Three Bridges signalling centre evacuated due to fire alarm

[Bald Rick]

There was quite enough chaos as it was, over 11,000 delay minutes and counting.

Frankly it doesn't matter whether the control centre signals 5 or 50 miles of the Brighton main line, if the centre is evacuated this is the sort of disruption that will ensue if that centre covers Croydon.

Such alarms are less likely in ROCs because the fire protection systems are far, far better than in 30 year old signalling centres. Equally, the kit inside them is of a higher standard and less likely to heat up enough in the first place.

I can think of at least 5 occasions in the last 4 years where one of the four large signalling centres in Anglia has had fire evacuations similar to this; so it is not that rare.

In comparison, to my knowledge, the longest serving of the new build ROCs (EMCC at Derby) has not had one in the 5? years it has been open. Small numbers in the sample admittedly.

 

[Chrisgr31]

Cant say I was particularly impressed with Southerns reaction to todays events. Again its not down to the staff on the frontline but its the information about what is happening that is so poor. The twitter service again was useless giving information which was no use at all, and indeed no information.

Then this evening when all was allegedly fine I get to Victoria Station and as I enter the station there is an announcement that all trains are operating a good service. Get to Platform 15-19 to find thats plainly not true. The next fasted train to East Croydon is from Platform 16 say the notices, only problem is there is no train on Platform 16, there is a train in platform 18 but no indication of where its going until its gone. The 16.51 is then announced as leaving at 16.05 however it actually goes after the 16.06.

In the meantime the National Rails automated email service which tends to pump out scores of emails that are totally irrelevant to your journey that day are conspicuous by their total absence.

I can accept that incidents like this happen but Southerns reaction to them again is very poor. It cant be that difficult to actually set up a plan that comes in to force when key parts of the network are taken out and enables both their staff and the public to be informed.

 

[Class172]

I was standing at the platform at Droitwich Spa at around 07:45 this morning waiting for my train to Worcester when this very odd announcement was broadcast on the tannoy:

There is a good service running on all lines at present, however please be aware that currently there is major disruption to services around Watford Junction. This is due to a signalling centre having to be evacuated.

I have no idea why this was broadcast at a station such as Droitwich; never had anything like that before.

 

[infobleep]

The North Downs line was somewhat affected- the main Guildford rush hour service (07:04 off Reading) was cancelled- I presume the unit forming that service was marooned at Redhill first thing- I hate to think what the already cosy one 30 minutes later was like. There were some cancellations to other destinations from Reading as well due to displaced crews, proving that an incident like this can have far reaching effect.

How many trains does a railway line need to run or have delayed for it to be included in a major incident. This morning, despite the disruption notice on National Rail Enquires mentioning the north downs line, there was nothing on the Guildford live departure board on the NRE Web Site giving details of the problem.

Surely trains running through Guildford being affected by the problems at Three Bridges should be reason enough.

There again how far does one take it? Should a note being included at Harrow & Wealdstone, given that West London Line trains were cancelled.

 

[Eagle]

How many trains does a railway line need to run or have delayed for it to be included in a major incident. This morning, despite the disruption notice on National Rail Enquires mentioning the north downs line, there was nothing on the Guildford live departure board on the NRE Web Site giving details of the problem.

Surely trains running through Guildford being affected by the problems at Three Bridges should be reason enough.

I think that's a fault with the way the delay was entered on NRE; it said (wrongly) "Delays to services through Three Bridges", which doesn't include the North Downs line or West London line, whose services only go as far as Gatwick and Croydon respectively.

 

[michael769]

I have no idea why this was broadcast at a station such as Droitwich; never had anything like that before.

Because some passengers may have been making long distance journeys that would result in connecting onto an affected serice?

 

[IanXC]

Because some passengers may have been making long distance journeys that would result in conecting onto an affected serice?

Given how far away Droitwich is from the effected area I do hope this isn't the start of a policy of broadcasting the entire NRE disruptions page at every station!

 

[Class172]

Because some passengers may have been making long distance journeys that would result in connecting onto an affected serice?

I seriously doubt that it would affect many people — people would soon discover better info at larger stations such as Birmingham New St, which they are likely to visit en route if they are making a long distance journey.

Given how far away Droitwich is from the effected area I do hope this isn't the start of a policy of broadcasting the entire NRE disruptions page at every station!

Exactly, given that Droitwich is over 100 miles from London and has no direct services. It's rare to get updates on even more local lines such as the WCML via B'ham (the only audible announcements are for services on the Snow Hill Lines or between Hereford and Birmingham.

Next week: "We regret to inform you that there are currently delays of 45 mins on the Sheerness Branch Line. This is due to a lineside equipment failure…" :roll:

 

[HSTEd]

Surely a modern signalling centre would have halon flood systems in its telecoms/computing areas?
In which case the fire woudl be out within seconds of the final stage alarm sounding... then it is just a matter of picking up the pieces.

(Assuming it is a fire in said spaces, which it almost always is now that they don't allow smoking).

 

[carriageline]

Surely a modern signalling centre would have halon flood systems in its telecoms/computing areas?
In which case the fire woudl be out within seconds of the final stage alarm sounding... then it is just a matter of picking up the pieces.

(Assuming it is a fire in said spaces, which it almost always is now that they don't allow smoking).

Don't thing it was a modern signalling center, more the old box. Dont think three bridges ROC goes live until December.

 

[cjmillsnun]

Surely a modern signalling centre would have halon flood systems in its telecoms/computing areas?
In which case the fire woudl be out within seconds of the final stage alarm sounding... then it is just a matter of picking up the pieces.

(Assuming it is a fire in said spaces, which it almost always is now that they don't allow smoking).

No they wouldn't have a halon system as halon is now completely banned.

 

[Darren R]

Forgive my ignorance, but I can't help wonder about what exactly happens when one of the larger signalling instalations has to be evacuated due to a fire alarm being sounded. Presumably when the alarm sounds the signallers have to evacuate immediately, just like at any place of work. So - what happens about the signals and trains under their control? Is the 'signals on' facility used to immediately re-set all signals to red? And what about the drivers attempting to telephone signallers to find out what's going on? If all the signallers are milling around at the muster point awaiting the all-clear, are there systems to inform drivers or are they just left at SPTs listening to the phone ringing unanswered at the box and cursing the signaller to high Heaven?! I assume there is something in place to ensure the latter scenario doesn't happen?

 

[cjmillsnun]

Forgive my ignorance, but I can't help wonder about what exactly happens when one of the larger signalling instalations has to be evacuated due to a fire alarm being sounded. Presumably when the alarm sounds the signallers have to evacuate immediately, just like at any place of work. So - what happens about the signals and trains under their control? Is the 'signals on' facility used to immediately re-set all signals to red? And what about the drivers attempting to telephone signallers to find out what's going on? If all the signallers are milling around at the muster point awaiting the all-clear, are there systems to inform drivers or are they just left at SPTs listening to the phone ringing unanswered at the box and cursing the signaller to high Heaven?! I assume there is something in place to ensure the latter scenario doesn't happen?

One would hope that there is a BCM plan in place that includes an alternative location that some evacuated signallers could go to get a limited service operational.

 

[Crossover]

No they wouldn't have a halon system as halon is now completely banned.

I guess the better term would be "automatic fire suppression system"

We have one in our server room at work, although I couldn't tell you off-hand what it uses gas wise. What I do know is that whilst if a person were to be in the room when it released, although it wouldn't suffocate you, it would be rather unpleasant to say the least

 

[michael769]

I guess the better term would be "automatic fire suppression system"

We have one in our server room at work, although I couldn't tell you off-hand what it uses gas wise. What I do know is that whilst if a person were to be in the room when it released, although it wouldn't suffocate you, it would be rather unpleasant to say the least

If your system does not carry a suffocation risk ( so called clean agent) it is probably FM-200 (AKA 1,1,1,2,3,3,3-Heptafluoropropane; the propellant used in medical inhalers incidentally) which acts to interrupt the physical process that generates heat from the combination of organic molecules with oxygen.

There are systems still available using asphyxiating gases (Argon, Nitrogen, CO2) which carry a significant danger to human life.

 

[pendolino]

Don't thing it was a modern signalling center, more the old box. Dont think three bridges ROC goes live until December.

Three Bridges might not exactly be state of the art today, but it was modern when first commissioned and is a lot more sophisticated than just some old blokes pulling levers: it controls all train movements from Thornton Heath/Anerley south through Croydon/Gatwick/Haywards Heath down to Brighton, as well as routes branching off (e.g., Caterham/Tattenham Corner) and movements into and out of Selhurst and Lovers Walk depots.

 

[Bedpan]

One would hope that there is a BCM plan in place that includes an alternative location that some evacuated signallers could go to get a limited service operational.

But there would still be a delay whilst they were getting there and setting it up.

Hopefully when the alarm sounds driver's phoning the box would receive a recorded message informing them of the fire alert rather than just having the phone ringing and ringing with nobody answering. But what happens to the trains? Do signals automatically revert to danger so that everything immediately grinds to a halt, or is it more that things come to a stop more slowly, as trains arrive at junctions to find that their routes have not been set (and no answer to phone calls).

 

[carriageline]

Control from one ROC can be passed to any other Of the 14 ROCs in the country. From what I last heard, each ROC was going to have a redundant operating floor, which can be switched on at any time, possibly to cover another ROC, or the same ROC should a fault occur.

Of course, the biggest question is then where do you get the additional staff from, perhaps you could run it between all 13 ROCs on relief/spare staff at each one, but who knows.

Incase of a fire, I presume they would activate emergency alarms, do an emergency broadcast stating there is a fire, be back soon lol!!

 

[Crossover]

If your system does not carry a suffocation risk ( so called clean agent) it is probably FM-200 (AKA 1,1,1,2,3,3,3-Heptafluoropropane; the propellant used in medical inhalers incidentally) which acts to interrupt the physical process that generates heat from the combination of organic molecules with oxygen.

There are systems still available using asphyxiating gases (Argon, Nitrogen, CO2) which carry a significant danger to human life.

You could be right. I will look when I am in there next week what the warnings say

 

[Bald Rick]

Control from one ROC can be passed to any other Of the 14 ROCs in the country. From what I last heard, each ROC was going to have a redundant operating floor, which can be switched on at any time, possibly to cover another ROC, or the same ROC should a fault occur.

No it can't, and no they don't!

 

[westcoaster]

Forgive my ignorance, but I can't help wonder about what exactly happens when one of the larger signalling instalations has to be evacuated due to a fire alarm being sounded. Presumably when the alarm sounds the signallers have to evacuate immediately, just like at any place of work. So - what happens about the signals and trains under their control? Is the 'signals on' facility used to immediately re-set all signals to red? And what about the drivers attempting to telephone signallers to find out what's going on? If all the signallers are milling around at the muster point awaiting the all-clear, are there systems to inform drivers or are they just left at SPTs listening to the phone ringing unanswered at the box and cursing the signaller to high Heaven?! I assume there is something in place to ensure the latter scenario doesn't happen?

from speaking to drivers caught up in this they were informed by radio (csr about the alarm and evac), I suppose due to it being early and not much about it was simple to call individual drivers, now during the peak they would do a general call (all trains in the csr area), informing them to what was happening, and to bring your train to a stand at the next suitible location or straight away with the ST function,

 

[carriageline]

No it can't, and no they don't!

What parts are you talking about? And do you have anything to back it up?

 

[tsr]

...now during the peak they would do a general call (all trains in the csr area), informing them to what was happening, and to bring your train to a stand at the next suitible location or straight away with the ST function,

And no doubt many trains would have been brought to a stand away from platforms, and a whole load of passengers would have been infuriated by the wait, thus dangerously detraining themselves... etc., etc.

Certainly, if this had happened at 1600 or 1700, it would have caused an even worse situation, as masses of commuters would be stranded at their places of work rather than (perhaps) nearer to home, and anyone staying late in London or wherever would have faced mass chaos in getting home in the evening. If you imagine what happened on that infamous day when there was both a landslip at South Croydon and a train fire at Brighton, or during the snow of December 2010, you might get half the picture (mind you, I'm not saying you don't already!).

 

[Bald Rick]

What parts are you talking about? And do you have anything to back it up?

At present the ROCs can't back each other up, and there is not a spare floor at any of them, nor is there planned to be.

It will take a couple of decades for them all to be filled, so it might seem there is a spare floor. But there isn't.

Longer term it is hoped that the ROCs will be able to provide back up. But there are some pretty difficult staff training issues, and that's before you get round the requirement to 'through' test every signalling function from workstation to signal / point / track circuit etc. This means that we can't even transfer control from one workstation to another, even if they are 200cm apart, let alone 200 miles. At least not without testing every function first, as we would in a signalling commissioning.

To back it up, I've been involved in this for 4 years. Currently working on Three Bridges.

 

[HSTEd]

Surely if a fire destroys the relevent computer equipment at the control centre, the local wiring boxes should detect this and go fail-safe?

Ie. no dangerous movements should be permitted.

 

[boing_uk]

You could be right. I will look when I am in there next week what the warnings say

They let you in a room with automatic fire supression equipment in it and you a) dont know what it is and b) you dont turn it off when you go in there? hock:hock:

Our machine room is where my traffic control server, primary network core switch and cctv server is held. It took me a year of badgering the head of IT to get me access without being escorted by an IT tech (mainly because we have external client systems in there as well as our own) but also because of safety implications. The room is key-card restricted to trained personnel only and it is a disciplinary offence to be in there with the fire system in automatic mode.

It is a CO2 flood system and can completely fill the room quicker than the time it would take to get to the door. The system also kills the electrical power to the room, obviously and I wouldn't fancy my chances in there in the dark.

 

[edwin_m]

Surely if a fire destroys the relevent computer equipment at the control centre, the local wiring boxes should detect this and go fail-safe?

Ie. no dangerous movements should be permitted.

Generally yes. If the link to the interlockings was lost the trackside equipment would put signals to red and refuse to move points. I think if the interlockings lost the link to the control centre they would carry on working as normal - no new routes would be set but auto signals etc would still display a proceed aspect according to the state of the line ahead. In a modern centre the signallers could theoretically just switch the Automatic Route Setting on and go home and the thing would run itself, but of course in practice things would come to a grinding halt sooner or later for example if there was a train that the ARS didn't know about.

All control centres using computer-based systems include an "all signals on" button which is hardwired independently of any other system, and I should guess this gets used if the staff have to evacuate the building.

So yes dangerous movements are not permitted. However having a lot of trains either stopped at signals or moving around with no supervision is itself a potential safety issue as tsr suggests.

 

[cjmillsnun]

At present the ROCs can't back each other up, and there is not a spare floor at any of them, nor is there planned to be.

It will take a couple of decades for them all to be filled, so it might seem there is a spare floor. But there isn't.

Longer term it is hoped that the ROCs will be able to provide back up. But there are some pretty difficult staff training issues, and that's before you get round the requirement to 'through' test every signalling function from workstation to signal / point / track circuit etc. This means that we can't even transfer control from one workstation to another, even if they are 200cm apart, let alone 200 miles. At least not without testing every function first, as we would in a signalling commissioning.

To back it up, I've been involved in this for 4 years. Currently working on Three Bridges.

That is extremely poor business practice, especially for critical transport infrastructure.

There are two terms that cover this. Resilience and Business Continuity Management.

I work in the utilities sector, specifically gas distribution. Our gas control centre has 2 locations, one is the main location and is used every day. The other is less than half an hour from the main location, is tested weekly and is a backup. In the event of a fire or some problem that cripples the main centre, the other centre takes over and the controllers move over. Should the second centre also fail, then another distribution company can and will take over control until we're back up and running. In short we make sure the gas never stops flowing. Yes it's expensive, but we run critical infrastructure.

The same should be true of the railways. There should be somewhere that can get a limited service going should the main ROC fail.

 

[Chrisgr31]

Certainly, if this had happened at 1600 or 1700, it would have caused an even worse situation, as masses of commuters would be stranded at their places of work rather than (perhaps) nearer to home, and anyone staying late in London or wherever would have faced mass chaos in getting home in the evening. If you imagine what happened on that infamous day when there was both a landslip at South Croydon and a train fire at Brighton, or during the snow of December 2010, you might get half the picture (mind you, I'm not saying you don't already!).

And that is my whole issue. Southern doesn't appear to have learnt from those events and found a way to inform customers what is happening, not to introduce an emergency timetable to enable people to make decisions.

The whole system seems to rely on the hope that huge numbers of people will find their way home independently which does indeed happen, but those left behind are infuriated.

 

[Class377/5]

And that is my whole issue. Southern doesn't appear to have learnt from those events and found a way to inform customers what is happening, not to introduce an emergency timetable to enable people to make decisions.

The whole system seems to rely on the hope that huge numbers of people will find their way home independently which does indeed happen, but those left behind are infuriated.

Seriously how do you expect Southern to introduce an emergency timetable that will include re-written drivers turns, altered stock working etc in time? Because of the time factor, peak was already lost before most passengers had left for station but there is simply not enough time to get a full emergency timetable in. That takes planning between NR and the TOCs, not just snap your fingers and have it working.

Due to the actual time it happened the only way to have gotten it back to normal quicker would have been cancel half the peak. Better to run trains late but provide some service than provide a service not fit for numbers traveling.

That is extremely poor business practice, especially for critical transport infrastructure.

There are two terms that cover this. Resilience and Business Continuity Management.

I work in the utilities sector, specifically gas distribution. Our gas control centre has 2 locations, one is the main location and is used every day. The other is less than half an hour from the main location, is tested weekly and is a backup. In the event of a fire or some problem that cripples the main centre, the other centre takes over and the controllers move over. Should the second centre also fail, then another distribution company can and will take over control until we're back up and running. In short we make sure the gas never stops flowing. Yes it's expensive, but we run critical infrastructure.

The same should be true of the railways. There should be somewhere that can get a limited service going should the main ROC fail.

So your saying you should shut down an area of railway for a few hours to just test the back up systems once a week?

Problem is to test you have to bring the entire railway to a halt in the affected and joining areas while you test everything works. You can stop gas flowing fine but stopping trains in the middle of no-where isn't quite seen in the same light. Not to mention that the extra staff required to test the systems. Some of the stuff is very old and there new stuff attached to it. To check on such a scale requires specialist staff.

Not to mention a few seconds of wrong working on a live railway could have disastrous results for those on it which is why when you signal test you remove the passengers.