What exactly were brake vans?

[Gloster]

So, as alluded to in a previous post, if the guard thought the driver was going too fast, they'd apply the brake?

That would be rare as the guard was usually expected to accept the driver’s judgement, but he might do it if he really thought the driver was going dangerously fast. Possibly the most likely reason would be if there was a special restriction on the train because of a load, special wagon, etc. and the guard feared that the driver had forgotten. On a fully fitted train the guard might make a brief brake application followed by a release in the hope that the drag would jerk the driver the into realising that he should slow down. On a non-fully fitted train the guard had to be more careful as there was a risk that the drag of the brake application might cause a coupling to break. (I was never a guard and most trains were fully-fitted where I worked.)

 

[D1511]

So, as alluded to in a previous post, if the guard thought the driver was going too fast, they'd apply the brake?

That's exactly what happened in the Morpeth and Eltham crashes I mentioned upthread. Both guards knew the route well, and knew of the slow speed curves in both locations, and immediately recognised their trains were travelling far too fast and applied their train brake by using the emergency valve in their brake coach. Unfortunately they were unable to slow either train sufficiently to avoid a derailment.

 

[Rescars]

Same way as the driver did - experience and route knowledge. Speedometers on locos were a relatively late phenomenon, IIRC.

William Stroudley fitted the first speed indicators on the LBSC back in the 1870s. It took everyone else decades to catch up. A different story in France I believe, where Flaman speed recorders were in common use by the 1920s.

 

[edwin_m]

This thread on RMWeb contains some entertaining and enlightening stories about the life of a guard in the early 70s.

https://www.rmweb.co.uk/topic/178046-confessions-of-a-canton-goods-guard/#comment-5113951

It has been suggested by a contributor to this site that I should record some of my experiences of working on the railway in the 70s for posterity, as the current railway is very different both in it's working methods and it's culture (there are no guards anymore), and the technology is much improved.

 

[norbitonflyer]

That's exactly what happened in the Morpeth and Eltham crashes I mentioned upthread. Both guards knew the route well, and knew of the slow speed curves in both locations, and immediately recognised their trains were travelling far too fast and applied their train brake by using the emergency valve in their brake coach. Unfortunately they were unable to slow either train sufficiently to avoid a derailment.

Also in the more recent Waverley runaway, where the driver realised rather late that he was effectively hauling a train with no continuous brake - the isolation valve between loco and train had been unwittingly closed while coupling up at Carstairs, and the brake test made on departure had not revealed this. The train manager was able to engage the train brakes on approach to Waverley, allowing it to be brought to a halt rather sooner than might otherwise have been the case, although it was still an over-run.

The Grantham disaster of 1906 had a similar cause, and again the footplate crew became aware they had no train brakes too late to prevent an over-run, in that case with results similar to Morpeth and Eltham. I don't know whether the guard had tried to apply the brakes in that case though.

 

[edwin_m]

There have been many accident reports where the guard stated they were just getting up to open the brake valve when they were knocked over by the force of the derailment/collision. Whether they were actually doing so or just said that to the enquiry may be questionable, but it must have been difficult for a passenger guard in particular to keep track of where they were, particularly as they had other duties to carry out. Having said that, there may have been many times where the guard was able to avert disaster. Until recently (such as the Edinburgh RAIB report) such an event would not get an accident report so would be lost to history.

 

[Elecman]

The Grantham disaster of 1906 had a similar cause, and again the footplate crew became aware they had no train brakes too late to prevent an over-run, in that case with results similar to Morpeth and Eltham. I don't know whether the guard had tried to apply the brakes in that case though.

The Grantham disaster the driver never braked at all and there were various rumours as to what happened on the footplate driver taken ill/ mistook his whereabouts /locomotive emergency. ASLeF at the time made an issue that there wasn’t a regular fireman on the footplate just an Premium Apprentice from Doncaster Works who was doing the fireman’s job in order to take notes on locomotive performance and thier view was the driver wax probably doing some firing as well as driving

 

[norbitonflyer]

The Grantham disaster the driver never braked at all and there were various rumours as to what happened on the footplate driver taken ill/ mistook his whereabouts /locomotive emergency. ASLeF at the time made an issue that there wasn’t a regular fireman on the footplate just an Premium Apprentice from Doncaster Works who was doing the fireman’s job in order to take notes on locomotive performance and thier view was the driver wax probably doing some firing as well as driving

There are many theories about Grantham, but the one I find most plausible is analagous to what happened at Waverley to the Sleeper recently.

The loco and its crew had taken over the train at Peterborough. The suggestion is that the train brakes had been left off with the valve closed whilst the change was made - this saved time as vacuum did not have to be regenerated after the loco was coupled on. The fireman, being inexperienced, (probably only used to light engines and unfitted goods) and failed to open the valve, or to notice that whoever was resposnsible hadn't done so. Again a more experienced fireman might have noticed how quickly vacuum was restored after coupling up.

The route from Peterborough to the e=next stop Grantham is up Stoke Bank and down the other side. The driver would not need to use the brakes until approaching Grantham station, by which time it was far too late to realise he had only the locomotive's own brake under his control.

The witness who saw them struggling on the footplate was not seeing a fight, but a desperate - and ultimately unsuccessfui - struggle by the two men to screw down the tender's handbrake as far as it would go.

Of course, as both men died in the crash, we will never know for sure, but the subsequent actions of the GNR in banning the practice of holding the brakes off during loco changes suggest thatn it had been common - albeit unofficial - practice until then.

All would have been well had there not been another train approaching Grantham from the Nottingham line, and the signalman had, naturally, set the points in the down direction for the Nottingham line as well to provide flank protection offer. The runaway therefore did not run harmlessly along the main line towards Newark, but took the curve onto the Nottingham line and overturned.

 

[Harpo]

The suggestion is that the train brakes had been left off with the valve closed whilst the change was made

What valve??

 

[Rescars]

There are many theories about Grantham, but the one I find most plausible is analagous to what happened at Waverley to the Sleeper recently.

The loco and its crew had taken over the train at Peterborough. The suggestion is that the train brakes had been left off with the valve closed whilst the change was made - this saved time as vacuum did not have to be regenerated after the loco was coupled on. The fireman, being inexperienced, (probably only used to light engines and unfitted goods) and failed to open the valve, or to notice that whoever was resposnsible hadn't done so. Again a more experienced fireman might have noticed how quickly vacuum was restored after coupling up.

The route from Peterborough to the e=next stop Grantham is up Stoke Bank and down the other side. The driver would not need to use the brakes until approaching Grantham station, by which time it was far too late to realise he had only the locomotive's own brake under his control.

It’s about 30 miles from Peterborough to Grantham, so say roughly 30 mins running time for an Edwardian era express. If the brakes on the train were fully off to start with, but isolated from the loco and its ejector, does anyone know how long would it likely to have been before the brakes started to leak on?

 

[norbitonflyer]

What valve??

The valve at the end of the vehicle's brake pipe, which has to be opened to connect it to the pipe in the next vehicle, but closed when it's at the end of a train.

If you close it before uncoupling the locomotive, the vacuum will not be lost and it will save time when you couple the new one on as you won't need to restore vacuum. But of course you must remember to open it again so the driver can control the train brakes.

(In the Waverley incident it was opened, but accidentally knocked shut again when making other connections)

 

[Hairy Bear]

There's no valve on vacuum braked vehicles, your confusing it with air brake ones.
And as for the vacuum leaking out and brakes releasing, anything between an hour and a week.

 

[edwin_m]

There's no valve on vacuum braked vehicles, your confusing it with air brake ones.
And as for the vacuum leaking out and brakes releasing, anything between an hour and a week.

If I recall correctly, when the vacuum pipe is not in use the free end is attached to a special fitting provided nearby, the vacuum itself helping to seal it. With an air brake the air pressure would probably blow it off such a fitting, so an isolating valve is provided next to the pipe. Did any vacuum brakes ever have valves like this?

As well as the Edinburgh incident mentioned above, there was a Deltic-hauled express that overran Darlington in the 70s, colliding sidelong with a DMU before the buffet steward pulled the cord to stop it. The train had struck something left on the track that dislodged a traction motor casing, which then jumped up between the loco and the first coach and managed to knock the valve closed. The valves were re-designed to make this less likely.

 

[Gloster]

There are many theories about Grantham, but the one I find most plausible is analagous to what happened at Waverley to the Sleeper recently.

The loco and its crew had taken over the train at Peterborough. The suggestion is that the train brakes had been left off with the valve closed whilst the change was made - this saved time as vacuum did not have to be regenerated after the loco was coupled on. The fireman, being inexperienced, (probably only used to light engines and unfitted goods) and failed to open the valve, or to notice that whoever was resposnsible hadn't done so. Again a more experienced fireman might have noticed how quickly vacuum was restored after coupling up.

The route from Peterborough to the e=next stop Grantham is up Stoke Bank and down the other side. The driver would not need to use the brakes until approaching Grantham station, by which time it was far too late to realise he had only the locomotive's own brake under his control.

The witness who saw them struggling on the footplate was not seeing a fight, but a desperate - and ultimately unsuccessfui - struggle by the two men to screw down the tender's handbrake as far as it would go.

Of course, as both men died in the crash, we will never know for sure, but the subsequent actions of the GNR in banning the practice of holding the brakes off during loco changes suggest thatn it had been common - albeit unofficial - practice until then.

All would have been well had there not been another train approaching Grantham from the Nottingham line, and the signalman had, naturally, set the points in the down direction for the Nottingham line as well to provide flank protection offer. The runaway therefore did not run harmlessly along the main line towards Newark, but took the curve onto the Nottingham line and overturned.

Two points on this. Firstly, the fireman was fairly experienced. He had been a premium apprentice and seems to have spent much of the previous nine months firing on a variety of different trains.

Secondly, the reports that there had been a struggle on the footplate were followed up, but the Inspector considered them to be ‘absolutely void of foundation’. There are, even now, plenty who will jump on the bandwagon of a disaster by giving false or imaginary reports to get publicity.

Personally, I think that this may have been a case of a the driver suffering a microsleep and not being aware of the train’s location while the fireman was occupied with other matters. This has cogently been argued as an explanation for the Salisbury crash earlier the same year.

 

[Dr_Paul]

On steeper falling gradients, the brake van alone was not enough and extra brake force came from pinning down handbrakes, the pin being put in a hole above the lever to keep it in place.

How easy was it to calculate the pinning down of the brakes, if one wished to avoid wheels not turning and thus getting flats or, conversely, not applying sufficient pressure on the wheels and thus not braking them? Presumably freight guards worked this out by way of experience.

 

[Ploughman]

One of the uses of Mileposts.
So many seconds per 1/4 mile gives you the speed.

 

[Rescars]

One of the uses of Mileposts.
So many seconds per 1/4 mile gives you the speed.

No need to work this out for yourself! The General Appendix contained a "Table to Calculate the Speed of Trains", between 3 and 90 mph. Speeds below 30 mph were calculated in 1 mph increments. Everything slower than 15 mph involved minutes as well as seconds. All this allowed for some finesse in calculating accurately the speed of unfitted freight trains.

 

[Harpo]

60 years ago, in the dark, the rail joints will have told you the train’s speed.

 

[marsker]

I remember that some LNER design passenger full brakes (BGs) were converted to air (dual?) braking for use with Liner Trains (as they were called then) and fitted with stoves for the guard. One day, in the early 1960s, I was standing beneath the Royal Border Bridge and watched a light Brush Type 4 (Later Cl. 47) cross the bridge. A few seconds later, one of these converted BGs crossed the bridge on its own! From my angle of view, I couldn't see the empty container flats separating them.

 

[sharpener]

One of the uses of Mileposts.
So many seconds per 1/4 mile gives you the speed.

As a schoolboy I was taught to divide 900 by the seconds for 1/4 mile to get speed in mph. Try it!

 

[ChiefPlanner]

How easy was it to calculate the pinning down of the brakes, if one wished to avoid wheels not turning and thus getting flats or, conversely, not applying sufficient pressure on the wheels and thus not braking them? Presumably freight guards worked this out by way of experience.

From memory - and there may be a Sectional Appendis guidance - say a heavy class 9 on coal or similar was being slowly drawn out of sidings , the driver would give 3 short blasts on the horn when the driver thought there were sufficient brakes pinned
down before getting onto the down gradient.

 

[AndrewE]

From memory - and there may be a Sectional Appendis guidance - say a heavy class 9 on coal or similar was being slowly drawn out of sidings , the driver would give 3 short blasts on the horn when the driver thought there were sufficient brakes pinned
down before getting onto the down gradient.

The problem comes from the difference between static and sliding friction. An under-powered (and under-braked) loco and train can't pull away if enough brakes are pinned down to maintain a safe speed down a steep gradient.
Hence additional brakemen at the top so that trains which have obeyed the instruction "Stop and pin down brakes" can be got moving. With the guard safely in his van after the initial pinning down of brakes the train gets moving and the extra brakesmen run along with the train pinning them down on more and more wagons until they think it is right... Apparently the points at the foot of the Lickey for the diversion from the main line into the freight loop were an unusually high speed set for the entry into a loop because it wasn't unknown for a train to arrive at the bottom going rather faster than intended!
( I think the videos of banking and braking on the Lickey show the pinning down and train starting off from the top.)

 

[ChiefPlanner]

South Wales , with fearsome gradients - e.g 1 in 37 down from GCG , and many others , saw the art of pinning down brakes etc performed by masters of the art. A 37 pulling out of the sidings often had to work hard before getting onto the gradient downhill, dropping sand etc.

We did a trial when I was a trainee for about 35 HTV's of soaking wet coal from Maerdy towards Porth , and I can only describe the experience as "scary" - like a piano out of a window , % of brakes pinned down , traction ispector and guards inspector present but were had no chance of stopping until we gradients eased , as we ran down the valley in a haze of acrid brake blocks with the driver giving repeated short blasts on the horn as we were in effect running away. Luckily the road was set for the down Valley line but we pulled up clear and no harm done. (bar the 37 almost certainly needed a new set of brake blocks)

Always thought the train crews were in some cases walking on egg shells metaphorically.

The trial was basically a failure.

 

[AndrewE]

South Wales , with fearsome gradients - e.g 1 in 37 down from GCG , and many others , saw the art of pinning down brakes etc performed by masters of the art. A 37 pulling out of the sidings often had to work hard before getting onto the gradient downhill, dropping sand etc.

We did a trial when I was a trainee for about 35 HTV's of soaking wet coal from Maerdy towards Porth , and I can only describe the experience as "scary" - like a piano out of a window , % of brakes pinned down , traction ispector and guards inspector present but were had no chance of stopping until we gradients eased , as we ran down the valley in a haze of acrid brake blocks with the driver giving repeated short blasts on the horn as we were in effect running away. Luckily the road was set for the down Valley line but we pulled up clear and no harm done. (bar the 37 almost certainly needed a new set of brake blocks)

Always thought the train crews were in some cases walking on egg shells metaphorically.

The trial was basically a failure.

which fits in well with the explanation for the apparently strange 0-6-2 wheel arrangement of the GWR (and earlier railway) tank engines for those services: Chimney-first uphill with the empties to keep the water at the back of the boiler covering the firebox crown while working hardest, and a pony truck under the bunker to help steer the loco coming downhill fast at the front of a loaded train!

 

[edwin_m]

We did a trial when I was a trainee for about 35 HTV's of soaking wet coal from Maerdy towards Porth , and I can only describe the experience as "scary" - like a piano out of a window , % of brakes pinned down , traction ispector and guards inspector present but were had no chance of stopping until we gradients eased , as we ran down the valley in a haze of acrid brake blocks with the driver giving repeated short blasts on the horn as we were in effect running away. Luckily the road was set for the down Valley line but we pulled up clear and no harm done. (bar the 37 almost certainly needed a new set of brake blocks)

Were the HTVs running unfitted? Was it ever necessary to pin down brakes on fitted trains?

 

[Sun Chariot]

Were the HTVs running unfitted? Was it ever necessary to pin down brakes on fitted trains?

IIRC, handbrake-pinning was just the preserve of unfitted and partially-fitted trains to create the required brake force (hence the use of diesel brake tenders).
Fully-fitted were far more effective, having the required brake force applied via loco's and wagons' tread-brakes

The only "pinned" comparison I can offer, is when a vehicle in the consist is dragging its brakes. Example linked

Loco hauled around Havant

My current photo "challenge", to capture the human factors of the railway: A follow-on to post #90; Portsmouth Harbour's track renewal work progresses this week, through rain and shine (literally!). Drier conditions for today's activity. Spot the WD-40 cans, in photo 3 - well, it's one way to...

www.railforums.co.uk

 

[matchmaker]

The Grantham disaster the driver never braked at all and there were various rumours as to what happened on the footplate driver taken ill/ mistook his whereabouts /locomotive emergency. ASLeF at the time made an issue that there wasn’t a regular fireman on the footplate just an Premium Apprentice from Doncaster Works who was doing the fireman’s job in order to take notes on locomotive performance and thier view was the driver wax probably doing some firing as well as driving

In all the reports I've seen about Grantham, this has never been touted as a possible cause!

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 18 Mar 2026 ==

I remember that some LNER design passenger full brakes (BGs) were converted to air (dual?) braking for use with Liner Trains (as they were called then) and fitted with stoves for the guard. One day, in the early 1960s, I was standing beneath the Royal Border Bridge and watched a light Brush Type 4 (Later Cl. 47) cross the bridge. A few seconds later, one of these converted BGs crossed the bridge on its own! From my angle of view, I couldn't see the empty container flats separating them.

Are you sure they were ex LNER? I thought they were ex LMS coaches. I saw one once (1967) going south through Arbroath. It was painted a light colour and was annotated "air braked, gas heated".

 

[Gloster]

Are you sure they were ex LNER? I thought they were ex LMS coaches. I saw one once (1967) going south through Arbroath. It was painted a light colour and was annotated "air braked, gas heated".

Looking at the list in Longworth’s Mark 1 & 2 book, I can’t see any coaches that were ex-LNER. There were a number of vehicles that appear to be of LM-design and one Bulleid Corridor Brake Second, but most were Mark 1 former Non-Corridor Brake Seconds. Some of the LM-design vehicles may have been Full Brakes, but I am not sure of the number series.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Were the HTVs running unfitted? Was it ever necessary to pin down brakes on fitted trains?

A fitted train would have been less stressful !- long time ago , but I suggest the wagons were a mix of vacuum and non fitted vehicles.

The wet coal slack would have added a ton or two of weight per wagon !

 

[marsker]

Looking at the list in Longworth’s Mark 1 & 2 book, I can’t see any coaches that were ex-LNER. There were a number of vehicles that appear to be of LM-design and one Bulleid Corridor Brake Second, but most were Mark 1 former Non-Corridor Brake Seconds. Some of the LM-design vehicles may have been Full Brakes, but I am not sure of the number series.

The ones I remember seeing were wooden bodied BGs and in the standard maroon livery.