SouthWest Airlines 1380 - Piloting Response

[ainsworth74]

Posts #1 - #15 originally in this thread.

This story reminds me of Southwest Flight 1380 in 2018.

That's quite an interesting one not only for being a heck of a piece of flying (and an excellent example of using your knowledge to know when to skip checklists to manage workload and fly the plane!) but because they didn't pull the cockpit voice recorder (despite seeming to try and do it as they discuss doing it in the transcript!) so the transcript runs on for quite a while longer than most do giving more of an insight of what happens after an incident like this you'd normally get. Or well it's interesting to me anyway

 

[Cloud Strife]

That's quite an interesting one not only for being a heck of a piece of flying (and an excellent example of using your knowledge to know when to skip checklists to manage workload and fly the plane!) but because they didn't pull the cockpit voice recorder (despite seeming to try and do it as they discuss doing it in the transcript!) so the transcript runs on for quite a while longer than most do giving more of an insight of what happens after an incident like this you'd normally get. Or well it's interesting to me anyway

I believe the Captain of that flight was a former fighter pilot, which undoubtedly helped a lot with being able to prioritise tasks and skipping parts of checklists in an emergency situation. Either way, the work of both pilots on that flight was textbook, even down to the FO (and pilot flying) starting the descent to 10,000 feet without being able to communicate with the Captain.

 

[pug1]

That's quite an interesting one not only for being a heck of a piece of flying (and an excellent example of using your knowledge to know when to skip checklists to manage workload and fly the plane!) but because they didn't pull the cockpit voice recorder (despite seeming to try and do it as they discuss doing it in the transcript!) so the transcript runs on for quite a while longer than most do giving more of an insight of what happens after an incident like this you'd normally get. Or well it's interesting to me anyway

CVRs are sadly not infallible. Response edited after re-reading the article.

I believe the Captain of that flight was a former fighter pilot, which undoubtedly helped a lot with being able to prioritise tasks and skipping parts of checklists in an emergency situation. Either way, the work of both pilots on that flight was textbook, even down to the FO (and pilot flying) starting the descent to 10,000 feet without being able to communicate with the Captain.

Why does being an ex-fighter pilot help with being able to prioritise tasks and ‘skip parts of checklists’ when benchmarked against a non ex-fighter pilot*? Ever heard of the Core Competencies that every commercial pilot in U.K. and EASA -land are assessed against?

Also do you think the FO would just haplessly sit there waiting for the Captain to tell him/her to don his/her mask, bug 10,000, hit LVL CHG, reduce thrust, deploy speedbrake to flight detect, ensure pitch to MMO-VMO? What if this was a different scenario and the Captain was incapacitated? Do you think the FO would have sat there waiting for a command?

I don’t meant to appear to be picking on you specifically. But can you see why your posts on other threads might lack credibility?

*as one former Jaguar, Typhoon and fast red things pilot once told me, fast jet pilots are no better than any other pilots, they just have good cheats. Said with tongue slightly in cheek perhaps, but there’s more than a spoonful of truth in that statement.

 

[ainsworth74]

CVRs typically only have a short replay, something like 15 minutes and they’re constantly recorded over. So in this instance the CVR would be useless.

The CVR transcript for the Southwest flight I was referring to runs for just over two hours so it's definitely bit longer than 15 minutes! At least on modern recorders. In ye olden days they were considerably shorter. Though that is still why they pull the breakers of course to make sure even with the extended recording times that come with modern technology something important isn't accidentally recorded over.

 

[pug1]

The CVR transcript for the Southwest flight I was referring to runs for just over two hours so it's definitely bit longer than 15 minutes! At least on modern recorders. In ye olden days they were considerably shorter. Though that is still why they pull the breakers of course to make sure even with the extended recording times that come with modern technology something important isn't accidentally recorded over.

Yes my post was subsequently edited to reflect prior to your response, then again when I re-read the article. But in my experience with flight data (not CVRs as they’re more heavily restricted) is that these bits of data are not infallible, even if the breakers are pulled as per procedure.

 

[ainsworth74]

Yes my post was subsequently edited to reflect prior to your response, then again when I re-read the article.

Ah I was too quick off the mark to reply

But in my experience with flight data (not CVRs as they’re more heavily restricted) is that these bits of data are not infallible, even if the breakers are pulled as per SOP.

I'm sure, after all have humans ever made something infallible?

 

[pug1]

Ah I was too quick off the mark to reply


I'm sure, after all have humans ever made something infallible?

Topical, and nope! God help us when the tech bros have their way and the single human failure point is an avionics engineer sat happily on the ground!

 

[Bald Rick]

I believe the Captain of that flight was a former fighter pilot, which undoubtedly helped a lot with being able to prioritise tasks and skipping parts of checklists in an emergency situation. Either way, the work of both pilots on that flight was textbook, even down to the FO (and pilot flying) starting the descent to 10,000 feet without being able to communicate with the Captain.

Captain was ex USN fighter pilot, indeed one of the first female fighter pilots in that service; FO was USAF (on AWACS)

 

[TravelDream]

Why does being an ex-fighter pilot help with being able to prioritise tasks and ‘skip parts of checklists’ when benchmarked against a non ex-fighter pilot*? Ever heard of the Core Competencies that every commercial pilot in U.K. and EASA -land are assessed against?

Yes, it's an exceptionally odd comment.

Checklists are not supposed to be 'skipped' - in part or in whole.

 

[speedy1]

Checklists are not supposed to be 'skipped' - in part or in whole.

I've watched a lot of Air Crash Investigation and I recall one or two where the checklist is so long or unoptimised or not appropriate for the context or too time consuming that it was in practice a hindrance, and the pilot was right to 'disobey' it. Look up Swissair 111, Icelandair FI-543, Pel Air VH-KDK.

 

[Bletchleyite]

Yes, it's an exceptionally odd comment.

Checklists are not supposed to be 'skipped' - in part or in whole.

This is generally true, but sometimes there isn't time. If for instance there's a double engine failure at sub 1000ft, you don't have time to be doing checklists, you revert to pilot instinct.

 

[pug1]

Yes, it's an exceptionally odd comment.

Checklists are not supposed to be 'skipped' - in part or in whole.

I accept that there won’t be a QRH checklist for ‘person sucked out of window’ but my issue was with the suggestion that being an ex fighter pilot is somehow beneficial when it comes to APK (Application of Procedures) SAW (Situational Awareness) and FPM/FPA (flight path management manual/automation). Plus Decision Making. All of which are benchmarked against in EASA land. The crew did what they did because they are a crew operating and managing a busy flight deck. Just because one of them might have previously flown small pointy fast things doesn’t come into the equation.

 

[hotelmode]

Hard agree.

Single seat fast jet experience isn't very relevant to flying large multi crew transports. Its not necessarily bad but it isn't necessarily good either.

 

[ainsworth74]

I accept that there won’t be a QRH checklist for ‘person sucked out of window’ but my issue was with the suggestion that being an ex fighter pilot is somehow beneficial when it comes to APK (Application of Procedures) SAW (Situational Awareness) and FPM/FPA (flight path management manual/automation). Plus Decision Making. All of which are benchmarked against in EASA land. The crew did what they did because they are a crew operating and managing a busy flight deck. Just because one of them might have previously flown small pointy fast things doesn’t come into the equation.

Yes absolutely which is why when I brought the SouthWest flight up I didn't mention the former career of the pilot. Didn't seem relevant. Far more relevant was all the stuff you mention which is what that crew showed in spades (in my opinion!) and which has nothing to do with what someone did before they became a commercial pilot.

 

[TravelDream]

Of course captains do have discretion to deviate from SOPs (which the checklists are a part of) if something is in the interests of safety.
This was not one of those scenarios.

There have been cases where checklists are overly long and complex.
When that comes to light, many of those are then changed. Training in the sim will also focus on them.

This is generally true, but sometimes there isn't time. If for instance there's a double engine failure at sub 1000ft, you don't have time to be doing checklists, you revert to pilot instinct.

Double engine failure would have memory items.
That's a checklist done from memory.
You don't solve double engine failure with instinct. You do it with knowledge of the aircraft and its systems.

I accept that there won’t be a QRH checklist for ‘person sucked out of window’ but my issue was with the suggestion that being an ex fighter pilot is somehow beneficial when it comes to APK (Application of Procedures) SAW (Situational Awareness) and FPM/FPA (flight path management manual/automation). Plus Decision Making. All of which are benchmarked against in EASA land. The crew did what they did because they are a crew operating and managing a busy flight deck. Just because one of them might have previously flown small pointy fast things doesn’t come into the equation.

Of course not, but there are two - cabin altitude warning/ rapid depressurization and engine severe damage (probably) - which are what actually happened.

Totally agree otherwise.

There are also huge risks of moving from the QRH as the two pilots need to work together in a high workload, high stress situation. Following SOPs to a tee will ease that dramatically. Deviating from them will do the opposite.

 

[ainsworth74]

The NTSB didn't seem to have an issue with it?

The NTSB concludes that performing required checklists according to standard operating procedures is a critical part of safe flight operations. However, given the emergency situation aboard this flight, the flight crew’s performance of most, but not all, of the items on the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation non-normal checklist and the nonperformance of the three other relevant non-normal checklists allowed the crew to appropriately balance the procedural requirement of executing checklists with the high workload associated with maintaining airplane control and accomplishing a safe and timely descent and landing.

(From end of section 2.4.1 of the full report)

DCA18MA142.aspx

www.ntsb.gov

 

[pug1]

Of course captains do have discretion to deviate from SOPs (which the checklists are a part of) if something is in the interests of safety.
This was not one of those scenarios.

There have been cases where checklists are overly long and complex.
When that comes to light, many of those are then changed. Training in the sim will also focus on them.



Double engine failure would have memory items.
That's a checklist done from memory.
You don't solve double engine failure with instinct. You do it with knowledge of the aircraft and its systems.



Of course not, but there are two - cabin altitude warning/ rapid depressurization and engine severe damage (probably) - which are what actually happened.

Totally agree otherwise.

There are also huge risks of moving from the QRH as the two pilots need to work together in a high workload, high stress situation. Following SOPs to a tee will ease that dramatically. Deviating from them will do the opposite.

Yes I think the conversation was getting mixed up between what happened on the Ryanair vs the Southwest. Both very similar in nature, both at different stages of flight. However as both occurred with cabin pressures above 14,000 ft then the same procedures would/should have been followed as outlined by yourself.

There are only a couple of notable events that I can think of off the top of my head where calm and quick decision making resulted in a survivable outcome. One of those being the Sully event. Also caused by a birdstrike, but a catastrophic dual engine failure at that height which isn’t documented in the QRH is when the quick thinking that some were priding the crew of Southwest on (incorrectly in my view) is when possible previous experience comes into play. In fact it would be safe to believe sullys background in gliding is what helped there! But that’s a subjective view.