Near miss with an access ramp at Norwood Junction station (RAIB)

[Horizon22]

The 700s only ever use 3 and 4
5 is Southbound Overground and some Southbound Southerns, 6 is almost always only Southern i think just the Tat & Cat

But could a Thameslink divert onto P1 (disruption, engineering works)? If the answer is not "no", there might be a ramp on that platform.

 

[renegademaster]

But could a Thameslink divert onto P1 (disruption, engineering works)? If the answer is not "no", there might be a ramp on that platform.

I guess in theory but the platforms 3 and 4 are only used twice per hour so the only scenario it would be occupied would a broken down 700, and when the BML fast lines are shut the Thameslinks are sent via Herne Hill and only Overground and the Southern London Bridge services will use the slow lines

 

[norbitonflyer]

For example I've seen signage at Liverpool St where they've stenciled on the types of stock one type of ramp can be used for (345, 720, 710 aventra stock)

Likewise at my local SWR station - separate ramps lined up for 450,455,458,701,707 (the last named now marked OOU).

It would only take one member of platform staff to not know their 450 from their 458 for such a mistake to occur

At Norwood Junction, all trains are now formed of Electrostars of one kind or another (class 37x), aren't they, so I would be surprised if the ramps were very different?

EDIT - I forgot that Thamelsinks 700s call there

 

[The exile]

Maybe. The way the Class 700s get round this is by having "arms" on the ramp that stretch beyond the end of the ramp into the train to prevent the doors from closing.

That’s exactly the sort of thing I had in mind earlier up the thread.

 

[bahnause]

Is there no way for staff to lock the door in the open position?

 

[The exile]

Given the sheer amount of ramps across the UK, it would be a very, very slow change.

That’s not a reason not to start, though.

 

[KNN]

Indeed.

To be clear I’m also not suggesting that the driver definitely wasn’t at fault. Unfortunately it’s a case of fallible human interfacing with fallible technology.

These events are also incredibly rare in the scheme of things, and taken very seriously when they do occur, as evidenced in this case, even where thankfully nobody was injured.

It seems to me that we need a wider conversation about what "safe" dispatch is.

The standards are hugely variable, what is expected somewhere like Crewe is not the standard they hold to at New Street (where I'm surprised there aren't more accidents) and London is the wild west by comparison.

 

[Julia]

Likewise at my local SWR station - separate ramps lined up for 450,455,458,701,707 (the last named now marked OOU).

Rather mind-boggling that there hasn't been a successful attempt at standardisation. Not least given the purchase cost and storage requirements of multiple ramps, even if the right one is used every time.

 

[bearhugger]

They're slotted in on some ramps from what I've seen. Its the main way to secure the ramp safely in. Most ramps have the longer two sides to stop a door fully closing but im unfamiliar with if the ramp at norwood junction ommits this.View attachment 184560

Most ramps (of similar design0 I've seen up here in the north don't have those extended bits - I've travelled a fair bit with the wife who uses a wheelchair with Northern & TPE mostly.

 

[DMckduck]

It seems to me that we need a wider conversation about what "safe" dispatch is.

The standards are hugely variable, what is expected somewhere like Crewe is not the standard they hold to at New Street (where I'm surprised there aren't more accidents) and London is the wild west by comparison.

The conversation around this particular incident should be:
What did you see?
What didnt you see?
If you couldn't see that monitor, why did you dispatch?

Which will then further uncover lapses by either drivers or the company on what is agreed safe dispatch on London Overground, maybe a bit of both.

 

[KNN]

The conversation around this particular incident should be:
What did you see?
What didnt you see?
If you couldn't see that monitor, why did you dispatch?

Which will then further uncover lapses by either drivers or the company on what is agreed safe dispatch on London Overground, maybe a bit of both.

I agree, but I also think there is a wider point about what is actually safe or unsafe, as it seems to be applied inconsistently.

 

[DMckduck]

I agree, but I also think there is a wider point about what is actually safe or unsafe, as it seems to be applied inconsistently.

I think dispatch standards are simply too extreme in the UK if implemented by the book, and that's where corners are cut and there is discrepancies.

Trains wouldn't leave platforms during the peak if the yellow line was as sacred as the standards make it.

 

[Peter Mugridge]

The conversation around this particular incident should be:
What did you see?
What didn't you see?
If you couldn't see that monitor, why did you dispatch?

Which will then further uncover lapses by either drivers or the company on what is agreed safe dispatch on London Overground, maybe a bit of both.

The question of visibility is a very good point. Someone mentioned the other day ( on either Twitter or Bluesky ) that the image the driver sees from each camera is only about the size of a mobile phone screen and that the ramps are more or less the same colour as the platform surface.

While the ramps do have yellow edges, those aren't exactly very high, so it would be interesting to establish just how visible these things are on the screens - especially if the displays are in black and white rather than colour.

Bearing all that in mind, the prediction you make in your last line is likely to be very accurate - particularly in relation to the "what didn't get seen" and the procedure itself.

 

[Horizon22]

Is there no way for staff to lock the door in the open position?

I think on some stock there is - albeit temporarily - but it might be able to be overridden by the driver anyway. It's highly stock variant as to whether you can or can't, and how you would go about doing so.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 22 Jul 2025 ==

Rather mind-boggling that there hasn't been a successful attempt at standardisation. Not least given the purchase cost and storage requirements of multiple ramps, even if the right one is used every time.

Different stock of different generations, the lack of a coherent national rolling stock policy and operators wanting/needing particular requirements will be to blame here.

 

[Deepgreen]

Rather mind-boggling that there hasn't been a successful attempt at standardisation. Not least given the purchase cost and storage requirements of multiple ramps, even if the right one is used every time.

I must say that I would have thought that a fundamental part of the original ramp design should have been arms to prevent doors from closing. This could be the case no matter what other securing arrangements there were. I know it's easy to apply hindsight, but I have always wondered why this was not done. All these ramps are used with sliding doors, by definition, and the arms would also prevent a door accidentally closing on a passenger using the ramp.

 

[MotCO]

Different stock of different generations, the lack of a coherent national rolling stock policy and operators wanting/needing particular requirements will be to blame here.

But can't the specification for new stock be standardised to require a certain type of ramp, and one which stops the doors being closed when it is in operation. The staggering thing is that having something to stop the doors closing when a ramp in operation is so obvious, why wasn't it done earlier?

 

[Horizon22]

The staggering thing is that having something to stop the doors closing when a ramp in operation is so obvious, why wasn't it done earlier?

Well accessibility requirements have come on leaps and bounds in even just the last 10 years, so I would suggest that these things weren't considered as important on older stock.

 

[Deepgreen]

I guess in theory but the platforms 3 and 4 are only used twice per hour so the only scenario it would be occupied would a broken down 700, and when the BML fast lines are shut the Thameslinks are sent via Herne Hill and only Overground and the Southern London Bridge services will use the slow lines

As it happens, the 700s have another issue at p3 at Norwood Junction, in that 12 car trains have selective door opening but the annoucement to move forward to alight only plays about 10-15 seconds before arrival - usually nowhere near enough time for someone in the rear coach to make it far enough forward to alight!

 

[Sunset route]

But could a Thameslink divert onto P1 (disruption, engineering works)? If the answer is not "no", there might be a ramp on that platform.

I guess in theory but the platforms 3 and 4 are only used twice per hour so the only scenario it would be occupied would a broken down 700, and when the BML fast lines are shut the Thameslinks are sent via Herne Hill and only Overground and the Southern London Bridge services will use the slow lines

Quite often when the 9Sxx Brighton to Cambridge is running a few minutes late the 9Rxx Three Bridges to Bedford will use platform 1 at Norwood Junction and cross to the up LB fast line just north of the station.

 

[cool110]

But can't the specification for new stock be standardised to require a certain type of ramp, and one which stops the doors being closed when it is in operation.

If you're going down that route then it would make even more sense to ban the ramps entirely and specify level boarding as the 777s have.

 

[1000 rounders]

I think dispatch standards are simply too extreme in the UK if implemented by the book, and that's where corners are cut and there is discrepancies.

Trains wouldn't leave platforms during the peak if the yellow line was as sacred as the standards make it.

Well said. There is a lot of hypocrisy around the yellow line. Operators do not care until something happens and then it will be the drivers fault.

 

[TheManBehind]

But can't the specification for new stock be standardised to require a certain type of ramp, and one which stops the doors being closed when it is in operation. The staggering thing is that having something to stop the doors closing when a ramp in operation is so obvious, why wasn't it done earlier?

Most ramps do that anyway by dint of their existence being in the way of the doors - Desiro ramps don't have the additional wings, but block the doors from closing when deployed properly. Same with 455s and their body doors.

 

[saltywalrus]

New RAIB report on unsafe dispatch at Norwood Junction last year

Report 09/2026: Dangerous occurrence involving a portable access ramp at Norwood Junction station

Summary​

At around 09:52 on Tuesday 1 July 2025, a London Overground passenger train departed from Norwood Junction station with a portable access ramp attached. The ramp collided with the end-of-platform barrier and fell beside the track. No injuries were caused, although a member of station staff and a passenger needed to take action to avoid the ramp as it travelled down the platform. The portable access ramp was damaged beyond repair, and minor damage was caused to the train as a result of the accident.


RAIB’s investigation found that a portable access ramp being attached at a doorway did not prevent the train’s door from closing or from traction power being taken, because the ramp was of the incorrect type. Platform staff were unaware that the ramp they were using was of the incorrect type for the train involved. The correct ramp had not been available since September 2021 and none of the station checks in the period up to the accident had identified this.


The train driver departed from Norwood Junction station with the ramp still attached as they believed it was safe to dispatch the train. The driver’s safety checks during dispatch were ineffective. Although some other factors may have been present, this was probably because the driver was distracted as they were making a mobile phone call at the time the train departed.


Efforts by platform staff to stop the train were ineffective because the warning signals they were using could not be seen by the driver, due to the cropped image presented to them on their in-cab monitor.


There were three underlying factors. Arriva Rail London, the operator of the London Overground concession at the time of the accident, had not identified the risks associated with using portable access ramps. Processes for checking portable access ramps at stations did not identify the appropriate ramp for the relevant rolling stock. Arriva Rail London’s processes for mitigating the risk of driver inattention caused by the use of mobile devices had also not been sufficiently effective.

Recommendations​

RAIB has made six recommendations. The first two recommendations are addressed to First Rail London, the current operator of the London Overground concession, and aim to better manage the use of portable access ramps. The third and fourth recommendations, addressed respectively to the Department for Transport and the Rail Safety and Standards Board, aim to address the legislation and regulations around portable access ramps. The fifth and sixth recommendations, addressed respectively to the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the Office of Rail and Road, aim to address the use of mobile devices by drivers.


RAIB also identified two learning points. The first is that railway staff are reminded of the risks presented by distracting personal issues, and the importance of seeking help from their employer. The second is to remind train drivers that mobile devices are a major source of distraction and that their use is not permitted during operations.

Notes to editors​

1. The sole purpose of RAIB investigations is to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety. RAIB does not establish blame, liability or carry out prosecutions.
2. RAIB operates, as far as possible, in an open and transparent manner. While our investigations are completely independent of the railway industry, we do maintain close liaison with railway companies and if we discover matters that may affect the safety of the railway, we make sure that information about them is circulated to the right people as soon as possible, and certainly long before publication of our final report.
3. For media enquiries, please call 01932 440015.

Newsdate: 22 June 2026​

Moderator note: Level boarding discussion can be found in the following thread:

Norwood Junction dispatching incident: level boarding implications

Moderator note: Split from: https://www.railforums.co.uk/threads/dangerous-occurrence-involving-a-portable-access-ramp-at-norwood-junction-station.303696/ One thing that has annoyed me; 31 Norwood Junction station has been in operation since 1859 and has six platforms (figure 9). The accident...

www.railforums.co.uk

 

[styles]

I don't doubt that the other recommendations should be implemented, but:

the driver was distracted as they were making a mobile phone call at the time the train departed.

That's wild. Making a mobile phone call, work or otherwise, while departing a station is surely advised against?

 

[Swedenorer]

Clearly the driver making a phone call is worrying but so is the number of organisations involved meaning too many cracks for things to fall through.

 

[matchmaker]

The report makes disturbing reading.

 

[voyagerdude220]

I've read the report and as others have already said, there are numerous concerning bits which it highlights.

Hopefully the Driver is no longer employed on the Railway if they were indeed using their personal phone whilst driving the train.

Also to be pedantic, the OP refers to "unsafe dispatch" but I don't think despatch took place.

 

[norbitonflyer]

Also to be pedantic, the OP refers to "unsafe dispatch" but I don't think despatch took place.

The report indicates that dispatch did take place - "The train driver is entirely responsible for the safe dispatch of the train from a station and station platform staff have no role in the dispatch process" (para 35)

 

[Crossover]

I've read the report and as others have already said, there are numerous concerning bits which it highlights.

Hopefully the Driver is no longer employed on the Railway if they were indeed using their personal phone whilst driving the train.

Also to be pedantic, the OP refers to "unsafe dispatch" but I don't think despatch took place.

From my reading of it, it seems like it goes beyond the use of a mobile phone. It says for this incident, the on call manager couldn't see any evidence of phone calls but evidence beyond this says they did. Presumably this was records from the phone company (which also showed the phone being turned on at a time the driver had said it was off. So not only was it likely against policies, but it makes out that the driver was also economical with the truth, with it

 

[IrishDave]

I've read the report and as others have already said, there are numerous concerning bits which it highlights.

Hopefully the Driver is no longer employed on the Railway if they were indeed using their personal phone whilst driving the train.

Also to be pedantic, the OP refers to "unsafe dispatch" but I don't think despatch took place.

In the section headed "Actions reported as already taken or in progress relevant to this report", paragraph 132 states:

132 The driver of train 9D18 ceased driving trains for ARL.

That doesn't exclude the possibility they were redeployed to other duties, however.