Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

[island]

In France the road speed limit automatically drops to 110km/h or by 10km/h below the road's limit when it's wet.

 

[bramling]

In France the road speed limit automatically drops to 110km/h or by 10km/h below the road's limit when it's wet.

Out of interest, is this enforced?

I tend to apply a rough reduction in speed depending on what setting the wipers are on, but of course one has to be wary of standing water too.

 

[AlexNL]

Out of interest, is this enforced?

I don't think the machines enforce it, but police definitely do.

 

[greatkingrat]

I don't think the machines enforce it, but police definitely do.

How exactly is "rain" defined? There is a big difference between driving in a bit of light drizzle and driving in torrential rain.

 

[M7R]

From my limited knowledge, Airbags would only work in conjunction with seatbelts as being thrown towards an exploding airbag unrestrained would just be as bad as hitting a tree at 70mph

This is right. I used to work in a vehicle crash lab and I am still heavily involved in vehicle approval 14 years later inc crash.

For seat belts you can just fit them, the ancharges are tested (for a car 1.3T on each part.. so chest 1.3 ton and lap 1.3 ton.. plus if any of the anchorages are on the seat then it’s also plus 20 times the mass of the seat inc all options (ie arm rests, leather etc) it soon adds up!

When you get to air bags they only work in a very limited range.. car makers do “out of position” testing ie all the way forward all the way rearward but it’s still a very controlled envelope.. no idea how you would get an airbag(s) in the right place… side could be in the seat but front one would be fun!

Then there is the timing, get it wrong by a few MS and it’s worse than no air bag, I watched development tests where the trigger was a few MS too late so the air bag second stage (most front ones are 2 stage now so not too hard for low speed impacts) went off too late and fired the dummy back into the seat causing a lot of injuries! If you designed it all from scratch then maybe… just maybe it could work but it would basically be a case of make a train more like a car for the driver and go from there.

 

[AlexNL]

How exactly is "rain" defined? There is a big difference between driving in a bit of light drizzle and driving in torrential rain.

The French 'code de la route' mentions "rain or any other sort of precipitation". There's actually more restrictions than what many people are aware of, the motorway one is just the most well-known because it's advertised on a lot of signs.

Autoroute (motorway): 130 km/h normal -> 110 km/h during rain
Dual carriageway: 110 km/h normal -> 100 km/h during rain
Single carriageway with at least two lanes in the same direction: 90 km/h normal -> 80 km/h during rain
Single carriageways and urban roads keep their regular speeds (80 km/h and 50 km/h).

When I'm driving in France, my rule of thumb is 'when I need my wipers, I need to lower my speed' and so far that has worked pretty well for me.

 

[InOban]

And because the autoroutes are toll roads, the speed limits are easy to enforce.

 

[Cowley]

I think we’ve probably drifted far enough off topic now that it looks like what needed to be discussed has been discussed and it’s time to close this thread. If anything comes up that you’d like to add please contact us via the report function or pm.

There’s a thread about potential HST replacement here.

Thanks for your contributions everyone.

 

[Cowley]

Thread reopened for @Deltic1961 to provide an update.

 

[Deltic1961]

Thank you. Article on the BBC North East Scotland page yesterday stating that the Steering Group set up to discuss issues arising from the derailment is still to meet.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-62290811

A steering group announced earlier this year to drive safety improvements on Scotland's railways following a fatal derailment has yet to meet.
Three people died when the train hit a landslide near Stonehaven in August 2020 after heavy rain.
The new panel was announced in March after a report on the crash made 20 safety recommendations.
The RMT union said the situation was disappointing. Transport Scotland said discussions had started.
Last week, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) said Network Rail Scotland had failed to provide tangible supporting evidence to demonstrate safety steps taken so far.
The track operator said it was "committed to learning the lessons" of the crash.

 

[John Bishop]

Thank you. Article on the BBC North East Scotland page yesterday stating that the Steering Group set up to discuss issues arising from the derailment is still to meet.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-62290811

Can’t say I’m hugely surprised. Sounds like a lot of mouth music and hot air by various parties involved. It’s time for these parties to get serious and start doing what they’ve said they would.

Can’t find the link but also the ORR publicly said last week that they’ve found no tangible evidence of any remedial action being taken following the RAIB recommendations into the crash.

 

[theageofthetra]

Can’t say I’m hugely surprised. Sounds like a lot of mouth music and hot air by various parties involved. It’s time for these parties to get serious and start doing what they’ve said they would.

Can’t find the link but also the ORR publicly said last week that they’ve found no tangible evidence of any remedial action being taken following the RAIB recommendations into the crash.

Abysmal behaviour if this report is accurate.

 

[BrianW]

Can’t say I’m hugely surprised. Sounds like a lot of mouth music and hot air by various parties involved. It’s time for these parties to get serious and start doing what they’ve said they would.

Can’t find the link but also the ORR publicly said last week that they’ve found no tangible evidence of any remedial action being taken following the RAIB recommendations into the crash.

Is this it?
https://www.orr.gov.uk/search-news/...-efficiently-calls-sustained-focus-continuing

 

[Morayshire]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-62250466

Concerns about safety steps in the wake of the Aberdeenshire train crash which claimed three lives have been raised by the industry regulator.
The train hit a landslide near Stonehaven in 2020 after heavy rain.
A drainage system had been incorrectly installed.
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) said Network Rail Scotland had failed to provide tangible supporting evidence to demonstrate steps taken so far to implement safety recommendations.
Network Rail Scotland said it was "committed to learning the lessons" of the crash.
Train drivers' union Aslef called for a public inquiry into the crash.
Driver Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62, died when the train derailed at Carmont on 12 August 2020.
Six other people were injured when the 06:38 Aberdeen to Glasgow service hit washed-out debris at Carmont, south of Stonehaven.

The train was returning to Aberdeen due to the railway being blocked further down the line.
The ORR said prioritised action plans had been made to meet safety recommendations, but warned focus was needed on delivering them.
The annual report also warned that a backlog in drainage inspections caused by extreme weather this year could potentially pose an increased safety risk.

The report said: "During our engagement, representatives from the region described the steps they have taken in response to their action plans but have subsequently failed to provide any tangible supporting evidence to demonstrate these.
"Network Rail Scotland also did not clearly articulate how each action plan will implement the relevant task force recommendations."

It added: "The region improved identification of its drainage assets, but our planned inspections relating to this were delayed by named storms in early 2022.

"Improved information about drainage assets is vital for Network Rail to ensure that its resources are correctly targeted to maintain existing assets and invested in meeting the challenges presented by climate change. We will report on these matters in due course, once our inspections work has been completed."

Network Rail Scotland said delivering a safe and reliable railway more efficiently had never been more important.

"We are committed to learning the lessons of Carmont made by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), as well as implementing the Mair report," a statement said.
"Since the accident, we have made significant changes to how we operate services during extreme weather and have increased our investment in new technologies.
"Our control room is also the first in Britain to establish a specialist weather team, and this additional resource is being supported by increased investment in our frontline teams."
The RAIB made 20 safety recommendations in a report in March on the crash, which followed the task force report by Lord Mair the previous year.
They included better management of civil engineering projects, improved response to extreme rainfall, and better understanding of the additional risk associated with older trains.
A drainage system was installed in 2011 and 2012 by now-collapsed contractor Carillion - but it was not in accordance with the design.
Had it been constructed correctly, it was "highly likely to have safely accommodated the flow of surface water" on the day of the crash, the RAIB report concluded.
Kevin Lindsay, of Aslef, said they would work with the industry to make railways as safe as possible.
"Because the reality is that this report suggests that we are still to see the full-scale action required after the Carmont crash," he added.

"Aslef remains committed to securing a full public inquiry into all aspects of the Carmont crash. We must ensure that everything possible is done to stop future tragedies from taking place."

Looks to me as if the BBC trawled the annual report on Network Rail linked to above

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

RAIB have been reporting annually for years the failure of the industry to respond in a timely fashion to recommendations they have made through each accident report. They aren't the enforces though that is upto ORR.

 

[najaB]

RAIB have been reporting annually for years the failure of the industry to respond in a timely fashion to recommendations they have made through each accident report. They aren't the enforces though that is upto ORR.

Just to point out that this isn't unique to the railway or to this country. The NTSB (investigator) in the USA is in constant tension with the FAA (regulator) - to the extent that the FAA is referred to informally as the 'tombstone agency' as they won't enforce NTSB recommendations unless and until there are enough bodies in the ground (at $9.6M each) to 'pay for' the improvement.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Just to point out that this isn't unique to the railway or to this country. The NTSB (investigator) in the USA is in constant tension with the FAA (regulator) - to the extent that the FAA is referred to informally as the 'tombstone agency' as they won't enforce NTSB recommendations unless and until there are enough bodies in the ground (at $9.6M each) to 'pay for' the improvement.

Oh and doesn't surprise me as there seems to be a favourite saying round the Western world we will learn lessons from these failure, accidents, incidents etc but they never do.

 

[yorkie]

Oh and doesn't surprise me as there seems to be a favourite saying round the Western world we will learn lessons from these failure, accidents, incidents etc but they never do.

If that was true, how are railways safer than they used to be in the past?

 

[bramling]

If that was true, how are railways safer than they used to be in the past?

The bigger problem is lessons are learned but then corporate memory forgets them perhaps a (corporate) generation into the future.

 

[najaB]

If that was true, how are railways safer than they used to be in the past?

They're safer than they used to be, but not nearly as safe as they could be.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

If that was true, how are railways safer than they used to be in the past?

True but would suggest the big gains in UK railway safety came before RAIB came into existence.

Had the same issue in NR with internal investigations when it came to recommendations you had to go in front of panel to have them signed off before the report would be issued and would be watering down as the view was often that recommendations although sound were impractical to implement.

There is the law of diminishing returns here with safety being so improved its taking an increasing bigger effort to chase out small residual risks.

 

[yorkie]

There is the law of diminishing returns here with safety being so improved its taking an increasing bigger effort to chase out small residual risks.

That's very true and it gets to the stage where the costs become extreme and it can become counterproductive if it forces people onto other modes, but this is really a whole new topic in itself.

Is there anything else for anyone to add regarding the Carmont incident specifically?

 

[Alanko]

They're safer than they used to be, but not nearly as safe as they could be.

"Lessons Learned" just becomes a meaningless stock phrase.

Presumably a better course of action would be to investigate any sites where Carillion are known to have undertaken any work involving modifying or creating earthworks, altering hydrology etc between a fixed set of dates. A corresponding data trawl would reveal how much, or how little information Network Rail hold on these assets.

I would prioritise capturing detailed LiDAR data for all of Scotland's rail network, plus a buffer zone each side of the track. This might have to vary depending on the topography around the line. Then re-survey at a fixed frequency (six months?) to build up a time series so that any changes around the network can be detected early.

Boring work for all involved, but fairly necessary.

 

[35B]

"Lessons Learned" just becomes a meaningless stock phrase.

Presumably a better course of action would be to investigate any sites where Carillion are known to have undertaken any work involving modifying or creating earthworks, altering hydrology etc between a fixed set of dates. A corresponding data trawl would reveal how much, or how little information Network Rail hold on these assets.

I would prioritise capturing detailed LiDAR data for all of Scotland's rail network, plus a buffer zone each side of the track. This might have to vary depending on the topography around the line. Then re-survey at a fixed frequency (six months?) to build up a time series so that any changes around the network can be detected early.

Boring work for all involved, but fairly necessary.

But why is the risk specifically with Carillion alone?

 

[Alanko]

But why is the risk specifically with Carillion alone?

Maybe it isn't! It appears that Carillion deviated from the site plans in the case of Carmont and loosely documented their work. Documentation wasn't handed over to Network Rail after Carillion collapsed, so it stands to reason that there are a number of either incorrectly or lightly documented, or wholly undocumented assets around the network.

 

[Falcon1200]

I would prioritise capturing detailed LiDAR data for all of Scotland's rail network, plus a buffer zone each side of the track. This might have to vary depending on the topography around the line. Then re-survey at a fixed frequency (six months?) to build up a time series so that any changes around the network can be detected early.

Well before the tragic event at Carmont NR Scotland had an Embankments & Cuttings Procedure, whereby, during forecast heavy rainfall, such structures which had been assessed and deemed by the engineers to be 'At Risk' had to be examined at prescribed intervals, and if this was not achieved, speed restrictions were imposed; Incidentally creating huge extra workload for Control at what were already guaranteed to be very busy periods. Therefore processes were, and are, in place to deal with extreme weather, however Carmont was an exceptional incident caused by different, and avoidable, circumstances, and I have no doubt that NR have been very carefully checking other similar situations. As per the report quoted in Post #1364, NR Scotland have revised and improved their weather management procedures since Carmont, so it would be wrong to suggest that nothing has been done.

 

[Taunton]

But why is the risk specifically with Carillion alone?

Probably because they have gone bust in the intervening period. How convenient.

The works were done in 2011-12. The landslip occurred in 2020. Trying to stick it on civils done that long beforehand (and apparently not checked since) is ridiculous. I'm surprised they haven't put the blame on Sir Thomas Bouch as well ...

Doubtless after the works were done, a Network Rail surveyor did a thorough check, to sign off the works, yes, along with supervising the works as they were going along, typically monthly (and these works spanned two years). They would check and approve the materials delivered and the Carillion workforce timesheets. That's what client surveyors do. Otherwise the contractor would not have been paid for it. Where are these records? The works were of course way out of contractors' warranty by this time, and were wholly the responsibility of Network Rail to maintain. It's their gig.

 

[LOL The Irony]

Trying to stick it on civils done that long beforehand (and apparently not checked since) is ridiculous.

Yes, pinning it solely on the civils is wrong. But if they'd built the thing as specified, then this accident probably wouldn't have happened.

 

[PG]

Doubtless after the works were done, a Network Rail surveyor did a thorough check,

I'd say until proven otherwise there is a lot of doubt! Also if the works were indeed surveyed, was it a NR surveyor or contracted out?...

 

[4069]

If you read the RAIB report, paragraph 183 makes it clear that there is no record of any check being done after the work was complete.