Scotrail HST serious tree strike avoidable- ASLEF.

[CarrotPie]

Certainly with hindsight it has turned out to be a very bad decision.

But would it have been without Carmont and then this?

 

[bramling]

But would it have been without Carmont and then this?

There also seem to be significant issues with fleet availability. I guess Covid probably didn’t help on that score.

I still reckon it’s worth a bet that within two years these trains will have been replaced by something else, probably the 222s. Perhaps the mistake was committing to the HSTs for such a long period, rather than as a total stop-gap - though works like power doors would have presumably had to be carried out regardless.

 

[VP185]

But the HST has no cab safety, which is why the drivers are angry?

It didn't even have a crash structure to have forces exceeding its design tested against it.

Edit.

To try and bring that round to something nearer the point of the thread, the HST as far as I understand, was never engineered to hit a tree, it was born in a different time, only a few years after the end of steam, however in the past 50 years trees, and the risk of trains hitting them, has grown significantly, and that is a risk which the HST is unsuitable for.

No train is engineered to hit a tree.

Of all the traction I drive, and put in a situation with a train vs a large tree, I wouldn’t put the HST at the bottom of the pile for what I consider to be the safest cab.

 

[duffield]

But the HST has no cab safety, which is why the drivers are angry?

It didn't even have a crash structure to have forces exceeding its design tested against it.

Edit.

To try and bring that round to something nearer the point of the thread, the HST as far as I understand, was never engineered to hit a tree, it was born in a different time, only a few years after the end of steam, however in the past 50 years trees, and the risk of trains hitting them, has grown significantly, and that is a risk which the HST is unsuitable for.

I thought it had one "safety feature" which, although not intended as such, probably saved the driver in this case - the room to escape the driver's seat quickly and get out of the worst impact area (this seems relevant since I'm pretty sure I've seen claims on this forum that this is not really possible in some more cramped cabs).

 

[bramling]

I thought it had one "safety feature" which, although not intended as such, probably saved the driver in this case - the room to escape the driver's seat quickly and get out of the worst impact area (this seems relevant since I'm pretty sure I've seen claims on this forum that this is not really possible in some more cramped cabs).

It is interesting to note that most older trains had a vestibule behind the cab unavailable for passenger use. Of such traction it seems the only types remaining with this feature are classes 150, 318 and 455, and of course HST power cars have the engine room.

I think I’m right in saying SWR lock out the front vestibule on their classes 158 and 159, but was that more to do with the possibility of having to access a signal post telephone than for driver egress?

With trains having tended to get busier, there’s now the increased risk that where cabs exit directly into passenger areas there is likely to be either people standing there or else luggage in the way.

 

[Meole]

Fallen tree warning given too late to stop crash

The train crashed into the tree at Broughty Ferry last December causing extensive damage

www.bbc.co.uk

Fallen tree warning too late to stop crash​

Helpline failure to communicate correctly it seems.

 

[Mag_seven]

The full RAIB report can be found here:

Report 13/2024: Collision between a passenger train and a fallen tree at Broughty Ferry

RAIB has today released its report into a collision between a passenger train and a fallen tree at Broughty Ferry, Dundee, 27 December 2023.

www.gov.uk

RAIB has today released its report into a collision between a passenger train and a fallen tree at Broughty Ferry, Dundee, 27 December 2023.

Summary
At around 13:09 on 27 December 2023, the 10:46 Perth to Aberdeen passenger service collided with a fallen tree approximately 1 mile (1.6 km) east of Broughty Ferry, Dundee. The train was travelling at around 84 mph (135 km/h) when the collision occurred. The train suffered significant damage to the leading driving cab. There were no physical injuries to the 37 passengers and three staff members on board the train.

 

[InOban]

The helpline couldn't get hold of NR
And the tree fell from a public park where other trees had been recently felled making the offending tree more vulnerable.

 

[Adam Williams]

Network Rail stated that calls to the SICC from the helpline rarely relate to safety of the line incidents, and as such they are given a lower priority when SICC staff are busy dealing with ongoing incidents.

This seems really suboptimal, the phone number is advertised as an emergency helpline to be used "if there's a safety threat to you or to others such as: people, animals, trees or objects on or near the track, damage or fault at a level crossing". How have they gotten to the point where the SICC routinely just ignore escalations, and what has gone wrong with the triage process if the SICC think that most of the escalations are non-critical?

Are people in this position (who've just witnessed windthrow onto railway property) better off ringing 999 vs persisting with the outsourced Journeycall contact centre - will the emergency services actually be able to get through to the control centre directly?

 

[TUC]

There's a big ASLEF meeting in Perth this Sunday with all HST driving depots invited. There seems to be a lot of anger amongst staff about not only the shambolic response by Network Rail, but anger that the HST still seems to be the only show in town according to Transport Scotland.
I hope that the drivers vote to boycott these heaps of scrap and we get a reliable intercity service using 158s or 170s. Enough is enough.

With the money for the new trains coming from whom?

 

[trainbow]

With the money for the new trains coming from whom?

They're already in the process of ordering replacements. I'm not sure where Christmas thinks they're gonna pull at 50 158/170 units from to make up for retiring the HSTs before this order is done.

https://www.railwaygazette.com/uk/scotrail-begins-hst-replacement-process/68038.article

 

[PupCuff]

Helpline failure to communicate correctly it seems.

That's evidently not the case as per the article and the report; the helpline operator made numerous attempts to pass the message on to NR control who could get trains stopped, but control didn't answer the phone.

In my opinion, it's quite unsatisfactory that the RAIB investigation doesn't establish what exactly the Incident Support Controller who was supposed to be answering the phone was doing at the time, instead referring to them vaguely "dealing with flood closures". Whether it was the case or not, the report is written in a way which allows the reader to infer that the ISC had intentionally left the helpline call ringing away unanswered whilst they did other stuff because the culture in NR Control was that calls from the helpline were rarely what they would consider important.

 

[WAB]

I found the photo of the phone concentrator to be very interesting - it looks like a much more basic system than is provided in other Controls, perhaps hence the lack of comprehending the urgency of the call.

No excuse for not providing the call centre with access to the Control emergency lines given the helpline's purpose includes members of the public reporting safety of the line issues.

Are people in this position (who've just witnessed windthrow onto railway property) better off ringing 999 vs persisting with the outsourced Journeycall contact centre - will the emergency services actually be able to get through to the control centre directly?

Prior to this event, yes, as they had access to the emergency lines which are pretty much guaranteed to be answered above all telephone and radio traffic. Now that the call centre has access to the emergency lines, I think it's much more likely that the message will get through in a timely manner.

 

[trainbow]

That's evidently not the case as per the article and the report; the helpline operator made numerous attempts to pass the message on to NR control who could get trains stopped, but control didn't answer the phone.

In my opinion, it's quite unsatisfactory that the RAIB investigation doesn't establish what exactly the Incident Support Controller who was supposed to be answering the phone was doing at the time, instead referring to them vaguely "dealing with flood closures". Whether it was the case or not, the report is written in a way which allows the reader to infer that the ISC had intentionally left the helpline call ringing away unanswered whilst they did other stuff because the culture in NR Control was that calls from the helpline were rarely what they would consider important.

If it were the case that the helpline's calls through were largely not an emergency, surely they should have a separate emergency and non-emergency number. Treating it as low priority surely would not pass any risk assessment. Absolutely wild imo.

 

[WAB]

That's evidently not the case as per the article and the report; the helpline operator made numerous attempts to pass the message on to NR control who could get trains stopped, but control didn't answer the phone.

In my opinion, it's quite unsatisfactory that the RAIB investigation doesn't establish what exactly the Incident Support Controller who was supposed to be answering the phone was doing at the time, instead referring to them vaguely "dealing with flood closures". Whether it was the case or not, the report is written in a way which allows the reader to infer that the ISC had intentionally left the helpline call ringing away unanswered whilst they did other stuff because the culture in NR Control was that calls from the helpline were rarely what they would consider important.

In a severe weather event, I wouldn't be surprised if the helpline call was one of many calls in the queue on the concentrator being ignored whilst other calls/GSMR calls/discussions with other controllers were prioritised.

Perhaps the helpline calls tended to be duff because of the lack of railway knowledge on the part of the call centre operators - I've had plenty of fun trying to get sense out of people from outsourced companies in the past.

 

[chuff chuff]

It was mentioned to us sometime ago the the helpline would have a priority line to control now.

 

[Falcon1200]

How have they gotten to the point where the SICC routinely just ignore escalations

That is not what happened.

In my opinion, it's quite unsatisfactory that the RAIB investigation doesn't establish what exactly the Incident Support Controller who was supposed to be answering the phone was doing at the time, instead referring to them vaguely "dealing with flood closures". Whether it was the case or not, the report is written in a way which allows the reader to infer that the ISC had intentionally left the helpline call ringing away unanswered whilst they did other stuff because the culture in NR Control was that calls from the helpline were rarely what they would consider important.

What the Incident Support Controller was doing was dealing with, or at least trying to deal with, were the multiple other incidents occurring at the time, and as the Helpline did not at that time have an Emergency number on which to call SICC there is no way the Controller could have known that that particular incoming call was high priority. I spent most of my career working in that very office (SICC) and on a day of severe weather phones are ringing constantly.

However now having an Emergency number will ensure that priority calls are answered immediately, regardless of other calls; The Emergency services already have such a number.

 

[Adam Williams]

That is not what happened

The report says otherwise.

Network Rail stated that calls to the SICC from the helpline rarely relate to safety of the line incidents, and as such they are given a lower priority when SICC staff are busy dealing with ongoing incidents.

In other words, they're ignored in favour of other ongoing incidents (as you'd expect there to be when there's challenging weather), and that's exactly what happened in this incident too. When they finally got around to dealing with it, it was too late.

 

[Falcon1200]

The report says otherwise.

In what way was the incoming call an escalation which was ignored? It was simply one more non-emergency (as far as SICC was aware) call received amongst a never-ending stream of other calls, some of which doubtless were emergency calls.

In other words, they're ignored in favour of other ongoing incidents (as you'd expect there to be when there's challenging weather), and that's exactly what happened in this incident too. When they finally got around to dealing with it, it was too late.

Not so much ignored as unable to be answered in time due to the sheer volume of other incoming calls.

 

[Adam Williams]

In what way was the incoming call an escalation which was ignored?

Every call from Journeycall to the SICC is an escalation. Otherwise Journeycall would've handled it themselves, noted the contact down and not escalated it.

The call wasn't answered, and they (the SICC) didn't call back, partly because of poor telecoms kit.

 

[SamYeager]

In what way was the incoming call an escalation which was ignored? It was simply one more non-emergency (as far as SICC was aware) call received amongst a never-ending stream of other calls, some of which doubtless were emergency calls.



Not so much ignored as unable to be answered in time due to the sheer volume of other incoming calls.

If the helpline had had an emergency number at the time is it likely that it would have been answered in time with the "sheer volume of other incoming calls"? If control is unable to cope with large number of calls during a major storm, which do seem to occcur at least once during a typical winter nowadays, then surely a system needs to put in place to deal with those other 'low priority' calls in a timely manner.

 

[PupCuff]

What the Incident Support Controller was doing was dealing with, or at least trying to deal with, were the multiple other incidents occurring at the time, and as the Helpline did not at that time have an Emergency number on which to call SICC there is no way the Controller could have known that that particular incoming call was high priority. I spent most of my career working in that very office (SICC) and on a day of severe weather phones are ringing constantly.

Again though - "dealing with". There is no detail in the RAIB report on what specific activities "dealing with" actually entailed in this case and how it was determined whether those activities were or were not more important than taking inbound calls. Okay, some other routes have flooded. Is "dealing with" that getting emergency calls out stopping trains, or is it going through uploading the MOM's photos from outlook into CCIL? Both are tasks which may need to be dealt with but the priority level of both those examples are wildly different.

What I'm trying to get at is, RAIB have chosen not to state in their report that the ISC did not answer the phone because - for example - they were on another call so could not take the escalation from the helpline. Instead, they have chosen to use vague references which open up the challenge towards workload prioritisation and control room culture. By not adequately challenging that element, it is - in my view - a missed opportunity for industry lessons to be learned on control room management.

 

[fgwrich]

y for the new trains coming from

They're already in the process of ordering replacements. I'm not sure where Christmas thinks they're gonna pull at 50 158/170 units from to make up for retiring the HSTs before this order is done.

https://www.railwaygazette.com/uk/scotrail-begins-hst-replacement-process/68038.article

Thankfully, that comment being replied to is from February post initial incident. I rather expect a more realistic approach has been taken by now, more so following the announcement this month from Transport Scotland.

 

[John Bishop]

A bit more concerning was the lack of BESR in force on that section of line given the weather conditions at the time the tree fell down. I’d rather not hit a tree when sitting at the front, but would rather hit it at 50mph than 85mph!

 

[chuff chuff]

A bit more concerning was the lack of BESR in force on that section of line given the weather conditions at the time the tree fell down. I’d rather not hit a tree when sitting at the front, but would rather hit it at 50mph than 85mph!

IIRC there was one further north but it finished at Carnoustie maybe Arbroath.

 

[WAB]

If the helpline had had an emergency number at the time is it likely that it would have been answered in time with the "sheer volume of other incoming calls"? If control is unable to cope with large number of calls during a major storm, which do seem to occcur at least once during a typical winter nowadays, then surely a system needs to put in place to deal with those other 'low priority' calls in a timely manner.

It would have been answered in time. The emergency lines have a distinct ringtone and are distinct on the concentrator, and will be for the attention of more than the area’s IC and ISC. Given the limited circulation of the number and the training on when it can be used, the prompt answering of this line is highly likely.

 

[AngusH]

The thing I'm still trying to understand, is there a benefit to inserting the SICC between the original call handler and the actual signal control center/signal box? (Dundee in this case?)

I assume that this ensures that the signallers only receive concerns considered to be serious
and aren't distracted by things that aren't relevant.
Possibly also so that all instructions flow through a single origin / chain of command.

edit: this also presumably means the call handler at journeycall doesn't need to have a directory of signal boxes or any location information (?)
but identifying location and identifying a local facility seems something call handlers often do.

But I can't see in this case that the SICC controller has any extra information to make a judgement.
Could they ever say no in such a case?
And then what would happen if they got it wrong.

Either the tree is on the line or it isn't and the Glasgow controllers can't tell which is true.

I feel like I'm possibly missing something, but I can't see what?

 

[43066]

With the money for the new trains coming from whom?

Well, it seems to be coming from somewhere.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 23 Dec 2024 ==

I rather expect a more realistic approach has been taken by now, more so following the announcement this month from Transport Scotland.

Indeed. Hopefully something that will continue to be prioritised.

 

[WAB]

The thing I'm still trying to understand, is there a benefit to inserting the SICC between the original call handler and the actual signal control center/signal box? (Dundee in this case?)

I assume that this ensures that the signallers only receive concerns considered to be serious
and aren't distracted by things that aren't relevant.
Possibly also so that all instructions flow through a single origin / chain of command.

edit: this also presumably means the call handler at journeycall doesn't need to have a directory of signal boxes or any location information (?)
but identifying location and identifying a local facility seems something call handlers often do.

But I can't see in this case that the SICC controller has any extra information to make a judgement.
Could they ever say no in such a case?
And then what would happen if they got it wrong.

Either the tree is on the line or it isn't and the Glasgow controllers can't tell which is true.

I feel like I'm possibly missing something, but I can't see what?

Expecting outsourced call handlers to understand the minutiae of signal box control areas is probably asking for a little too much.

It's also consistent with the signs on bridges which give the Route Control emergency number rather than the number for each signal box.

 

[DelW]

Surely the error here was by the original witness, in phoning the NR helpline. I thought everyone knew that in such a situation, what you need is Jenny Agutter waving her red underwear at the train driver ...