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Stopping a runaway train.

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shakey1961

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Hi everyone.

Although I have an interest in railways etc., I still don't know too much about them.

Would anyone be kind enough to answer these possible scenarios.

Example... I'm on a WCML Pendolino doing 120mph and the driver falls ill at the controls and is unconscious. How would the train be brought safely to a halt?

Secondly... Same scenario as above but are there safety features in place if the driver threw a wobbler and decided he was going to ignore all red lights and stops like the aircraft did at 9/11.

Second one is a bit crazy, but was just wondering if plans are in place for both.

Thanks
 
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cool110

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In the first case the DSD/Vigilance will automatically apply the emergency brakes.
In the second case if all the safety systems are isolated then sending it into a siding or loop with trap points would be the best option.
 
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Darandio

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Secondly... Same scenario as above but are there safety features in place if the driver threw a wobbler and decided he was going to ignore all red lights and stops like the aircraft did at 9/11.

And no driver (pilot) threw a 'wobbler' then either. You do know the planes were hijacked, don't you?
 

shakey1961

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You know what I mean. A take over of an aircraft. Nothing to stop the same thing happening on a train or a rogue driver.

Never happened yet and I doubt very much it will
 

headshot119

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In a hijack situation surely pulling the passcom would bring most trains to a stand (exception in ones that can be overridden from the cab, or if the EBS has been operated.)
 

NSE

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There was a run away train on the Northern line a year or so ago, some trucks on the end of an engineering train broke free, and it that was stopped by gravity when it hit the incline after Warren Street I believe. So I guess in some cases that would happen. I guess the Lickey incline would slow down anything heading up it, that said it would be a nightmare scenario if it was going down it!

I guess with an Electric train that there might always be the possibility of switching it to an unelectrified line, but then if you have a Pendo surging off the WCML at 120 mph and onto a diesel branch line, chances are its going way to fast for the line speed/gauge clearance and you'd derail it causing more problems!

I remember watching the East Coast documentary on Sky, and there was some sort of bell that rings every 90 seconds (I think) and the driver said he had to press a pedal with his foot to cancel it within something like three seconds of it ringing. This was to check the driver was still conscious and aware. I guess if it wasn't pressed then it would begin some form of slowing down procedure or set of a warning in control HQ or something.

On a side note, I found my old Thomas the Tank Engine collection from when I was a kid. When some young kids set James off down the mainline, he's chased by Edward and the line inspector stands on his buffers with a length of a rope hanging off a shunters pole, and manages to hook this round James buffers, allowing James driver to jump across and stop him. Whilst I'm not saying it should happen, I don't see any reason why an inspector couldn't hang off the end of a Pendo, aiming for the buffers of a fellow run away one :P :P
 

shakey1961

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Thanks people. I know it's all unlikely to happen especially the hijack/rogue driver with a death wish.

I've not been on many fast trains in my life and I'm hoping to try a Pendolino next week from Preston forward facing (last time I did it 5 years ago I was rear facing, and the tilt made me feel quite sick).

Quite scary at 120mph and you're not in control. Being a car driver I'm a bad passenger. LOL
 

najaB

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In a hijack situation surely pulling the passcom would bring most trains to a stand (exception in ones that can be overridden from the cab, or if the EBS has been operated.)
Those 'exceptions' are increasingly becoming the norm.
 

dosxuk

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I guess with an Electric train that there might always be the possibility of switching it to an unelectrified line, but then if you have a Pendo surging off the WCML at 120 mph and onto a diesel branch line, chances are its going way to fast for the line speed/gauge clearance and you'd derail it causing more problems!

Or just turn the power off.
 

Bletchleyite

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Thanks people. I know it's all unlikely to happen especially the hijack/rogue driver with a death wish.

I've not been on many fast trains in my life and I'm hoping to try a Pendolino next week from Preston forward facing (last time I did it 5 years ago I was rear facing, and the tilt made me feel quite sick).

Were you in the front coach? Because it doesn't have the coaches in front of it to predict the level of tilt, the tilt in that coach is noticeably rougher than the others.
 

shakey1961

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Someone on the train would call someone (999) if it became obvious the train was not running normally.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
Was 5 years ago now, I think I may have been near the front
 

Hadders

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It's perhaps worth pointing out that not a single passenger has died on a British passenger train since February 2007.

Compare and contrast to deaths on the roads in the same period...
 

Merseysider

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It's perhaps worth pointing out that not a single passenger has died on a British passenger train since February 2007.

Compare and contrast to deaths on the roads in the same period...
Or compare to deaths travelling by air, indeed. A remarkable safety record for rail passengers.
 

Jamesb1974

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Hi everyone.

Although I have an interest in railways etc., I still don't know too much about them.

Would anyone be kind enough to answer these possible scenarios.

Example... I'm on a WCML Pendolino doing 120mph and the driver falls ill at the controls and is unconscious. How would the train be brought safely to a halt?

Secondly... Same scenario as above but are there safety features in place if the driver threw a wobbler and decided he was going to ignore all red lights and stops like the aircraft did at 9/11.

Second one is a bit crazy, but was just wondering if plans are in place for both.

Thanks

1) DSD/Vigilance. (Drivers Safety Device) Usually a pedal that has to be kept depressed while the train is either in forward or reverse gear. The DSD is linked to the emergency brakes so that failure to keep it depressed while the train is in forwards or reverse will trigger a brake application.

The vigilance device is part of the DSD pedal. This sounds bleeping tone every 90 seconds if no movement of the controls are detected. The driver is then required to release and reapply the pedal in order to cancel the vigilance device and prevent an emergency brake application. On trains fitted with GSMR, a failure to cancel the DSD/Vigilance also sends an alarm to the nearest signal box/panel to alert the signaller.

This covers your illness/unconscious angle.

2) AWS/TPWS (Automatic Warning System and Train Protection & Warning System).

Both linked to the trackside signals, with the added bonus that TPWS can also prevent trains from passing signals at danger by large margins and can also be used in conjunction with permanent speed restrictions.

AWS has been around for a very long time in various forms (since the early 1900s with the GWR). It consists of fixed electromagnets in the 4 foot of the track and receiving gear on the train. A green signal activates a bell or 'bing' in the cab, turns a cab indicator to all black and requires no further action on the driver's part. A signal showing red, yellow or two yellows activates a horn, turns the cab indicator to black and yellow and requires the driver to press a button to cancel the horn. Failure to cancel the horn in time (6-8 seconds I think) triggers an emergency brake activation.

TPWS is a bit more complicated.

TPWS.jpg


A train passing over the first arming loop sets off a timer in the TPWS system so that by the time the train passes over the second trigger loop the system knows how fast the train is going. If the speed that the train is travelling at is too fast to stop at the red signal/dead end platform road/reach the posted speed restriction, a 'TPWS intervention' is triggered which applies the emergency brakes. The second set of arming and trigger loops are at the signal themselves. When the signal is at red, the trigger loop is energised and should the train pass over it as it passes the signal at danger, the system will activate and make an emergency brake application.

However, there is a temporary isolation button in the cab as well as an isolation switch. These are used when the signaller instructs you to pass a signal at danger. The temporary isolation button disables the TPWS for a short period of time (30 secs for a passenger train, 60 for a freight train I think is right) before the system becomes live again. The isolation switch isolates the system but is usually in a cabinet somewhere with a seal on it. If a driver were to suddenly go 'rogue', the signaller would see the unauthorised movement on his panel and, hopefully be able to send the train into a loop, through catch points or just stop other train movements to avoid a collision.

So that answers your question about ignorning red signals.

And finally, train brakes are designed to be fail safe. To apply the brakes, air pressure is released from the brake system, so a sudden loss of air pressure, break in the brake pipe etc would discharge all the air from the system and apply the brakes fully.
 
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shakey1961

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Thanks everyone. I'll read it all more fully later as I have to go out now.

Moral of the story is, I've no need to worry on a Pendolino! :D
 

Merseysider

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Thanks everyone. I'll read it all more fully later as I have to go out now.

Moral of the story is, I've no need to worry on a Pendolino! :D
Indeed. Think of the tilting as being on a very basic rollercoaster.

It could all go horribly wrong, but it virtually never does. So sit back and enjoy it :)

Ps the Tilting Ale is well worth a try.
 

ac6000cw

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Thanks everyone. I'll read it all more fully later as I have to go out now.

Moral of the story is, I've no need to worry on a Pendolino! :D

You have no need to worry on any UK train - statistically you are much safer on the train than walking/cycling/driving to the station.

And besides which, sweeping through reverse curves in a Pendo at 125mph on full tilt is part of the reason for riding them, isn't it ? (they're sports cars on steel wheels, really ;))
 

Peter Mugridge

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And besides which, sweeping through reverse curves in a Pendo at 125mph on full tilt is part of the reason for riding them, isn't it ? (they're sports cars on steel wheels, really ;))

You'd get a more enjoyable sensation and a "faster" feel without the tilt; try doing a Paris - Bordeaux non stop TGV before the extension to the LGV opens next year. You'll do up to 135mph without tilt on track similar to what the Trent Valley and weedon were like before they were straightened out a bit.:D
 

ac6000cw

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You'd get a more enjoyable sensation and a "faster" feel without the tilt; try doing a Paris - Bordeaux non stop TGV before the extension to the LGV opens next year. You'll do up to 135mph without tilt on track similar to what the Trent Valley and weedon were like before they were straightened out a bit.:D

The 'being hustled' trip I remember most was a Birmingham-Edinburgh excursion in the mid-1970's - an 86 plus Mk1s (can't remember if they were B1 or Commonwealth bogied). Last passenger stop was Wolverhampton - from there to Carstairs it went like the proverbial 'bat out of hell', plenty of hitting the bump stops on the northern curves and pointwork plus doubtless some bogie hunting too, all accompanied by the usual Mk1 cacophony....we arrived more than 30min early at Edinburgh, and I reckon probably more than that at Carstairs. :)
 
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Llama

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1) DSD/Vigilance. (Drivers Safety Device) Usually a pedal that has to be kept depressed while the train is either in forward or reverse gear. The DSD is linked to the emergency brakes so that failure to keep it depressed while the train is in forwards or reverse will trigger a brake application.

The vigilance device is part of the DSD pedal. This sounds bleeping tone every 90 seconds if no movement of the controls are detected. The driver is then required to release and reapply the pedal in order to cancel the vigilance device and prevent an emergency brake application. On trains fitted with GSMR, a failure to cancel the DSD/Vigilance also sends an alarm to the nearest signal box/panel to alert the signaller.

This covers your illness/unconscious angle.

2) AWS/TPWS (Automatic Warning System and Train Protection & Warning System).

Both linked to the trackside signals, with the added bonus that TPWS can also prevent trains from passing signals at danger by large margins and can also be used in conjunction with permanent speed restrictions.

AWS has been around for a very long time in various forms (since the early 1900s with the GWR). It consists of fixed electromagnets in the 4 foot of the track and receiving gear on the train. A green signal activates a bell or 'bing' in the cab, turns a cab indicator to all black and requires no further action on the driver's part. A signal showing red, yellow or two yellows activates a horn, turns the cab indicator to black and yellow and requires the driver to press a button to cancel the horn. Failure to cancel the horn in time (6-8 seconds I think) triggers an emergency brake activation.

TPWS is a bit more complicated.

TPWS.jpg


A train passing over the first arming loop sets off a timer in the TPWS system so that by the time the train passes over the second trigger loop the system knows how fast the train is going. If the speed that the train is travelling at is too fast to stop at the red signal/dead end platform road/reach the posted speed restriction, a 'TPWS intervention' is triggered which applies the emergency brakes. The second set of arming and trigger loops are at the signal themselves. When the signal is at red, the trigger loop is energised and should the train pass over it as it passes the signal at danger, the system will activate and make an emergency brake application.

However, there is a temporary isolation button in the cab as well as an isolation switch. These are used when the signaller instructs you to pass a signal at danger. The temporary isolation button disables the TPWS for a short period of time (30 secs for a passenger train, 60 for a freight train I think is right) before the system becomes live again. The isolation switch isolates the system but is usually in a cabinet somewhere with a seal on it. If a driver were to suddenly go 'rogue', the signaller would see the unauthorised movement on his panel and, hopefully be able to send the train into a loop, through catch points or just stop other train movements to avoid a collision.

So that answers your question about ignorning red signals.

And finally, train brakes are designed to be fail safe. To apply the brakes, air pressure is released from the brake system, so a sudden loss of air pressure, break in the brake pipe etc would discharge all the air from the system and apply the brakes fully.

You are a little off with your descriptions of the systems.

AWS is a subsystem of TPWS. An AWS warning is given by a (usually) permanent magnet in the four-foot, with a certain orientation (south pole IIRC). The train-borne receiver passes over this magnet, the AWS visual indicator in the cab turns to all-black and the AWS horn tone sounds. This must be acknowledged by pressing *and releasing* the AWS reset button within a certain set period after initiation of the warning tone - usually 2 or 3 seconds depending on traction type. The warning tone stops and the AWS visual indicator then changes to black & yellow to remind the driver that he has acknowledged an AWS warning and has responsibility for controlling the speed of the train. If the AWS warning isn't acknowledged in time then an emergency brake application (of the automatic brake) is made via the TPWS system, known as a brake demand, which must then be acknowledged by the driver, allowed to 'time out' and then certain procedures carried out before the train may then be moved.

TPWS works in a simple way - there are sets of arming and trigger loops in the four foot which transmit certain frequencies, and a receiver underneath the leading end of all traction units. If the train-borne system detects that the time taken from receiving an 'arming' frequency to then receiving a 'trigger' frequency is shorter than a predetermined length of time (just under a second for traction units designated with 'passenger' timings, just over a second for 'freight' timings) then a TPWS brake demand is initiated which must then be acknowledged, will 'time out' and again there are procedures to follow before the train should be moved.

The TPWS arming loops and trigger loops are physically spaced a measured distance apart to provide the required 'set speed' for each installation. These are known as 'over-speed sensors' or OSS, although this is a misnomer because the TPWS track equipment doesn't do any 'sensing', only transmitting. TPWS OSS in conjunction with a permanent speed restriction or those approaching buffer stops are permanently energised. TPWS OSS are also found on approach to some stop signals, and these are only energised when the signal is displaying a danger aspect. Those stop signals (and some others) will also have TPWS 'train stop sensors' (TSS) fitted which are basically an arming and trigger loop butted right up to each other, effectively giving a set-speed of zero miles per hour. TSS transmit at a certain distinct frequency (which allows use of the TPWS Trainstop Override button in the cab when authorised to pass a single signal at danger) - OSS operate on other frequencies, these frequencies are related between arming and trigger loops, so that TPWS OSS can be set up on bidirectional lines without causing spurious TPWS activations when an arming loop from one setup is followed quickly by a trigger loop for a setup provided for the other direction.

The TPWS train stop override button provides up to 20 seconds (or until a TSS is encountered, whichever occurs first) to pass a TSS on passenger stock, and up to 60 seconds on freight, due to the slower accelerating characteristics of some freight trains.

The TPWS temporary isolation switch in the cab (or usually in the engine room on a loco) completely isolates the TPWS system (but not AWS) until it is either reinstated, or until that cab desk is shut down then reenergised. This is used where TPWS TSS and OSS may be required to be passed, in degraded conditions such as Temporary Block Working, when assisting a train in rear or driving from other than the leading cab for any reason, in case of a system fault, when working in T3 engineering possessions or when working of a single or bidirectional line by pilotman is required ('P2 working') and more than one signal is to be passed at danger.

If TPWS activates to stop the train where the driver has attempted to brake first (or if activates because of a fault) this is known operationally as an 'activation', if the driver has made no attempt to brake and the TPWS system has activated correctly to stop an unsafe movement, this is known operationally as an 'intervention' and is viewed as a more serious incident from a driver's point of view.

Finally, TPWS isn't intended to stop spads from happening, but is designed to stop trains within a safe margin beyond main aspect running signals (known as the 'overlap') at approach speeds up to 75mph. Beyond 75mph the system still works but variables and parameters can't guarantee that the overlap won't be exceeded.

TPWS set speeds aren't generally common knowledge within the industry, although some TOCs do provide this information to drivers. TPWS OSS approaching buffer stops are always set at 10mph. These loops approaching buffer stops are smaller than standard loops, this is to reduce the margin of inaccuracy which would result if the full-size loops (with a greater transmitting area) were used.
 

edwin_m

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Someone on the train would call someone (999) if it became obvious the train was not running normally.

The signallers would almost certainly become aware of this before or soon after anyone on board the train (passing red signals, missing station stops etc) and would also be in the best position to do something about it.

There are situations where it might be possible to do some damage by hijacking a train, which I'm not going to go into on here, but road vehicles or aircraft offer far more opportunities to a potential terrorist.
 

Merseysider

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edwim_m said:
There are situations where it might be possible to do some damage by hijacking a train, which I'm not going to go into on here, but road vehicles or aircraft offer far more opportunities to a potential terrorist.
Notwithstanding trains carrying inherently dangerous loads, like nuclear or chemical stuff, surely the damage someone could do with a hijacked train would be limited to wherever and whatever the signaller and/or aforementioned equipment lets them?

By the sounds of what's posted above, the hijacker would very quickly become a sitting duck in an immobile train.
 
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