Sounds like the blind leading the blind. What a terrible indictment of London Midland's management when the people given the task of ensuring standards can't even manage them themselves.
Sounds like a typical Driver Manager
Sounds like the blind leading the blind. What a terrible indictment of London Midland's management when the people given the task of ensuring standards can't even manage them themselves.
Sounds like a typical Driver Manager
Sounds like the blind leading the blind. What a terrible indictment of London Midland's management when the people given the task of ensuring standards can't even manage them themselves.
... the importance of managers fully preparing before driving trains, the need for driving assessors to prepare as if they were driving the train and the use of unambiguous words in safety communications.
Sounds like the blind leading the blind. What a terrible indictment of London Midland's management when the people given the task of ensuring standards can't even manage them themselves.
In my view that's rather harsh.
Both were ex-drivers with a good degree of experience, so this is not a case of some newby being on the handle who had no idea about the railway.
A mistake was made, so it's for the industry to implement processes to minimise the chance of that mistake being made again.
Not harsh at all. A person in charge in implementing and maintaining standards should be of a high standard themselves. To miss an emergency speed restriction despite e-mails, late notice cases and trackside signed warnings is basic stuff.
Indeed. And the report describes this as 'the average loading for this service as reported by London Midland' (my emphasis).The passenger load of 2000 quoted by the RAIB seems deeply implausible to me. The seating capacity of a 12 car formation of class 350 is only 678. This implies 1322 standing passengers or 110 standees per carriage. This simply isn't credible. Even class 700s cannot be loaded to that level and they would be much better configured for standing space. Dwell times would be lengthened considerably as loading would resemble a 'how many students can fit in a telephone box / mini / whatever' competition!
In normal operation passengers are very reluctant to subject themselves to that level of crowding and it is often difficult for boarders to persuade the passengers already on board to move down to fully occupy the aisles between the seats. Even with a seated and standing total load of say 1200, most passengers would believe the train to be 'very crowded'.
Interesting that the train should contain 350264 (which was damaged in the recent derailment) - is that set London Midland's equivalent of 91023?
If I'm interpreting the report correctly, he didn't *miss* it, instead he had wrongly formed the opinion it didn't apply to the move he was carrying out.
The RAIB has published its report linked to from:
https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/overspeed-incident-at-queen-s-park
Summary:
One thing rather skimmed over was that this accident would not have happened if the driver manager driving hadn't confused "crossing" with "crossover". The report says this term is used ambiguously but the definitions section only gives one definition (the correct one in my view, where two rails cross in a set of points). The railway really needs to tighten up on use of jargon, in this case by someone who is supposed to be passing best practice on to others.
Answered the questions I was going to ask.
Just one, how do they detect over-speeds on an ESR, Is it something TC signalling wise? do they treat it is a SPAD?
Answered the questions I was going to ask.
Just one, how do they detect over-speeds on an ESR, Is it something TC signalling wise? do they treat it is a SPAD?
Is there any benefit in telling the driver that it's a problem with a crossing, rather than with the points or even with the track?
Answered the questions I was going to ask.
Just one, how do they detect over-speeds on an ESR, Is it something TC signalling wise? do they treat it is a SPAD?
In what sense? :roll:
The RAIB has also identified three learning points concerning the importance of managers fully preparing before driving trains
Wouldn't you expect the protecting signal on the Up Slow to be held at single yellow for such a severe speed restriction?
What action/inaction did the booked driver take before or on arrival at Euston to report the overspeed incident himself ? He must surely have noticed that the train was not doing 5 mph when passing Queens Park, as he will have read the Late Notice case so should,have been aware of the emergency speed restriction before starting the journey given that he was relieved by the DM en route. One wonders what would have happened if NR had not appointed the watchman who appears from the RAIB report to be the only person reporting this very serious incident.
What action/inaction did the booked driver take before or on arrival at Euston to report the overspeed incident himself ? He must surely have noticed that the train was not doing 5 mph when passing Queens Park, as he will have read the Late Notice case so should,have been aware of the emergency speed restriction before starting the journey given that he was relieved by the DM en route. One wonders what would have happened if NR had not appointed the watchman who appears from the RAIB report to be the only person reporting this very serious incident.
What action/inaction did the booked driver take before or on arrival at Euston to report the overspeed incident himself ? He must surely have noticed that the train was not doing 5 mph when passing Queens Park, as he will have read the Late Notice case so should,have been aware of the emergency speed restriction before starting the journey given that he was relieved by the DM en route. One wonders what would have happened if NR had not appointed the watchman who appears from the RAIB report to be the only person reporting this very serious incident.
The rostered driver wouldn't be required nor expected to take any action. He'd been relieved from being in charge of the train, so would have been travelling "pass", in the passenger area. There would be no need for him to be paying any attention to the running of the train.
No, that is what the lineside warning boards are for.
The passenger load of 2000 quoted by the RAIB seems deeply implausible to me. The seating capacity of a 12 car formation of class 350 is only 678.
That train is normally 2x350/2 and 1x350/1 on the back, so the seating capacity would be a bit higher. But yeah, 167 people in each carriage of a 350, including the three first class compartments, really isn't credible. I'd have said a really busy London Midland train at that time would have 1500 people on it, mind.
Quite frightening that London Midland gave the figure, really.
Other evidence for the figure being plucked out of thin air, is that the spring 2015 top 10 overcrowding statistics only had two 12 car trains in the table, both on SWT Waterloo services, carrying about 1200 passengers each.
A hypothetical LM 12 car train with 2000 on board would have been off the scale...