at that time would have cost nothing - in a previous post I have shown that retaining the new rolling stock on hopeless lines would have caused more capital expenditure elsewhere. There was no more money available. On your favourite York-Beverley line there were at least 19 manned level crossings between York (Bootham Junction) and Market Weighton - I expect replacing those (to get operating costs down) would cost a million pounds at 1965 prices. Multiply that by the number of lines you think should have been retained rather than closed (not the 'Cuckoo' line judging by the loading figures above!) and you start getting a feel for the magnitude of the problem.
These were the decisions that the people at the time were faced with.

So the answer to the OPs question is that, although there may have been more cost effective ways of running some of the closed lines, there was no capital available to introduce these more cost effective ways. Even then, there still may have been a wide gap between revenue and costs.

 

[yorksrob]

Sorry, I thought that the Eridge-Hailsham section was steam worked on Monday-Friday up to closure, although the weekend service had been taken over by DEMUs before then. I found a newspaper article on the closure of the line; apparently an average of 250 passengers per day [28 using season tickets] were travelling in 1965 [I think the timetable had 18 trains each way = 36 trains] which works out as an average of 7 passengers per train, if the figures are to be believed. What possibly could have been done to bring that kind of loss to an acceptable level? A one-man-operated 'bus could not have survived on that kind of business.

Of course the closure programme can be criticised, but for the criticism to be fair it has to be based on options that were open - Should the Government have paid higher sums of subsidy to the railways to maintain the services, or more money to invest in cost saving measures by cutting other activities such as welfare state or something? Should the railways have used all/more of their capital investment money on preserving marginal lines rather than modernising and speeding up inter-city routes, eliminating the costs of steam traction, developing 125s etc? Was there anything else that could be done?

It is a fallacy to think that 'rationalisation' at that time would have cost nothing - in a previous post I have shown that retaining the new rolling stock on hopeless lines would have caused more capital expenditure elsewhere. There was no more money available. On your favourite York-Beverley line there were at least 19 manned level crossings between York (Bootham Junction) and Market Weighton - I expect replacing those (to get operating costs down) would cost a million pounds at 1965 prices. Multiply that by the number of lines you think should have been retained rather than closed (not the 'Cuckoo' line judging by the loading figures above!) and you start getting a feel for the magnitude of the problem.
These were the decisions that the people at the time were faced with.

So the answer to the OPs question is that, although there may have been more cost effective ways of running some of the closed lines, there was no capital available to introduce these more cost effective ways. Even then, there still may have been a wide gap between revenue and costs.

In terms of the options available, If the Governments of the day had spent a tiny proportion of their seemingly unlimited road budget on rationalising marginal routes, they could have avoided towns like Market Weighton being cut off of the network. I understand that at one stage the Government provided a grant for removing underused trackwork from the network. It's not inconceivable that they could have provided one to rationalise marginal passenger lines.

 

[Killingworth]

For the record, what Beeching said about Hull - York via Beverley. Page 99

Hull- York via Beverley
This is a stopping service over a distance of 42 miles, serving a rural area between the cities of Hull and York, and with an element of commuter traffic at each end. The stations served are:-

Hull, Londesborough, Cottingham, Pocklington, Beverle, Stamford Bridge, Kipling Cotes, Earswick, Market Weighton, York.

All intermediate stations except Cottingham and Beverley would be closed. Nine trains run in each direction on weekdays and most of them are composed of diesel multiple units.

In a year the service involves 260,000 train miles. On average, there are 57 passengers on a train. The earnings of the service are £90,400, and cover the movement expenses of £84,400. Terminal expenses bring the total of movement and terminal expenses to £107,500, so that earnings show a shortfall of £17,100. It is estimated that withdrawal of the service would reduce track and signalling expenses by £43,300. Thus, on total direct expenses of £150,800, earnings show a shortfall of £60,400, equivalent to two-fifths of total direct expenses. Because alternative services would be available after withdrawal of the service, £25,600 of the present earnings would be retained. It is estimated that passengers using the service as part of their rail journey contribute £37,700 to the revenue of other services.

Because of the existence of services between Hull and York via other routes, only 9,900 of this amount is expected to be lost. The total loss in gross revenue resulting from withdrawal of the service is estimated at £69,700, but the overall net financial improvement is expected to be £81,000, equivalent to over half of the total direct expenses.

 

[RT4038]

In terms of the options available, If the Governments of the day had spent a tiny proportion of their seemingly unlimited road budget on rationalising marginal routes, they could have avoided towns like Market Weighton being cut off of the network. I understand that at one stage the Government provided a grant for removing underused trackwork from the network. It's not inconceivable that they could have provided one to rationalise marginal passenger lines.

The Government could have used the road budget for this purpose, but this would have run contrary to the prevailing view in 1962/3 that the railways were considered outdated, inefficient and a bottomless pit for funding. Small towns the size of Market Weighton were not judged as requiring rail service, and indeed lots of towns this size lost theirs.
It was inconceivable that grants would have been paid to rationalise marginal passenger lines at the time of the Beeching report, as this would have been giving more money to the railways, who had already wasted lots of the 1955 tranche. The (later) grants for removal of underused trackwork was to enable the scrap value to be realised, on lines that were going to be retained.

 

[yorksrob]

The Government could have used the road budget for this purpose, but this would have run contrary to the prevailing view in 1962/3 that the railways were considered outdated, inefficient and a bottomless pit for funding. Small towns the size of Market Weighton were not judged as requiring rail service, and indeed lots of towns this size lost theirs.
It was inconceivable that grants would have been paid to rationalise marginal passenger lines at the time of the Beeching report, as this would have been giving more money to the railways, who had already wasted lots of the 1955 tranche. The (later) grants for removal of underused trackwork was to enable the scrap value to be realised, on lines that were going to be retained.

Then the prevailing view was wrong.

One could argue that the Government could and perhaps should have kept a tighter control of what the modernisation money was spent on (although as they hadn't reformed the common carrier legislation, it's hard to see that they would have made different spending decisions anyway) but that's no reason not to issue a tightly controlled grant for a specific purpose, such as realising scrap value or rationalising passenger routes.

You're happy to point the finger of blame for pretty much everything under the sun at the modernisation plan, yet in your eyes, the likes of Beeching/Marples/Fraser are absolved from responsibility for any poor decisions that they made because you've adopted uncritically the Establishment view of the railways as a bottomless pit, rather than a vital public service. The "prevailing" view was not shared by a large proportion of the public who could see that the cuts of the 60's went too far, and had the politicians been subject to the kind of scrutiny we would expect today, it's unlikely that they would have been able to get away with the extent of the cuts that they did.

 

[Killingworth]

You're happy to point the finger of blame for pretty much everything under the sun at the modernisation plan, yet in your eyes, the likes of Beeching/Marples/Fraser are absolved from responsibility for any poor decisions that they made because you've adopted uncritically the Establishment view of the railways as a bottomless pit, rather than a vital public service. The "prevailing" view was not shared by a large proportion of the public who could see that the cuts of the 60's went too far, and had the politicians been subject to the kind of scrutiny we would expect today, it's unlikely that they would have been able to get away with the extent of the cuts that they did.

Today we're told 2% of journeys are made by rail after a big resurgence in recent years. Back in the 1950/60 era rail was falling off a cliff. Yes, there was a view that the cuts were going too far, that view particularly strong among most working in the industry and people who would have contributed to this forum. The general public were voting much more effectively with their steering wheels.

I've only a shallow knowledge of market research but I did learn that people will say what they think the question expects them to say. Yes, they'd buy that product. It's great. When given the opportunity to buy they don't in anything like the same numbers.

Speaking personally I was horrified in 1982 when I saw Serpell suggesting cutting the ECML north of Newcastle and the North Tyneside electrics. However, as a native of Newcastle, with family and friends still there, I hadn't used either since 1967 when I got a car. That was fairly typical of that time. Over the last few years I've used the Metro many times, and the ECML north of Newcastle too.

Looking at Hull-Beverley-York today it looks like the wrong decision. It almost certainly was, and it came as a shock, taken with almost disbelief in East Yorkshire. Wrong, with hindsight, but I recall the line with its many hand operated level crossings, before automation was standard. Interesting stuff about that line on the Disused Stations website.

 

[yorksrob]

Today we're told 2% of journeys are made by rail after a big resurgence in recent years. Back in the 1950/60 era rail was falling off a cliff. Yes, there was a view that the cuts were going too far, that view particularly strong among most working in the industry and people who would have contributed to this forum. The general public were voting much more effectively with their steering wheels.

I've only a shallow knowledge of market research but I did learn that people will say what they think the question expects them to say. Yes, they'd buy that product. It's great. When given the opportunity to buy they don't in anything like the same numbers.

Speaking personally I was horrified in 1982 when I saw Serpell suggesting cutting the ECML north of Newcastle and the North Tyneside electrics. However, as a native of Newcastle, with family and friends still there, I hadn't used either since 1967 when I got a car. That was fairly typical of that time. Over the last few years I've used the Metro many times, and the ECML north of Newcastle too.

Looking at Hull-Beverley-York today it looks like the wrong decision. It almost certainly was, and it came as a shock, taken with almost disbelief in East Yorkshire. Wrong, with hindsight, but I recall the line with its many hand operated level crossings, before automation was standard. Interesting stuff about that line on the Disused Stations website.

My own family were part of the 1960's motorcar revolution. My father adored driving and still misses it. As you say, when we went anywhere as a family, we were more likely to take the car.

Yet, like I suspect the majority, we were a one car family. When my mother took me to visit relatives during the week, the train was the only sensible alternative. It was a similar story if we went shopping anywhere other than my home town. And when my sister went to University in London in the 1980's, guess how she came back and visited every weekend.

The narrative that 'everyone' in the 1960's/70's was getting a car was a very incomplete picture. I exect much more so than now, when families are more likely to have two or even more cars. But then what did mere housewives and students and people who couldn't afford cars matter to politicians in the 1960's and 70's, when they were busy building the future in concrete.