Short-sightedness of 1960s line closures

[Philip]

The reason given for the closure of many lines in the 1960s was that they were operating at a loss and that their continuing operation would be financially unsustainable. However, was this a short-sighted decision, considering the road traffic problems we have now and the pollution levels this causes? Also if we still had the railway network of the 1950s in operation now then travel would be a lot more convenient across the country, particularly getting to and from towns/villages in more rural areas.

Nothing is beyond extra (if emergency) funding from the government and this includes keeping all railways open, even the ones not making a profit, for public convenience reasons. Do people think that the 1960s closures should never have happened, could these loss-making lines have even become profit-making, or were the closures necessary for the sustainability of the railway over the following decades?

What do people think the railway would be like now if we still had the pre-1960s network in operation?

 

[Cavan]

The track bed and infrastructure should definitely have been protected from development to allow the lines to be re-opened if needed. Many lines that would be useful now have houses and other development on the track bed.

 

[zwk500]

What do people think the railway would be like now if we still had the pre-1960s network in operation?

It would have been burning through money so fast by the end of the 70s that Thatchers govt would have hit it harder than the coal industry.

Lines have been closing in this country since before WW1. The societal changes happening in the 50s and 60s made the rethink of the rail network not just inevitable but necessary.

More lines should have had their trackbed protected, and there were individual cases of lines that should not have closed, but by and large the network was too bloated, too complex. It had been built as a series of speculative lines for certain traffics, and services were often spares and patchy (just look at 1940s timetables). The private car had won for individual journeys, and the train needed to accept this and move on.

 

[Falcon1200]

More lines should have had their trackbed protected, and there were individual cases of lines that should not have closed, but by and large the network was too bloated, too complex.

I agree.

Sometime comments about short-sightedness are quite ludicrous, one I saw recently (on Facebook) was that closing Braintree/Bishops Stortford was short-sighted because it would be so useful now for travel to Stansted Airport - Who in the 1950s or 60s could possibly have foreseen the huge growth in air travel since then, and the development of Stansted Airport itself ? I always feel like asking those complaining of the short-sightedness of 1960s rail closures to predict the country's transport needs in say 2080 - Not that most of us will be around to check the accuracy of those predictions !

 

[dosxuk]

How would the country have justified the expense of the subsidies to keep lines open - many of which even today have a poor-bad case for reopening - in the face of the various financial issues throughout the 70s, 80s and 90s, and the continual decline in passenger and freight usage?

It's very easy to point to today's passenger usage being higher than ever, but this is concentrated on the most popular routes and has only come about after basically 40 years of decline then recovery when the perceived replacement (personal car) has run into it's own capacity issues. But then look at the figures for wagon-load freight - required hundreds of miles of tracks and sidings and justified keeping many branch lines open, but is all but extinct today.

 

[Magdalia]

At the start of the 1960s the main function of the railway was to move freight not passengers, and especially coal.

Most of the lines that closed had a very sparse passenger service. But up to that point the railway was the economic lifeline for rural communities that brought in coal and other essentials, and took out agricultural produce to market.

That all changed with the development of motor lorries, and the decline in the importance of coal. Beeching was a recognition that the country branch line had ceased to be an economic lifeline. Where those routes continued to be an economic lifeline, for example in the Highlands of Scotland, the lines remained open.

Frequent leisure travel for most of the population only came with the spread of car ownership. At the start of the 1960s lots of people only did long train journeys for annual seaside summer holidays and/or day trips on excursion trains. In the 1960s nobody could foresee the huge expansion in leisure travel on the railway, the received wisdom was that such travel would be by road, and that the road building programme would meet the demand for more capacity. Air travel for the masses came later.

There can be a bit of quibbling on the edges, especially with regard to cross country connecting routes, but most of the 1960s closures were inevitable.

 

[northernbelle]

It's easy to accuse our predecessors of short-sightedness with the benefit of hindsight.

At the time, the world was a different place:

• Global warming had not been identified - rail was not seen as any more environmentally friendly than road.
• Road was (and still is) considerably cheaper and more flexible to operate than rail.
• The general aspiration of society was (and still is, although slowly changing) to own a car.

So, at the time, it was probably the decision that was logical. The short-sighted bit was the sale of trackbed so the decisions couldn't be reversed if they ever needed to be.

 

[physics34]

The track bed and infrastructure should definitely have been protected from development to allow the lines to be re-opened if needed. Many lines that would be useful now have houses and other development on the track bed.

100%.

 

[pdeaves]

It is possible that in many cases, the current service on today's routes would be lower to free capacity at important junctions for the 'branch' service.

 

[Western Sunset]

Remember that many lines closed in the 1930s (and some even earlier). Indeed, some lines shouldn't have been built at all.

Marples, let's put it nicely, was a crook who wanted to feather his road construction firm. But the rot had set in before he assumed office. The Modernisation Plan was poorly handled; it was touch and go that the WCML electrification would be completed to Euston, for example. We all know of the mess made of dieselisation.

Rail was largely seen as "old hat" and in many areas not relevant to a country interested in the "white heat of technology".

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but without Beeching (though too brutal at times in his statistical interpretations), we'd possibly have a much smaller network today.

Yes, it would have been nice to preserve the trackbeds of closed lines, but who'd have paid for its upkeep? Politically (and economically) at the time there was no will to do so. If BR had to pay, that would've taken even more funds away from its operations - and remember its property board received considerable sums from sales of old railway lands. Would local councils have paid to keep the path of disused routes? Doubt it somehow too. The only way would've been central government, to retain future strategic assets. But politicians generally only think about the short term...

There you go; said my piece.

 

[A0]

The reason given for the closure of many lines in the 1960s was that they were operating at a loss and that their continuing operation would be financially unsustainable. However, was this a short-sighted decision, considering the road traffic problems we have now and the pollution levels this causes? Also if we still had the railway network of the 1950s in operation now then travel would be a lot more convenient across the country, particularly getting to and from towns/villages in more rural areas.

Nothing is beyond extra (if emergency) funding from the government and this includes keeping all railways open, even the ones not making a profit, for public convenience reasons. Do people think that the 1960s closures should never have happened, could these loss-making lines have even become profit-making, or were the closures necessary for the sustainability of the railway over the following decades?

What do people think the railway would be like now if we still had the pre-1960s network in operation?

By "1960s" closures, I assume you're referring to the Beeching closures - it's worth being aware that between 1950 and 1962 (the Beeching report was published in 1963) British Rail closed, on average, over 200 miles a year.

So there was quite alot of 'dead wood' to be removed. In the Beeching closures there were a few 'long' line closures which then pushed the overall route mileage closed up (e.g. the Great Central, Somerset and Dorset) but despite calls for those lines to be reopened, nobody's ever managed to construct a viable business case to demonstrate they actually would be useful.

I very much doubt that lines like the Somerset and Dorset, most of the Isle of Wight network and various other Beeching closures would ever have been profitable. Either they served minimal populations or they shadowed other routes which means they'd simply have reduced revenue on other lines making them less profitable.

 

[davidknibb]

This is such a wide ranging question that there is no clear and concise answer.
Firstly - consider that nature of the rail system over the years.
Many early lines were build with freight in mind and only thought of passengers later. Much of the freight flow - think coal- has gone, crops today are moved by truck mainly and not rail. The fishing ports had major freight flows by rail - almost completely gone and never to return. So a major source of revenue for the railways has disappeared.
Then think of the passenger routes - nearly all built speculatively and with no overall planning - unlike some European countries.
So we had several competing routes between major centres. How many major ways were available from London to Manchester in the post WW1 years.
Then there were long routes between a largish centre and a smallish town with sparse population en route. Lots come to mind. And sometimes ever these had competing routes. Quite often these were partially closed midway - and the extremity was left without a service. Think for example the closed link from Barnstable to Ilfracombe.
Then there were dozens of shorth length branch lines - with a next to nothing service - and not at times to be useful for anyone. Not surprising that the vast majority of these were closed - often even before WW1
I've got the 1922 Bradshaw - and it's just mind blowing the way the country was criss-crossed then with routes that had bad services.
but some of the closures have proved to be really bad for regional connectivity. For example it was faster to get a direct train from Leicester or Derby to Manchester in 1922 that it is today becaise of the closure of the Buxton/Matlock link. So east Midlands to the North West is an example of closures that should never have happened.
So there is no one answer to the original question - it's far too complex for that - and I've only just scratched at the surface in my reply.

 

[zwk500]

Marples, let's put it nicely, was a crook who wanted to feather his road construction firm. But the rot had set in before he assumed office.

I've seen this bandied about regularly. Is there any evidence that Marples did gain financially from the closure of the railways? Is there also any evidence at all that any other Transport Secretary or either party would have taken a different route?

 

[Western Lord]

For example it was faster to get a direct train from Leicester or Derby to Manchester in 1922 that it is today becaise of the closure of the Buxton/Matlock link. So east Midlands to the North West is an example of closures that should never have happened.

This, of course, was a line NOT proposed for closure by Beeching.

 

[Senex]

Lines have been closing in this country since before WW1. The societal changes happening in the 50s and 60s made the rethink of the rail network not just inevitable but necessary.

More lines should have had their trackbed protected, and there were individual cases of lines that should not have closed, but by and large the network was too bloated, too complex. It had been built as a series of speculative lines for certain traffics, and services were often spares and patchy (just look at 1940s timetables). The private car had won for individual journeys, and the train needed to accept this and move on.

Absolutely agree. There have always been closures, way back into the C19 (though not that many of them, for various reasons). And because of the way the railways here were planned, promoted, and built, the network was indeed too bloated and too complex, and not really a "network". Some other countries did things rather better. And then were the branches, occasionally always useless, but more often providing a service that at the time couldn't be offered any other way — but would be superseded the moment viable road transport came into existence. There were always going to be massive simplifications sooner or later, as there have been in other countries too. But there have been far too many cases where demolition followed by a giving up of the right of way has proved a folly, especially on inter-urban routes. We'll all have our favourite examples that we like citing, so I'll give three here: the Midland Main Line between Wath Road and Goose Hill, as this could (with a re-alingnment at Masboro) have been the 110-mph main line between Sheffield and Leeds we really do need; the original Midland line into Derby from the north end, as that would have made a fast Birmingham-Nottingham service actually serving Derby possible (though now what is left of the wretched HS2 seems set to do that, continuin to miss Derby); and Denton Jn - Droylsden, as with relatively straightforward upgrading that could have provided the only genuinely fast route from Stockport to Manchester Victoria. One I personally would not be suggesting, though I loved travelling over it as a route, especially in winter, is the Woodhead Line.

 

[Western Sunset]

NOT from Wiki:

"His period as Minister of Transport was controversial. He both oversaw significant construction (he opened the first section of the M1 motorway) and the closure of a considerable portion of the national railway network with the Beeching cuts. His involvement in the road construction business Marples Ridgway, of which he had been managing director, was one of repeated concern regarding possible conflict of interest.

In later life he was elevated to the peerage before fleeing to Monaco at very short notice to avoid prosecution for tax fraud."

Of course, it wasn't all down to the Tory bad boys. Barbara Castle et al continued with closures that they could've stopped.

 

[A0]

NOT from Wiki:

"His period as Minister of Transport was controversial. He both oversaw significant construction (he opened the first section of the M1 motorway) and the closure of a considerable portion of the national railway network with the Beeching cuts. His involvement in the road construction business Marples Ridgway, of which he had been managing director, was one of repeated concern regarding possible conflict of interest.

In later life he was elevated to the peerage before fleeing to Monaco at very short notice to avoid prosecution for tax fraud."

Of course, it wasn't all down to the Tory bad boys. Barbara Castle et al continued with closures that they could've stopped.

To add some context though - he only opened the M1 having been appointed Minister for Transport on 14th October 1959. The first section of the M1 was built mainly by John Laing Ltd https://historicengland.org.uk/serv...he,Hertfordshire to Crick in Northamptonshire.

The inauguration slab for the M1 was unveiled by Marples predecessor, Harold Watkinson in 1958 https://historicengland.org.uk/images-books/photos/item/JLP01/01/168/103

There's alot of people who put 2 and 2 together and get 5 where Marples is concerned.

 

[Western Sunset]

I don't really want to drift too much, but there is a lot about Marples and his various, how shall I put it, financial "dealings". In his case 2 + 2 really did make 4. The selling of shares/interest in Marples Ridgway to his wife (and his buy-back options), whilst not strictly illegal, was viewed by many as sailing very close to the wind. Echoes of the behaviour of more recent politicians...

Like so many others, it was his tax affairs which were his downfall:

"The final straw came when Inland Revenue ordered Marples to pay almost 30 years’ overdue tax on his London properties. Fearing the substantial fee, Marples fled the country. The Treasury subsequently froze his assets." [Churchill Archives Centre - online].

 

[RT4038]

NOT from Wiki:

"His period as Minister of Transport was controversial. He both oversaw significant construction (he opened the first section of the M1 motorway) and the closure of a considerable portion of the national railway network with the Beeching cuts. His involvement in the road construction business Marples Ridgway, of which he had been managing director, was one of repeated concern regarding possible conflict of interest.

In later life he was elevated to the peerage before fleeing to Monaco at very short notice to avoid prosecution for tax fraud."

Of course, it wasn't all down to the Tory bad boys. Barbara Castle et al continued with closures that they could've stopped.

Motorway construction would have happened whatever (as it did in every other Western country) and it seems unlikely that the country would have afforded to retain (and pay for the modernisation) of the railways and build the motorways that everyone wanted for their cars and trucks.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 18 Aug 2022 ==

I don't really want to drift too much, but there is a lot about Marples and his various, how shall I put it, financial "dealings". In his case 2 + 2 really did make 4. The selling of shares/interest in Marples Ridgway to his wife (and his buy-back options), whilst not strictly illegal, was viewed by many as sailing very close to the wind. Echoes of the behaviour of more recent politicians...

Like so many others, it was his tax affairs which were his downfall:

"The final straw came when Inland Revenue ordered Marples to pay almost 30 years’ overdue tax on his London properties. Fearing the substantial fee, Marples fled the country. The Treasury subsequently froze his assets." [Churchill Archives Centre - online].

Yes, but I doubt this really had any bearing on the railway decisions. It is this which people add 2 + 2 to make 5.

 

[mike57]

Some lines were basket cases that needed to close. Others could have been saved with simplification and staff reductions, and of those that could have been saved some would have flourished and still be with us, and some would have continued to decline and end up going anyway. One of the issues is if the industrial relations of the period would have allowed the simplification and downsizing that would have been needed.

Allowing closed interurban routes to be built on making future reopening almost impossible was a disaster, it should have been forseen in general terms and routes should have been protected. Had the big bang approach of Beeching been not happened then some issues which we have today would have been avoided. Closed routes could be brought back into use more easily. And closure of routes/stations would not so politically charged. Opening and closures would be seen more as the system adapting to changing conditions and needs. Some closed branches could have survived as a more tram like operation, with less signalling.

So were the Beeching cuts a disaster, yes they were in my opinion, It was very black and white, the accounting methods used were to be polite 'primative'. The report did nothing to promote economical operation of less busy routes. No thought was given to integrated operation, both in terms of lightly used branches as feeders, and integration of other modes of transport. But of course Beeching was hired to deliver a report, and it was no doubt what the government of the day wanted to hear. But we have paid the price over the next 60 years.

 

[Western Lord]

But of course Beeching was hired to deliver a report, and it was no doubt what the government of the day wanted to hear. But we have paid the price over the next 60 years.

It was not the "government of the day" that presided over most of the closures but the succeeding Labour government (which had campaigned against the closures in the 1964 General Election).

 

[Western Sunset]

Anyway, enough of Marples and Beeching (and Castle).

Lack of integration goes back (rather ironically) to the British Transport Commission and their often fractious relationship with the Railway Executive. Prior to nationalisation, the Big Four were moving to something more integrated; ownership of bus companies, holdings in airlines and suchlike.

As others have noted above, passenger train services on many branch lines were on a "take it or leave it" basis. With a train up to town in the morning and an evening return (with a midday Saturday train when folks still worked mornings).

 

[Bald Rick]

it should have been forseen in general terms and routes should have been protected.

How should it have been foreseen?

 

[dosxuk]

How should it have been foreseen?

Especially considering all the forecasts, which were subsequently proven over the following 30-40 years, were that freight and passenger usage was going to fall. Add to that there's still a significant amount of protected routes that have not been reopened and the chances of them doing so anytime soon are basically zero.

But then I've never been sold on the idea that a few light industrial warehouses built on a former track bed are the reason that xx line can't reopen, even if that's what the popular opinion is. Normally the fact the line went nowhere, only served a few villages and the odd farm and would be operationally difficult to integrate into the modern network seem like far more likely reasons, but it's easier to blame Terry's Tyres being built on what would otherwise be an abandoned bit of undergrowth.

 

[A0]

So were the Beeching cuts a disaster, yes they were in my opinion, It was very black and white, the accounting methods used were to be polite 'primative'. The report did nothing to promote economical operation of less busy routes. No thought was given to integrated operation, both in terms of lightly used branches as feeders, and integration of other modes of transport. But of course Beeching was hired to deliver a report, and it was no doubt what the government of the day wanted to hear. But we have paid the price over the next 60 years.

Bit in bold - simply not true - you really need to read the report in its entirety.

Here are some quotes from the report itself - which is available as a PDF on Railways Archive

"Suburban services feeding other centres of population are serious loss makers, and it will not be possible to continue them satisfactorily without treating: them as a part of a concerted system of transport for the cities which they serve."

There was also the focus on how freight costs could be effectively managed as well.

The killer for the railways both now and then were the fixed costs of having a rail line there, the maintenance, signalling etc of it - that was a high fixed cost before you even put a train on it. And that was the issue for most lightly used lines, there was no chance of ever covering the gap between the cost of having that piece of infrastructure and the revenue at the farebox.

 

[87 027]

The Serpell Report shows that thinking to slash back the network to a much smaller profitable core was still around in the early 1980s

 

[RT4038]

Especially considering all the forecasts, which were subsequently proven over the following 30-40 years, were that freight and passenger usage was going to fall. Add to that there's still a significant amount of protected routes that have not been reopened and the chances of them doing so anytime soon are basically zero.

Looking at the other Anglophone countries (US, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand) these forecasts have come true. Whilst I appreciate there are significant differences, what was happening in the US in particular very much influenced judgements in the 60s.

 

[infobleep]

By "1960s" closures, I assume you're referring to the Beeching closures - it's worth being aware that between 1950 and 1962 (the Beeching report was published in 1963) British Rail closed, on average, over 200 miles a year.

So there was quite alot of 'dead wood' to be removed. In the Beeching closures there were a few 'long' line closures which then pushed the overall route mileage closed up (e.g. the Great Central, Somerset and Dorset) but despite calls for those lines to be reopened, nobody's ever managed to construct a viable business case to demonstrate they actually would be useful.

I very much doubt that lines like the Somerset and Dorset, most of the Isle of Wight network and various other Beeching closures would ever have been profitable. Either they served minimal populations or they shadowed other routes which means they'd simply have reduced revenue on other lines making them less profitable.

And her look at the part of the Waverly route that reopened. Would that have happened in England?

I think the lines should have been safeguarded from development for a set time vut maybe that would still have made no difference. That doesn't mean you look after them but that development that stops reinstatement isn't allowed.

Are there any former lines today that don't mean the reopening case solely due to development along part of the former route?

 

[A0]

And her look at the part of the Waverly route that reopened. Would that have happened in England?

I don't think any of the closures in England or Wales were remotely comparable. The bit everyone keeps forgetting is places like Galashiels were *much* further away from their nearest railhead than any of the places on the Great Central or Somerset and Dorset.

For example Galashiels was over 20 miles from its nearest station, Hawick even further.

Yet on the GC places like Lutterworth is only 7 miles to Rugby, Woodford Halse 12 miles to Banbury. On the S&D Blandford's about 14 miles to Poole.

So the reality is in England, none of the lines which were closed created remote communities of the same scale - Hawick + Galashiels + Melrose + Selkirk is ~30,000. Whereas the longer lines in England which were closed were either closer to other rail links (GCR, M&GN, S&D) or ran through areas which even today are very rural with small communities e.g. Northallerton - Garsdale or Darlington - Penrith via Stainmore.

 

[tbtc]

A few thoughts. Before anyone gets their knickers in a twist, I’m not insisting on a railway where every station/ service/ like is profitable (clearly a country has an incentive to subsidise public transport, to a degree, there are social benefits from accessibility etc), but there comes a point at which heavy rail is too costly/ inflexible to serve every little market, e.g. if the numbers are too low to sustain a commercial minibus service then a DMU chugging along at a couple of miles to the gallon feels like a very expensive sledgehammer

1. Even after decades of overall growth nationwide (approx 1980-covid) , passengers numbers at hundreds of open stations and dozens of lines are still in the “basket case” territory. Right wingers like to tell us that “a rising tide lifts all boats” but (even after passenger numbers elsewhere going up for almost forty years in a row) there are still plenty of stations that struggle to achieve much more than a couple of departing passengers a day on average. If this is the case on the lines that were deemed healthy enough to survive Beeching then I’d shudder to think how low the numbers would be on lines that didn’t make the cut

2. Railway demand peaked in about 1910 and dropped significantly between then and 1980. So it’s understandable that lines were closing a hundred years ago, just like railways continued to close after Beeching (e.g. Woodhead in the 1980s), the 1960s just made the process a focused review where some methodology was applied to try to work out what could be “saved”. Without Beeching we’d have continued to see piecemeal closures (as indeed we did regardless), they’d have got less national attention, maybe we’d have seen some bigger cuts as each BR region quietly tried to balance its books rather than a nationwide benchmark being used to try to assess something “fair” nationally

3. Of course there were borderline cases where one route could have been spared, just as there are lines they did survive which continue to struggle today. I’m certainly sympathetic to some reopening campaigns. But a number of these campaigns only look a lot better after years of closure. For example, I can buy into the argument that we should have something linking the MML and WCML in the Leicester/ Northampton/ Beford. But then the MML-WCML link from Bedford to Bletchley isn’t exactly busy! Compare the SELRAP ambitions, where they claim a route from Skipton to Colne would have electrification and three passenger trains per hour (from Leeds and Bradford to Manchester Airport etc) plus an hourly freight, with how poorly used the surviving Skipton to Carnforth line is.

4. There are some creative suggestions for how we could have saved track bed/ infrastructure etc, but where does a cash strapped BR find the money needed to maintain all of that land? Close more lines or reduce other services, to try to balance the books? You might have mothballed a line but you presumably need to maintain viaducts etc to stop them falling does.

5. Should we have saved every canal bed, when thousands of miles of them were drained/ abandoned in the nineteenth century (because newfangled trains were better at carrying loads than barges)?

6. HS2 felt like a luxury project in the New Labour years but then increasingly important/ essential in the subsequent decade of growth on the motorways/railways between “the north” and London… post covid it feels less important… maybe in five years time things will look different again… making long term decisions is always fraught with difficulty… I’m amazed with the Sages on here who always feel like “we should have known” that Rail demand would double (which it did from about 1980-covid) but yet are often the same people reluctant to invest in things like HS2 because there’s no way of knowing whether technologies will make it obsolete!

And her look at the part of the Waverly route that reopened. Would that have happened in England?

The line as far as Tweedbank made some sense (not economic sense, admittedly, but social/political), but it’s not too dissimilar to some English projects, a simple linking a town to the nearest big city, not too dissimilar from Mansfield or Blyth or Portishead

But the people of Galashiels have a railway now. Opening the significantly busier “third” of the Waverley route is much better than insisting on “all or nothing”. A simple “stub” as far as Tweedbank means most demand is catered for