Public Accounts Committee PAC report

[MarkRedon]

Another in what promises to be a long list of reports which kick the UK railway community without necessarily providing clear answers or forward directions, the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons has produced a report which the Guardian newspaper describes today at http://www.theguardian.com/business...stment-plan-has-staggering-costs-report-finds. The specific target of this report would appear to be the ORR, whose own suggestions were previously discussed in this forum at http://www.railforums.co.uk/showthread.php?t=122097.

 

[Xenophon PCDGS]

Surely the Public Accounts Committee are there to perform the type of accountancy function for submissions. They have no remit to act as the providers of solutions and I wonder if there is a certain amount of confusion with the large organisations such as PwC UK who carry out that type of commercial guidance.

 

[Taunton]

What I have not yet found is any statement of where the extra £1 bn and upwards, or the extra time, has actually gone. A great deal is written about the overspend without any analysis of what the extra money is being spent on, and why it was not in the original pricing.

Given that (presumably) the same number of track miles of wire, same number of masts, same number of substations, etc are to be provided as originally specified, and contracted for, what other aspects have skyrocketed?

 

[thenorthern]

Just seen this on BBC News

Rocketing rail electrification costs unacceptable, say MPs

A £1.2bn hike in the cost of the Great Western Main Line rail electrification is "staggering and unacceptable", the Public Accounts Committee has said.
Upgrading the line between Maidenhead and Cardiff was set at £1.6bn in 2014 but is now estimated to cost £2.8bn.

MPs said it was not clear why and said Network Rail had "lost its grip" on large projects.

Network Rail said planning of the scheme had not been good enough but changes had been made to control costs.

The line from London to Oxford and Bristol Parkway was originally due to be electrified in 2016, to Cardiff in 2017 and Swansea in 2018.

In June the government "paused" the Midland Main Line and TransPennine route electrification schemes due to costs but said the Great Western Main Line scheme remained "a top priority".

However, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) heard in October that there was now no firm completion date and costs could reach £2.8bn.

Regulator the Office of Rail and Road (ORR), which calculated the £1.6bn estimate, had not been robust enough in scrutinising Network Rail's plans or ensuring it addressed risks, the PAC report said.

It added there was still "far too much uncertainty" on costs and timescales for the TransPennine and Midland Main Line projects, which have been pushed back into the 2020s.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-34868859

It seems that someone at the DfT has got their sums wrong again.

 

[NSEFAN]

Aren't the extremely high costs in part down to the lack of an ongoing electrification programme? If everything has to be done from scratch for each project, especially if things are moved from contractor to contractor, then it's no wonder that costs will escalate.

 

[steverailer]

Rough guess

1. The original budget was based on the all singing, all dancing HOPS train doing nearly all the work, but conventional methods have had to be employed so the cost has spiralled. Added to the fact its bloody useless and can't get the output it says, conventinal methods are out working it every night.

2. Material supply problems from the supplier in Italy meaning delays in getting stuff out on track,and short work nights/standbys as a result (Before you say lay the staff off,the problem would then have arose of no staff when the materials actually turn up as the suppliers of the staff would move them onto other work elsewhere)

3. As the work has gotten further behind more managers brought in to try and get the work back up to date and find out why its running so late. These all want paying and usually cause more dissruption and confusion than they solve. (eg 4 managers/technitians reporting a item is installed on the night.2 weeks later another identical item sent to same location to be installed because the system says its not been done ???????)

BTW I don't work on there, just what I've been told by friends that do

 

[MarkRedon]

Surely the Public Accounts Committee are there to perform the type of accountancy function for submissions. They have no remit to act as the providers of solutions and I wonder if there is a certain amount of confusion with the large organisations such as PwC UK who carry out that type of commercial guidance.

The Guardian newspaper today reported that the Public Accounts Committee PAC of the House of Commons has published another in that series of reports which over the next few months will kick the UK railway community rather hard. See http://www.theguardian.com/business...stment-plan-has-staggering-costs-report-finds. Still to come are the Shaw report, Sir Peter Hendy’s revised delivery plan, and an overall and uncomfortable level of public scrutiny of how it is that the rail industry spends so much and sometimes appears to deliver so little.

The report by the PAC can be found at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmpubacc/473/47302.htm

Direct evidence was taken by the PAC from:
Philip Rutnam, Permanent Secretary, Department for Transport,
Mark Carne, Chief Executive, Network Rail, and Richard Price, Chief Executive, Office of Rail and Road

I here quote in a summarised form the conclusions and recommendations made by the PAC:

1. The 2014–2019 rail investment programme could not have been delivered within the budget which the Department, Network Rail and the Office of Rail and Road agreed…
Recommendation: For the next planning round for rail investment, and in all future investment planning, the Government must assure itself that its plans can be delivered. For all rail spending decisions the Department, Network Rail and the Office of Rail and Road must assess and explain how uncertainty in key projects could affect the plan’s overall costs and schedule.

2. The Office of Rail and Road’s approach to reviewing the efficiency of Network Rail’s costs is unconvincing and it was not robust enough in scrutinising Network Rail’s plans…
Recommendation: The Department should carry out a fundamental review of the regulator’s role and effectiveness in rail infrastructure planning.

3. The rail investment planning and funding model is not adequate for major enhancement work such as the current electrification schemes…
Recommendation: The Department, Network Rail and the Office of Rail and Road should put in place sharper accountability arrangements for major enhancement projects, such as the Great Western Main Line electrification. They should also agree principles on when it is appropriate to fund and manage these projects outside the five year rail funding cycle, and build in strong accountability mechanisms to avoid costly overruns.

4. Network Rail’s reclassification as a public body has brought reduced flexibility to borrow to cover cost increases. Before reclassification in 2014, Network Rail covered cost increases through borrowing from the financial markets, but now it can only borrow from government, with a loan cap of £30.3 billion…
Recommendation: Network Rail must embed much tighter project planning, costing and cost control throughout the organisation and be clearer with the Department about what can and cannot be afforded. We want to see clearer accountability for project costs and project management.

5. Cost increases on the Great Western Main Line electrification programme are staggering and unacceptable. Network Rail estimates that the Great Western Main Line electrification programme will cost between £2.5 and £2.8 billion, £1.2 billion more than the £1.6 billion which the Office of Rail and Road said it should cost, a year ago…
Recommendation: The Department and Network Rail should publish an updated schedule and cost forecast for the Great Western Main Line electrification programme, a full account of what has caused the cost increases to date and proposals for controlling future costs, including the liabilities associated with the new electric trains.

6. Without active engagement and management of the supply chain, skills shortages in key areas pose serious risks to Network Rail delivering its plans… With proper planning, a skills shortage should be no excuse for delivery failure or delay.
Recommendation: The Department and Network Rail should publish a rail skills strategy for the industry with milestones for delivery.

7. There is still far too much uncertainty on costs and eventual delivery dates for the other two major rail electrification programmes in the 2014-2019 programme. Electrification of both the TransPennine route and the Midland Main Line will now be delayed into the next five year planning period (2019–2024)… Sir Peter Hendy’s review of these and the other rail enhancement planned for 2014-2019, which is to be published towards the end of this year, will bring more bad news on costs.
Recommendation: The Department and Network Rail, drawing on the Hendy review, should publish a revised programme of rail electrification improvements, including the rationale for prioritisation between projects, with updated cost and delivery forecasts.

8. There is a risk that more projects will be delayed in order to balance Network Rail’s budget. Over promising what can be delivered leads to inevitable delays and cost overruns; and simply delaying projects further as a budget management mechanism is not good financial planning.
Recommendation: The Department and Network Rail need to have a clear and agreed public strategy about which rail projects are deliverable. Deadlines for key milestones must be clear, realistic, and transparent to passengers and the public.

Here are some suggestions responding to that PAC report. I would like to suggest that people on this forum, most of them very knowledgeable about an industry which in most cases they love: try to put forward answers and solutions to very real questions.

The challenge for the industry can be put simply: provide answers to the “how-to?” questions:

1. How do we drive down investment costs?
2. How do we drive down daily operating costs?
3. How do we drive up delivered everyday quality?
4. How do we drive up delivered project success?
5. How do we learn better to manage enhancement projects, when for too long all our management expertise has been in maintenance and renewals?

Behind that are some challenging “why?” questions, for example, why is the operating railway so expensive to maintain and so costly to enhance and what can be done to reduce those costs? My own quick suggestions here include the observation that in Network Rail, we have a monopsony buyer, not previously strongly incentivised to reduce costs, dealing in effect with a small cartel of monopoly industry suppliers principally represented via engineering consortia. A common answer is to introduce the pressures of real buyer choice and of competition. The move towards reorganisation within Network Rail on a route basis is perhaps intended to provide benchmarking, but perhaps also real competition: you can have more resources if you deliver on these commitments. However, I think the unit of accountability is probably too large and the degree of real competition too low. So my own suggestion is that the fundamental unit should become a relatively local route, sufficiently close to the end consumer – the passenger – to offer real choices. Wherever possible, there should always be a direct choice possible between at least two options. Within these choices, there should be real consequences of success (in the form of reward, in particular additional resources) and penalties for failure (primarily financial penalties on managers).

If this is regarded as unrealistic, I will give an example. I used to live in Bingley in West Yorkshire. Never having owned a car, and working across a large part of the United Kingdom and sometimes abroad, I had to choose how to travel. I frequently had to work in central Manchester. I would normally take the train to Leeds and change to Trans Pennine North. However, I did have the choice of a train or a bus and a train onwards from Bradford Interchange. Not a particularly attractive journey, I would still sometimes take that choice not least because it existed – or because the route via Huddersfield was disrupted. In a better world, I could have travelled west from Bingley through Skipton, Colne and onwards. For this and similar reasons I am a strong supporter of the reinstatement of railway links that increase network connectivity. In this light, reopening Skipton to Colne, Brighton to Uckfield (not necessarily via Lewes), and Oxford to Cambridge make perfect sense.

Opening a new long branch line to Tweedbank will only make network sense if it is ever extended to Carlisle – which will not happen in my lifetime - and in any event many alternative network possibilities already exist.

We know that in the few areas in which choice is readily available to the passenger, they benefit from a more diverse offering and often from lower fares – e.g. Grand Central, Chiltern Mainline. I suppose that I am arguing in favour of, if not micro-franchises, at least mini-franchises. If you want examples, you might do worse than to look at the titles which are given to lines in West Yorkshire, thus contrast three separate routes Calderdale, Huddersfield, and then (and you cannot split this one) Airedale and Wharfedale.

Paul has correctly pointed out that it is not the job of an auditor to provide solutions to issues that the auditor recognises. Nor are my “answers” likely to be the right ones. What do others think? Let’s have a real and positive debate on better structures and organisation and management.

 

[Philip Phlopp]

Rough guess

1. The original budget was based on the all singing, all dancing HOPS train doing nearly all the work, but conventional methods have had to be employed so the cost has spiralled. Added to the fact its bloody useless and can't get the output it says, conventinal methods are out working it every night.

2. Material supply problems from the supplier in Italy meaning delays in getting stuff out on track,and short work nights/standbys as a result (Before you say lay the staff off,the problem would then have arose of no staff when the materials actually turn up as the suppliers of the staff would move them onto other work elsewhere)

3. As the work has gotten further behind more managers brought in to try and get the work back up to date and find out why its running so late. These all want paying and usually cause more dissruption and confusion than they solve. (eg 4 managers/technitians reporting a item is installed on the night.2 weeks later another identical item sent to same location to be installed because the system says its not been done ???????)

BTW I don't work on there, just what I've been told by friends that do

And Schedule 4/Schedule 8 compensation payments to train operating companies. The signal failures that have occurred have been costly.

 

[thenorthern]

I think if Network Rail was a proper private company financially it would be much more efficient in electrification costs as there seems to be a lot of waste in infrastructure projects.

Selling off Network Rail though would not be a good idea given the history of Railtrack PLC and cutting safety standards.

 

[steverailer]

The challenge for the industry can be put simply: provide answers to the “how-to?” questions:

1. How do we drive down investment costs?
2. How do we drive down daily operating costs?
3. How do we drive up delivered everyday quality?
4. How do we drive up delivered project success?
5. How do we learn better to manage enhancement projects, when for too long all our management expertise has been in maintenance and renewals?

The problem with some of these How-to questions is they can't be achieved in the short term. 1 and 2 especially due to the significant lack of investment over the past decades, alot of the infrastructure is in need ofsignificant upgrade/repair.

The same can be said for 4 and 5, due to the lack of previous spending alot of skill and knowledge has gone from the industry,it is being replaced but will take time and possibly some late delivered programmes, but as time goes on it will get better.

 

[HowardGWR]

And Schedule 4/Schedule 8 compensation payments to train operating companies. The signal failures that have occurred have been costly.

That's interesting; with SteveRailer's points, I wonder what the proportions are for each cause?

With the payments to the TOCs, I can see Mick Cash building up a head of steam with a 'lining the pockets of the franchisers at tax payers' expense' press release.

In fairness, he has a point. If the operating companies were NR, such 'payments' would simply be an internal departmental appropriation (if they bothered). What are the true costs? Well, replacement buses are a direct cost, if any were organised. Outside of that, there could be some overtime worked by staff if schedules were disrupted

But would those costs approach the sort of sums that the franchise holders are coining in?

 

[Joseph_Locke]

Rough guess

1. The original budget was based on the all singing, all dancing HOPS train doing nearly all the work, but conventional methods have had to be employed so the cost has spiralled. Added to the fact its bloody useless and can't get the output it says, conventinal methods are out working it every night.

2. Material supply problems from the supplier in Italy meaning delays in getting stuff out on track,and short work nights/standbys as a result (Before you say lay the staff off,the problem would then have arose of no staff when the materials actually turn up as the suppliers of the staff would move them onto other work elsewhere)

3. As the work has gotten further behind more managers brought in to try and get the work back up to date and find out why its running so late. These all want paying and usually cause more dissruption and confusion than they solve. (eg 4 managers/technitians reporting a item is installed on the night.2 weeks later another identical item sent to same location to be installed because the system says its not been done ???????)

BTW I don't work on there, just what I've been told by friends that do

4. The original budget was set by a unit within NR that has no idea what things cost and didn't do any work to identify what work was required over and above simple electrification. This unit also did the costings for NWEP phase 1 (late and overspent) phase 2 (late and overspent), ....

 

[HH]

From my experience of dealing with NR on projects, problems are built-in from the ground up. When you lack the profit motive what seems to take its place is the motive to protect empires. Everyone wants a piece of the big projects and so you get far too many managers - all pulling in different directions.

 

[Philip Phlopp]

That's interesting; with SteveRailer's points, I wonder what the proportions are for each cause?

With the payments to the TOCs, I can see Mick Cash building up a head of steam with a 'lining the pockets of the franchisers at tax payers' expense' press release.

In fairness, he has a point. If the operating companies were NR, such 'payments' would simply be an internal departmental appropriation (if they bothered). What are the true costs? Well, replacement buses are a direct cost, if any were organised. Outside of that, there could be some overtime worked by staff if schedules were disrupted

But would those costs approach the sort of sums that the franchise holders are coining in?

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to make use of the new Companies House Open Access service to see exactly how much dividend FGW has paid to First Group in recent years. Compensation payments by NR to FGW should be available or FoI requested.

Don't forget the large enterprise which has sprung up to facilitate the TDA business - jobs that really shouldn't exist (though would need to exist to a lesser extent thanks to the EU's open access rules, and separation of infrastructure from train operation).

The TOC on TOC and TOC on self aspect of TDA doesn't need to exist and wouldn't under BR, NR on BR delays would need to be resolved, and Open Access on BR would also need to be resolved.

 

[HowardGWR]

I imagine that one only needs the NR to GWR/FGW amounts to prove one's case, although there will be the 'electrification occupation-buried cable delay' component and the 'normal' delay component payments to untangle. Of course, had the situation been as with the ECML, and First had earlier walked away from the GW franchise, then my supposition would have been realised, since the payments would have gone to DOR (W) and thence straight back to the DfT. No tax payer loss as a result.

 

[The Ham]

And Schedule 4/Schedule 8 compensation payments to train operating companies. The signal failures that have occurred have been costly.

As well as delaying the electrification work due to less work being able to be done as they either get stopped after breaking the signals and/or have to work around signalling teams who are fixing the problems.

 

[Dr Hoo]

That's interesting; with SteveRailer's points, I wonder what the proportions are for each cause?

With the payments to the TOCs, I can see Mick Cash building up a head of steam with a 'lining the pockets of the franchisers at tax payers' expense' press release.

In fairness, he has a point. If the operating companies were NR, such 'payments' would simply be an internal departmental appropriation (if they bothered). What are the true costs? Well, replacement buses are a direct cost, if any were organised. Outside of that, there could be some overtime worked by staff if schedules were disrupted

But would those costs approach the sort of sums that the franchise holders are coining in?

As a relative newcomer to the forum this may be covering old ground but both the performance regime (Schedule 8 of franchised passenger track access agreements) and the possessions/restrictions of use regime (Schedule 4) are calibrated to be 'cash neutral' in overall terms.

For any business selling a product or service to its customers it is highly likely that poor quality will deter future and repeat business. This applies both to individual customers ("I wouldn't stay there again") and general reputation ("I heard down the pub that the XYZ Hotel is a cesspit")

It has long been recognised - back to BR days - that there is an elasticity of demand related to performance and reliability. Key tools like the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook were first developed by BR. But because things were internalised nobody could really be sure what poor performance or long strings of engineering works were doing to revenue. Hence it was difficult to justify spending money on any particular initiative that might reduce failures.

It was also difficult to decide what was the best way of delivering engineering work in terms of the effect on revenue. It was relatively easy to demonstrate that (say) weekend blockades might be more efficient in engineering cost terms than a long string of less disruptive nighttime possessions but the passenger impact was usually a matter of crude judgement or unduly influenced by things like bus costs.

In a franchised environment the passenger operator is obviously concerned that one of the main influences on product quality and value is largely out of their control. They can look after their own trains, staffing levels and so forth but not the infrastructure aspects and outside factors like bridge strikes.

The regimes mean that if performance is worse than expected when they took on the franchise the TOC will get compensation that broadly matches the revenue loss, at least over time. Of course, if performance is better than expected then the TOC will pay Network Rail bonuses but those will be paid for as revenue picks up. If performance is at 'benchmark' levels then no money changes hands. A TOC only 'trousers the compensation' to the extent that it makes up for the inevitable shortfall in the booking office.

The performance regime is not designed to cover 'costs', such as refunds, taxis or staff overtime. The TOC takes these on the chin.

Schedule 4 is slightly different in two main ways. The rate of compensation is lower because disruption from possessions is pre-planned and pre-notifed but it still reflects the best estimate of revenue loss in those circumstances. Secondly there is no neutral point for the amount of engineering work disruption that is expected. A TOC pays an Access Charge Supplement that is a bit lke an insurance premium for an expected level of claims. If there is less disruption from engineering work than expected then Network Rail keeps some of the Supplement and the TOC is happy because it will get more revenue rather than compensation.

Unlike the Schedule 8 performance regime there is now a relatively straightforward degree of cost compensation for rail replacement buses for engineering work.

This may seem rather complicated but once established the regimes actually cost relatively little to operate and genuinely give a meaningful 'value' to disruption in its various forms -lateness, cancellation, diversion and so forth.

Remember that the full detail of delay attribution is only needed for identification of cause (and, hopefully, enabling future prevention). The performance regimes only need to know whether a delay was down to the TOC itself, Network Rail or another operator.

(The freight regimes are rather different but form a fairly small part of the overall picture.)

 

[Dave1987]

Rough guess

1. The original budget was based on the all singing, all dancing HOPS train doing nearly all the work, but conventional methods have had to be employed so the cost has spiralled. Added to the fact its bloody useless and can't get the output it says, conventinal methods are out working it every night.

2. Material supply problems from the supplier in Italy meaning delays in getting stuff out on track,and short work nights/standbys as a result (Before you say lay the staff off,the problem would then have arose of no staff when the materials actually turn up as the suppliers of the staff would move them onto other work elsewhere)

3. As the work has gotten further behind more managers brought in to try and get the work back up to date and find out why its running so late. These all want paying and usually cause more dissruption and confusion than they solve. (eg 4 managers/technitians reporting a item is installed on the night.2 weeks later another identical item sent to same location to be installed because the system says its not been done ???????)

BTW I don't work on there, just what I've been told by friends that do

That sounds like NR alright. NR solution to everything - throw manpower at it. If that doesn't work throw more manpower at it. Some of the worksites I've seen have a colossal amount of manpower and plant on site.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

A couple of observations:

Buried Cables: The Paddington-Heathrow electrification around 1994 involved 12 miles of the GW main line.
I don't remember delays or cost overruns because of the signalling cables being severed by the piling back then, and yet the buried cable problem must have existed.
On the other hand BR was monolithic and secretive and not open to the same scrutiny as NR today.
Was that a problematic electrification?

Skills: Much is made of the departure of electrification skills from BR days.
From what I have read, experienced BR technical staff found their way into the various consultancies which are now firmly part of the project design and planning cycle.
For instance, people who ran the Heathrow and WCRM rewiring projects went to firms like Atkins and others.
These consultancies are now engaged on all sides (by NR, ORR, DfT) to advise, design, vet, audit and project manage today's electrification projects.
Although we criticise NR/ORR/DfT, these consultancies, and by inference the ex-BR people staffing them, are also in the firing line for getting it wrong.
I don't altogether buy the "evaporation of skills" argument for project failure.

Thoughts?

 

[RobShipway]

I wonder if NR where expecting the trains that would be using the electrification would be later, so put the cost lower. Now, they have found that the trains are going to be on time - it is case that the cost is higher as we need to get it done sooner than expected.

If it is not the above, then someone, somewhere dramatically got their figures wrong.

 

[AM9]

Even just looking at the overspend which seems to be animating the PAC, their position seems to be that whatever was the starting cost at a 2008 base or whatever it was is unquestionable, and any deviation is down to the contractors. As anybody who has dealt with both large commercial or government contracts knows, 'one man's overspend is another man's underestimate and/or a third man's budget setting'.
This dance usually needs to take place for some projects to get off the ground. Despite the Channel Tunnel end costs being greater than was agreed at the start, who, (except somebody who is worried about the modern equivalent of Napoleon's troops marching through it) thinks now that it shouldn't have been done at all?

 

[GRALISTAIR]

What do others think?

The problem with some of these How-to questions is they can't be achieved in the short term.

The same can be said for 4 and 5, due to the lack of previous spending alot of skill and knowledge has gone from the industry,it is being replaced but will take time and possibly some late delivered programmes, but as time goes on it will get better.

I agree - change can/will not happen overnight.

I am going to make a gross over-simplification. What is needed is for the Sec of State say " We need a rolling programme of electrification" . The skills base is built up and never again do we have a stop-start programme. Lessons are learned after each bit of line is electrified and the supplier base gets built up and all know that next year x will get done and the year after y gets done etc. A lot of problems (see Scotland) can start to get solved when there is a rolling programme IMHO.

 

[edwin_m]

Buried Cables: The Paddington-Heathrow electrification around 1994 involved 12 miles of the GW main line.
I don't remember delays or cost overruns because of the signalling cables being severed by the piling back then, and yet the buried cable problem must have existed.
On the other hand BR was monolithic and secretive and not open to the same scrutiny as NR today.
Was that a problematic electrification?

I think I'm right in saying that the line out of Paddington was re-signalled before significant electrification work started on the Heathrow scheme (according to Google the re-signalling was 1992 and the interim Heathrow Fast Train not until 1998. So I imagine the signalling cable routes were aligned to avoid the future OLE position, or at least records were kept or cables put in visible troughs so that the electrification people knew where they were.

On the other hand much of the 1960s signalling on the GWML is still in use although it will have to be replaced before the wires are energised. Completing the signalling first would have pushed back the completion date but reduced risk and probably cost.

Skills: Much is made of the departure of electrification skills from BR days.
From what I have read, experienced BR technical staff found their way into the various consultancies which are now firmly part of the project design and planning cycle.
For instance, people who ran the Heathrow and WCRM rewiring projects went to firms like Atkins and others.
These consultancies are now engaged on all sides (by NR, ORR, DfT) to advise, design, vet, audit and project manage today's electrification projects.
Although we criticise NR/ORR/DfT, these consultancies, and by inference the ex-BR people staffing them, are also in the firing line for getting it wrong.
I don't altogether buy the "evaporation of skills" argument for project failure.

In the last years of BR there were generous redundancy terms available, people with long service had built up fat pensions and there seemed to be little future for the UK's railway in general or for electrification engineers in particular. So it's hardly surprising that many of them took jobs overseas (either directly or by joining international consultancies) or simply retired. 20 years on few with experience in a senior position on a BR electrification scheme are still in the workforce (though I read that Don Heath has been brought back). Of those that are, many that are will be unwilling to give up a well-renumerated international career to return to Britain where their experience tells them the money is poor and the work frequently non-existent.

Declaring an interest as a consultant (but not on electrification schemes) I'd suggest the problem is simply a lack of available resource with electrification experience in general but with UK electrification experience in particular. As I've posted several times already, the Scottish approach of a modest but steady programme of wiring is far preferable to trying to go from nothing to the biggest UK electrification programme in 50 years or possibly ever.

 

[GRALISTAIR]

As I've posted several times already, the Scottish approach of a modest but steady programme of wiring is far preferable to trying to go from nothing to the biggest UK electrification programme in 50 years or possibly ever.

Amen to that.

 

[WatcherZero]

That's the answer im leaning towards too, records were poorly kept, same thing that resulted in Ladbroke not inheriting records on the condition of the track which was in worse condition than they knew as maintenance was skimped on the dying years of BR.

Future projects do the signalling and utilities first then do the electrification afterwards. At the same time as you are moving signalling you can be surveying locations for future infrastructure. Naturally that means knowing the track layout you will be installing as well, which all leads back to longer planning and prep and not rushing. Politicians setting arbitrary dates and last minute projects should end and the franchises themselves should be commissioning infrastructure investment from within an allotted infrastructure budget.

Of course the politicians would never let go as it would reduce or eliminate their ability to claim credit for the work.

 

[MarkRedon]

The franchises themselves should be commissioning infrastructure investment from within an allotted infrastructure budget.

Of course the politicians would never let go as it would reduce or eliminate their ability to claim credit for the work.

This is why in my original post I hinted at the idea of relatively local route – autonomy? With the route manager buying a level of service (and even suggesting investment?) appropriate to the route and to their judgement of its growth potential?

All this within the framework of a long-term infrastructure planning framework à la Strategic Rail Authority (hah!) or National Infrastructure Commission?

<ASIDE> Politicians rarely get remembered, and when they are it is often for the wrong thing! I am not normally one to heap praise upon Tory ministers but it was David Mitchell and Michael Portillo who engineered the retention of the Settle and Carlisle line - see http://www.cravenherald.co.uk/news/...n_the_Settle_Carlisle_line_was_saved/?ref=rss. And the often-great Barbara Castle (Lab., Blackburn) who signed off the closure of lines such as Skipton to Colne! </ASIDE>

 

[Philip Phlopp]

That's the answer im leaning towards too, records were poorly kept, same thing that resulted in Ladbroke not inheriting records on the condition of the track which was in worse condition than they knew as maintenance was skimped on the dying years of BR.

Future projects do the signalling and utilities first then do the electrification afterwards. At the same time as you are moving signalling you can be surveying locations for future infrastructure. Naturally that means knowing the track layout you will be installing as well, which all leads back to longer planning and prep and not rushing. Politicians setting arbitrary dates and last minute projects should end and the franchises themselves should be commissioning infrastructure investment from within an allotted infrastructure budget.

Of course the politicians would never let go as it would reduce or eliminate their ability to claim credit for the work.

That's something that features in the PAC report - removing longer term larger projects from the Control Period framework. I like the 2043 date that's used in the Route Utilisation Studies as something to work towards, decide what needs to be done by that date (it's a long way off but 100% electrification should feature) and plan the best way to achieve that, taking into account capacity, pathing and demand requirements and most importantly, engineer and asset availability.

If it's going to be 2 years before a larger electrification project can start because resignalling and redoubling work (as an example) is needed, then find a secondary route that's ready to be wired and do it, the savings gained in retaining teams of workers, not losing skills, not paying redundancy and then having to go through months of work to rebuild teams would pay for a pretty large chunk of electrification.

It doesn't even matter if can't complete the electrification works in their entirety in one period, if a scheme like Craigendoran Junction to Fort William/Oban/Mallaig was to be treated like the trial works and training that was undertaken at High Marnham, most of the costs can be offset against initial training, certification and competency retention/renewal, the rest would be easily offset against a business case for new/cascaded EMUs replacing like expired DMU stock.

If NR goes to ABB or Siemens and asks for 400/25 or 275/25 transformers for one project, it's quoted a specific price, if NR was to go to ABB, tell them that they'll be electrifying every last route mile by 2043 and they'll be taking x transformers every year until 2043, the costs will come down, not by much, but it might result in a transformer or two coming at effectively zero cost.

I'd take the same approach with bridges, level crossings and any other gauge restricting infrastructure - there's plenty of routes where we could be doing bridge rebuilding works, footbridge erection/level crossing closures and general upgrades at the same time as scheduled track/S&C renewals, removing the need for additional closures for bridge demolition and reconstruction. Yes, it adds extra risk, but if we kept our trained workers, recruited and retained good engineers and didn't haemorrhage skills with cyclical investment, the risk in what we do would drop dramatically.

We have an old and crumbly railway too, bits are what, 180 years old and still see traffic counted in trains per hour, things will always go pear shaped during possessions, we'll always keep finding unmapped drains, mine workings, gas/water/electric utilities and we'll always be screwed over by our predecessors who used sand or soil instead of rubble or gravel to back fill platforms and trackbeds, what we need is people on the ground who can tell their teams exactly what to do and get the issue fixed quickly, rather than inexperienced staff who make phone calls, get more people to come out and before where we know where we are, it's time to hand back the possession, despite the gaping hole under the track or in the platform.

It's also sometimes quite nice to have people on-site or in meetings who do the whole 'I remember when we built this platform - remember the water table is quite high here, had terrible trouble last time'.

That's skills and experience again, isn't it. It's a recurring theme, isn't it.

Stop training up staff, then letting them go because there's no work for them, then having to re-hire them (but not being able to) and having to train up more staff.
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This is why in my original post I hinted at the idea of relatively local route – autonomy?

It depends on what autonomy brings, what it absolutely cannot do is take us back to the dark days of British Rail's Western Region, where they had particularly stupid ways of doing just about everything.

 

[The Planner]

Schedule 4 is slightly different in two main ways. The rate of compensation is lower because disruption from possessions is pre-planned and pre-notifed but it still reflects the best estimate of revenue loss in those circumstances. Secondly there is no neutral point for the amount of engineering work disruption that is expected. A TOC pays an Access Charge Supplement that is a bit lke an insurance premium for an expected level of claims. If there is less disruption from engineering work than expected then Network Rail keeps some of the Supplement and the TOC is happy because it will get more revenue rather than compensation.

That assumes we get our act together and we plan the possessions far enough out to get the maximum discount for schedule 4, if something gets changed later on then NR pays out at a substantially higher rate. TOCs stick schedule 4 in their business plans as it is still a form of revenue to them and I wouldn't be at all surprised if they play the game with it.

 

[Dr Hoo]

That assumes we get our act together and we plan the possessions far enough out to get the maximum discount for schedule 4, if something gets changed later on then NR pays out at a substantially higher rate. TOCs stick schedule 4 in their business plans as it is still a form of revenue to them and I wouldn't be at all surprised if they play the game with it.

Quite! It doesn't seem entirely unreasonable to expect Network Rail to get its act together.

Although Schedule 4 is primarily intended to de-risk franchises and thereby protect value to the taxpayer an important secondary purpose is as an incentive to use possessions effectively (e.g. By multiple jobs in one block) and to plan them well in advance so as to minimise surprises to the travelling public.

Given that Schedule 4 is definitely going to be a source of income - hopefully broadly in line with the access charge supplement - it should appear in any business plan.

 

[moggie]

I read this and weep. As a nation we simply no longer get it when it comes to efficient rail (or pretty much any major) infrastructure upgrade. BR, despite decades of continuous underfunding was able to carry out the major works it was tasked with. Not without unavoidable disruption but efficiently and with maximum use of diversionary routes which remained. It was adequate staffed with the right skill levels in the necessary numbers to do the work with a smaller but capable private sector supplier network to work in support of BR. The organisation was, simple, effective, mature and coherent.

All that was trashed in 1994.

Why people are now surprised that the replacement by an ever more fragmented miriad of large and small consultants, contractors, sub contractors all held together by a rats nest of frameworks / contracts / specifications / contradictory standards / multidisciplinary programmes / schedules is serving up modernisation slower and more expensive than what preceded it is no surprise. And that's before they've got near a working railway where the problems and perverse incentives are just as complicated.

Many of those administering this mess have little or no real (decades) railway experience (plenty of non rail 'construction' experience) and even the minority with the proven rail experience are submerged in a sea of 'can do' attitude even though the evidence is clearly 'they can't'. It's what happens when the control of projects is removed from those that 'know how' to those that 'know better'.

Talk of those skills that transferred from BR to the private sector ignores the reality that that was over 20 years ago. They have moved on / out. The companies that employed them have moved on. The net result being that the old BR skill set is virtually gone from them short of a few top level mangers who spend most of their time deflecting the latest crisis.

Couple that with an uninformed buyer (DfT / ORR - as always) and NR who lurch from one re-org / crisis to the next in ever decreasing cycles.

Unless this nonsense is stopped nothing will change except the company name at the top of the letterhead / emails. Unfortunately the answer to that is clear in the PAC report which concludes nothing more than another decreasing cycle of the same old nonsense.