Derailment causing disruption at Sheffield 09-10-2018

[Crossover]

The protection system known as TPWS is widely fitted on the UK network. This cannot always prevent a SPAD, but is designed to stop a train from reaching a conflict point in a junction in the event of an actual or anticipated SPAD. In the case of sidings, exit signals are not usually fitted with TPWS equipment but the track connections have always been equipped with 'trap points' or derailler devices which operate together with the junction points where the siding joins the main line. If a train attempts to exit a siding without a clear signal and route set it should be derailed before it reaches any conflict point, which is exactly what has occurred at Sheffield in this case. Once such a derailment has occurred, other movements in the area are often prevented due to track, signalling equipment and associated cabling damage, and the trap points are invariably fitted with an 'interrupter' device that is triggered by the derailing train to deliberately places the track circuits in the vicinity to occupied status and hence prevent any further train movement until the situation has been assessed, debris cleared and equipment restored to normal service.

I am reminded of the incident outside Paddington in the recentish past where a Turbo was derailed into an OHLE gantry. Did it’s job similarly if not dramatically!

 

[SideshowBob]

ATP is only on the Chiltern Main Line and the Great Western Main Line (plus CTRL/HS1 of course), and not all unit's that work these lines have it fitted. TPWS(+) is what's fitted to a lot of signals and that will stop the train automatically, but not necessarily in time to pass a signal at danger. In this situation it's likely only AWS is fitted and that can only warn of a restrictive aspect bit so long as the warning is cancelled the train will not brake automatically.

ATP is only fitted to a small number of areas and Sheffield isn’t one (to the best of my knowledge anyway)

As this was a shunt move, it may have been even less protected

In the event, the trap points have served their purpose in diverting the unit from anything more serious, as dramatic as the end result appears

So, in an industry dominated by private TOCs driven by a need to return financial dividends to shareholders, reliant on drivers working their rest days and seemingly hell-bent on cutting the numbers of safety critical staff, there's actually very little in most parts of the country to prevent a repeat of the carnage of Southall and Ladbroke Grove, barring an approach of "fingers crossed that drivers aren't too tired or distracted/stressed by other things (like DOO) to concentrate on things like signal aspects"? For real??

 

[142Pilot]

No.

Their is lots to prevent a major disaster happening again.

Tpws does its job very well. Major conflict points are protected, but there is no need to put them in every signal - the risk of hitting another train in minimal on plain line where the driver should in effect see the tail lights before hitting the train.

 

[MarkyT]

So, in an industry dominated by private TOCs driven by a need to return financial dividends to shareholders, reliant on drivers working their rest days and seemingly hell-bent on cutting the numbers of safety critical staff, there's actually very little in most parts of the country to prevent a repeat of the carnage of Southall and Ladbroke Grove, barring an approach of "fingers crossed that drivers aren't too tired or distracted/stressed by other things (like DOO) to concentrate on things like signal aspects"? For real??

As I just explained there is the widely fitted TPWS system in the UK which, while not always preventing a SPAD occuring is designed to ALWAYS prevent an actual or anticipated SPAD train from reaching a conflict point at junctions where it could strike another train. TPWS was specifically implemented in a great hurry following the tragedies you quote to prevent these types of incidents and has been highly successful in preventing further occurrences.

 

[NoOnesFool]

Have the units involved been moved now?

 

[SideshowBob]

As I just explained there is the widely fitted TPWS system in the UK which, while not always preventing a SPAD occuring is designed to ALWAYS prevent an actual or anticipated SPAD train from reaching a conflict point at junctions where it could strike another train. TPWS was specifically implemented in a great hurry following the tragedies you quote to prevent these types of incidents and has been highly successful in preventing further occurrences.

Apologies; I didn't see your earlier post until after I had posted my last one. Thank you for your explanation and for reiterating it; it's somewhat reassuring to know that the industry is being run on a bit more than just a wing and a prayer in terms of preventing the horror of a major train crash caused by a SPAD.

 

[Mugby]

Are there any cranes or breakdown trains left anywhere on the network now or are such incidents yet another aspect of rail operation which is outsourced to private contractors?

 

[snowball]

So, in an industry dominated by private TOCs driven by a need to return financial dividends to shareholders, reliant on drivers working their rest days and seemingly hell-bent on cutting the numbers of safety critical staff, there's actually very little in most parts of the country to prevent a repeat of the carnage of Southall and Ladbroke Grove, barring an approach of "fingers crossed that drivers aren't too tired or distracted/stressed by other things (like DOO) to concentrate on things like signal aspects"? For real??

The facts suggest otherwise.

No passenger has been killed in a train accident since an elderly woman died in the Grayrigg derailment 11.5 years ago. There has never been such a long gap without such deaths in history before.

The main threats to life and limb on the railway today are level crossings, the train/platform interface and trespassing.

 

[LowLevel]

Are there any cranes or breakdown trains left anywhere on the network now or are such incidents yet another aspect of rail operation which is outsourced to private contractors?

There are (though fewer in number than before and I can't remember where they're based at the minute - I think Wigan is one) - since privatisation the national network stuff has been contracted to EWS/DB.

 

[SideshowBob]

The facts suggest otherwise.

No passenger has been killed in a train accident since an elderly woman died in the Grayrigg derailment 11.5 years ago. There has never been such a long gap without such deaths in history before.

The main threats to life and limb on the railway today are level crossings, the train/platform interface and trespassing.

Grayrigg wasn't caused by a SPAD.

 

[driver9000]

Grayrigg wasn't caused by a SPAD.

That's true and you would probably need to go back to Ladbroke Grove and Southall to find the last passengers killed in an accident following a SPAD. The point Snowball was making is we as an industry have gone over a decade without loss of passenger life in any accident nor have had a major disaster. We certainly do not run the industry on a wing and a prayer, the reason ATP was never rolled out nationally is because TPWS proved itself just as capable in reducing the risk following a SPAD. The national trend year on year is a falling number of SPAD incidents.

 

[ComUtoR]

Surely, no SPAD should ever "exist", i.e. actually happen??

So I provided you with good information about the classification of SPADS, you know they existed as that's what you stated and now you quote me out of context for some kind of leading question about them happening. WTF is that about !

I thought SPADs were a thing of the past. As a lay person, it's quite shocking to hear that they arent!

On a typical day I can pass 350+ signals. On some routes near 500. Each one of those can give me a Red. Personally I'm looking at going past 70k(ish) signals in a single year. At my last medical I'm sure I was still human and limited to human capabilities. Mistakes happen, you have to accept that. Granted some mistakes are worse than others and some lead to an incident. Major ones will still reoccur because, no matter how much we try there will always be something that gets past us or a swiss cheese hole opens up.

Back of a fag packet calculation : 350 signals x 4 days per week x 52 weeks per year = 72,800 x 1,000 Drivers at my TOC = 72.8mil signals passed in a year. I tried to calculate the % of SPADs but the calculator kinda broke. TBVFH we have an incredible safety record and the level of error is almost negligible and yet we still push ourselves forward to get it lower and lower.

TPWS is a drop in the ocean of work that is going on behind the scenes to both prevent and mitigate a SPAD from happening. There is research always going on and there will be investigations both internally and externally after each SPAD.

Does anyone have any figures they could share on how often they're still happening, and/or how many per year across the network?

I can pretty much give you a break down of every single SPAD across the entire network with unit numbers, dates and TOC etc. They can be found using your preferred search engine.

 

[SideshowBob]

That's true and you would probably need to go back to Ladbroke Grove and Southall to find the last passengers killed in an accident following a SPAD. The point Snowball was making is we as an industry have gone over a decade without loss of passenger life in any accident nor have had a major disaster. We certainly do not run the industry on a wing and a prayer, the reason ATP was never rolled out nationally is because TPWS proved itself just as capable in reducing the risk following a SPAD. The national trend year on year is a falling number of SPAD incidents.

Thank you, that's all good to know.

Just to be clear, as long I know that there are proven and reliable technological systems in place that activate in times of human error to prevent catastrophe, I'm reassured. Whether they be ATP, TPWS, trap points or whatever else is appropriate doesn't matter to me - as long as it works and no-one is killed or injured, all well and good. I only highlighted ATP as I seem to recall that it (or the lack of it) featured heavily in the Cullen report; TPWS may have done too - it's been a long time since I've read it.

 

[SideshowBob]

So I provided you with good information about the classification of SPADS, you know they existed as that's what you stated and now you quote me out of context for some kind of leading question about them happening. WTF is that about !



On a typical day I can pass 350+ signals. On some routes near 500. Each one of those can give me a Red. Personally I'm looking at going past 70k(ish) signals in a single year. At my last medical I'm sure I was still human and limited to human capabilities. Mistakes happen, you have to accept that. Granted some mistakes are worse than others and some lead to an incident. Major ones will still reoccur because, no matter how much we try there will always be something that gets past us or a swiss cheese hole opens up.

Perhaps I overreacted; if so, I can only apologise. Thank you for your information.

I'm just a guy, who travels by train a lot, knowing it's a good deal safer than travelling by road and very much wanting it to stay that way, but who doesn't trust the senior management of those private TOCs who want to cut safety critical staff and increase drivers' workloads as far as he could throw them.

I was looking for reassurance and information, and have received both, for which I am genuinely grateful.

 

[ComUtoR]

We have worked so hard to get the safety level to where it is that potentially there is an acceptance that it is safe enough. Posters on this very form lead the DOO debate with the mantra that it is 'safe' Those of us who work in the industry as people dealing with issues like SPADs on a daily basis take risk aversion to an extreme.

TPWS was the cheap version and it does work as intended and has reduced the risk and occurrences of SPADS. The figure for TPWS activation's however, are shocking. The SPAD numbers are low but the number of times the system has intervened is still too high. If TPWS has intervened that many times then what is still going wrong ?

I firmly believe that those of us who are on the risk averse side just see what you do and see that as the protections are slowly eroded then there may be a return to a greater number of accidents. The 'Railway' is still reactive to everything so until the balance tips against it and the figures stay 'low' then it will do its best to keep the status quo.

Is it safe ? Sure and probably one of the safest in the world. But there will always be something we can do better and there will always be incidents like Lewisham or SPADS ending with a derailment or potential collision. I find it contradictory from some people that they will rail against the TOCs and their staff when incidents like Lewisham happen and in the same breath still support the system as being 'safe' because the level of incidents are negligible. Look at the differences between Lewisham and Peckham and how both people and the industry reacted.

Safety is a very emotive topic for all involved. There truly is more going on behind the curtain than the lay person will ever know.

 

[DarloRich]

were the units involved rerailed yesterday?

 

[Harpers Tate]

Going back to the original matter, a couple of observations:

Having seen the derailed train (I was there at about 2pm when it was still languishing in place), I can see why platform 1 and 2 were inacessible from the south. By this time, platform 2c (the bay typically used by Hope Valley stoppers) was used, as was 5 and up. I can see why EMT were skipping Sheffield with the Liverpool - Norwich (etc) services - makes perfect sense - especially if they were standing for time out of the way at Chesterfield.

But I simply don't get how an incident at the south end of the station caused such stupid congestion with services coming and going exclusively at the north - like Adwick (Doncaster) <> Sheffield turnarounds; Hull (etc) <> Sheffield turnarounds; Leeds <> Lincoln (acknowledging there were issues elsewhere with these, still doesn't explain why those that did run were queueing way back along the line towards Meadowhall). I mean - for all it matters, the blocked south end of Platforms 1 & 2 effectively could have given Sheffield two additional north facing bays.

Nor why greater use wasn't made, for services going via Chesterfield, of the "back road" from Sheffield south (via Woodhouse) as it has been when the line via Dronfield is blockaded - if necessary to relieve the three usable through platforms.

And - very importantly and disappointingly - during the hour or so I was at Sheffield yesterday afternoon - MANY hours after the incident had occurred - the only tannoy announcements and information displays (in this context) were about cancelled and delayed services (with apologies) but with NO guidance about alternatives. Like - Passengers for Norwich (etc) or Liverpool (etc) should take the first train and change at Chesterfield. I mean - I knew (from RealTimeTrains) that Liverpool - Norwich were actually running and serving Chesterfield - but this wasn't being shared with customers. Why not?

I hesitate to post anything critical of The Railway nowadays because there will inevitably be a barrage of defense and claims of lack of insider knowledge and understanding - all of which may be true. But that is EXACTLY the point. The superficial evidence here is that The Railway (collectively) did a dismal job of (a) working around the situation and (b) communicating with its users about what it was (or weas not) doing. Yet again.

 

[Robertj21a]

We have worked so hard to get the safety level to where it is that potentially there is an acceptance that it is safe enough. Posters on this very form lead the DOO debate with the mantra that it is 'safe' Those of us who work in the industry as people dealing with issues like SPADs on a daily basis take risk aversion to an extreme.

TPWS was the cheap version and it does work as intended and has reduced the risk and occurrences of SPADS. The figure for TPWS activation's however, are shocking. The SPAD numbers are low but the number of times the system has intervened is still too high. If TPWS has intervened that many times then what is still going wrong ?

I firmly believe that those of us who are on the risk averse side just see what you do and see that as the protections are slowly eroded then there may be a return to a greater number of accidents. The 'Railway' is still reactive to everything so until the balance tips against it and the figures stay 'low' then it will do its best to keep the status quo.

Is it safe ? Sure and probably one of the safest in the world. But there will always be something we can do better and there will always be incidents like Lewisham or SPADS ending with a derailment or potential collision. I find it contradictory from some people that they will rail against the TOCs and their staff when incidents like Lewisham happen and in the same breath still support the system as being 'safe' because the level of incidents are negligible. Look at the differences between Lewisham and Peckham and how both people and the industry reacted.

Safety is a very emotive topic for all involved. There truly is more going on behind the curtain than the lay person will ever know.

Thanks for that, some good stuff in there.

I think the railway has moved on a bit nowadays so that some of the more pressing concerns are to do with passenger egress, the use of social media, ongoing lack of good communication etc etc. In my view a combination of these factors is, regrettably, likely to be a key factor in any future serious incidents and injuries.

 

[sprinterguy]

Have the units involved been moved now?

were the units involved rerailed yesterday?

Yes, the derailed unit had been rerailed and moved by 7pm last night. Signalling has been restored.

 

[edwin_m]

Going back to the original matter, a couple of observations:

Having seen the derailed train (I was there at about 2pm when it was still languishing in place), I can see why platform 1 and 2 were inacessible from the south. By this time, platform 2c (the bay typically used by Hope Valley stoppers) was used, as was 5 and up. I can see why EMT were skipping Sheffield with the Liverpool - Norwich (etc) services - makes perfect sense - especially if they were standing for time out of the way at Chesterfield.

But I simply don't get how an incident at the south end of the station caused such stupid congestion with services coming and going exclusively at the north - like Adwick (Doncaster) <> Sheffield turnarounds; Hull (etc) <> Sheffield turnarounds; Leeds <> Lincoln (acknowledging there were issues elsewhere with these, still doesn't explain why those that did run were queueing way back along the line towards Meadowhall). I mean - for all it matters, the blocked south end of Platforms 1 & 2 effectively could have given Sheffield two additional north facing bays.

There could be two factors at play here that might not be obvious to an "outsider" (though I wasn't there and have no inside knowledge to comment specifically on this incident):

1. The derailment is stated to have damaged signal cables, which could affect operations that aren't physically blocked by the derailed train. For example if the signal at the south exit of a through platform is affected and the system can't confirm it is lit, the signals won't clear for moves into the north end of that platform.
2. The derailment was on the exit from the sidings. As well as the two units directly involved, were other trains trapped in those sidings?

None of this however excuses the failure to provide good information. As with many other roles involving communication, the trick is to put yourself in the shoes of the other person (the passengers in this case) and think about what information they need and in what form. Unfortunately too often on the railway the people who are responsible for communicating about an incident are the same ones who are responsible for dealing with it.

 

[InOban]

Re #76. The advent of ATP and then TPWS allowed drivers to reduce their focus because they knew subconsciously that there was a backup to them.

When ABS came into cars, it was assumed that it would reduce accidents. Instead cars were driven nearer the limit because the drivers knew that if they had to brake suddenly, the wheels wouldn't lock up.

The more fail-safe technology you build into a car, train or plane, the less engaged the driver/pilot has to be, until it is safer to dispense with the human altogether.

 

[edwin_m]

Re #76. The advent of ATP and then TPWS allowed drivers to reduce their focus because they knew subconsciously that there was a backup to them.

When ABS came into cars, it was assumed that it would reduce accidents. Instead cars were driven nearer the limit because the drivers knew that if they had to brake suddenly, the wheels wouldn't lock up.

The more fail-safe technology you build into a car, train or plane, the less engaged the driver/pilot has to be, until it is safer to dispense with the human altogether.

I think that may be so for cars, due to the relatively low level of training required to drive one and the fairly lax attitude of a significant proportion of the people who do so. But I think it's less likely to be so for trains because of the higher level of training, the very strong emphasis on safety and not least because of the amount of investigation that takes place when TPWS etc kick in to avert a possible accident.

With aircraft (and in future with autonomous cars and perhaps with automatically driven trains) I think it's a bit different. The issue is more de-skilling because the automatic systems take over some of the pilot/driver role rather than just intervening when something has gone wrong. The pilot/driver has less hands-on experience and may have less reason to concentrate on the current situation, so be less able to take manual control quickly if the need arises.

 

[DarloRich]

Are there any cranes or breakdown trains left anywhere on the network now or are such incidents yet another aspect of rail operation which is outsourced to private contractors?

yes there are breakdown cranes. There are also a number of rail mounted Kirow cranes that can be used. There are also road cranes. It is horses for courses

 

[njamescouk]

Going back to the original matter, a couple of observations:

Having seen the derailed train (I was there at about 2pm when it was still languishing in place), I can see why platform 1 and 2 were inacessible from the south. By this time, platform 2c (the bay typically used by Hope Valley stoppers) was used, as was 5 and up. I can see why EMT were skipping Sheffield with the Liverpool - Norwich (etc) services - makes perfect sense - especially if they were standing for time out of the way at Chesterfield.

But I simply don't get how an incident at the south end of the station caused such stupid congestion with services coming and going exclusively at the north - like Adwick (Doncaster) <> Sheffield turnarounds; Hull (etc) <> Sheffield turnarounds; Leeds <> Lincoln (acknowledging there were issues elsewhere with these, still doesn't explain why those that did run were queueing way back along the line towards Meadowhall). I mean - for all it matters, the blocked south end of Platforms 1 & 2 effectively could have given Sheffield two additional north facing bays.

Nor why greater use wasn't made, for services going via Chesterfield, of the "back road" from Sheffield south (via Woodhouse) as it has been when the line via Dronfield is blockaded - if necessary to relieve the three usable through platforms.

And - very importantly and disappointingly - during the hour or so I was at Sheffield yesterday afternoon - MANY hours after the incident had occurred - the only tannoy announcements and information displays (in this context) were about cancelled and delayed services (with apologies) but with NO guidance about alternatives. Like - Passengers for Norwich (etc) or Liverpool (etc) should take the first train and change at Chesterfield. I mean - I knew (from RealTimeTrains) that Liverpool - Norwich were actually running and serving Chesterfield - but this wasn't being shared with customers. Why not?

I hesitate to post anything critical of The Railway nowadays because there will inevitably be a barrage of defense and claims of lack of insider knowledge and understanding - all of which may be true. But that is EXACTLY the point. The superficial evidence here is that The Railway (collectively) did a dismal job of (a) working around the situation and (b) communicating with its users about what it was (or weas not) doing. Yet again.

read the raib peckham rye report to understand why incidents are so chaotic.

 

[DarloRich]

think about what information they need and in what form. Unfortunately too often on the railway the people who are responsible for communicating about an incident are the same ones who are responsible for dealing with it.

Trains are delayed at Sheffield due to a derailment. This is the impact. These are your alternatives. This information is valid until further notice. <Ends>

What more does a passenger need?

 

[Robertj21a]

Trains are delayed at Sheffield due to a derailment. This is the impact. These are your alternatives. This information is valid until further notice. <Ends>

What more does a passenger need?

In my experience, what is lacking is the advice about the alternatives. It might be blatantly obvious to rail staff but it won't be to many passengers. That information also needs to be regularly updated in the light of events.

 

[Tomnick]

Re #76. The advent of ATP and then TPWS allowed drivers to reduce their focus because they knew subconsciously that there was a backup to them.

When ABS came into cars, it was assumed that it would reduce accidents. Instead cars were driven nearer the limit because the drivers knew that if they had to brake suddenly, the wheels wouldn't lock up.

The more fail-safe technology you build into a car, train or plane, the less engaged the driver/pilot has to be, until it is safer to dispense with the human altogether.

I’d suggest that it changes the focus more than it reduces it. The focus, when braking for a signal at danger or for a significant speed reduction, is likely to be on the overspeed loops initially, which means a more cautious approach than might otherwise have been the case. I suppose there’s a risk that you brake early to deal with the TPWS and then relax a bit too much, but I don’t know whether that’s a serious risk.

ABS sits quietly in your car, helps you out when you need it and then sits quietly until you push the limits again. TPWS sits quietly in the train, intervenes when you push the limits, then the whole world knows about it and you’re in for a world of trouble.

 

[theageofthetra]

No.

Their is lots to prevent a major disaster happening again.

Tpws does its job very well. Major conflict points are protected, but there is no need to put them in every signal - the risk of hitting another train in minimal on plain line where the driver should in effect see the tail lights before hitting the train.

Should still be installed at sidings and depot exits though. Trap points do their job but can cause massive disruption and damage.

 

[DarloRich]

In my experience, what is lacking is the advice about the alternatives. It might be blatantly obvious to rail staff but it won't be to many passengers. That information also needs to be regularly updated in the light of events.

not disagreeing - the problem is the fragmented nature of TOC's and their competing interests. Personally i would just keep pumping out the same message until it changes. Keep the message straight and simple.

 

[142Pilot]

Should still be installed at sidings and depot exits though. Trap points do their job but can cause massive disruption and damage.

Tpws is not designed to prevent disruption. It's sole purpose is the protection of trains.

It comes down to cost, to fit every sidings with tpws at every sidings would be very expensive.