Paddington derailment 16/06/16

[Dieseldriver]

How could such a SPAD occur, when drivers get visual/auditory warnings of signals?

Because... Poor railhead conditions, misjudging braking, loss of concentration caused by distractions, loss of concentration caused by personal issues/medical issues, fatigue due to erratic shift patterns and concentration involved in train driving, misreading signals, reading across, gaps in route knowledge, low sunlight affected signals, miscommunication etc etc.
Basically, because we are humans performing a role which demands high levels of concentration, responsibility and adapting to/anticipating situations, sometimes we get it wrong. Unfortunately when we do, we don't have the luxury of a 'slap on the wrist' or an ability to rub mistakes out.

 

[455driver]

I totally agree. When the Up sleeper came off the road approaching Paddn (mid 1980s), I ran almost the entire Class 1 service from Ealing Broadway the same afternoon. It's pitiful these days the lack of ambition to provide a service by today's railway industry.

How much of the overhead did it pull down?
How many relay cabinets did it flatten?
How many electic trains did it strand so they ended up blocking the lines they were on so no other (diesel) trains could leave?

Apples and oranges!
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

How could such a SPAD occur, when drivers get visual/auditory warnings of signals?

The signal in question is a position light (shunt) signal so no audible warning (AWS) provided.

 

[Juniper Driver]

How could such a SPAD occur, when drivers get visual/auditory warnings of signals?

You would have to be doing the job many years (or perhaps not) to realise the many factors that can contribute to an incident like this.Can't criticise the driver.This is every drivers nightmare.

I think Dieseldriver has explained quite well.

 

[richw]

90 cancellations today and 125 service alterations. The joys of being up early means seeing journey check for the whole day, rather than just remainder if seen later.

 

[SpacePhoenix]

Was the catch point there before the gantry went up or is it one that's gone in since the gantry went up?

 

[No Fault Found]

There are other factors to consider which lead to the cause of the accident, which the RAIB will also want to look at. I have been informed of a possible big factor that hasn't been mentioned but I am keeping that one to myself, as it will no doubt be a major part of investigations.

If it's the same 'factor' that i heard from a colleague that attended that evening, it should make for a very interesting investigation.

 

[LeylandLen]

How could such a SPAD occur, when drivers get visual/auditory warnings of signals?

Of course it depends whether the driver sees/hears the without being distracted . Ive reread a summary about the Ladbroke Grove rail crash (October 5th 1999) and wonder if there is any connection, especially to do with the signalling ?
A 165 was also involved in that incident . Sadly , its driver was killed so unable to hear his side of events.
Yes I agree with previous post #122 from Dieseldriver

 

[JN114]

Was the catch point there before the gantry went up or is it one that's gone in since the gantry went up?

Catch point was put in in the resignalling from Old Oak PSB into Slough IECC in the early 90s, replacing one that was much closer to the platform 1 ramp on the same line.

Electrification for Heathrow Express started in the mid 90s, but has been endlessly tweaked and tinkered with since.

As others have said here and elsewhere - the OHL structure is a fair distance beyond the end of the traps, and the unit has 1 vehicle completely derailed and the other with just 1 bogey still on. I suspect the OHL designers didn't anticipate a train running through the traps at a high enough speed to reach the structure.

 

[jimm]

Pictures of work to move the overhead wires last night and removal of the damaged cantilever support this morning now on Network Rail's West route Twitter feed

https://twitter.com/networkrailwest

 

[PHILIPE]

NRE advises passengers for Hereford to travel on Arriva Trains Wales between Newport and Hereford but doesn't point out that the route between Newport and Shrewsbury is closed over the weekend for Engineering Work. They could arrive at Newport and find themselves transferred to busses.

 

[jimm]

NRE advises passengers for Hereford to travel on Arriva Trains Wales between Newport and Hereford but doesn't point out that the route between Newport and Shrewsbury is closed over the weekend for Engineering Work. They could arrive at Newport and find themselves transferred to busses.

Given that the line between Great Malvern and Hereford is also closed from today until next Wednesday inclusive for resignalling work, then going to Newport and getting on a coach there is the sensible thing to tell passengers from London to do to give them the quickest journey.

It will take coaches the same time to do the run to/from Newport as it will to get from Malvern to Hereford as the roads in that area are no great shakes and the train is a lot faster to/from Newport than Great Malvern.

Details of Malvern and forthcoming Worcester signalling work here
https://www.gwr.com/travel-updates/planned-engineering/malvern2016
http://www.londonmidland.com/your-journey/improvement-works/1242/1249/#Check

 

[scott118]

other pictures are available....

https://twitter.com/networkrailwest/status/744157507761864704

 

[Tio Terry]

Catch point was put in in the resignalling from Old Oak PSB into Slough IECC in the early 90s, replacing one that was much closer to the platform 1 ramp on the same line.

Electrification for Heathrow Express started in the mid 90s, but has been endlessly tweaked and tinkered with since.

As others have said here and elsewhere - the OHL structure is a fair distance beyond the end of the traps, and the unit has 1 vehicle completely derailed and the other with just 1 bogey still on. I suspect the OHL designers didn't anticipate a train running through the traps at a high enough speed to reach the structure.

Normal design allowance for trap points or bufferstop overrun is 20M and 5m either side of the track centre line.

 

[JN114]

Normal design allowance for trap points or bufferstop overrun is 20M and 5m either side of the track centre line.

The stanchion hit is 32m beyond the traps, so is acceptable to those design standards, if that's the case.

 

[Whistler40145]

I know a set of trap points that run over the side of a bridge !



Mile north of Banbury the trap points on the down loop lead straight into the Oxford Canal!

Oops, that was planned well!

 

[Shaw S Hunter]

There was a stabling and fuelling/watering facility a little further out at Ranelagh Road on the same south side side of the railway as the sidings concerned here. It survived steam to become a diesel loco facility but the last vestiges were removed in the 1990s resignalling.

That was Ranelagh Bridge and even had its own shed code: RB. Fell into disuse after HSTs were introduced. It was decidedly small and could only accommodate a handful of locos.

The press and media this morning all reporting SPAD due to driver error, citing network rail as their source.

Is this reasonable of network rail before investigation to make such a statement to the press. Driver has been hung out to dry by the network rail release before the investigation.

3185 form if driver makes an allegation against the signalling (wrong side)
3188 form for TPWS intervention no SPAD
3189 form for a SPAD

All forms are filled out as close to the invent using as much as the drivers own words as possible with all voice coms, S&T data loggers plus any onboard data loggers down loaded as soon as possible. So what happened is known really quickly the why it happened takes a bit longer with all the interviews that need to be conducted.

It could be established quite quickly if a SPAD is down to driver error or not. But the investigation certainly doesn't stop there. Increasingly investigations look into a lot of detail about the indirect causes which may have led to the driver error. Indeed the Ladbroke Grove report highlighted a number of these such as previous signal sighting checks, quality of training, etc. To say this incident is already leading to the driver being hung out to dry is doing the investigation process a disservice.

 

[LeylandLen]

See this article on BBC News site ...(hope its correct) ... 9 interesting pictures .

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-36566985

 

[David Goddard]

They are some good photos there from Network Rail. Good to see these released to help the public (and us enthusiasts) understand what is happening.

I was up in town today and on arrival this morning the unit was still sitting forlornly with the tarpaulin over it. HSTs were using Ps 8-10 and HEX was alone in 7. Meanwhile in Platform 1 was 166217- which I assume was the other unit to which 165124 was to attach to form the Henley service.

When I returned at 1800, there were HSTs in 8,9,10 and 11 (do they use 11 much- it meant that 12 was then blocked), while 217 remained over in 1.
On departure, the road-rail vehicle was alongside with the damaged mast on board, while the first stage of recovery was underway with the unit split into two. With the tarpaulin removed you could see more clearly the damage to the end cab.

 

[Sunset route]

That was Ranelagh Bridge and even had its own shed code: RB. Fell into disuse after HSTs were introduced. It was decidedly small and could only accommodate a handful of locos.





It could be established quite quickly if a SPAD is down to driver error or not. But the investigation certainly doesn't stop there. Increasingly investigations look into a lot of detail about the indirect causes which may have led to the driver error. Indeed the Ladbroke Grove report highlighted a number of these such as previous signal sighting checks, quality of training, etc. To say this incident is already leading to the driver being hung out to dry is doing the investigation process a disservice.

That's why I said "the why it happened takes a bit longer".

I've been around long enough to have been involved in a few incidents now, none are pleasant to deal with. The bigger the location worked the greater chance of being involved in more and the more complex they are.

 

[D1009]

To say this incident is already leading to the driver being hung out to dry is doing the investigation process a disservice.

What angers almost everyone who knows anything about the railway is the use of the phrase "running a red light" (by the BBC) as posted earlier.

 

[bnm]

If it's the same 'factor' that i heard from a colleague that attended that evening, it should make for a very interesting investigation.

People criticise posts that speculate as to the likely cause or causes of an incident. If such posts are speculating with a modicum of understanding of railway operation then I've no problem either reading such speculation or making it.

However, I have no time for posts that say, "I know something you don't". Pointless and add nothing to debate.

 

[theageofthetra]

I am not familiar with this particular traction but am with the equivalent 2car EMU version. I would have thought that a 466 at < 25mph on a dry, level rail would stop well within its length in emergency brake. Would this be the same with this type of traction?

 

[ian959]

The one thing that puzzles me about this incident is that the train seems to have travelled quite a distance after hitting the trap points, given the low speed involved. Obviously I am no expert but I would have assumed a 75 ton train would stop pretty quick once off the rails. I look forward to the RAIB report on this one...

 

[richw]

The BBC now have a video of the rerailing here.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-36569006

 

[DarloRich]

NR people were doing the old jack and pack when I went past on the train yesterday. The front non driver side of the cab looked badly smashed up. i hope the driver wasn't hurt.

 

[AM9]

The BBC now have a video of the rerailing here.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-36569006

I can imagine that re-railing would be that much more disruptive (or hazardous) if the track was 3rd rail electrified.

 

[jimm]

Before anyone else enthusiastically credits the BBC for pictures and videos, all those linked to above have been taken from the Network Rail Western Route Twitter feed.

https://twitter.com/networkrailwest/media

Latest one, from this morning, has a caption saying damaged signal cables are now repaired.

 

[adc82140]

I presume this unit will now jump the refurb queue and go to Wolverton, so as not to leave GWR too many units short?

 

[jimm]

I presume this unit will now jump the refurb queue and go to Wolverton, so as not to leave GWR too many units short?

Not necessarily, as Wolverton is still working its way through the last one or two of the 166s and the derailed set was a 165.

GWR was a three-car Turbo set down for reasons other than the refurbishment work for the past six months anyway, after one of 166209's driving cars was damaged in the Betchworth fire last November. It has only just come back from being repaired by Brodies at Kilmarnock and GWR coped while that set was out of action, so they should be able to manage until the damaged 165 can follow the 166s to Wolverton.

Equally, given the damage the cab corner looks to have taken hitting the catenary post, if it needs specialist bodyshell repairs it may be better to get that done elsewhere, rather than risking the scheduling of the main refurbishment programme at Wolverton, which won't allow time for that kind of heavy repair on top of the refurb work.

 

[GB]

The one thing that puzzles me about this incident is that the train seems to have travelled quite a distance after hitting the trap points, given the low speed involved. Obviously I am no expert but I would have assumed a 75 ton train would stop pretty quick once off the rails. I look forward to the RAIB report on this one...

Has the speed of the train been reported on?