The Great Train Robbery - a technical question

[Peter Mugridge]

What I have never quite understood is how the robbers stopped the train. If, as reported, they put a glove over the green light and falsely lit the red light, then the signal in rear would still have been showing green. The driver would not have been expecting the red aspect. He would surely have had to make an emergency brake application, which would have alerted the guard. And if running at full speed, there would surely have been a good chance of overrunning the signal, and so not stopping in the right place for the robbers.

Did they have someone at the previous signal to make that one display a false yellow?

 

[eman_resu]

Did they have someone at the previous signal to make that one display a false yellow?

Have a look at this thread https://www.railforums.co.uk/threads/great-train-robbery-signalling-query.255624/

It would appear that the Yellow in the distant was also false fed, however the green bulb was removed (instead of covered) so the signalman received a lamp failure alert.

 

[Belperpete]

Have a look at this thread https://www.railforums.co.uk/threads/great-train-robbery-signalling-query.255624/

It would appear that the Yellow in the distant was also false fed, however the green bulb was removed (instead of covered) so the signalman received a lamp failure alert.

Thanks, that explains it. Having people at both the IB home and distant, in addition to the bridge site, and knowing how to access them, shows the level of planning and knowledge involved. I suppose that they could have walked trackside down to the signals before the robbery, but considering how quickly the others were off-site after the train had been stopped, I doubt that the man at the distant would be keen on walking all the way back (probably the best part of 2 miles trackside?) with the risk of getting caught or left behind.

 

[midland1]

I knew you'd come up trumps. Thanks.

For the benefit of this thread, the consist was:
D326 (English Electric Type 4)
M31016M - Full Brake (BG)
M30204M - Sorting (POS)
M30289M - Sorting (POS)
M30235M - Sorting (POS)
M30220M - Sorting (POS)
M30277M - Sorting (POS)
M30214M - Sorting (POS)
M30210M - Bag Tender (POT)
M30275M - Bag Tender (POT)
M30272M - Sorting (POS)
M30247M - Sorting (POS)
M30276M - Brake Bag Tender (BPOT)
All ex LMS vehicles

I have checked the numbers with " Hold-Up At Sears Crossing" by Bill Williams and they are correct. No. 30272 is on the Nene Valley Railway.

 

[Roger1973]

On the subject of the guard's actions (or lack of actions), what - under the rules and procedures in place at that time - would the guard have been expected to do?

I'm not a railway professional or involved in any practical way with preserved railways, so excuse what may be a daft question.

I'm vaguely aware of the concept (not the detail) of 'rule 55' where the fireman would make contact with the signalman if the train was held at a signal for more than x amount of time, and i've an idea that the were circumstances where the guard was expected to protect the rear of the train. (was it just to check the rear lamp, or were they expected to put detonators down?)

But as others have hinted at, what would happen if the guard got off to do whatever he was expected to do, and the signal changed?

How did driver and guard communicate to make sure this didn't happen? (I appreciate that multiple unit trains got driver - guard intercoms at some point, but fairly sure nothing like that existed between locomotive and hauled stock.)

 

[Morayshire]

On the subject of the guard's actions (or lack of actions), what - under the rules and procedures in place at that time - would the guard have been expected to do?

I'm not a railway professional or involved in any practical way with preserved railways, so excuse what may be a daft question.

I'm vaguely aware of the concept (not the detail) of 'rule 55' where the fireman would make contact with the signalman if the train was held at a signal for more than x amount of time, and i've an idea that the were circumstances where the guard was expected to protect the rear of the train. (was it just to check the rear lamp, or were they expected to put detonators down?)

But as others have hinted at, what would happen if the guard got off to do whatever he was expected to do, and the signal changed?

How did driver and guard communicate to make sure this didn't happen? (I appreciate that multiple unit trains got driver - guard intercoms at some point, but fairly sure nothing like that existed between locomotive and hauled stock.)

Graham Satchwell's book "Great Train Robbery Confidential" and Chapter 16 in particular refers to the BR internal report into the robbery. The chapter also refers to what the BR rule book of the time supposedly said what the staff should be doing.

Caveat - I have no idea as to how accurate the rules description given actually is.

It does raise some interesting points about the BR staff's actions and/or inactions. To be fair though, there may have been more mundane explanations for the actions taken or lack of action taken (like the guard being asleep for example and not realising the train had stopped as a result).

 

[Rescars]

It does raise some interesting points about the BR staff's actions and/or inactions. To be fair though, there may have been more mundane explanations for the actions taken or lack of action taken (like the guard being asleep for example and not realising the train had stopped as a result).

We have the benefit of hindsight. The staff involved did not. In fairness to all parties, if a train comes to a stand unexpectedly, or if a signal indicates a failure, even in the middle of the night, that this may be due to the execution of a particularly audacious robbery is surely a very long way down the list of likely causes.

 

[Gloster]

On the subject of the guard's actions (or lack of actions), what - under the rules and procedures in place at that time - would the guard have been expected to do?

I'm not a railway professional or involved in any practical way with preserved railways, so excuse what may be a daft question.

I'm vaguely aware of the concept (not the detail) of 'rule 55' where the fireman would make contact with the signalman if the train was held at a signal for more than x amount of time, and i've an idea that the were circumstances where the guard was expected to protect the rear of the train. (was it just to check the rear lamp, or were they expected to put detonators down?)

But as others have hinted at, what would happen if the guard got off to do whatever he was expected to do, and the signal changed?

How did driver and guard communicate to make sure this didn't happen? (I appreciate that multiple unit trains got driver - guard intercoms at some point, but fairly sure nothing like that existed between locomotive and hauled stock.)

I would think that the guard did not have anything particular to do unless the stop seemed unusually long. He would probably have looked out when they stopped, seen that the train appeared to have stopped normally at a red signal, sat down again and noted the time for his journal. He might have looked out of the other side of the train, but he probably wouldn’t have seen anything unusual. As there was no sign of an emergency or assistance (i.e. a loco to rescue a failed train) being needed, the rules probably did not require him to do anything else unless the stop was unusually long, in which case he should confer with the driver and fireman. But this would require walking along the side of the train, so he would wait until it looked like being more than just a routine signal stop. ‘Unusually long’ probably wasn’t specifically defined and would depend on the circumstances.

Putting detonators down behind was generally only going to be necessary if assistance (see above) was needed or if the signalling was defective. If a signal changed while the guard was walking to the front of the train, he should reboard as soon as possible: the driver should be looking back for a hand signal from the guard to show he was back on and stop if he didn’t get one. Unfortunately, with a Mail train I think the guard could only use his van at the rear and not a Sorting or Stowage van.

As far as the guard being asleep: well, he might have been dozing. But long-service railwaymen were good at waking up fully whenever necessary. If the train slowed down I reckon the guard would have been aware as soon as the brakes came on.

Note: I was never a guard and this is all long before my time.

 

[Fleetwood Boy]

Having been on a few trains which divided en route, it is usually obvious that something different to a usual stop is taking place, with the loco slackening off the couplings and/or noises from the brake pipes. I’m a bit surprised that didn’t alert the guard although I could see that a stop at a signal wouldn’t be anything unusual.

Presumably trains weren’t usually divided unexpectedly en route and if this was required for some reason then the footplate crew would certainly inform the guard?

 

[Harpo]

Having been on a few trains which divided en route, it is usually obvious that something different to a usual stop is taking place, with the loco slackening off the couplings and/or noises from the brake pipes.

Split the vac pipe and seat the hijacked side. Undo the screw coupling without buffering, lower it gently, slip away. Two minute job.

 

[edwin_m]

Having been on a few trains which divided en route, it is usually obvious that something different to a usual stop is taking place, with the loco slackening off the couplings and/or noises from the brake pipes. I’m a bit surprised that didn’t alert the guard although I could see that a stop at a signal wouldn’t be anything unusual.

Presumably trains weren’t usually divided unexpectedly en route and if this was required for some reason then the footplate crew would certainly inform the guard?

It was mentioned above that the distant was also false fed yellow, so as far as the driver was concerned it was a normal stop at a red signal so only normal braking would have been used. The splitting of the train only took place after it had stopped.

 

[Belperpete]

With a fully fitted train, the guard can apply the handbrake, which should stop the vacuum being released and so stop the train moving off, before alighting and walking to the loco. But he would be unlikely to do so unless he was fairly sure there was something wrong. He would likely wait either for the driver to draw his attention with the whistle, or for the fireman to walk back.

 

[Friary Yard]

With a fully fitted train, the guard can apply the handbrake, which should stop the vacuum being released and so stop the train moving off, before alighting and walking to the loco. But he would be unlikely to do so unless he was fairly sure there was something wrong. He would likely wait either for the driver to draw his attention with the whistle, or for the fireman to walk back.

The Handbrake is just that. It is not connected to the vacuum brake. The guard does have a brake setter which will destroy any vacuum that has been created but will not, unless held open, stop the driver creating vacuum. This is used when carrying out a brake continuity test.

 

[AndrewE]

Graham Satchwell's book "Great Train Robbery Confidential" and Chapter 16 in particular refers to the BR internal report into the robbery. The chapter also refers to what the BR rule book of the time supposedly said what the staff should be doing.

Caveat - I have no idea as to how accurate the rules description given actually is.

It does raise some interesting points about the BR staff's actions and/or inactions. To be fair though, there may have been more mundane explanations for the actions taken or lack of action taken (like the guard being asleep for example and not realising the train had stopped as a result).

That book is absolutely essential reading for anybody interested in the topic. It's by a senior British Transport Policeman who has unearthed lots of stuff that wasn't looked for at the time, and put it into a wider context (e.g. Met "Flying squad" disbanded because of corruption but, instead of all being sacked, dispersed around the country spreading the contagion.)


Beg, borrow or steal it - or get it from your library! my library says it is on the shelf at the moment - time for me to re-read it. The library catalougue title notes say

In 1981, Detective Inspector Satchwell was the officer in charge of the case against Train Robber Tom Wisbey, and 20 others. The case involved, like the Great Train Robbery, massive thefts from mail trains. Thirty years later their paths crossed again and an unlikely collaboration to reveal the truth about the Great Train Robbery began. This study reassesses the known facts about one of most infamous crimes in modern history with the uniquely qualified insight of an experienced railway detective, presenting new theories alongside compelling evidence. This is an important, and perhaps final, opportunity to reverse the lies and half-truths that are increasingly becoming accepted as known facts in the story of the Great Train Robbery of 1963.

 

[Morayshire]

Strangely the BR internal report isn't on the Railway Archives website (at least, I couldn't find it) but there is scan of the initial British Transport Police log card.

Not able to add a link at present but will do once I get home.

Finally back home..

Crime Report for Larceny of Mails

The above link should take you to the Railway Archive webpage which has a copy of the British Transport Police crime report for the great train robbery

The transcript of the report is copied below for reference:

"Train stopped at unauthorised signal, signal faked with aid of glove to cover green light and four six volt Ever-Ready Dry Cell batteries to keep "RED" showing. Driver and Co-Driver attacked and Diesel engine and two front coaches un-coupled. Driver forced to take it about one mile to a point at Sears Crossing, where raiders attacked G.P.O. staff in Royal Mail Coach... and 120 Mail bags stolen."

 

[AndrewE]

Strangely the BR internal report isn't on the Railway Archives website (at least, I couldn't find it) but there is scan of the initial British Transport Police log card.

Not able to add a link at present but will do once I get home.

I think that Satchwell's point is that there was a lot of backside-covering (in BR, the Post Office and the police) so that those investigation reports almost wilfully failed to make much progress...

 

[Morayshire]

I think that Satchwell's point is that there was a lot of backside-covering (in BR, the Post Office and the police) so that those investigation reports almost wilfully failed to make much progress...

This is especially true of the BR internal report which contains info (according to Satchwell anyway) which does not appear in the official eyewitness statements.

 

[Belperpete]

The Handbrake is just that. It is not connected to the vacuum brake. The guard does have a brake setter which will destroy any vacuum that has been created but will not, unless held open, stop the driver creating vacuum. This is used when carrying out a brake continuity test.

I was under the impression that there is a valve that destroys the vacuum when the guard's handbrake is applied. Certainly most of the guards vans on the preserved railway that I know are so fitted, I have found reference to such valves elsewhere on this forum, and they are apparently sold by Rail Vehicle Components (UK).

 

[AndrewE]

I was under the impression that there is a valve that destroys the vacuum when the guard's handbrake is applied. Certainly most of the guards vans on the preserved railway that I know are so fitted, I have found reference to such valves elsewhere on this forum, and they are apparently sold by Rail Vehicle Components (UK).

That's quite a clever innovation - it stops the loco creating the vacuum and dragging the train - putting wheelflats on the brake vehicle. Pity one can't be fitted to every freight vehicle with a handbrake! (I presume it could be made to work on air-braked vehicles too.)

 

[Gloster]

As far as I can remember vacuum-braked brake vans had a pipe with a release handle in the guard’s compartment that could be lifted to apply or test the brake, but was designed to drop back and so maintain the vacuum when released. I don’t remember there being a valve that allowed the brakes to be held on while the guard left the van. (Be aware that I was never a guard or shunter and the only LMS design brakes I dealt with had been gutted internally for parcels traffic.)

 

[Belperpete]

As far as I can remember vacuum-braked brake vans had a pipe with a release handle in the guard’s compartment that could be lifted to apply or test the brake, but was designed to drop back and so maintain the vacuum when released. I don’t remember there being a valve that allowed the brakes to be held on while the guard left the van. (Be aware that I was never a guard or shunter and the only LMS design brakes I dealt with had been gutted internally for parcels traffic.)

In the cases I know of, the valve isn't something that the guard can see in the van. It is usually connected to the brake rigging under the coach. You only know about it from the hissing sound from under the coach if the driver is trying to create vacuum while you have your handbrake on.

 

[43096]

In the cases I know of, the valve isn't something that the guard can see in the van. It is usually connected to the brake rigging under the coach. You only know about it from the hissing sound from under the coach if the driver is trying to create vacuum while you have your handbrake on.

It's not something as simple as pulling the PASSCOM, is it?

 

[Gloster]

In the cases I know of, the valve isn't something that the guard can see in the van. It is usually connected to the brake rigging under the coach. You only know about it from the hissing sound from under the coach if the driver is trying to create vacuum while you have your handbrake on.

Looking at a picture of the inside of a guard’s compartment in a Mark 1 Brake Second Compartment in Parkin’s book on the type, there is a pipe coming out of the floor to the right of the exterior door that rises to about 5’ above floor level. It has a flat top and a small handle sticking out just below the top. My recollection is that you could lift the handle up and, if the brakes were off, air would rush into the pipe and apply them to stop the train. This appears to have been a pretty standard arrangement in all Mark 1 vehicles and I doubt that it differed much from LMS vehicles. My clear recollection is that there was no way to keep the handle up except by holding it and no other easily available method of holding the brake off.

 

[AndrewE]

But @Belperpete says this isn't a Mk1-era BR fitting.

It is new, not in the brake van itself but underneath, and just lets air into the vacuum system when the handbrake is wound on. It's such an obvious idea for preserved stock/heritage railways when staff haven't had the training/drilling that you would hope that main-line crews have had. (It grieves me every time i hear a freight go through a station platform with wheelflats banging away on a wagon or two.)

Especially when volunteer-run train services might be worked by staff who could be a bit rusty... I bet that one valve like this could be fitted to a brake vehicle for less than the cost of turning 4 wheelsets...

 

[Harpo]

As far as I can remember vacuum-braked brake vans had a pipe with a release handle in the guard’s compartment that could be lifted to apply or test the brake, but was designed to drop back and so maintain the vacuum when released.

Which I always knew as the ‘setter’.

 

[Dr Hoo]

I have ‘emergency stopped’ a vacuum-braked train with the setter and you do need to hold it up to prevent the vacuum being re-created. Having seen the gauge going back up I gave it a second go, which was enough to get the driver to look back for a hand signal. (We had left a terminus with no tail light.)
People had been known to stick a matchbox under the plate to hold it open. Major bungle! Imagine what happens next.

 

[74A]

Going back to the actions of the guard was it possible for them to walk through the train ?

 

[Morayshire]

Going back to the actions of the guard was it possible for them to walk through the train ?

According to Graham Satchwell, there was no direct access from the guard's brake to the TPO. Instead, the guard got down, walked alongside the train and contacted the TPO supervisor.

 

[74A]

According to Graham Satchwell, there was no direct access from the guard's brake to the TPO. Instead, the guard got down, walked alongside the train and contacted the TPO supervisor.

So another reason why the guard did not go down to check. No access through the train.