We have now established, thanks to
GB, that all four incidents we know about are associated with one type of mounting on two very similar types of wagon. RAIB has already suggested that the previous risk mitigation of pinning containers down to those wagons when high winds are forecast is insufficient, so these wagons need to be modified or a more stringent working practice such as pinning them on every day should be introduced.
Oh dear.
Plenty of well qualified people ignored lots of things that were wrong on the railway.... until 17th October 2000. The immediate and long term consequences are well documented.
That was down to lack of understanding within Railtrack of the safety issues involved, by people whose qualifications may have been good but weren't of any assistance in allowing the people that mattered to do their jobs properly*. After the initial failure to repair the defect, there was a massive
overreaction by Railtrack in assuming that all similar rails were also defective. This caused a good deal of disruption for passengers, and quite possibly extra casualties due to people going by road instead.
What you are proposing would lead to a similar knee-jerk reaction, a small but significant increase to the risk faced by staff at container depots, and probably a small but significant increase in risk to the general public because transporting containers by rail would get slower and/or more expensive and more of them would go by road.
*some did, but not the ones that mattered.