West Coast Railways Suspended (now reinstated)

[amcluesent]

Future in doubt for West Coast steam trains 'run like private toy'

Details have emerged about the near miss.The driver of the steam train travelling from Bristol to Southend along the main Great Western line isolated a safety devise that had just applied the brakes after he failed to acknowledge the audible warning devise alerting him to a temporary speed restriction ahead. It is understood that he did not see a yellow warning signal and with the safety devise isolated, was unaware that the following signal would be at danger. The train passed the red signal protecting the junction at 75mph just as a high speed passenger train from Swansea to London passed ahead at 100mph.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

The interim report by the RAIB clearly states the AWS was NOT isolated.

Some people need to stop pointing fingers and wait for the full report to come out.

I think these two sentences are pretty clear:

Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph. The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective

 

[DaleCooper]

The interim report by the RAIB clearly states the AWS was NOT isolated.

Some people need to stop pointing fingers and wait for the full report to come out.

I can find no use of the words "the AWS was NOT isolated" in the report.

Perhaps mtbox could point out the relevant sentence.

What it does say is:

"The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective."

 

[alxndr]

Future in doubt for West Coast steam trains 'run like private toy'

I don't put much stock in a report which can't tell the difference between "device" and "devise". Nor will they know any more than we do until the RAIB release their full report.

I've certainly never read it as the AWS was disabled. It says they cancelled the effects of the braking, not that they disabled it, to me that says they did something to overcome the braking effects, not stopped the AWS trying to apply the brakes. The report from the RAIB also goes onto say that there was an AWS warning for SN43 so the action they took couldn't have entirely disabled it.

 

[47802]

Hypothetically, supposing they lost their licence to operate permanently, wouldn't that be pretty devastating for the railtour market in the UK?

Well a quick look at the Railtour listings suggests there are roughly 45 steam tours which were due to run in the initial ban period of which 3 are actually likely to run, that's pretty devastating for steam and I expect it will take a long time to recover from that if it ever does, if the ban becomes perm.

Diesel is not quite so bad but I imagine it will have some impact for a while, and its coming at a time when DRS are experiencing a significant increase in required resources for Scheduled services, admittedly DBS will have a bit less to do.

 

[D1009]

I'm told there has recently been a lot of route learning of Carnforth WCR depot by DBS drivers, which until now they have not needed to know.

 

[sprinterguy]

Hypothetically, supposing they lost their licence to operate permanently, wouldn't that be pretty devastating for the railtour market in the UK?

With the large proportion of railtours that West Coast operate or otherwise support through the provision of locos, stock and crews it seems quite daunting that we could lose as large a major player as WCRC from the charter market. However, the rail industry has been through this before with Fragonset, who 10 - 15 years ago seemed to me to occupy a very similar dominant position in the charter and spot hire market to where West Coast are now, and seemed large enough as to be unassailable. I was proved wrong, and yet the charter market didn't implode back then - Tour promoters found alternatives and the market responded in order to plug the gaps, with existing names picking up extra work and new faces appearing too. Come to think of it, I think that's when West Coast started coming to the fore.

Interesting that with Fragonset we initially saw a (albeit short lived) "mirror" operation rise from the ashes in the form of FM Rail: Same faces at the helm and behind the wheel and a similar ethos and modus operandi. I wonder whether Network Rail would have an issue if something similar were to occur with West Coast Railway Co., i.e. would they take exception to the individuals involved, and the potential for a repeat of the same sub-standard practices, rather than the company as an entity?

 

[mtbox]

I think these two sentences are pretty clear:

Yes, they are very clear. They took the actions that are laid out in the interim report.
They did not ISOLATE the AWS.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

Yes, they are very clear. They took the actions that are laid out in the interim report.
They did not ISOLATE the AWS.

Pointless semantics. The point of the AWS is to warn the driver of a hazard, and if no acknowledgement is received, to stop the train. The ability of the AWS to stop the train was removed thereby removing the whole safety protection of the AWS system, effectively isolating it.

Quite why you are defending such a blatant breach of safety I am unsure.

 

[Domh245]

The point that the others are making is that whilst they don't say that the AWS was isolated, it equally doesn't state the exact course of action by the crew. The way in which the sentences are phrased (especially the second one about "The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective" implies an isolation of the AWS / TPWS equipment, and so unless you can state what action was taken, rather than what wasn't taken, we will have to make the assumption that the AWS was isolated and the RAIB took the decision to not publish it (at this stage)

 

[E&W Lucas]

Yes, they are very clear. They took the actions that are laid out in the interim report.
They did not ISOLATE the AWS.

They took an action which prevented the AWS applying the brake when it should have. This subsequently prevented the TPWS applying the brake. Anyone with first hand knowledge of AWS/ TPWS fitted steam locos can work out what they have done.

 

[edwin_m]

Interesting that with Fragonset we initially saw a (albeit short lived) "mirror" operation rise from the ashes in the form of FM Rail: Same faces at the helm and behind the wheel and a similar ethos and modus operandi. I wonder whether Network Rail would have an issue if something similar were to occur with West Coast Railway Co., i.e. would they take exception to the individuals involved, and the potential for a repeat of the same sub-standard practices, rather than the company as an entity?

According to Wikipedia FM Rail (previously Merlin) and Fragonset ran alongside each other for a period until both went into administration in December 2006. I wasn't aware of that at the time and my perception was that FM rail was effectively an amalgamation of the two. I don't think there is any suggestion of either company having a poor safety record - their disappearance seems to have been for purely financial reasons.

I don't think there is any procedure to prevent individuals from a company found to have a defective safety management system from becoming involved in another train operator. However I imagine the safety auditors would look at such a venture very closely, and anyone thinking of investing in it would be well advised to do the same because of the risk of losing their money to either a suspension of operations or the consequences of an accident.

 

[Clarence Yard]

To be fair, he isn't but there has been a fair amount of confusion on here and other places about how AWS and TPWS works and speculation about what the action of the crew may or may not have been.

What is pretty clear is that as a result of an action by the crew, a very dangerous incident occurred and there have been some and will be further repercussions. We will all know exactly what happened in full when the RAIB report is published.

 

[mtbox]

Pointless semantics. The point of the AWS is to warn the driver of a hazard, and if no acknowledgement is received, to stop the train. The ability of the AWS to stop the train was removed thereby removing the whole safety protection of the AWS system, effectively isolating it.

Quite why you are defending such a blatant breach of safety I am unsure.

I am not defending anyone.

Merely pointing out a fact, which could turn out to be relevant, as I think I know (initially, at least) what went on on the footplate and why.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

I think I know (initially, at least) what went on on the footplate and why.

Better tell the RAIB then to stop them wasting taxpayer's money on a proper investigation.

 

[47802]

Of which

44871
45407
46233
70000
35028

Are air braked and currently operational

60007/09 not sure about, last I saw 09 it was in bits at Crewe.
34027 is in bits at Bridgnorth

Presumably Tornado has Air Brakes since it will be back soon and its first charter is a DBS one.

 

[ac6000cw]

According to Wikipedia FM Rail (previously Merlin) and Fragonset ran alongside each other for a period until both went into administration in December 2006. I wasn't aware of that at the time and my perception was that FM rail was effectively an amalgamation of the two. I don't think there is any suggestion of either company having a poor safety record - their disappearance seems to have been for purely financial reasons.

I don't think there is any procedure to prevent individuals from a company found to have a defective safety management system from becoming involved in another train operator. However I imagine the safety auditors would look at such a venture very closely, and anyone thinking of investing in it would be well advised to do the same because of the risk of losing their money to either a suspension of operations or the consequences of an accident.

Also from a commercial viewpoint, I assume any passenger train operator has to have considerable public/third party liability insurance - this is likely to get more expensive for WCR, and of course their reputation is now tainted by just about the worst sort of publicity you can have. This is bound to have some effect on the willingness of tour promoters and their customers to use them in the future.

 

[DaleCooper]

The interim report by the RAIB clearly states the AWS was NOT isolated.

Some people need to stop pointing fingers and wait for the full report to come out.

Yes, they are very clear. They took the actions that are laid out in the interim report.
They did not ISOLATE the AWS.

I am not defending anyone.

Merely pointing out a fact, which could turn out to be relevant, as I think I know (initially, at least) what went on on the footplate and why.

You still haven't told us where in the RAIB report it says the AWS was NOT isolated., but you think you know what happened.

 

[ac6000cw]

Presumably Tornado has Air Brakes since it will be back soon and its first charter is a DBS one.

As an aside to this, why on earth do we still allow obsolete vacuum braked passenger trains to operate on mainlines - it's not like there is any real problem with fitting steam locomotives with air compressors (like they always have been in most parts of the world), or with fitting Mk1 stock with air brakes - BR did it years ago.

 

[33Hz]

Not sure which work experience student they got to write this...

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/11530499/Off-the-rails.html

 

[Xenophon PCDGS]

Not sure which work experience student they got to write this...

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/11530499/Off-the-rails.html

Adrian Quine has been around for quite a long period in the field of journalism. I should well imagine that many years have elapsed since he could be described as a "work experience student".

His hair parting is a now a lot wider now than it was in his youth...

 

[mtbox]

You still haven't told us where in the RAIB report it says the AWS was NOT isolated., but you think you know what happened.

The AWS warning was acknowledged for the single yellow at SN43 signal, which was after the AWS warning for the TSR, which was where the chain of events started. As the AWS warning at SN43 was acknowledged, it IS PLAINLY OBVIOUS THE AWS WAS NOT ISOLATED.
The report does not actually state "The AWS was isolated" , but if you read the report properly and actually understand it, it's obvious it wasn't.

Based on my experience of operating steam locomotives, yes I think I know what was going on at the time, which could explain the initial action taken by the crew. I could be very wrong. Thats my opinion, I'm sure others have an opinion what happened as well, but I think this incident is not as clear cut as some think. We shall see.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

I think what happened is pretty clear cut. Why it happened is what the RAIB will be looking at.

 

[30907]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/11530499/Off-the-rails.html

A bit of light relief in a serious matter:

the first sentence of the Torygraph report reveals that it was all down to the wrong trousers

 

[markindurham]

the first sentence of the Torygraph report reveals that is was all down to the wrong trousers

Hey up, Gromit lad...

 

[Tracky]

Who did what, why and how is known only to the guys on the footplate on the day. It will all come out in what will be a very interesting RAIB report.

Presumably Tornado has Air Brakes since it will be back soon and its first charter is a DBS one.

Only DB work with Tornado. The A1 group have got the VSOE contract lined up for 35028s overhaul period.

The irony is WCR were not happy with the A1 trusts paperwork.

 

[D1009]

As an aside to this, why on earth do we still allow obsolete vacuum braked passenger trains to operate on mainlines - it's not like there is any real problem with fitting steam locomotives with air compressors (like they always have been in most parts of the world), or with fitting Mk1 stock with air brakes - BR did it years ago.

I don't think the fact that it was a vacuum braked train had any bearing on the incident. You could just as easily argue why on earth to we allow obsolete steam locomotives on main lines.

 

[kermit]

Are they the ones that barge in front when someone's trying to take a photo?

Run like the wind, lass!!

I'll get me coat.........

 

[E&W Lucas]

The AWS warning was acknowledged for the single yellow at SN43 signal, which was after the AWS warning for the TSR, which was where the chain of events started. As the AWS warning at SN43 was acknowledged, it IS PLAINLY OBVIOUS THE AWS WAS NOT ISOLATED.
The report does not actually state "The AWS was isolated" , but if you read the report properly and actually understand it, it's obvious it wasn't.

Based on my experience of operating steam locomotives, yes I think I know what was going on at the time, which could explain the initial action taken by the crew. I could be very wrong. Thats my opinion, I'm sure others have an opinion what happened as well, but I think this incident is not as clear cut as some think. We shall see.

Are you familiar with the valve located at the bottom left of this photo?

 

[455driver]

I am not defending anyone.

Yes you are!

Merely pointing out a fact, which could turn out to be relevant, as I think I know (initially, at least) what went on on the footplate and why.

The fact that their actions rendered the AWS/TPWS ineffective means it was effectively isolated, your semantics on the subject does you no favours!