What's gone so wrong at Wrightbus? Did they sell them too cheap when the orders were coming in thick and fast? Did they over invest in starting to manufacturing chassis for their integrals? Were they too slow to react to the desire for lightweights?
It's seems that quality and orders were on a downward spiral for a few years really.
It does seem strange doesn't it, when you consider what a (seemingly) good reputation Wrightbus had around 10 years ago. I suspect there isn't one single reason, but a combination of factors that have come together to make an imperfect storm.
On the vehicle front its worth remembering that Wrights were a relatively late-comer to the world of integral bus manufacture. Until relatively recently the core of their business was bodying other manufacturers heavyweight (or heavier-weight) chassis and this proved a very successful strategy for a while - gaining, for example, regular large orders from FirstBus on Volvo chassis.
The increasing focus from operators in driving down costs - to counter rising fuel, employment and other operating costs has seen a near wholesale move towards operating lightweight vehicles, and let's face it for the vast majority of UK bus work such lightweight vehicles are more than adequate. This was a change that happened over a relatively short period of time (compared with the timeframe over which vehicle manufacturers would write-down development costs).
This isn't something that has only affected Wrights - look at the decline in market share of chassis manufacturers such as Volvo, Scania, MAN, VDL, etc over the last five to ten years. There has been a marked shift in vehicle procurement. For those heavyweight chassis manufacturers this shift had a less critical impact - for these manufacturers the UK is but one small part of a global marketplace. That could not be said for Wrightbus whose order book was much more reliant on the UK market (as well as the Far East).
Wrightbus did react - seeing the introduction of the Streetlite, then Streetdeck (as well as other products like the StreetAir, etc), but this must have required significant investment into the business (which will take time to recoup). The cost of independently developing a new vehicle for a company like Wrightbus must have been significant. Its worth remembering that the Streetlite has only been around since 2010 (with door forward and Max varieties following in 2011/12). Compare that to their main rival ADL who have been able to refine their own midibus chassis offering over some 30 years (the original Dennis Dart being introduced in 1989, followed by the low floor Dart SLF in ?1996/7). Similarly for double deck vehicles (Streetdeck introduced in 2014 vs Trident introduced in 1997). Even smaller players like Optare already had some well-established integral products.
I think it is fair to say that Wrightbus has had some quality issues, which is not unexpected given they have a finite development resource and the need to effectively replace their main product line in a short period of time - this meant that some development issues ended up being ironed-out in service, which leads to a perception of unreliability. Unfortunately bus companies aren't going to be forgiving when it comes to placing orders - why accept such reliability issues when there are alternative manufacturers ready and willing to deliver tried and tested vehicles? Its not like the Streetlite is such a revolutionary product (unlike say the Dart or Solo when they were first introduced). I think to an extent we are seeing a similar issue with Optare's Metrodecker - what's the compelling reason to order this over an Enviro 400MMC? It might be possible to gather sales if you have an existing customer base (like Wrights did) or through competitive pricing (like MCV with their EvoSeit), but this is only going to gain short-term traction unless backed up by quality of product.
As well as developing their own products Wrights also had to develop the New Routemaster for TfL after winning a competitive tender (against stiff competition) - whilst they eventually delivered 1,000 units I suspect that Wrights had hoped for further orders beyond this. Ironically it was also ADL that was first to develop a mainstream product to capitalise on the "halo-effect" from the New Routemaster - you have to wonder about Wrightbus's management when ADL managed to get their Enviro 400 City model to market quicker that Wrightbus could with their SRM? Were Wrightbus placing too great an expectancy on further New Routemaster orders that they took their eye off the ball?
Wrights were undertaking all this new (and costly) development work against the background of an economy that was yet to fully emerge from a global recession, and more recently has faced uncertainty from Brexit, increased material costs, ever tightening regulations, etc. This came at a time when bus operators were just starting to scale back purchasing and certainly the bus operating market in the UK is a tough place to be at the moment, where only the fittest are surviving.
Wrights were briefly helped by the rush to meet DDA deadlines and the production boost from the New Routemaster, but with hindsight these were short-lived bonanzas that were perhaps papering over the cracks.
Compare this with ADL who, despite a rocky past, have gradually developed a sound business, with an established product line-up. This has enabled them to focus their growth on other markets, and have been successful in winning a number of breakthrough orders (Mexico, Berlin, Switzerland, etc) as well as winning new domestic customers and generally retaining their existing customer base.
Sorry for the waffling and somewhat speculative post - just my thoughts on why a seemingly successful business like Wrights have found themselves in the position they now face.