Trains stopping so far from exit points, why????

[35B]

But that would be looked at as possibly just causing a slight delay with the dispatch process whereas stop short and release would be a far more serious issue.

So interference with the despatch corridor is not safety critical? And timekeeping optional?

 

[dk1]

So interference with the despatch corridor is not safety critical? And timekeeping optional?

That’s not what I said.

 

[Magdalia]

On my patch it was brought in in the last couple of years at Chelmsford and also in the bay platform at Cambridge North. The latter causing much criticism on social media.

Cambridge North had its own discussion here!

Cambridge North platform 3 stopping location

For the last few weeks, the terminating GA trains on platform 3 at Cambridge North have been stopping at the far (north) end of the station, rather than near the bridge as before. Obviously this isn't a difference for 10-car trains, but for 5-cars, it is quite an additional hike - and not...

www.railforums.co.uk

In all instances moving stopping points on the same platform is a minor inconvenience compared with platform alterations at some big stations. In my commuting days I used to dread the occasions when a train booked to depart platforms 1-8 at Kings Cross was moved to platforms 9-11. And now try the difference between platform 1 and platform 8 at Cambridge.

 

[800001]

For LNER. If it was as you say it would be forced on everyone. Other TOCs have more passenger-focused viewpoints and drivers capable of stopping different formations at different places, seemingly beyond the drivers and management at LNER.

XC voyager drivers manage to stop in correct place with 4, 5, 8 or 9 coach formations.

 

[35B]

That’s not what I said.

It’s what was implied - Grantham p2 country end is both curved and very narrow, so this policy adds risk.

 

[800001]

When Azumas were being introduced, stopping points for 5 cars were created mid platform at stations.
Signs were produced and were to be shared with TPE, and these were fitted at stations, certainly seen at Darlington and York.
However they were soon removed and the 9 car stop boards for LNER became the standard stopping point for all LNER Azuma formations.

 

[z444z]

But the train wouldn’t move as the procedure would be stopped if the dispatch corridor was blocked.

I don’t think you can just make this assertion when the rest of your argument was based on the fact that mistakes can be made! If this was true zero trap and drags would have happened ever and that’s clearly not the case.

 

[Starmill]

But the train wouldn’t move as the procedure would be stopped if the dispatch corridor was blocked.

By the same token, the train driver wouldn't stop at the wrong car marker for their set.

I don’t think you can just make this assertion when the rest of your argument was based on the fact that mistakes can be made! If this was true zero trap and drags would have happened ever and that’s clearly not the case.

Indeed. I'm confident of course that most train drivers, dk1 included, would never dream of endorsing a policy just so that operational risks transferred off themselves and equally onto their station and onboard colleagues.

XC voyager drivers manage to stop in correct place with 4, 5, 8 or 9 coach formations.

Indeed. And Hull Trains with 5/10 802, and TPE with 3/6 185 and a whole host of other positions we could think of I'm sure. These are generally at the same platforms as LNER trains.

 

[Ian Hardy]

SWR is another one, with 8 car trains stopping at Kingston and Wimvbldon (among other places) a long way from the stairs. But curiously it seems that 5-car trains can stop in the right place, as I noticed yesterday at Kingston when I was on a solo 458/5.

This is odd, because the driver of a 2x455 has to stop at the 10-car stop but could not possibly in a ten-car train (at least, not in the past four years when the 456s were withdrawn), whereas the driver of a 458/5 (and presumably a 701/5, when/if they enter service) is allowed to stop short.

That is because SWR the suburban area only has two stop marking boards "4 - 5" and "6 - 10" so an 8 car train has to stop at the 10 board and not at the 5 board.
This was probably decided so that when DOO was introduced, there would only need to be two sets of CCTV camera screens for the driver whereas if you had "4-5", "6-8" and "9-10" boards you would need an extra set of CCTV camera screens which is extra expense a cash strapped railway cannot afford.

 

[NSEWonderer]

These are the same drivers who insist on their special because of the level of route knowledge they acquire?

If that route knowledge is so good, and they are so skilled, then being able to maintain knowledge of what they are driving, and obey simple signs at stations, is a basic requirement that they ought to be able to meet.

Completely ignored again that human factors can occur with the most and very well trained individuals like Train drivers. "Obey simple signs" at stations as you say we'll thats exactly what they've done if they stopped at a stop car mark? The issue being its the wrong one because they've also for X reason not also processed other information at that moment in time that tells them they're a 9 instead of a 5 car on this specfic journey.

This basic requirement you mention, they'd not have much of a job if that weren't the case, no one purposely skirts what they've been trained to do most of the time with this job but with NTS failures due to X circumstances, can have mistakes occur.

 

[35B]

Completely ignored again that human factors can occur with the most and very well trained individuals like Train drivers. "Obey simple signs" at stations as you say we'll thats exactly what they've done if they stopped at a stop car mark? The issue being its the wrong one because they've also for X reason not also processed other information at that moment in time that tells them they're a 9 instead of a 5 car on this specfic journey.

This basic requirement you mention, they'd not have much of a job if that weren't the case, no one purposely skirts what they've been trained to do most of the time with this job but with NTS failures due to X circumstances, can have mistakes occur.

Of course mistakes occur. I just take issue with Schrodinger's driver; so expert that they must be treated as if perfect, yet so frail that any mitigation for the possibility of error is justified.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

As this conversation cannot confirm anything one way or the other, I've raised a Freedom of Information request through www.whatdotheyknow.com to seek the information. I shall be interested to see what comes back.

 

[NSEWonderer]

Of course mistakes occur. I just take issue with Schrodinger's driver; so expert that they must be treated as if perfect, yet so frail that any mitigation for the possibility of error is justified.

Whilst im not sure where the first bit came from, unless its in regards to stop car placements at specfic TOCs(which hasn't 100% been defined as being only placed there to reduce stop shorts), I'd think an industry that an error could lead to the endangering of passengers at a moments notice would look for a justifiable mitigation?

The weighing up of safety related changes/ implementations doesn't just happen at a blink of an eye either, those in the pay grade would have looked at the risks at play before making the decisions that yes affect the passenger.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

Of course mistakes occur. I just take issue with Schrodinger's driver; so expert that they must be treated as if perfect, yet so frail that any mitigation for the possibility of error is justified.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

As this conversation cannot confirm anything one way or the other, I've raised a Freedom of Information request through www.whatdotheyknow.com to seek the information. I shall be interested to see what comes back.

Fair enough, would be interesting to see.

 

[LowLevel]

Completely ignored again that human factors can occur with the most and very well trained individuals like Train drivers. "Obey simple signs" at stations as you say we'll thats exactly what they've done if they stopped at a stop car mark? The issue being its the wrong one because they've also for X reason not also processed other information at that moment in time that tells them they're a 9 instead of a 5 car on this specfic journey.

This basic requirement you mention, they'd not have much of a job if that weren't the case, no one purposely skirts what they've been trained to do most of the time with this job but with NTS failures due to X circumstances, can have mistakes occur.

I don't think anyone is disputing this. More the risk assessment in this case being disputed as it introduces other issues to resolve a problem that other operators appear not to consider to be important.

Grantham platform 2 is on the outside of a curve. By using the far end of it you drag passengers and their often not inconsiderable belongings when they have arrived from Skegness on to the worst part of the platform to use, and then have them walking back along it when you're trying to dispatch the train. This practice was also coinciding with the taking out of use of the platform 2 side of the bay after many decades which constrained the EMR operation considerably.

Basically the critique is that the LNER response appears to have been "this is a risk, the only risk, and regardless of all else, we aren't having variable car stop markers".

Meanwhile other operators including those using essentially the same traction at the same location do it differently.

 

[NSEWonderer]

I don't think anyone is disputing this. More the risk assessment in this case being disputed as it introduces other issues to resolve a problem that other operators appear not to consider to be important.

Grantham platform 2 is on the outside of a curve. By using the far end of it you drag passengers and their often not inconsiderable belongings when they have arrived from Skegness on to the worst part of the platform to use, and then have them walking back along it when you're trying to dispatch the train. This practice was also coinciding with the taking out of use of the platform 2 side of the bay after many decades which constrained the EMR operation considerably.

Basically the critique is that the LNER response appears to have been "this is a risk, the only risk, and regardless of all else, we aren't having variable car stop markers".

Meanwhile other operators including those using essentially the same traction at the same location do it differently.

Ah then that is fair, it just seemed that someone was going off on something that hadn't been concluded as being the primary reason for the stop car choices of said operators.

 

[dk1]

It’s what was implied - Grantham p2 country end is both curved and very narrow, so this policy adds risk.

No it wasn’t. I said the train wouldn’t move as dispatch would be stopped. With almost 40 years in the railway industry 27 of them driving trains I would be fully aware of what was and what wasn’t safety critical.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

I don’t think you can just make this assertion when the rest of your argument was based on the fact that mistakes can be made! If this was true zero trap and drags would have happened ever and that’s clearly not the case.

As I said, the train dispatch would be stopped and restarted if it wasn’t deemed safe on the first or subsequent attempt.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

By the same token, the train driver wouldn't stop at the wrong car marker for their set.

Indeed. I'm confident of course that most train drivers, dk1 included, would never dream of endorsing a policy just so that operational risks transferred off themselves and equally onto their station and onboard colleagues.

The argument is that a train driver can easily stop at the wrong marker board and release. It is then too late. Train dispatch can be aborted at anytime during the procedure and all that’s happened is a delay.

 

[z444z]

As I said, the train dispatch would be stopped and restarted if it wasn’t deemed safe on the first or subsequent attempt.

But what if it wasn’t, because somebody made a mistake, as has been your point throughout the rest of this thread?

 

[dk1]

But what if it wasn’t, because somebody made a mistake, as has been your point throughout the rest of this thread?

But it would be. If somebody is standing too close or trapped then the dispatch is aborted. There is far less risk than with stop short and release.

 

[35B]

But it would be. If somebody is standing too close or trapped then the dispatch is aborted. There is far less risk than with stop short and release.

That is interesting, given that I've a number of times observed dispatch continue when people are too close. And the RAIB library demonstrates that staff also make mistakes.

 

[dk1]

That is interesting, given that I've a number of times observed dispatch continue when people are too close. And the RAIB library demonstrates that staff also make mistakes.

Anyone can make a mistake. We are all human after all but it’s all down to how you mitigate it.

 

[35B]

Anyone can make a mistake. We are all human after all but it’s all down to how you mitigate it.

Indeed it is. But any risk management methodology will include a measure of prioritisation, and also accepting that the risk can't cost-effectively be mitigated any further.

 

[Starmill]

The argument is that a train driver can easily stop at the wrong marker board and release. It is then too late. Train dispatch can be aborted at anytime during the procedure and all that’s happened is a delay.

Argument by whom?

The driver is at liberty to stop the process of releasing the doors just as much as the guard is of stopping giving the right away signal. They're both the same in the respect that once they've happened, it's generally considered an irreversible action. Yes, the train can be stopped again shortly after it begins to move and the doors can be locked again shortly after they've opened, but both would equally be considered a wrong-side failure.

There is far less risk than with stop short and release.

According to whom?

The doors being released when not on the platform could result in broken bones as people fall to the tracks but there's an obvious way to prevent that from happening in that one can not press the button to open the door, or not step out, if one notices there isn't actually a platform there. Indeed doors opened against no platform all the time until just a couple of years ago and few people were ever injured. By contrast a person trapped in the door of a departing train generally can't do anything to help themselves at all other than hope a passerby hears. I'm not suggesting neither are risks, of course - both are very unlikely but highly risky situations. I don't think anyone has presented any evidence here that one is inherently worse than the other though.

 

[dk1]

Indeed it is. But any risk management methodology will include a measure of prioritisation, and also accepting that the risk can't cost-effectively be mitigated any further.

We will have to agree to disagree on the subject.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

Argument by whom?

The driver is at liberty to stop the process of releasing the doors just as much as the guard is of stopping giving the right away signal. They're both the same in the respect that once they've happened, it's generally considered an irreversible action. Yes, the train can be stopped again shortly after it begins to move and the doors can be locked again shortly after they've opened, but both would equally be considered a wrong-side failure.


According to whom?

The doors being released when not on the platform could result in broken bones as people fall to the tracks but there's an obvious way to prevent that from happening in that one can not press the button to open the door, or not step out, if one notices there isn't actually a platform there. Indeed doors opened against no platform all the time until just a couple of years ago and few people were ever injured. By contrast a person trapped in the door of a departing train generally can't do anything to help themselves at all other than hope a passerby hears. I'm not suggesting neither are risks, of course - both are very unlikely but highly risky situations. I don't think anyone has presented any evidence here that one is inherently worse than the other though.

But being trapped in doors can happen at any time and it is normally spotted and as I keep repeating, dispatch can be aborted by the platform staff or guard at any time. Under normal circumstances traction interlock would not allow brake release should this be the case. Should anyone fall between train and platform interface once dispatch is complete and train is moving should they then ignore warnings or act dangerously cannot be helped. To give you another example I worked DCO at the end so responsible for always opening and most of the time closing doors. If after platform duties were complete and power was taken we were picked up and marked down on assessments if we rechecked cameras after the train started moving (they automatically switch off between 3mph & 5mph) as we’re told we should be solely focussing on the signals and route ahead.

 

[Starmill]

But being trapped in doors can happen at any time and it is normally spotted and as I keep repeating, dispatch can be aborted by the platform staff or guard at any time.

Alas that repeating it doesn't make it more or less likely to influence the outcome.

Should anyone fall between train and platform interface once dispatch is complete and train is moving should they then ignore warnings or act dangerously cannot be helped.

All sounds like a rather "safety for me but not for thee" sort of attitude to be honest, which I can assure you is certainly not the usual one taken by the former collueages on the platform whom you so disparage here.

 

[z444z]

Under normal circumstances traction interlock would not allow brake release should this be the case.

From reading RAIB reports of trap-and-drags, this is a common belief held by staff involved, and it is one that the RAIB has dispelled time and time again.

 

[dk1]

Alas that repeating it doesn't make it more or less likely to influence the outcome.

All sounds like a rather "safety for me but not for thee" sort of attitude to be honest, which I can assure you is certainly not the usual one taken by the former collueages on the platform whom you so disparage here.

I do not disparage them by any means and have never implied that. I am merely saying that stopping short and releasing the doors cannot be overcome and even though somebody may not fall that driver is then on a plan or something more serious. Mitigating it by making passengers walk a little further is a small price to pay for operational familiarity. The whole dispatch scenario was brought up by @35B mentioning some problem with a busy area of platform 2 at Grantham.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

From reading RAIB reports of trap-and-drags, this is a common belief held by staff involved, and it is one that the RAIB has dispelled time and time again.

Which is why I said under normal circumstances. We have all sat in safety update briefings watching CCTV of rucksacks, arms and even dogs on leads being overlooked or not detected causing trap and drags. Thankfully they are very very rare.

 

[Starmill]

I am merely saying that stopping short and releasing the doors cannot be overcome and even though somebody may not fall that driver is then on a plan or something more serious.

If the train begins to move with someone stuck to it that cannot be overcome. And even though, we all hope, they may not come to an injury, no doubt the guard will then be on the same plan. Or something more serious.

The whole dispatch scenario was brought up by @35B mentioning some problem with a busy area of platform 2 at Grantham.

I don't think it was. I think it was brought up by multiple people suggesting that CrossCountry, TPE and HT dispatch at the same platforms is slightly safer.

 

[dk1]

If the train begins to move with someone stuck to it that cannot be overcome. And even though, we all hope, they may not come to an injury, no doubt the guard will then be on the same plan. Or something more serious.

That’s a situation no member of staff wants to be involved in. Was easily done though for most of my career as slam door stock had CDL but obviously no traction interlock. There were always guards that we all had less confidence in to dispatch safely especially if no platform staff were present. That awful moment when on accelerating away an emergency brake application was applied due to a pass-com activation was always a heart stopping moment almost making me afraid to look back.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 4 Jan 2026 ==

I don't think it was. I think it was brought up by multiple people suggesting that CrossCountry, TPE and HT dispatch at the same platforms is slightly safer.

Not for me. It was from then that I properly joined in on that subject.

 

[z444z]

From reading RAIB reports of trap-and-drags, this is a common belief held by staff involved, and it is one that the RAIB has dispelled time and time again.

• 12/2016, Hayes and Harlington, head and back injuries

The RAIB's investigation identified that the train driver and other railway staff held the same misunderstanding: if someone had a hand trapped in a door it would not be possible for the door interlock light to illuminate and a driver to take power. This is not the case.

• 03/2019, Elstree and Borehamwood, passenger’s dog killed

The investigation identified a number of factors, some or all of which may have played a part in the driver not seeing the passenger:

1. the short time taken to check the platform-train interface during the dispatch process (paragraph 52);
2. reliance on the door interlock system

• 01/2022, Wood Street, passenger forced to run alongside train until it stopped 20 metres later

The driver later stated that he did not believe that the passenger could have been trapped in the doors when he started the train, because he had obtained door interlock.

• 19/2014, Newcastle Central, wrist injury

The conductor stated that he was unable to explain why he did not undertake a train safety check after closing the passenger doors, or restart the dispatch process. The RAIB believes that there are two possible explanations for this:

1. He made an error due to confusion at being ready to depart and then realising that he had not turned the DKS on. He then relied on the door interlock indicator to confirm to him that the passenger doors were closed, locked and clear of passengers, or
2. He consciously ignored what he had been trained to do (possibly with reliance on the illuminated door interlock indicator) to avoid having to restart the dispatch sequence.

• 07/2018, Bushey, forearm injury

The conductor stated he believed the extinguished body side lights and the illuminated interlock light in his cab showed that nothing was trapped in the closed doors. He therefore sent the driver a signal that the train could depart.

• 05/2022, North London PTI events (Crouch Hill incident), no injuries

The driver involved in the incident at Crouch Hill stated that they did not know about the limitations regarding door interlocks at all and that they relied on the door interlock indicator as assurance that nothing was trapped in the doors.

• 14/2018, Notting Hill Gate, serious injuries

After the accident, the train operator stated that he could not understand why the pilot light was illuminated with something trapped in the doors. This implies a potential dependence on the door interlock and a lack of awareness about its limitations, which the investigation found may be widespread.

• 03/2016, West Wickham, life-changing injuries

The trainee driver was not aware of the passenger before the train started to move. The possible explanations for this lack of awareness are:

• He did not carry out a full train safety check after the doors were closed, and before operating the power controller, because the illuminated door interlock light gave him reassurance that it was safe to start the train; and/or
• He had not noticed the trapped passenger while monitoring the doors as they were closing (or between door closure and the doors beginning to close) and so believed a further check of this door was unnecessary

• 17/2008, Tooting Broadway, minor injuries

Evidence indicates that the train operator was using the doors closed visual indicator to gain confirmation that the train doors were closed.

• 15/2018, Radford Road, unoccupied pushchair dragged and crushed

The driver stated that he was unaware that small objects could be trapped when tram doors were detected closed and locked (paragraph 60). This belief was also apparent in evidence from a driver trainer and a driver manager at Nottingham Trams. The seniority and roles of these staff indicates a high probability that many other Nottingham Tram drivers shared this belief.

• 06/2024, Archway and Chalk Farm, serious injuries

The train operator was relying on several different cues to indicate that it was safe to start the train, particularly the pilot light which indicates that the doors are closed. The illumination of this light reinforced the train operator's belief that it was safe to depart because they stated that they believed it would not illuminate if something was trapped in the doors.

• 22/2014, Holborn, neck and back injuries

The SATS saw the scarf become trapped in the doors. He stated that he assumed that the doors would re-open because the interlock between the doors and the traction control would prevent the train from moving, and the train operator would re-open the doors to resolve the problem. When this did not happen, he was unsure what to do next.

 

[dk1]

• 12/2016, Hayes and Harlington, head and back injuries

• 03/2019, Elstree and Borehamwood, passenger’s dog killed

• 01/2022, Wood Street, passenger forced to run alongside train until it stopped 20 metres later

• 19/2014, Newcastle Central, wrist injury

• 07/2018, Bushey, forearm injury

• 05/2022, North London PTI events (Crouch Hill incident), no injuries

• 14/2018, Notting Hill Gate, serious injuries

• 03/2016, West Wickham, life-changing injuries

• 17/2008, Tooting Broadway, minor injuries

• 15/2018, Radford Road, unoccupied pushchair dragged and crushed

• 06/2024, Archway and Chalk Farm, serious injuries

• 22/2014, Holborn, neck and back injuries

Many thanks for that.

 

[z444z]

Which is why I said under normal circumstances.

What do you mean by normal circumstances? All of the above incidents I’ve just listed occurred on trains with door interlock systems functioning as intended.