Which year was the lowest ebb in UK railways

[35B]

Yes, it is fair to criticise some of the mistakes that early BR made, but rather deluded to think that everything would have been lovely had the 'Big Four' survived. The LNER was effectively bankrupt in 1948 and the other three would have gone the same way by the early '60s at the latest. They would have followed the familiar U.S.A. pattern of mass closures, deteriorating infrastructure and no money for capital investment. Unlike the U.S., freight wouldn't have saved them either, for once the motorway network developed in the U.K. wagon-load traffic was doomed.

In a desperate attempt to stay afloat, we might even had seen the demolition of Paddington or St. Pancras, like Penn NYC, for a 'Madison Square Garden' type development - or perhaps diversification into airlines and tourism. Clearly government intervention would have to had to come at some point if any semblance of a national rail network was to be retained - even the U.S. created Conrail and Amtrak.

It is all very well getting misty-eyed about the 'Big Four' in the inter-war years, but apart from the few 'glamour' services much of the network was pretty dire with clapped out rolling stock, run-down stations and in dire need of investment. Yes, the Southern invested in electrification and the GWR in its major stations and the Devon and Cornwall holiday route, but mostly at government expense through grants and cheap loans. The LMS was particularly turgid with a poor motive power policy in the early years and eschewed electrification - it was a reluctant partner with the LNER in the Altrincham scheme and the Wirral scheme didn't come along until 1938. It did very little to eliminate its pre-grouping legacy of duplicate lines, stations and depots in Scotland, the North West, Yorkshire and elsewhere. The LNER was hamstrung from the start, with the collapse of heavy industry in the North East and was also stuck with servicing the Great Central debt.

Let's be clear, I'm saying nothing about the Big 4 in comparison - my comments are solely about BR and BTC.

However, I do think that the simple fact of nationalisation inhibited commercial and engineering innovation during that period, and that it is unreasonable to assume the same outcome whether nationalised or not.

 

[Bevan Price]

Several bad periods in my opinion.
1. Roghly 1963-1967. DMUs displaced from elsewhere replaced loco hauled trains on longish journeys for which their uncomfortable 3+2 seating was totally unsatisfactory (e.g. Manchester/North Wales, Birmingham/Norwich). Probably helped to lose a lot of passenger traffic; one train on which I once commuted declined from a well-loaded 6-7 coaches to a half-empty 2 car dmu within a couple of years of the changeover....

2. The mid 1990s and privatisation. The concept of reasonable connections & cooperation was destroyed. Some walk-on anytime fares became horrendously expensive. And the attitude often became "sod you" - another TOC caused your problems.

 

[Magdalia]

1. Roghly 1963-1967. DMUs displaced from elsewhere replaced loco hauled trains on longish journeys for which their uncomfortable 3+2 seating was totally unsatisfactory (e.g. Manchester/North Wales, Birmingham/Norwich).

In the 1960s there was only one Norwich-Birmingham round trip that was loco hauled, and it continued to be hauled until May 1970. There was a Birmingham-Ely round trip that was DMU way before the route via Seaton was closed in 1966. The Birmingham-Norwich route only got more through trains in the 1970s by stringing various local DMU workings together, party facilitated by the remodelling at Peterborough allowing more through running.

 

[quantinghome]

Let's be clear, I'm saying nothing about the Big 4 in comparison - my comments are solely about BR and BTC.

However, I do think that the simple fact of nationalisation inhibited commercial and engineering innovation during that period, and that it is unreasonable to assume the same outcome whether nationalised or not.

To make that claim you do need to compare BR with what went before though.

I think Gerry Fiennes book "I tried to run a railway" is instructive on this point. It does seem that there was a great deal of continuity from the Big 4 into the BR regions, both good and bad. The pre-WW2 railways were already struggling to respond to the new commercial reality of road freight competition. There were incremental improvements but no real innovation. Electrification, dieselisation and other major innovations were being led by other countries. Like so much British industry in the first half of the C20th the railway was largely content to sit on its Victorian laurels and complain to the government that it wasn't getting a 'square deal' when it came to freight. The major changes to operations, to motive power and so on, were all left to BR to sort out.

 

[35B]

To make that claim you do need to compare BR with what went before though.

I think Gerry Fiennes book "I tried to run a railway" is instructive on this point. It does seem that there was a great deal of continuity from the Big 4 into the BR regions, both good and bad. The pre-WW2 railways were already struggling to respond to the new commercial reality of road freight competition. There were incremental improvements but no real innovation. Electrification, dieselisation and other major innovations were being led by other countries. Like so much British industry in the first half of the C20th the railway was largely content to sit on its Victorian laurels and complain to the government that it wasn't getting a 'square deal' when it came to freight. The major changes to operations, to motive power and so on, were all left to BR to sort out.

I'm familiar with Fiennes, but also Gourvish. And Gourvish is quite clear that nationalised status within the BTC was an inhibiting factor for early BR.

 

[mike57]

from the Big 4 into the BR regions, both good and bad.

Of the four undertakings that went into the make up of BR the Southern always seemed to be the most advanced, they had embraced electrification, and had WW2 not intervened would probably have electrified most of their major routes. It may also be that because they relied more heavily on passenger revenue they had a different approach.

After nationalisation wasn't another problem that the government wanted to support the UK coal industry, and dieselisation went against that. To me the biggest mistake of the immediate post war period was not to pursue electrification more aggressively

 

[35B]

Of the four undertakings that went into the make up of BR the Southern always seemed to be the most advanced, they had embraced electrification, and had WW2 not intervened would probably have electrified most of their major routes. It may also be that because they relied more heavily on passenger revenue they had a different approach.

After nationalisation wasn't another problem that the government wanted to support the UK coal industry, and dieselisation went against that. To me the biggest mistake of the immediate post war period was not to pursue electrification more aggressively

A decision taken on the basis of the wider constraints on the economy - steel in particular was in short supply.

 

[quantinghome]

I'm familiar with Fiennes, but also Gourvish. And Gourvish is quite clear that nationalised status within the BTC was an inhibiting factor for early BR.

I think there's a good argument to say that the ineffective BTC / BR arrangements contributed to BR initially failing to do the modernisation that the Big Four had also failed to do. And it's also fair to say that the Big Four would have struggled to do anything better in the circumstances. The solution would have been a better high level structure for nationalised transport.

This brings up an interesting what-if: What if there had been no nationalisation and the Big Four had carried on?

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 12 Jan 2026 ==

Of the four undertakings that went into the make up of BR the Southern always seemed to be the most advanced, they had embraced electrification, and had WW2 not intervened would probably have electrified most of their major routes. It may also be that because they relied more heavily on passenger revenue they had a different approach.

After nationalisation wasn't another problem that the government wanted to support the UK coal industry, and dieselisation went against that. To me the biggest mistake of the immediate post war period was not to pursue electrification more aggressively

The other issue was that steam engines were cheap to build (although certainly not to maintain). The railway works were all set up to build them, and considerable capital investment would have been required to change over to diesel or electric. This I presume was the same reason why steam had persisted in the 1930s when we should have been shifting away from steam if we had been the technological leaders of the world (which by that point we hadn't been for a good 50 to 60 years).

 

[35B]

I think there's a good argument to say that the ineffective BTC / BR arrangements contributed to BR initially failing to do the modernisation that the Big Four had also failed to do. And it's also fair to say that the Big Four would have struggled to do anything better in the circumstances. The solution would have been a better high level structure for nationalised transport.

This brings up an interesting what-if: What if there had been no nationalisation and the Big Four had carried on?

I think the important point, about "what if" structures with or without nationalisation, is focus. The theme that comes across in much of the writing is that BR managers felt inhibited in acting "commercially" because they were supposed to be working as part of a nationalised transport industry, but where the other components of that industry didn't act in any such way.

Whether that would have materially affected the quality of the response is impossible to know at this remove.

 

[eldomtom2]

The other issue was that steam engines were cheap to build (although certainly not to maintain). The railway works were all set up to build them, and considerable capital investment would have been required to change over to diesel or electric. This I presume was the same reason why steam had persisted in the 1930s when we should have been shifting away from steam if we had been the technological leaders of the world (which by that point we hadn't been for a good 50 to 60 years).

This is something Gourvish emphasises, along with the fact that steam ran on domestically produced coal while diesel required imported oil. Therefore Gourvish does not fault BR for not going full-throttle for dieselisation, but he does fault them for a) the Western Region's construction of hundreds of pannier tanks since even in 1948 the superiority of diesel shunters was clear, and b) the failure to do more and larger trials of diesel traction, in particular the cancellation of the LNER's plans for 25 1600hp diesel locos for London-Edinburgh services. Riddles in particular is criticised for what Gourvish sees as a hostility to diesel traction.

 

[dk1]

Three events stick in my mind. First was the Flexible Rostering dispute in 1982. Only time I have ever known serious threats to shut much if not all the network down. Second was following the Hatfield accident in 2000. I know Clapham was terrible but it was the sheer meltdown that went on for months caused by gauge corner cracking. I couldn’t believe it when told by a senior manager the following week that this will still be affecting us beyond Christmas. Even though passenger numbers dived a very successful recovery advertising campaign was launched and steadily all came good. Third and unsurprisingly was the 2020 global pandemic. Going to work to drive few or no passengers around was so disheartening, unsustainable and along with home working I did wonder where our railway would be should life go back to normal. Looking back there was no real need to fret as much as leisure travel rebounded quite quickly although business and commuter traffic remained depressed. The latter however seems to be returning in abundance on many routes and business travel is doing okay considering we have been bordering on a recession especially compared to when you look back at previous lows in the economy in the 80s/90s and how that affected BRs books.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Three events stick in my mind. First was the Flexible Rostering dispute in 1982. Only time I have ever known serious threats to shut much if not all the network down. Second was following the Hatfield accident in 2000. I know Clapham was terrible but it was the sheer meltdown that went on for months caused by gauge corner cracking. I couldn’t believe it when told by a senior manager the following week that this will still be affecting us beyond Christmas. Even though passenger numbers dived a very successful recovery advertising campaign was launched and steadily all came good. Third and unsurprisingly was the 2020 global pandemic. Going to work to drive few or no passengers around was so disheartening, unsustainable and along with home working I did wonder where our railway would be should life go back to normal. Looking back there was no real need to fret as much as leisure travel rebounded quite quickly although business and commuter traffic remained depressed. The latter however seems to be returning in abundance on many routes and business travel is doing okay considering we have been bordering on a recession especially compared to when you look back at previous lows in the economy in the 80s/90s and how that affected BRs books.

A very thoughtful and well composed reply !

 

[dk1]

A very thoughtful and well composed reply !

Oh cheers mate. It’s just being a passion and a career for me its quite sobering when the rug gets pulled away. Certainly made me think and take stock.

 

[Oxfordblues]

Working for the Edible Products division of Railfreight Distribution my lowest-ebb year was 1991 with the abandonment of the Speedlink wagonload system. Many useful flows of traffic such as the Grainflow network of Polybulk wagons, mainly barley from East Anglia to Scotland, were thrown away. EWS CEO Ed Burkhardt later described it as a "scorched-earth policy". Speedlink was indeed loss-making, but more could have been done to retain much of the traffic.

 

[mike57]

Third and unsurprisingly was the 2020 global pandemic.

An interesting and informative reply.

Thinking about your 3 'Low points' the first two were 'internal' railway problems which threatened the network, the third was an external event which impacted heavily.

 

[dk1]

An interesting and informative reply.

Thinking about your 3 'Low points' the first two were 'internal' railway problems which threatened the network, the third was an external event which impacted heavily.

Thank you.

Yes I was still at school when the first one happened then 16 years into my career with the second. I suppose I didn’t understand so much and was worried with the flexible rostering dispute as lived in a pub opposite a station. It affected our business too but was sad to see trains all stabled going nowhere. When the Hatfield incident occurred its aftermath was like nothing I’d ever witnessed. I don’t think the majority of us knew how the world would end up for a time during 2020/21.