Quintinshill - Signalling

[Darren R]

The significance of the 0610 from Carlisle - the 'local' in question - was that it connected at Beattock into the northbound 'Tinto Express' from Moffat to Glasgow Central. Although the 0610 provided northbound local connections from the Sleepers, these were frequently late runners, and the northward connection at Beattock was considered more important. This resulted in the practice of the 0610 being despatched on time from Carlisle in the event of the Sleepers running late and then being shunted. In the six months prior to the crash, the 0610 had been shunted at Quintinshill 21 times. The frequency of this also led to the practice of the relieving day signaller travelling up to the box on the 'local' from Gretna station. To cover this up, when his shift finished st 0600, the night signaller ceased writing in the Train Register and instead wrote the entries on s piece of paper for the day signaller to copy on his arrival.

This is what happened on the day in question. At 0624 the northbound local arrived at Quintinshill, but the Down Loop was already occupied by a goods train. The local was shunted back to be held wrong line, a practice not dangerous per se, if the rules were followed.

This took some time, and train out of section wasn't sent to Gretna (to the south) until 0633, just in time for the first northbound Sleeper to be accepted. At the same time a southbound empty coal train was arriving in the Up Loop to allow the Troop Special to pass.

Train out of section for this southbound freight was received at Kirkpatrick (to the north) at 0634, but both of the signallers denied sending it. This is the problem with the Train Register. To an extent it is forged. There were two signallers in the box and we don't know who actually performed what action. Tinsley, the day signaller, was occupied by getting the Train Register up to date, and even though he himself had travelled on the footplate and was fully aware of the shunting movement, he took none of the necessary safety precautions. Additionally, Meaken (the night signaller) stayed in the box to read the morning newspapers and discuss the latest war news with the guards from the two freight trains who were also in the box.

At 0638 the first of the Down Sleepers passed without incident. At 0642, Kirkpatrick, in the absence of the blocking back signal, offered the Up Troop Special. Without even pausing to look outside the window, Tinsley accepted it immediately. It was at this point that all the Up line signals were pulled off.

Despite the presence of four railwaymen in the box, none of them realised what was happening. It is doubtful if track circuiting would have made any difference that morning. The Inspecting Officer of the Board of Trade, in his official report, had virtually no criticism of the equipment or working regulations, although he did conclude that track circuiting would almost certainly have prevented the accident. Given that Tinsley didn't even glance through the window, I'm not as sure.

 

[MarkyT]

Despite the presence of four railwaymen in the box, none of them realised what was happening. It is doubtful if track circuiting would have made any difference that morning. The Inspecting Officer of the Board of Trade, in his official report, had virtually no criticism of the equipment or working regulations, although he did conclude that track circuiting would almost certainly have prevented the accident. Given that Tinsley didn't even glance through the window, I'm not as sure.

If track circuits on the up main between the up home and starter had been present and had been interlocked with the up home signal, then the signalman would have been unable to pull the lever and therefore would also not have been able to clear the distant either. If the track circuit had also been cut into the block controls he would also not have been able to send a line clear.

 

[Tomnick]

In this case (and many others), I don't think that it would be practical to cut any such track circuit into the block controls, as a 'line clear' could (probably) be legitimately given with the facing points set into a clear Up Loop. Was there any example, in 1915, of track circuits being interlocked with signals as opposed to simply being a visual reminder?

 

[Darren R]

I was under the impression that track circuits were no more than a visual reminder in 1915. That's why they were recommended after Hawes Junction where an otherwise conscientious signaller caused a devastating crash through a simple act of forgetfulness.

 

[Taunton]

Meakin stated (correctly) that he was unable to send 2-4 as the coal empties were still in section

I don't understand this one, there's no interlock between the bell and the signalling. You can sent what you like on the bell. Furthermore it would make sense to the box to the north, who doubtless knew the local was being put over the road parallel to the goods taking the loop.

 

[ChrisPSR]

No problem Chris, I've located a copy of the book which should be with me soon!

Reading the accident report, however, it's clear that both Tinsley and Meakin denied sending 'train out of section' for the coal empties, but that someone (surely one of them, rather than anyone else in the box) did. Both mentioedn 'blocking back' - Meakin stated (correctly) that he was unable to send 2-4 as the coal empties were still in section, and Tinsley stated that it didn't occur to him to send it after taking duty as he'd already forgotten about the local standing on the Up Main. It's impossible to know who should have sent 2-4 without knowing who cleared back for the coal empties though! Failing to do so was one of the greatest failings though.

On lever collars, Tinsley stated that he did not use them for trains standing on the main lines, only for those in the loops (the former directly contravening the Regulations, as stated in the accident report), and Meakin merely states that he didn't consider it necessary whilst he had charge of the box. Misplaced confidence? Either way, the other great failing, and one that perhaps both chaps should have been held responsible for.

Finally, the suggestion that the loops were being used as sidings - I see nothing to substantiate this. The train in the Down Loop arrived at 6.14, and that in the Up Loop around 6.34, with the collision occurring at around 6.50. That doesn't point to them being used for anything other than routine traffic purposes.

First a lot of reasons and statements you provided are not apparent in May 1915reportage of the moment, enquiry, inquest or trial.
Most people talk of sending blocking back and that Meakin said he could not do it because............ This is not reported speach of Meakin I believe but current hearsay.
Blocking back. You say it couldn't be done because the coaler was still on line. Given that then it could never be given which is patently untrue because what on earth is the difference between a goods online the up, a Parly or for that matter a drunk laying across both rails. Do you still think blocking could not be given; God anyone in their right mind would do whatever they could to prevent a catastrophe of any sort. Unless they were an unfit for purpose person that is.

Chris S.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

The significance of the 0610 from Carlisle - the 'local' in question - was that it connected at Beattock into the northbound 'Tinto Express' from Moffat to Glasgow Central. Although the 0610 provided northbound local connections from the Sleepers, these were frequently late runners, and the northward connection at Beattock was considered more important. This resulted in the practice of the 0610 being despatched on time from Carlisle in the event of the Sleepers running late and then being shunted. In the six months prior to the crash, the 0610 had been shunted at Quintinshill 21 times. The frequency of this also led to the practice of the relieving day signaller travelling up to the box on the 'local' from Gretna station. To cover this up, when his shift finished st 0600, the night signaller ceased writing in the Train Register and instead wrote the entries on s piece of paper for the day signaller to copy on his arrival.

This is what happened on the day in question. At 0624 the northbound local arrived at Quintinshill, but the Down Loop was already occupied by a goods train. The local was shunted back to be held wrong line, a practice not dangerous per se, if the rules were followed.

This took some time, and train out of section wasn't sent to Gretna (to the south) until 0633, just in time for the first northbound Sleeper to be accepted. At the same time a southbound empty coal train was arriving in the Up Loop to allow the Troop Special to pass.

Train out of section for this southbound freight was received at Kirkpatrick (to the north) at 0634, but both of the signallers denied sending it. This is the problem with the Train Register. To an extent it is forged. There were two signallers in the box and we don't know who actually performed what action. Tinsley, the day signaller, was occupied by getting the Train Register up to date, and even though he himself had travelled on the footplate and was fully aware of the shunting movement, he took none of the necessary safety precautions. Additionally, Meaken (the night signaller) stayed in the box to read the morning newspapers and discuss the latest war news with the guards from the two freight trains who were also in the box.

At 0638 the first of the Down Sleepers passed without incident. At 0642, Kirkpatrick, in the absence of the blocking back signal, offered the Up Troop Special. Without even pausing to look outside the window, Tinsley accepted it immediately. It was at this point that all the Up line signals were pulled off.

Despite the presence of four railwaymen in the box, none of them realised what was happening. It is doubtful if track circuiting would have made any difference that morning. The Inspecting Officer of the Board of Trade, in his official report, had virtually no criticism of the equipment or working regulations, although he did conclude that track circuiting would almost certainly have prevented the accident. Given that Tinsley didn't even glance through the window, I'm not as sure.

My goodness..............So that's what happened..............Makes all the difference.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

I don't understand this one, there's no interlock between the bell and the signalling. You can sent what you like on the bell. Furthermore it would make sense to the box to the north, who doubtless knew the local was being put over the road parallel to the goods taking the loop.

Quite right Mr Taunton. Spot on.

Chris S.

 

[Tomnick]

I don't understand this one, there's no interlock between the bell and the signalling. You can sent what you like on the bell. Furthermore it would make sense to the box to the north, who doubtless knew the local was being put over the road parallel to the goods taking the loop.

Apologies, I wasn't very clear. I meant shouldn't rather than couldn't - the Regulations made it quite clear, as they still do, that one shouldn't block back into an already occupied section (and, using the principles of Absolute Block signalling to follow that to a logical conclusion, the box in rear should refuse any attempt to do so). Doing so merely introduces the potential for confusion, which is quite unnecessary given that the purpose of the 'blocking back (inside)' bell signal is to state one's intent to foul the line for which any facing points are set within the clearing point - so would only become relevant once the loop entry points had been returned to normal (thus bringing the local back inside the clearing point) anyway.

First a lot of reasons and statements you provided are not apparent in May 1915reportage of the moment, enquiry, inquest or trial.
Most people talk of sending blocking back and that Meakin said he could not do it because............ This is not reported speach of Meakin I believe but current hearsay.
Blocking back. You say it couldn't be done because the coaler was still on line. Given that then it could never be given which is patently untrue because what on earth is the difference between a goods online the up, a Parly or for that matter a drunk laying across both rails. Do you still think blocking could not be given; God anyone in their right mind would do whatever they could to prevent a catastrophe of any sort. Unless they were an unfit for purpose person that is.

I fear that you might be confusing 'obstruction danger' (which is an emergency bell signal and may be sent at any time necessary) with 'blocking back' (which isn't, and may not).

Meakin's suggestion that he couldn't (or shouldn't?) send 'blocking back' is indeed evidenced in the extract (linked above) from the accident return of the time, and I'll endeavour to support that with a quote as soon as technology permits.

My goodness..............So that's what happened..............Makes all the difference.

I think there are a few minor discrepancies in Darren's summary (when compared against the accident returns of the time), but it appears pretty much spot on otherwise - most of all, supporting those who suggested that 'train out of section' was sent (and no doubt Kirkpatrick's train register would have been withdrawn to support this) but that 'blocking back' wasn't. That latter omission, along with the failure to use lever collars as required by the Regs, was the trap that Meakin unwittingly laid for Tinsley to fall foul of as soon as he was offered the troop train.

 

[ChrisPSR]

Apologies, I wasn't very clear. I meant shouldn't rather than couldn't - the Regulations made it quite clear, as they still do, that one shouldn't block back into an already occupied section (and, using the principles of Absolute Block signalling to follow that to a logical conclusion, the box in rear should refuse any attempt to do so). Doing so merely introduces the potential for confusion, which is quite unnecessary given that the purpose of the 'blocking back (inside)' bell signal is to state one's intent to foul the line for which any facing points are set within the clearing point - so would only become relevant once the loop entry points had been returned to normal (thus bringing the local back inside the clearing point) anyway.

I fear that you might be confusing 'obstruction danger' (which is an emergency bell signal and may be sent at any time necessary) with 'blocking back' (which isn't, and may not).

Meakin's suggestion that he couldn't (or shouldn't?) send 'blocking back' is indeed evidenced in the extract (linked above) from the accident return of the time, and I'll endeavour to support that with a quote as soon as technology permits.


I think there are a few minor discrepancies in Darren's summary (when compared against the accident returns of the time), but it appears pretty much spot on otherwise - most of all, supporting those who suggested that 'train out of section' was sent (and no doubt Kirkpatrick's train register would have been withdrawn to support this) but that 'blocking back' wasn't. That latter omission, along with the failure to use lever collars as required by the Regs, was the trap that Meakin unwittingly laid for Tinsley to fall foul of as soon as he was offered the troop train.

Kirkpatrick's signalman of the moment Thomas Sawyers said that this had happened. That was after the death of some 240 persons.......What would you have said?
I do though accept that there is some evidence of that communication but I am not sure its proof positive.
Chris S.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

I understand that the 'conspiracy' book has an extract from the train register published - would it be possible for you to post some edited highlights, Chris? That should show whether 'train out of section' has been sent (or at least whether it had been booked). If it hadn't, though, the box in rear wouldn't have offered the troop train, without giving both chaps cause to step back and work out what was going on.

It seems generally accepted that the coal empties were recessed at Quintinshill because they couldn't be dealt with at Carlisle. Even if it was a local regulating decision, it seems unlikely that Meakin would ever have pulled off straight up the main - but, even if he had, both the Up Distant and Up Home (to the Main) must have been replaced (enforced by the mechanical locking) before the loop entry points could have been reversed. Whether it was to run up the Main or into the loop, there's also little doubt that it would have been protected by the block at T.O.L. (and, in turn, the section signal in rear) - that's the basic mode of signalling. I can't see any other likely course of events, then, other than Meakin sending 'train out of section' and leaving a clear block for the troop train to be offered.

Tomnick,

Your are obviously, like me looking for that loop hole that divulges the truth. Honestly, I am finding it very difficult to hold all the bits and pieces of knowledge together as there are so many and in all reality you/we need to make an asserted attempt at a diurnal layout of facts. Not sure I want to go that far. However:-
1] As far as I can remember in all four of the reports I have read, ( I am at Page 126 in TQC'y: Just 133 P's to go), to date I have read that there is absolutely no mention of the state of the signals when the coaler was held on the up or as it went into the up loop, with the one exception of the fact that Mr., Meakin is reported as to have set the signal for that train (coal empties) clear, and that includes not providing any clues as to what signal he referred. I have taken it to be the signal indicating that the trailing point and signal had been set clear and to branch for the coaler to advance into the loop.
2] You say "there's also little doubt that it would have been protected by the block at T.O.L.". That would seem to be speculative as I can find no reference as to how those signals were in fact set. One can only guess/surmise; for my purposes of reality that is I am afraid not good enough.
Having said those things I think we are as they say 'Pals in same boat'.

Cheers, Chris S.

 

[Taunton]

It is probably the case that the regulations about blocking back and putting a train over the road to the opposite running line were simplistic, and just envisaged a plain crossover between running lines. They likely did not envisage a turnout to a goods loop as well, with a second train running in parallel under signals into that loop. There were five trains at Quintinshill at the time, probably an unusual workload for a country wayside box.

I don't know the fine detail of the layout, but if the trailing crossover was beyond the 1/4 mile clearing point of the up home signal then it should not have prevented the acceptance of the troop train.

 

[MarkyT]

Whether or not he did or should have sent a blocking back bell code to the rear box according to the rules of the day, the Quintishill man should surely not have sent the 'train out of section' code nor should he have normalised his block instrument from the 'train on line' position, because he didn't have a clear overrun available to a block clearance point, 440yds from the home either along the up main or along the up loop. I did wonder, wildly speculatively, if perhaps there had been an unreported equipment failure which had allowed the block system to fall out of 'train on line' (perfectly possible with a dead cell or blown fuse for example). But even then the sending Quintishill instrument switch should have still been set in the 'train on line' position even if the corresponding telegraph needle wasn't, so on the subsequent giving of a line clear (opposite polarity usually fed by a separate battery) the signalman would have had to turn the knob two clicks straight from train on line to line clear - surely highly irregular and a warning in itself. Suggests that in order for the subsequnt line clear request and grant to have been so routine, so automatic, that the block must have been incorrectly fully normalised by one of the men previously.

 

[Taunton]

Except of course that the train sent by the box in the rear was indeed Out Of Section - it had gone into the loop. What was the situation when the points were reset was that there was now ANOTHER train standing on the main line, beyond the clearing point. I wonder to what extent the written instructions envisaged this.

Say, for example, a train was accepted, checked at the Home, and brought to a stand at the starter. You send Out Of Section because it is more then 1/4 mile beyond the Home. Then another train is offered, you accept it, check it with the Home, and put it into the loop, where it comes to a stand alongside the first. Change points behind it. Is that Out Of Section now? Yes it is. Do you send anything now to the box in the rear?

I would think it reasonable that the Quintinshill Up Home was well to the north, before the loop points and giving the 1/4 mile clearing before the crossover.

 

[MarkyT]

I don't know the fine detail of the layout, but if the trailing crossover was beyond the 1/4 mile clearing point of the up home signal then it should not have prevented the acceptance of the troop train.

There was only a single home signal close before the loop turnout and the signalbox and crossover was at about the middle point of the loops which from turnout to turnout extend almost all the way from one bridge to the next, that is between Quintishill Bridge and Blacksike Bridge, a distance of about 770m measured on Google Earth. It could easily be just about 1/4 mile to the obstruction from the home, so maybe you are right that he could have legitimately sent 'train out of section' as soon as he set the up loop entry points to normal after passage of the coal empties.

This map shows where the crossover was relative to the signalbox and the adjacent bridges north and south, The same field boundaries etc are clearly visible on todays google earth imaging. The OS map is rather earlier than the disaster and predates provision of the loops, but it's fairly likely the crossover stayed where it was. The box certainly did.

http://maps.nls.uk/view/82876974#zoom=4&lat=2716&lon=10909&layers=BT
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

Say, for example, a train was accepted, checked at the Home, and brought to a stand at the starter. You send Out Of Section because it is more then 1/4 mile beyond the Home. Then another train is offered, you accept it, check it with the Home, and put it into the loop, where it comes to a stand alongside the first. Change points behind it. Is that Out Of Section now? Yes it is. Do you send anything now to the box in the rear?

Logically I don't see the need to send 'blocking back'. The block would be fully clear with a suitable clear block overrun to the clearance point beyond the home. I agree it's no different really to the forward train held at the up starter.

I would think it reasonable that the Quintinshill Up Home was well to the north, before the loop points and giving the 1/4 mile clearing before the crossover.

Having looked at the maps I agree.

 

[Tomnick]

Kirkpatrick's signalman of the moment Thomas Sawyers said that this had happened. That was after the death of some 240 persons.......What would you have said?
I do though accept that there is some evidence of that communication but I am not sure its proof positive.

I'm sure that this would have been supported by the entry in the train register at Kirkpatrick. I accept that it's possible that Sawyers offered the troop train 'over the top' of something still on the block (with a gap in the train register that could later have been filled to try to cover it up), but it seems unlikely, especially if a cross-check of the two train registers highlighted nothing amiss (it also seems unlikely that Tinsley and Sawyers would have conferred in the aftermath!).

Your are obviously, like me looking for that loop hole that divulges the truth. Honestly, I am finding it very difficult to hold all the bits and pieces of knowledge together as there are so many and in all reality you/we need to make an asserted attempt at a diurnal layout of facts. Not sure I want to go that far.

I think we're broadly in agreement, aren't we? I don't think that's far away from the conclusion of the offical report either. The discussion has certainly been worthwhile, from a personal point of view at least, as it's prompted me to go digging around for some of the finer details, something that I'm finding most interesting!

Addressing your comments in turn, then:

However:-
1] As far as I can remember in all four of the reports I have read, ( I am at Page 126 in TQC'y: Just 133 P's to go), to date I have read that there is absolutely no mention of the state of the signals when the coaler was held on the up or as it went into the up loop, with the one exception of the fact that Mr., Meakin is reported as to have set the signal for that train (coal empties) clear, and that includes not providing any clues as to what signal he referred. I have taken it to be the signal indicating that the trailing point and signal had been set clear and to branch for the coaler to advance into the loop.

The empty coal train was signalled into the Up Loop - there's no doubt about that, from the evidence given - so the Up (Loop) Home signal (11) would have been cleared and, by virtue of the fact that the loop entry points were reversed, both the Up Distant (17) and Up (Main) Home (18) must have been 'on' - the mechanical interlocking would enforce that. Prior to that, both 11 and 18 were at danger, and the distant at caution - the evidence from the driver of the coal empties, brought to a stand at the Up Home, supports that:

James Benson, driver, states:-I am 38 years of age, and have been 20 years in the service-a driver for 10 years. On the date in question I was driver of the up empty wagon train. When I approached Quintinshill the signals were standing at danger, but on nearing the home signal the loop signal was cleared

2] You say "there's also little doubt that it would have been protected by the block at T.O.L.". That would seem to be speculative as I can find no reference as to how those signals were in fact set. One can only guess/surmise; for my purposes of reality that is I am afraid not good enough.

The extract from the accident return, again, provides a detailed description of how the block instruments functioned, and the mode of signalling - the basic principles of Absolute Block - meant that any train in section, signalled normally, should be protected by the block at 'train on line'. All evidence provided suggests that both the coal empties and the troop train (and indeed the trains on the down) were signalled normally, and I can't see any reason for them not to have been.

Having said those things I think we are as they say 'Pals in same boat'.

Absolutely!

It is probably the case that the regulations about blocking back and putting a train over the road to the opposite running line were simplistic, and just envisaged a plain crossover between running lines. They likely did not envisage a turnout to a goods loop as well, with a second train running in parallel under signals into that loop. There were five trains at Quintinshill at the time, probably an unusual workload for a country wayside box.

Two relevant snippets from the regulations are provided in the extract from the accident return, and the regulations seem to cater perfectly well for the layout at Quintinshill. My interpretation, limited by the fact that I can't check other relevant Regulations, is that 'train out of section' shouldn't have been sent until the Signalman was in a position to give "Line Clear" for a following train (which, with a train inside the clearing point on both lines, he wasn't). The regulation relating to 'blocking back' is rather less clear, but the evidence provided by Meakin and Tinsley suggests the broad principle is unchanged from that within the Absolute Block regulations today - that 2-4 ('blocking back inside home signal') is sent to seek permission from the box in rear to block the line for which facing points are set within the clearing point. We certainly wouldn't block back under those circumstances nowadays (with a train in the section, either on the move with facing points set for another line or at a stand at the home signal with facing points set for the line to be obstructed), and I can see nothing to suggest that it was broadly different back then.

I don't know the fine detail of the layout, but if the trailing crossover was beyond the 1/4 mile clearing point of the up home signal then it should not have prevented the acceptance of the troop train.

The distances were:
Up Home to south end of trailing crossover: 259yds
Up Home to Up Advanced Home (as named in the report): 376yds

That brings the local train well within the clearing point.

Except of course that the train sent by the box in the rear was indeed Out Of Section - it had gone into the loop. What was the situation when the points were reset was that there was now ANOTHER train standing on the main line, beyond the clearing point. I wonder to what extent the written instructions envisaged this.

Say, for example, a train was accepted, checked at the Home, and brought to a stand at the starter. You send Out Of Section because it is more then 1/4 mile beyond the Home. Then another train is offered, you accept it, check it with the Home, and put it into the loop, where it comes to a stand alongside the first. Change points behind it. Is that Out Of Section now? Yes it is. Do you send anything now to the box in the rear?

I would think it reasonable that the Quintinshill Up Home was well to the north, before the loop points and giving the 1/4 mile clearing before the crossover.

Since the loop points and trailing crossover were both well within the clearing point, the correct action nowadays would be to only send 'train out of section' only when the train has passed beyond the clearing point or facing points have been set for a line which is clear to the clearing point (neither condition being satisfied at Quintinshill). My interpretation of the extract from the Regulations in force at the time, as above, suggests that this was the case back then too.

If the trailing crossover had been beyond the clearing point, of course, things would have been very different, and there would have been no issue with clearing back behind the coal empties and accepting the troop train.

There was only a single home signal close before the loop turnout and the signalbox and crossover was at about the middle point of the loops which from turnout to turnout extend almost all the way from one bridge to the next, that is between Quintishill Bridge and Blacksike Bridge, a distance of about 770m measured on Google Earth. It could easily be just about 1/4 mile to the obstruction from the home, so maybe you are right that he could have legitimately sent 'train out of section' as soon as he set the up loop entry points to normal after passage of the coal empties.

This map shows where the crossover was relative to the signalbox and the adjacent bridges north and south, The same field boundaries etc are clearly visible on todays google earth imaging. The OS map is rather earlier than the disaster and predates provision of the loops, but it's fairly likely the crossover stayed where it was. The box certainly did.

http://maps.nls.uk/view/82876974#zoom=4&lat=2716&lon=10909&layers=BT

The distances given in the official report suggest that that wasn't the case, and indeed that would put the points into at least the Up Loop beyond the maximum distance (from the box) permitted for mechanical facing points (350yds - or less - at that time??). I have puzzled over the purpose of the 'spurs' shown at both ends of each loop, though - were they provided to allow trains longer than the distance between the loop entry crossover and the outlet crossover to use them, by drawing into the further spur then setting back into the nearer one? Irrelevant, but of possible interest all the same!

 

[edwin_m]

The distances given in the official report suggest that that wasn't the case, and indeed that would put the points into at least the Up Loop beyond the maximum distance (from the box) permitted for mechanical facing points (350yds - or less - at that time??). I have puzzled over the purpose of the 'spurs' shown at both ends of each loop, though - were they provided to allow trains longer than the distance between the loop entry crossover and the outlet crossover to use them, by drawing into the further spur then setting back into the nearer one? Irrelevant, but of possible interest all the same!

I wondered if that was the case too. The Up goods is reported to have backed up into the northern spur after arriving in the loop. For this backing move to take place the loop points would have to be normalised, and the signalman would probably need to watch it happen and perhaps even to authorise it by flag signal. Maybe this distraction was the reason for not sending a blocking back bell?

 

[Taunton]

The distances were:
Up Home to south end of trailing crossover: 259yds
Up Home to Up Advanced Home (as named in the report): 376yds

OK. I was thinking of GWR practice, which was always to have connections and any train standing at the Starter beyond the clearing point, at the expense where necessary of providing an Advanced Starter or Outer Home.

Since the loop points and trailing crossover were both well within the clearing point, the correct action nowadays would be to only send 'train out of section' only when the train has passed beyond the clearing point or facing points have been set for a line which is clear to the clearing point

Of course, when 99.9% of the time you give Out of Section when a train being looped is clear of the running line, it's easy to get into the habit.

The distances given in the official report suggest that that wasn't the case, and indeed that would put the points into at least the Up Loop beyond the maximum distance (from the box) permitted for mechanical facing points (350yds - or less - at that time??). I have puzzled over the purpose of the 'spurs' shown at both ends of each loop, though - were they provided to allow trains longer than the distance between the loop entry crossover and the outlet crossover to use them, by drawing into the further spur then setting back into the nearer one? Irrelevant, but of possible interest all the same!

Yes, this was common in those days before motored points were introduced, and it was also common then to not have loops but just a siding with a trailing point which a slow goods would be pushed back into. David L Smith writes in his books about the G&SW of the Jellicoe Coal Specials sent that way, 49 large coal wagons (with a single 0-6-0 in charge and just loco and van brakes). I wonder if this train was indeed pushed back, further extra lever moves.

 

[Tomnick]

I wondered if that was the case too. The Up goods is reported to have backed up into the northern spur after arriving in the loop. For this backing move to take place the loop points would have to be normalised, and the signalman would probably need to watch it happen and perhaps even to authorise it by flag signal. Maybe this distraction was the reason for not sending a blocking back bell?

There were, to the best of my knowledge, signals provided for the moves in and out of each of the spurs. The only unsignalled moves were those to get the local across the road and back again! Either way, though, it seems fair to suggest that the added workload at an already busy time would've made it more likely that the local would be overlooked, as it was.

OK. I was thinking of GWR practice, which was always to have connections and any train standing at the Starter beyond the clearing point, at the expense where necessary of providing an Advanced Starter or Outer Home.

Always? It's certainly not an unusual arrangement (providing an outer home to permit acceptance where there are regular moves that'd otherwise foul the clearing point), but I'm not convinced that it was always the case. We digress, however!

Of course, when 99.9% of the time you give Out of Section when a train being looped is clear of the running line, it's easy to get into the habit.

Exactly! That sort of thinking, looking more at the human factors involved, is rather more productive in my opinion, and that seemed to be the general thrust of Neil Oliver's documentary (and the 'Conspiracy' book by Searle and the other chap?). It was identified at the time, not wrongly, that a series of omissions and errors by the two signalmen (including, most significantly, not using lever collars and clearing the block without, however it should have been done, indicating that the line within the clearing point was obstructed). Dealing with the two signalmen, without taking any other action, just leaves the door wide open for someone else to make the same errors in the future. Of course, the railway has always been pretty good at learning from its mistakes (it's often said that the Rules & Regs are written in the blood from the many accidents in years gone by), and I don't doubt that lessons were learnt at the time. In more recent years (I don't know when they were introduced), reminders to sit upon the block instrument commutator came into being - effectively the equivalent of the lever collar, which, had one been available to apply when the local was shunted across, might have made Meakin or Tinsley (whoever did it) think twice before clearing back for the coal empties.

Yes, this was common in those days before motored points were introduced, and it was also common then to not have loops but just a siding with a trailing point which a slow goods would be pushed back into. David L Smith writes in his books about the G&SW of the Jellicoe Coal Specials sent that way, 49 large coal wagons (with a single 0-6-0 in charge and just loco and van brakes). I wonder if this train was indeed pushed back, further extra lever moves.

Indeed, I think that the most common arrangement by far was a simple siding with a trailing connection (and often within the clearing point, at that). Given the much lower speed of goods traffic back then, and the much greater margins that they'd need as a result, the additional three or four minutes that it'd take to push back inside would really be neither here nor there. I suspect that the arrangement at Quintinshill was relatively unusual, and that it was only with the introduction of motorised points that the refuge sidings could be converted to (longer) loops. Unfortunately for those around at the time (who probably never knew what they were missing), it took many more decades for tail lamp cameras to come onto the scene!

 

[ChrisPSR]

Hi,

Has anybody managed to find a copy of the Caladonian Rules and Regulations of 1906, the last that I can find published by the CRA., prior to 1915? I have written the CRA., requesting a copy but so far have not received a reply.

The earliest R & R's that I have been able to get hold of are those of the NER of 1922. Whereas I am sure that many of the rules would be similar to the CRA., I don't believe one can rely on them as concurrent with the CRA., rules nor at 1922 are they a safe bet as they may well be updated and utilising the experience of Quintinshill and others as at Beatock. This work is entitled and notated as "Volume 1" (One) and is scanned from the original book to .pdf and therefore carries much misspelling and wrong words of scanned and character recognised works especially as I guess nobody wants to manually correct 350 pages.

Chris S.

 

[Clarence Yard]

A couple of recent posts talk about the block instrument and assume it operates like a conventional BR block with turning moves. The blocks here were standard Caledonian single wire two (actually two and a half) position instruments with semaphore indicators for both lines and two large plungers (one red, one white) and a tapper. You signal using both plungers and the tapper. There is also a small brass plunger on the side of the instrument which cancels the train on line indicator (the half!) which also sits on the face of the instrument.

The exact way of operating these instruments is in the accident report, iirc, so I won't repeat them here but in the Quintinshill case, I would have, when giving T.O.S. for the freight, not pushed the brass plunger on the side, therefore not releasing the main plunger to allow another train in and then, using the tapper, give 2-4. The train on line indicator would therefore still be on and no new train could have been accepted.

I have operated this kind of block instrument fairly regularly at a signalling simulation and what it does need is a keen eye on your booking because your visual "triggers" are different to using a standard style block. It's a nice piece of kit though and once you work it out, fairly easy to use.

 

[Taunton]

From the military side, there's an "artist's impression" here of the moment of second collision here on the Royal Scots website.

I suppose we can forgive things such as the tender labelled LNER.

http://www.theroyalscots.co.uk/page/the-quintinshill-gretna-train-crash-22-may-1915

 

[ChrisPSR]

From the military side, there's an "artist's impression" here of the moment of second collision here on the Royal Scots website.

I suppose we can forgive things such as the tender labelled LNER.

http://www.theroyalscots.co.uk/page/the-quintinshill-gretna-train-crash-22-may-1915

Taunton,

I know that the NER., had running orders over the self same Cal'y lines with their own tracks leading from Newcastle to Carlisle and the LNER., was I think constituted on or about 1922 as the first edition of their rule book commences there. Whether the LNER., continued with those RO's or not I do not know.

However it seems that the lad who had drawn the artwork was possibly in a state as they say of "Nere a slip twixt cup and lip" which in all probability is forgiveable especially if it was drawn some time after the event.

I haven't seen anywhere who owned the engine that brought down those unfortunate soldier lads but could it have been the NER? Or even; was the LNER., constituted earlier than imagined and was the engine that of the LNER?

More guessing and irrelevant conjecture! Apologies.

Chris S.

 

[Taunton]

No, this all happened long before the LNER was thought of, and the Caledonian didn't go into the LNER in 1923 anyway, but into the LMS. All the locos involved were Caley ones, and I don't believe the NER had any running powers north of Gretna. However, the rolling stock of the troop train was, surprisingly, Great Central, who normally got nowhere near either start or finish of the trip, which was Larbert to Liverpool Exchange. It was doubtless 19th century wooden-bodied non-corridor stock, being used as and when under central government control, which had been introduced for military traffic.

It looks as though the artist has based their locomotives on a B1, a design of the 1940s; I would think the sketch is probably quite recent. This goes along with an artwork representation I saw some years ago of soldiers leaving for the Boer War, on a train hauled by a GWR King.

If you take the link onward from the military page above to the list of those killed, it is notable that even on the down express most of the passengers were military; the fact that the train was a relief, the first section having passed Quintinshill before the accident, shows the extent to which the railway was running at far more than its normal traffic levels. There's also a photograph on the page of the ragged survivors grouped together after the incident; I believe they were indeed sent onwards to their intended destination of Gallipoli, going by ship from Liverpool, and a significant number of them ended up being lost there. That battle is having its own 100 years commemoration at present.

 

[ChrisPSR]

No, this all happened long before the LNER was thought of, and the Caledonian didn't go into the LNER in 1923 anyway, but into the LMS. All the locos involved were Caley ones, and I don't believe the NER had any running powers north of Gretna. However, the rolling stock of the troop train was, surprisingly, Great Central, who normally got nowhere near either start or finish of the trip, which was Larbert to Liverpool Exchange.

HI. Taunton, Your guessing again.

1] I said that the LNER was probably formed in 1922. Probably out of the NER.

2] The LMS didn't exist in 1915. It was constituted at the beginning of 1923 and mainly from the Midland Railway and other grouped railways. The principal owner user of the road around 1915 and south of Carlisle was the LNWR., with the NER., coming into Carlisle from Gretna.

3] The LNER was so formed as 2 above from the NER & other grouped companies.

4] NER Actually had a line running through Gretna and into Carlisle.

5] I hold a map that shows that the NER went North of Gretna to Kirtle Bridge. Subsequent maps of the LNER., do not show this road as one of their routes.

6] It is well documented that the coaches to carry the troupes from Larbet to Liverpool were in fact borrowed from the GCR. Where the engine came from I find no note.

7] The troupes went on to Liverpool and although they were ordered home seem to have - on release from hospital - formed a rank and marched to the station where the train to Liverpool was to depart and hence Gallipoli. Some of the children in the neighbourhood thought that they were in fact captured enemy and regrettably threw sticks and stones at them.

Thought you had the book now!

 

[Taunton]

HI. Taunton, Your guessing again.

Unlikely. Despite a GWR background.

6] It is well documented that the coaches to carry the troupes from Larbet to Liverpool were in fact borrowed from the GCR. Where the engine came from I find no note.

Just FYI, it was Caledonian No 121, a "Dunalastair" 4-4-0. It was substantially rebuilt at St Rollox works after the accident and lasted until 1961, latterly as BR No 54465. The full train formations are well documented in the official accident report

http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BoT_Quin1915.pdf

Regarding the other points, I'll leave it to others to comment on.

 

[ChrisPSR]

Unlikely. Despite a GWR background.
Just FYI, it was Caledonian No 121, a "Dunalastair" 4-4-0. It was substantially rebuilt at St Rollox works after the accident and lasted until 1961, latterly as BR No 54465. The full train formations are well documented in the official accident report

http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BoT_Quin1915.pdf

Regarding the other points, I'll leave it to others to comment on.

Taunton,

Oh-kay thanks for that. The thread has wobbled so far of course though from my request for help with lots most people offering almost stupidly simple answers from common reportage so that at this point in the exercise all we are getting is reported rhetoric so from now I'm out. As for the BBC's attempt at re-telling that tragic day; well if you know absolutely nothing about railways then it was a dramatic documentary but for the rail enthusiast it was too massively short of serious content, so they were of no use. I'll finish the book and make my own mind up as to what really happened but one thing that I am sure did happen was that the Parly on the up main went without protection from it seems the outset of its crossing over unto it being a train no more.

Note I said, "I am sure". I cast the net no further, in any direction.

Chris S.

 

[Tomnick]

I'll finish the book and make my own mind up as to what really happened but one thing that I am sure did happen was that the Parly on the up main went without protection from it seems the outset of its crossing over unto it being a train no more.

I've been a bit out of the discussion since yesterday, but am now in receipt of the Conspiracy book. I would agree, though, that the Parly wasn't properly protected whilst standing on the Up Main (discussing the technicalities of 'blocking back' or use of lever collars doesn't change the stated fact that neither were used!), but that it must have been protected for fixed signals at least until the coal empties were clear inside the loop - the exact time at which they were subsequently cleared for the troop train makes little difference, as the lack of 'blocking back' and lever collars (that allowed the Parly to be overlooked without a second thought) are, as I think we agree, the critical failings that led to that relatively simple error.

 

[ChrisPSR]

I've been a bit out of the discussion since yesterday, but am now in receipt of the Conspiracy book. I would agree, though, that the Parly wasn't properly protected whilst standing on the Up Main (discussing the technicalities of 'blocking back' or use of lever collars doesn't change the stated fact that neither were used!), but that it must have been protected for fixed signals at least until the coal empties were clear inside the loop - the exact time at which they were subsequently cleared for the troop train makes little difference, as the lack of 'blocking back' and lever collars (that allowed the Parly to be overlooked without a second thought) are, as I think we agree, the critical failings that led to that relatively simple error.

I said I am out of this thread but I have to thank you for your agreement on the status of the Parly. But: I cannot find anything that says that Meakin, (for Meakin it would have to have been due to time) cleared (as in cleared away) the signals after the coaler was placed in the sidings. What Meakin is reported to have last done was to clear the signals and trailing points for the branch into the Up Loop, I believe.

Now I'm really out.
Chris

 

[Tomnick]

What is "cleared away", please? The Up Main Home and the Up Distant must have been 'on' (danger/caution) whilst the coal empties were being admitted to the loop - the mechanical interlocking, by then a fundamental part of any signalling installation, would have prevented that. The Up Loop Home signal (which had authorised that movement) must have been replaced to danger before the loop entry points were returned to normal, and at some time after that, the signals right through on the Up Main were cleared (that is, to show a proceed indication). Do you disagree with any of that?

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Just a thought - "if" Quintinshill had properly blocked back on the up main - and collars applied to the up main home - would Kirkpatrick have also collared his up main starting signal ? (as a belt and braces measure) ......to prevent an inadvertent "pull off" - all of this of course was basically with a "free block" - no "Welwyn Control" or "line clear - one pull" safeguards which were generally applied in some measures over the following years.

Am wondering if there is nothing more to say on this thread.....

 

[Tomnick]

I don't know when 'line clear' releases came into widespread use, or whether they were provided around Quintinshill at that time (I'll readily accept that they weren't!), but, even if it was a free pull on Kirkpatrick's starter, at least sending 'blocking back' should have stopped the troop train being offered - another layer of protection, another layer of cheese for the holes to line up...

 

[krus_aragon]

However believe it or believe it not I managed to buy the book 'Brand New' from the bookshop "The Works" and all for the miniscule cost of 5 quid. If you don't live near them then phone them up and see if they will send you one.

The book is also available through their website. If you haven't shopped with them before, they have "free delivery" promotions and the like several times a month to entice new shoppers.