So for the purpose of providing a clear and unambiguous answer to BestWestern's question, the RPI or their office colleagues would not have the authority, but may mobilize the support of the police who do have such authority?
The observation that the lawfulness of the procedures in question was found to be proper comes across as being a little disingenuous. You really need to take a look at the Lord Chief Justices judgment in
Virgin v Zinga (
Link) . For balance, its worth drawing attention to the passage cited in Zinga from the judgment in
R v Hounsham & Ors (
Link):
"The prosecution now accept that the police were acting ultra vires their powers when they accepted financial contributions towards the expense of the investigation from three insurance companies. In our judgment, soliciting by the police of funds from potential victims of fraud, or any other crime, quite apart from being ultra vires police powers, is a practice which is fraught with danger. It may compromise the essential independence and objectivity of the police when carrying out a criminal investigation. It might lead to police officers being selective as to which crimes to investigate and which not to investigate. It might lead to victims persuading a police investigating team to act partially. It might also lead to investigating officers carrying out a more thorough preparation of the evidence in a case of a "paying" victim; or a less careful preparation of the evidence in the case of a non-contributing victim. In short, it is a practice which, in our judgment, would soon lead to a loss of confidence in a police force's ability to investigate crime objectively and impartially.
It has been unnecessary, in this case, to consider whether the police authority could sanction such activities pursuant to its powers under section 93 of the 1996 Act (the power to accept gifts and loans). Even assuming it does have such powers, we find it difficult to conceive of a situation where it would be sensible to exercise those powers in connection with criminal investigations."
And later in
Zinga (para. 52 et seq):
"Given the fact that the only benefit of the confiscation proceedings inured to the benefit of the state as no compensation or other recompense was sought by Virgin, there is no basis on which it can be contended that the agreement with the Metropolitan Police Authority gave rise to any abuse of process.
However we would observe that the agreement of 28 November 2011 (i.e. the agreement made under Section 93 Police Act 1996) did in fact run some of the risks identified by Gage LJ in Hounsham. It did in fact provide an incentive for the police to devote resources to assisting Virgin in their claim for compensation and gave rise to a perception that their independence was being compromised.
It would not, however, be appropriate us to comment further on the circumstances in which the police should assist in confiscation proceedings brought by private prosecutors (particularly where the private prosecutors are commercial companies or trade organisations with substantial resources) or in the obtaining of compensation by such private prosecutors and the terms on which the police do so. The Association of Chief Police Officers has issued guidance on the generation of income for the police service under s.25 and s.93 of the Police Act 1996. The issues raised by the present appeal will require careful consideration by the Association of Chief Police Officers (or its successor national body), the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Home Office in the light of the observations made by Gage LJ in Hounsham and the very changed financial circumstances in which police forces now operate. Although it is not for this court to give advice on what is acceptable and what is not, it is essential that very urgent consideration is given by the three bodies to which we have referred to the issuing of clear guidance on what the police may or may not do when approached by commercial enterprises to lend assistance in the proceedings for confiscation and claims for compensation. "
In April 2014 ACPO published its Guidelines on Charging for Police Services. This makes no more than a passing reference to the power of a police force to accept contributions under Section 93, so its not clear to me whether this is the guidance being referred to in
Zinga. If the 2014 ACPO publication is the only such guidance, the circumstances in which police forces may properly assist a private prosecutor (e.g. by application for search warrants) have yet to be clarified.