Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

[AlbertBeale]

The latter three letters stand for "beyond all recognition". I'll let you guess for the remainder!

Indeed - many thanks. It's an abbreviation (either in 3-letter or 5-letter form) that I don't remember encountering before. I assumed it was something rail-industry-specific.

 

[gimmea50anyday]

It is used many times in Saving Private Ryan, but its only near the end of the film when Corporal Upham finally understands what it means

 

[driverd]

According to the article below, ASLEF members may boycott working on HSTs from August next year unless "meaningful discussions" take place.

Link to Daily Record article on Pressreader: https://www.pressreader.com/uk/daily-record/20220312/281840057141165

The main concern I would highlight with the HST is the terrible performance of the lifeguards. I don't drive HSTs, but if there is one thing out of everything detailed in that report that would, personally, make me feel much safer, it's an upgrade to these, seemingly insignificant bits of metal.

In essence, if these were more resilient, there's half a chance this accident wouldn't have happened in the way it did.

Its also more than just the spectaculars. The lifeguards are very much the last line of defence against any obstruction on the track - from animals to masonry to vehicles. I would hope and expect to see modifications in order to bring them in line with the latest standards - or atleast to get them as close to modern spec as is possible.

I think other practical modifications would be simple changes to give the couplers more resilience and to investigate bogie retention.

In terms of seat belts/air bags - the report is very clear. The drivers cab, even if this was a meridian/voyager/turbostar, would have been destroyed. In lesser accidents they may help but in this case, there was only ever going to be one outcome.

Modifications to the life guards (primarily), but also to the couplers and bogies, likely could have prevented the train from leaving the tracks where it did, prevented carrying so much force into the bridge (and ultimately, the ground), and given a far more linear debris field.

 

[Horizon22]

One thing I don't recall noticing when I skimmed the report is why the train had to return to Stonehaven on the down line. Shortly after it had been brought to a stand by the GSMR call the whole network was FUBAR and nothing was moving south of Carmont or north of Stonehaven. Rather than wait for two hours for a MOM to fit facing point locks why didn't it just return to Stonehaven under caution on the up line?

This would require it to run "wrong road" for quite some time which can have implications to the infrastructure. In normal circumstances it wouldn't take two hours and I imagine when originally called the MOM didn't necessarily think it would take as long as it did.

Therefore, a Network Rail mobile operations manager (MOM) was tasked (at 07:40 hrs) to travel to Carmont with the equipment for temporarily securing the crossover to allow the passage of train 1T08. The MOM, who was based in Aberdeen, experienced considerable difficulty in reaching Carmont because of the many flooded roads in the area, and eventually arrived there at approximately 08:55 hrs

So sequence of events:
0718 - Route control suggests crossing at Carmont. No scotches or clips held at box (nor signaller trained)
0740 - Aberdeen MOM dispatched to Carmont to scotch & clip
0835 - LOM [MOM manager] and 2nd MOM dispatched to Carmont in event they can arrive quicker
0855 - Aberdeen MOM arrives at Carmont (having been severely delayed)
0917 - Aberdeen MOM (presumably) advises scotches & clips fitted
0920 - Driver traverses points and changes cab to go northbound
0928 - Carmont signaller authorises 1T08 to proceed northbound.
0930 - Second MOM arrives
0934 - 1T08 passes Carmont signal box
0940 - LOM arrives

 

[Adoarable]

The RAIB report lists at least 34 infrastructure failures in Scotland on that morning.

How many of them were first discovered by the driver of a train travelling at line speed? Given Scotland's sparse population and the lack of a general order to reduce speed, I would guess most of them.

Presumably in most cases either the driver was able to brake soon enough to avoid an incident, or the failure was not yet dangerous to passing trains.

The passengers and staff on 1T08 were of course unlucky to meet that particular landslip at that time, but was a fatal accident almost inevitable that day, given the lack of route proving trains and lack of obligation to reduce speed? Network Rail were gambling against the law of averages and might actually consider themselves lucky that there was 'only' 1 fatal accident.

If that train had been heavier loaded there could have been dozens of fatalities, and it would only take 1 or 2 more accidents of a similar nature across the network to make it hundreds.

I'm not saying this to sensationalise what happened. Rather I'm suggesting that the magnitude of Network Rail's failings is even higher than the actual death toll indicates.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

The main concern I would highlight with the HST is the terrible performance of the lifeguards. I don't drive HSTs, but if there is one thing out of everything detailed in that report that would, personally, make me feel much safer, it's an upgrade to these, seemingly insignificant bits of metal.

In essence, if these were more resilient, there's half a chance this accident wouldn't have happened in the way it did.

Its also more than just the spectaculars. The lifeguards are very much the last line of defence against any obstruction on the track - from animals to masonry to vehicles. I would hope and expect to see modifications in order to bring them in line with the latest standards - or atleast to get them as close to modern spec as is possible.

I think other practical modifications would be simple changes to give the couplers more resilience and to investigate bogie retention.

In terms of seat belts/air bags - the report is very clear. The drivers cab, even if this was a meridian/voyager/turbostar, would have been destroyed. In lesser accidents they may help but in this case, there was only ever going to be one outcome.

Modifications to the life guards (primarily), but also to the couplers and bogies, likely could have prevented the train from leaving the tracks where it did, prevented carrying so much force into the bridge (and ultimately, the ground), and given a far more linear debris field.

Its also interesting that RAIB believe the remainder of the train stayed on the track upto the point the power car hit the bridge abutment so presumably the passage of the power car through the debris cleared sufficient of it away to keep the following wheelsets guided so it does show that improved lifeguards could have made a material difference. If i was an owning ROSCO now i would be quickly looking into what can be easily modified on the power cars to improve the lifeguards and cab resilience. It will never be as good as modern train but it would demonstrate to operators and their staff what the art of the possible is.

 

[takno]

The RAIB report lists at least 34 infrastructure failures in Scotland on that morning.

How many of them were first discovered by the driver of a train travelling at line speed? Given Scotland's sparse population and the lack of a general order to reduce speed, I would guess most of them.

Presumably in most cases either the driver was able to brake soon enough to avoid an incident, or the failure was not yet dangerous to passing trains.

The passengers and staff on 1T08 were of course unlucky to meet that particular landslip at that time, but was a fatal accident almost inevitable that day, given the lack of route proving trains and lack of obligation to reduce speed? Network Rail were gambling against the law of averages and might actually consider themselves lucky that there was 'only' 1 fatal accident.

If that train had been heavier loaded there could have been dozens of fatalities, and it would only take 1 or 2 more accidents of a similar nature across the network to make it hundreds.

I'm not saying this to sensationalise what happened. Rather I'm suggesting that the magnitude of Network Rail's failings is even higher than the actual death toll indicates.

In short no. There are infrastructure failures across the network all the time and have been constantly over the last 20 years, and yet we typically go years between fatal accidents. Suggesting that a fatal accident was "almost inevitable that day" is almost comically over-dramatic

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

In short no. There are infrastructure failures across the network all the time and have been constantly over the last 20 years, and yet we typically go years between fatal accidents. Suggesting that a fatal accident was "almost inevitable that day" is almost comically over-dramatic

You could say that the subsequent weather events that have seen Scotland implement suspension of train movements or region wide blanket speed restrictions as an admission that the response that day was sufficient and at least lessons have been learnt.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

You could say that the subsequent weather events that have seen Scotland implement suspension of train movements or region wide blanket speed restrictions as an admission that the response that day was sufficient and at least lessons have been learnt.

Did you mean to say 'insufficient'?

 

[takno]

You could say that the subsequent weather events that have seen Scotland implement suspension of train movements or region wide blanket speed restrictions as an admission that the response that day was sufficient and at least lessons have been learnt

You could also conclude that that was a (hopefully temporary) overreaction. It's questionable whether it's in the interests of public safety to force people into much-more-dangerous cars every time the Met Office issues an alert.

 

[Deltic1961]

Although the incident at Carmont was tragic, I can't help feeling it's gone too much the other way now with Scotrail cancelling trains ahead of weather events. I always thought of the railways as a resilient form of transport, but now they're shutting down parts of the network in advance of events even happening.

 

[Falcon1200]

Rather I'm suggesting that the magnitude of Network Rail's failings is even higher than the actual death toll indicates.

Yet only one fatal accident occurred that day, and while it was without doubt a tragic and avoidable event, it was the first in the UK since 2007. And until Carmont, by far the most serious incident of the scores in Scotland that morning was the washaway near Polmont caused by the canal failure (beyond Network Rail's control) which could have been far more devastating that Carmont had it occurred when trains were running.

 

[John Bishop]

You could also conclude that that was a (hopefully temporary) overreaction. It's questionable whether it's in the interests of public safety to force people into much-more-dangerous cars every time the Met Office issues an alert.

It just goes to show what a shocking state the network is in and the lack of confidence of it holding up in the face of adverse weather. I wonder how other Rail networks deal with adverse weather across Europe?

 

[bramling]

The RAIB report lists at least 34 infrastructure failures in Scotland on that morning.

How many of them were first discovered by the driver of a train travelling at line speed? Given Scotland's sparse population and the lack of a general order to reduce speed, I would guess most of them.

Presumably in most cases either the driver was able to brake soon enough to avoid an incident, or the failure was not yet dangerous to passing trains.

The passengers and staff on 1T08 were of course unlucky to meet that particular landslip at that time, but was a fatal accident almost inevitable that day, given the lack of route proving trains and lack of obligation to reduce speed? Network Rail were gambling against the law of averages and might actually consider themselves lucky that there was 'only' 1 fatal accident.

If that train had been heavier loaded there could have been dozens of fatalities, and it would only take 1 or 2 more accidents of a similar nature across the network to make it hundreds.

I'm not saying this to sensationalise what happened. Rather I'm suggesting that the magnitude of Network Rail's failings is even higher than the actual death toll indicates.

I wouldn’t necessarily blame Network Rail for this. As a society, we need to make up our collective mind what should happen during extreme weather, which includes to what extent we expect people to travel.

For example, at my place during Storm Eunice, there was an acceptance that people were going to have issues travelling in by train, so the solution was to offer mileage payments.

I declined to drive in until the red warning had elapsed, which meant I got in about an hour and a half late, and got a sarcastic comment “you’d be no good in the SAS”.

As a society we are very inconsistent about adverse weather. Much as I like the idea of keeping moving at all cost, reality is this doesn’t happen in practice - the job still ends up suspended, only with people stranded and trains damaged.

 

[IanXC]

I wouldn’t necessarily blame Network Rail for this. As a society, we need to make up our collective mind what should happen during extreme weather, which includes to what extent we expect people to travel.

For example, at my place during Storm Eunice, there was an acceptance that people were going to have issues travelling in by train, so the solution was to offer mileage payments.

I declined to drive in until the red warning had elapsed, which meant I got in about an hour and a half late, and got a sarcastic comment “you’d be no good in the SAS”.

As a society we are very inconsistent about adverse weather. Much as I like the idea of keeping moving at all cost, reality is this doesn’t happen in practice - the job still ends up suspended, only with people stranded and trains damaged.

I always ponder how odd the situation is for railway workers themselves going to work when their own TOC issue a 'do not travel' instruction!

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

It just goes to show what a shocking state the network is in and the lack of confidence of it holding up in the face of adverse weather. I wonder how other Rail networks deal with adverse weather across Europe?

Dutch and Belgium Infrastructure operators called halt to all services in Northern part of their countries during the height of storm Eunice a few weeks back.

 

[AlexNL]

Dutch and Belgium Infrastructure operators called halt to all services in Northern part of their countries during the height of storm Eunice a few weeks back.

Not just the northern part of the country - in NL all services were suspended nationwide from 14:00 onwards, with 14:00 meaning "trains are back at their depot by then". It took ProRail and their contractors two days to clean up the damage the storm caused.

There was 1 train which ran anyway, an international charter train, which ended up leaving NL almost a day late.

 

[coxxy]

Surely, If ASLEF are convinced there is a genuine safety concern, they should be telling their members to stop working HST's UNTIL meaningful discussions take place....

 

[scotraildriver]

Not just the northern part of the country - in NL all services were suspended nationwide from 14:00 onwards, with 14:00 meaning "trains are back at their depot by then". It took ProRail and their contractors two days to clean up the damage the storm caused.

There was 1 train which ran anyway, an international charter train, which ended up leaving NL almost a day late.

Whhooaa you can't go writing reality like that! According to this forum, and the press in general, "other countries" manage just fine and all these issues are unique to the UK.

 

[yorkie]

Whhooaa you can't go writing reality like that! According to this forum, and the press in general, "other countries" manage just fine and all these issues are unique to the UK.

Do you have a source for that?

 

[Dieseldriver]

Surely, If ASLEF are convinced there is a genuine safety concern, they should be telling their members to stop working HST's UNTIL meaningful discussions take place....

And you reckon the good people of this forum and the general public would view that as acceptable? I’m actually impressed that the union have been so reasonable and sensible about the issue.

 

[Mag_seven]

For discussion as to whether Scotrail should withdraw HSTs as a result of this report, please use the following thread in Speculative Ideas:

Following the Carmont RAIB report, should Scotrail withdraw its HSTs?

I read these trains will come out of service soon does it mean a return to 170 3 coach trains rather than 4?

www.railforums.co.uk

 

[Falcon1200]

It just goes to show what a shocking state the network is in and the lack of confidence of it holding up in the face of adverse weather. I wonder how other Rail networks deal with adverse weather across Europe?

It was a bit more than just adverse weather; a month's worth of rain fell in two hours ! That level of extreme weather is rare but becoming more common, there are serious questions to be asked regarding infrastructure resilience in such conditions, but I disagree that the issues on that day mean that the network is in a shocking state.

 

[Starmill]

Whhooaa you can't go writing reality like that! According to this forum, and the press in general, "other countries" manage just fine and all these issues are unique to the UK.

I've personally seen lots of complaints about the effects of serious disruption to services and chronic unreliability of trains on the continent in the media and on the forum. Especially in Germany, but also in Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria and Czechia.

A pretty major story about the scarf of a woman from Munich made press around the continent, in Britain and Ireland, and even here on CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/europe/woman-knitting-train-delay-scarf-intl-scli/index.html

 

[John Bishop]

It was a bit more than just adverse weather; a month's worth of rain fell in two hours ! That level of extreme weather is rare but becoming more common, there are serious questions to be asked regarding infrastructure resilience in such conditions, but I disagree that the issues on that day mean that the network is in a shocking state.

I was referring to the fact that each time we have adverse weather now, it requires a blanket speed restriction to be imposed due to the risk of infrastructure failure and subsequent risk to trains.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

I was referring to the fact that each time we have adverse weather now, it requires a blanket speed restriction to be imposed due to the risk of infrastructure failure and subsequent risk to trains.

Well when the infrastructure operator doesn't really know the resilience of its assets or the quality of its construction work this is only course of action open to it.

 

[duffers2324]

This leads this back though to the whole argument for TOC's as well of "We'll run the trains regardless of knowing that there is going to be adverse weather" and in that knowing full well that there might very well be disruption and then passengers aren't happy when trains get delayed or cancelled etc because of running in the weather, or the other way of "Do not travel at all and wind the system down before a certain time and have trains and staff in correct places for services and for safety for when they restart after the "adverse" weather but passengers are still not happy because they cant travel at all, so TOC's are damned if they do and damned if they don't, what do people expect? I get that people might need to travel for work etc and i imagine the people who complain about there being no service during bad weather are the same people who complain when the trains do run in bad weather but then get caught up in disruption etc and turn around and say "oh they really shouldn't be running etc"

With hindsight you can see why Scotrail errs on the side of caution when it comes to weather etc and the network etc and possibly Stonehaven is partly a reason for this again it makes you think if this sort of policy was in place before hand then it might not have happened.

 

[rebmcr]

i imagine the people who complain about there being no service during bad weather are the same people who complain when the trains do run in bad weather

Your imagination seems a little more vivid than reality! Before reading this line, I was actually about to reply stating that those people are probably not the same ones!

 

[scotrail158713]

I was referring to the fact that each time we have adverse weather now, it requires a blanket speed restriction to be imposed due to the risk of infrastructure failure and subsequent risk to trains.

Is that unique to railways though? Road transport also alters speed/driving style in extreme weather e.g. heavy rain.

 

[bramling]

Is that unique to railways though? Road transport also alters speed/driving style in extreme weather e.g. heavy rain.

Hollow laugh from me on that one. Driving home on the A1(M) a couple of weeks ago when every night was torrential rain and significant standing water, I was passed by *plenty* of vehicles doing speeds in the 80-100 mph range. Interestingly, not the Audis and BMWs as stereotype might have, but almost exclusively either small cars or vans.

But yes the point is sound, it’s reasonable to expect a reduction in capability from the road system during adverse weather.