Incident at Talerddig, Wales - 21/10/2024

[sefyllian]

So is the Other Railway really Ffesti-NEE-og?, or is the "io" treated as one syllable (Ffes-TIN-yog) ?

Yes, io is a diphthong and is one syllable. (Sorry for the thread diversion.)

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Now I have learned how Talerddig should be pronounced. Stress on the middle syllable, like "allergic", not the last as in Tallyllyn or Ynys Mon

To my mind, Talerddig is actually a combination of two words - Tal and Erddig.
Tal is valley, and Erddig is probably the name of a local river/stream/saint (Erddig is also the name of a National Trust estate and manor house in Wrexham).
You can often decode Welsh names by parsing the individual parts (eg Aber and Ystwyth).

 

[ainsworth74]

Okay I think we might need to leave the discussion of Welsh place names here please (or take it to a new thread). It's not really relevant to the incident that this thread is about

 

[Bald Rick]

Okay I think we might need to leave the discussion of Welsh place names here please (or take it to a new thread). It's not really relevant to the incident that this thread is about

Yes, no need to Bangor on about it. Conwy start a new thread?

 

[ainsworth74]

Yes, no need to Bangor on about it. Conwy start a new thread?

Listen, I'm not above banning even a Veteran Member in good standing if they continue in such a fashion as this

 

[Corn]

My first reaction on reading the report is that, as with the recent near miss with track workers at Bookham that was the subject of the last RAIB report (discussion here), there has been an absolutely huge amount of Swiss cheese aligning here to create this dreadful incident.

The report seems to be unusually explicit that the error of the driver of 1J25 in not operating the emergency sander was a factor in the incident, but equally they do, in a more typical and subtle RAIB way, hint that the driver was set up to fail to an extent.

I think it's telling that the RAIB were explicit about the sander, but somewhat glossed over the fact that 1J25 was being controlled in a way typical of a train passing along the main line rather than through the loop, because of the confusing way in which speed limits were presented on the ERTMS, and the driving style which had been adopted on the line. Compare, for instance, the tone of paragraph 239 of the report, and the tone of paragraph 204. In particular, I found it surprising that drivers reported getting interventions from the system at least once a week (paragraph 368). That suggests to me that this was an accident waiting to happen. Also, if that kind of culture existed on the line with regard to driving style, with a huge amount of trust placed on the ERTMS system, I can completely understand how the unfortunate driver of 1J25 forgot about a manual system which they never had cause to use and didn't seem to have been adequately trained on anyway, particularly given they had no reason to believe that the automatic system wasn't working. I suppose, though, that there is no obvious solution to the fact that the Cambrian is worked entirely by drivers who only sign about three minutes'-worth of conventionally-signalled track, given the length of the line. But it can't have helped matters that the Cambrian is so thoroughly separate to any other railway environment.

I am slightly disappointed that the RAIB gave mention to seatbelts in paragraph 329 without explicitly saying that if the poor driver of 1S71 had been wearing a seatbelt (as was mooted after Carmont) the consequences may well have been even worse for them given the state of their cab.

A final word on the severity of the collision; given the excellent safety record of railways in the UK I think it's a stark reminder that a 30mph head-on collision carries a huge amount of energy, and thankfully we haven't had such an incident in years. Hopefully, the various small lessons learned from this incident, which combined in such a terrible way, won't need to be learnt in blood again.

---

RAIB report references:
Para 239

Para 204

Para 368

Para 329

Also I didn't realise that 158s don't have a light in the sanding button to show when sand is being deployed (para 83). Perhaps if the sanding button did have the function to light up when sand was being laid, the driver may have noticed it not being lit and done something different, now knowing the auto sander had a fault.

But even if it did have that function, the light not being illuminated during this incident might not have drawn the drivers attention anyway in a stressful situation.

 

[norbitonflyer]

Interesting comment in the RAIB report (quoted in "RAIL" this week) that "the relatively calm tone of the driver of train 1J25 [when reporting that he was going to overshhot the block marker] did not lead the signaller to perceive the situation to be an emergency"

It may be that at that point the driver was still expecting to be able to stop, albeit in the wrong place, but it does suggest that it was not the time or the place for sounding in control of the situation

 

[millemille]

Also I didn't realise that 158s don't have a light in the sanding button to show when sand is being deployed (para 83). Perhaps if the sanding button did have the function to light up when sand was being laid, the driver may have noticed it not being lit and done something different, now knowing the auto sander had a fault.

But even if it did have that function, the light not being illuminated during this incident might not have drawn the drivers attention anyway in a stressful situation.

The light doesn't show that sand is being dispensed ie. a demand for sand for sand is being met, only that there is a demand for sand.

Sanding systems in the UK are typically open loop, it will only be apparent to the driver that demand is not being met when the train fails to stop in low adhesion conditions.

 

[D365]

The light doesn't show that sand is being dispensed ie. a demand for sand for sand is being met, only that there is a demand for sand.

Sanding systems in the UK are typically open loop, it will only be apparent to the driver that demand is not being met when the train fails to stop in low adhesion conditions.

Thanks for confirming this. I wasn't sure about the Class 158 sander fitment - on Class 150 and Class 156 with autosander facility, the pushbutton indicator is merely wired in parallel with the sand valve (no fault indication available).