Beeching

[exile]

As the Somerset and Dorset has been mentioned....

What do we think of Beeching? Given the facts that confronted him - that is, that BR was losing large and increasing amounts of money, and that the Government did not accept the idea that railways should receive a general subsidy (it took until the Transport Act of 68 for this to be accepted) - what sort of report SHOULD he have written?

Should he actually be seen as a defender of the railway for saying that it may be possible to run the system at a profit, by concentrating on inter city passenger, containers and bulk loads rather than saying that the railways were a hopeless case and should be converted to roads? In pure financial terms, might this have been a more logical conclusion?

 

[fairysdad]

Personally, I think Beeching started what has been continuing on, moreso recently actually - running the railways as a business. His aim was to cut the bits that weren't making a profit and work on the bits that were, just as you would with any business.

It was a shame he closed a lot of lines, and - if what I've heard on the subject is correct - the fact that the survey of usage wasn't done thoroughly enough meant a lot of lines that would be well used now - for instance, summer services on some of the westcountry branches - were cut when they should've been left. But at the end of the day, what happened happened. The fact that I have to travel 20 miles when I'm at home to get to my nearest station is a shame, but my nearer station (3 miles away) closed BEFORE Beeching, as did a fair number of lines.

I don't think he's as bad as has been made out. That's not to say I think he did right in what he did, but he did do what he was asked to do. There's a surprising amount of sentimentality when it comes to railways, something he didn't have. Financially, at the time, he did what was needed. Hindsight is a wonderful thing though, and it's a shame that some of these lines were closed which could (would?) be well utilised now.

 

[stanley T]

He saved the railway after the unplanned and wasteful muddle that was the 1955 modernisation scheme. A branch line is defined as something that the British love to have around but don't actually use. Most of the really stupid closures (such as the Oxford-Cambridge line) were done after Beeching, and the lines that stayed open and should have closed (such as Kyle of Lochalsh and Heart of Wales) were done to allay the Celtic fringe.

The main mistake was to phase out steam too quickly, and to continue to buy too many unreliable and difficult to maintain diesels and not go instead with slow and sure electrification, but that was partly the usual cheapskate short termism from HM Treasury. The fact that nearly 50 years later the MML and GWML are the busiest non-electrified lines in Europe cannot be blamed on Beeching.

It is difficult to remember now how deeply unfashionable railways were , in the age of new motorways and jet airliners. It took HSTs at home and TGVs abroad to change the perception, but that was over a decade away.

Branch line closures should have been replaced by proper integrated bus services connecting with main lines. Integrated transport in Britain? Pigs will fly first (to a reliable timetable, of course).

 

[exile]

In France, "Beechingisation" occurred in 1938, immediately after nationalisation. The process was called "co-ordinisation" and consisted of closing the less used lines and replacing them with buses run under contract to SNCF and connecting with rail services, and stopping bus services that directly competed with rail routes. More lines have closed in recent decades, as investment in TGVs has been to some extent at the expense of rural lines. The extensive narrow gauge network in France has disappeared entirely except for the odd heritage line.

Germany still has a lot of branch lines that would not have survived in either the UK or France, and has a genuine integrated system. Italy's rail network never grew to the extent that it needed pruning. Spain has closed a few lines most of whom have been left to rust rather than being lifted.

Can a branch line be kept open just because it has heavy holiday traffic for a few weeks each year? Well, I suppose it could be mothballed in winter with a bus service substituting - again, the French do this on a few lines (eg the Quiberon branch).

 

[WillPS]

Some branch closures were neccessary, but there were some mighty poor decisions amongst them - removing the Matlock - Buxton section of the Derby - New Mills Central line - why?? In doing that 2 branch lines were *created*!

 

[sprinterguy]

Although Beeching is most popularly villified for the ruthless pruning of Britians' rail network, he also did quite a lot of good for Britains' railways, pioneering several new concepts in rail freight during his tenure that greatly improved the efficiency of moving freight by rail and putting in place working practices still prevalent in the industry today.

Some of the branch lines and duplicated secondary and main line routes really did realistically have to go, as they were creating a lot of wasteage in the rail network for very little return. The closure of so many rail lines has also created a "blank slate" for modern day rail reopenings to be effected on, so that reopened rail lines can be matched to modern day requirements, rather than existing lines adhering to long obsolete Victorian land uses that have since changed and become unsuitable for modern values, such as the siting of stations. It's also created some cracking cycle paths around the country!

However, I strongly disagree with the way that the Beeching closures were carried out. In a number of cases lines were purposely run down, with services diverted away from the route and/or retimed to run at times inconvenient for the passengers that would use them, before a study into their cost-effectiveness was carried out, in order to ensure that such studies came back with negative results. There was also no coherent, enforcable strategy covering the rail replacement bus services that were supposed to substitute for the lost rail servuces.

I think Beeching also failed to consider the importance of many of the branches to the key trunk network in their capacity as feeder services, and that the programme of closures was too far reaching when a more measured approach should have seen the likes of the Waverley route left open.

 

[Greenback]

Beeching was just a puppet of the government, which wanted to close the railway network and pour the money into motroways and otehr roads instead. He was just following orders, and it is my opinion that it was intended to be just the first stage of a project to close the system completely outside of the South East.

I base this on two of the most common criticisms of Beeching:

1. The accountancy methods used were flawed.
2. No consideration was given to economies that could be made tor educe the running costs of some lines.

Beeching wa snot stupid. You don;t get to be chair of ICI by beign daft, more likely by going to the right school and knowing the right people. He was under instructions from his superiors to close the network in stages. The reason the plan did not succeed was because the amount of protests that took place surprised both the government of the day and the Dr himself.

As such, Beeching should nt be villified or praied. He was a mandarin, merely following orders.

 

[Zoe]

I think Beeching also failed to consider the importance of many of the branches to the key trunk network in their capacity as feeder services

What is the benefit in keeping a branch line open though when a bus could provide the feeder service?

 

[Bittern]

I don't blame Beeching, I blame Marples. He was the true evil behind the axe.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

It was already too late when Beeching took over. The railways had lost control over its costs and could not prune intelligently as the business declined. It had also neglected to compete with the car/bus/lorry - didn't even try in most cases. I find it difficult to judge whether this was a failure of the 1948 nationalised system, or whether the fault lay further back with the "Big 4".

The only management solution by 1963 was to chop and chop until what remained was "profitable". Not surprisingly some strategic errors were made. Probably more secondary routes should have been downsized and more branches retained, so that more routes would have remained available for investment as the prospects improved.

Beeching did give us liner trains and merry-go-round coal, and put business methods back in the railway.

 

[Greenback]

I don't blame Beeching, I blame Marples. He was the true evil behind the axe.

Completely agree.

It was already too late when Beeching took over. The railways had lost control over its costs and could not prune intelligently as the business declined. It had also neglected to compete with the car/bus/lorry - didn't even try in most cases. I find it difficult to judge whether this was a failure of the 1948 nationalised system, or whether the fault lay further back with the "Big 4".

I don't think that the railway ha dlost control of its costs. The fact is that on nationalisation the network was prett ymuch on tis last legs after the war effort. The modernisation plan of the late 1950's was probably too late to do any real good, it should have been started in 1945!

The only management solution by 1963 was to chop and chop until what remained was "profitable". Not surprisingly some strategic errors were made. Probably more secondary routes should have been downsized and more branches retained, so that more routes would have remained available for investment as the prospects improved.

Well, the only option for management was to cut and cut because that was the instruction from the top. As you say errors were made, I believe that this exercise was merely a prelude to what was intended to be total closure.

The intelligent people in charge must have realised that pruning the network would also have cut the profitability of what remained; they clearly expected that they would be able to get rid of passenger services entriely outside commuterland within a decade.

Beeching did give us liner trains and merry-go-round coal, and put business methods back in the railway.

I suspect that this was designed to mask the true intentions, which were that the motorway network woulde ventually replace rail completely.

 

[Zoe]

I suspect that this was designed to mask the true intentions, which were that the motorway network woulde ventually replace rail completely.

Was there a plan to have an extensive network of express coach services using the motorways then to replace trains?

 

[yorksrob]

What is the benefit in keeping a branch line open though when a bus could provide the feeder service?

Unfortunately, buses simply don't tend to be fast, comfortable or reliable (in terms of keeping time for connections) enough to provide an adequate feeder service - as illustrated by the failure of several replacement bus services.

It's been mentioned by previous posters that a lot of the worst closures were perpetrated after Beeching. However, Beeching was guilty of establishing the mindset which simply didn't appreciate the value of having a railway network wider than the core of profitable Inter-City routes.

Beeching is rightly vilified (as should be Marples and the rest of the establishment at the time) in that his calculations made no provision for improving the viability of secondary and rural routes. The experimentation such as singling and radio signalling etc which saved a lot of the network happenned afterwards.

To things in particular illustrate to me why he deserves his reputation.

1) the case study of the York - Beverley via Market Weighton used by Beeching had to include "terminal costs" i.e running costs associated with York and Hull stations just to present the line as unprofitable. This smacks of someone cooking the books to suit the ideology.

2) Beeching never admitted that he might have been wrong. Infact, I understand that he went to his grave regretting that he didn't close more lines.

 

[Bittern]

The real failure was not the closing of the lines, but the lack of preservation of the trackbeds. Had they been preserved, there would no doubt be a lot more openings going on right now. Off the top of my head, I can only think of two trackbeds that have been somewhat preserved for future railway use, and even then...

 

[Greenback]

Was there a plan to have an extensive network of express coach services using the motorways then to replace trains?

I don't know, there may have been. What I do know is that in the early 1960's perceived wisom was that almost everyone who needed to travel would have a car. Most people didn't really travel far, long distance commuting by train was pretty much unheard of, and it would not take much of a leap in thought to realise that any long distance traffic that remained could easily be handled by coaches on the new motorways.

 

[Zoe]

Most people didn't really travel far

If most people didn't travel far then why were the motorways built?

 

[DaveNewcastle]

If most people didn't travel far then why were the motorways built?

The early motorways were very, very lightly used!
They were quite incomparable to the high density traffic we experience on them today.

As for why tey were built, we'd need to view that from the PoV of planners anticipating demand in the 70's, which is about as difficult as anticipating future rail useage from Beeching's time.

 

[Greenback]

If most people didn't travel far then why were the motorways built?

The real reason the motorways were built was to make money for the construction companies, and then the raod hauliers that would use them to carry the freight that used to be carried by rail!

There were associated benefits - the new generation of car owners could also use these roads for the short journeys that were more common.

 

[Zoe]

The road network planned wasn't fully completed though so today we are left with trucks using high standarde roads for many miles then having to go through villages for a few miles before the high standard road resumes. This is always the danger though when you have a project spanning a few decades. It may have seemed a good idea at the time to reduce the rail network and get people to use the roads but now I think most will agree it was not the right decision. Right now there is a plan to build HS2 but there's no guarantee that in 30 years time it will all be built as planned.

 

[Greenback]

The road network planned wasn't fully completed though so today we are left with trucks using high standarde roads for many miles then having to go through villages for a few miles before the high standard road resumes. This is always the danger though when you have a project spanning a few decades. It may have seemed a good idea at the time to reduce the rail network and get people to use the roads but now I think most will agree it was not the right decision. Right now there is a plan to build HS2 but there's no guarantee that in 30 years time it will all be built as planned.

Yes, people agree now that it was a good diea, but people in 1960 had a strange view of the future! Oil was both cheap and plentiful, and was the fuel of the futre. A bit like gas in the 1980's!

The project was never compleed. We still have many miles of railway, and not as many motorways and dualc arriageways that were once envisaged.

 

[exile]

I don't blame Beeching, I blame Marples. He was the true evil behind the axe.

His successors continued to wield the axe pretty freely.

 

[Greenback]

But not as freely as Marples and his henchmen would have!

 

[Tom B]

It was already too late when Beeching took over. The railways had lost control over its costs and could not prune intelligently as the business declined. It had also neglected to compete with the car/bus/lorry - didn't even try in most cases. I find it difficult to judge whether this was a failure of the 1948 nationalised system, or whether the fault lay further back with the "Big 4".

Was part of this not owing to the fact that the railways were *required* to carry any goods which were presented to it, at a set rate? Road hauliers could pick and choose what they carried, so took the profitable traffic. And I don't think that speed was of the essence!

As others have said, I think Beeching was following orders - the report was obviously written to suit the orders. I don't believe consideration was given to changing working practices - use of centralised signalling rather than individual signalboxes on lightly used routes, unstaffed stations - which gradually came in in later years.

And surely in many cases the loss of a "feeder" service will have made someone think "stuff it - I'll use the car" rather than a bus - train - another bus etc, especially now in a time when connections are disregarded.

 

[stanley T]

Some branch closures were neccessary, but there were some mighty poor decisions amongst them - removing the Matlock - Buxton section of the Derby - New Mills Central line - why?? In doing that 2 branch lines were *created*!

think you will find that was post-Beeching, as was the other stupid one, the closure of the Oxford-Cambridge line, which even at the time was a useful east-west route.

 

[Bonemaster]

Beeching often gets a lot of unfair blame many of the closures that could today be described as short sighted to name the Cambridge - Oxford line, Cambridge - St Ives, and the Great Central were not Beeching closures at all but post Beeching cuts.

Beeching did what had to be done we had an excessive railway system, where despite the modernisation plan (and much to the fault of for the huge financial burdens this imposed on the system having been funded by loans) British Rail was loosing money hand over fist, and something drastic had to be done. Beeching introduced Freightliner services which are now today (as intermodal services) the largest freight users of our railway, that could be described as visionary rather than an evil axe wielder.

I'm all for the state supporting socially necessary railway services, but there has got to be limits to this. Everything simply can not be supported by the tax payer going on forever. However I would agree that mistakes were made, and that the methods of selection, especially around the data collection were questionable, but I would argue in the same way that other lines that should have gone based on economic grounds survived.

The biggest error of the Beeching cuts was to allow the formations to be built on, this eliminating any reasonable chance of reopening when developments occurred that may have justified a railway service in the future

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

think you will find that was post-Beeching, as was the other stupid one, the closure of the Oxford-Cambridge line, which even at the time was a useful east-west route.

It was in the "Passenger Services to be Modified" list, with the closure of most of the intermediate stations (I've still got my copy of the 1963 Report).

Would have been a better outcome than what we have today.

 

[yorksrob]

Beeching often gets a lot of unfair blame many of the closures that could today be described as short sighted to name the Cambridge - Oxford line, Cambridge - St Ives, and the Great Central were not Beeching closures at all but post Beeching cuts.

Cambridge - St Ives and the Great Central Railway North of Aylesbury were both listed in "the Re-shaping of British Railways" for closure, as were Uckfield - Lewes, the Mid Hants and Okehampton - Plymouth, all lines which would be of great use today.

Incedentally, so were Ashford - Hastings, Ipswich - Yarmouth, and Settle - Carlisle, all lines which are busy and vital today.

Beeching did what had to be done we had an excessive railway system, where despite the modernisation plan (and much to the fault of for the huge financial burdens this imposed on the system having been funded by loans) British Rail was loosing money hand over fist, and something drastic had to be done. Beeching introduced Freightliner services which are now today (as intermodal services) the largest freight users of our railway, that could be described as visionary rather than an evil axe wielder.

He should have looked at other ways of saving costs on routes before closure. That way he might have been better remembered, although I agree that some of the routes closed would have had to have closed anyway.

The biggest error of the Beeching cuts was to allow the formations to be built on, this eliminating any reasonable chance of reopening when developments occurred that may have justified a railway service in the future

Yes, we could have an even bigger network of pointless guided busways

 

[Bittern]

He should have looked at other ways of saving costs on routes before closure.

To an extent, they did. The first DMUs were introduced to increase branch line passenger numbers. In many cases, they did little good.

 

[yorksrob]

To an extent, they did. The first DMUs were introduced to increase branch line passenger numbers. In many cases, they did little good.

Good point, although funnily enough, they did often increase passenger numbers. The problem was that increasing numbers (as we know from today) don't necessarily lead to profitability, hence why so many ended up on the list.

I go back to the Market Weighton example where equipment had already arrived to begin the automation of its level crossings. Then, Beeching wrote his report, the line was listed and the automation never happenned.

 

[Bonemaster]

Cambridge - St Ives and the Great Central Railway North of Aylesbury were both listed in "the Re-shaping of Britains Railways" for closure, as were Uckfield - Lewes, the Mid Hants and Okehampton - Plymouth, all lines which would be of great use today.

Incedentally, so were Ashford - Hastings, Ipswich - Yarmouth, and Settle - Carlisle, all lines which are busy and vital today.

The point here is that they were not closed as part of this process both Cambridge - St Ives (with the exception of the station at Histon) and Great Central survived the Beeching cuts, as such can not be considered as Beeching cuts in retrospect.

BTW I think you mean Ipswich - Lowestoft

He should have looked at other ways of saving costs on routes before closure. That way he might have been better remembered, although I agree that some of the routes closed would have had to have closed anyway.

During the 1950s the modernisation plan had already happened to modernise and reduce costs, and it didn't work very well, and the debt burden imposed from this increased the loses.

We can all point to numerous examples that would be useful today,but were they in 1963, Beeching, Marples or the government of the time could not have possibly foreseen demand today nearly 50 years in the future, or industrial or infrastructure changes that occurred in the meantime, let us not forget that its not the strategic nature for Railfreight of the S&C that saved in during the 1980s, it was deregulation of power generation more than a decade later that started to provide that.

Yes, we could have an even bigger network of pointless guided busways

I'm not an advocate of guided busways by any stretch of the imagination, but if it falls flat on its face there is a clear run for a trackbed in the future, unlike if housing, or a boating lake had been built across it.