How did Scotrail procure the 365s so quickly?

[brad465]

In recent years, rolling stock cascades seem to have dragged their heels in both being approved and then entering service with their new operator. However in 2018, Scotrail, in response to 385 issues, managed to get 10x 365s into service in the space of 2-3 months from lease agreement to revenue service.

Of course this had to be quick, because this was a temporary stop gap that ultimately lasted 9 months. But had someone tried to do this in the same way 175/377/379/387 cascades have gone, and the 350/2 cascade is set to go, they wouldn't have bothered as the passage of time would have seen the 385s fully fixed.

I suspect the stingy heel-dragging DfT is partly responsible, but there must be other factors at play as well.

 

[Magdalia]

I don't know the details, but my understanding is that, at privatisation, the class 365s were treated differently from most other existing BR rolling stock. This was because BR did not own the class 365s, they were already being leased under an existing leasehold agreement.

This peculiar status had consequences: for example it is why the class 365s remained in NSE livery for such a long time after privatisation.

I don't know what was the legal status of the class 365s by 2018, but it could have been a factor.

 

[Carntyne]

I think the team responsible just didn't listen when they were told it couldn't be done.

 

[Dr Hoo]

If ScotRail and Transport Scotland really needed the units there certainly wouldn’t be any heel dragging from their end.

And they’re not the DfT either.

 

[Bald Rick]

I don't know the details, but my understanding is that, at privatisation, the class 365s were treated differently from most other existing BR rolling stock. This was because BR did not own the class 365s, they were already being leased under an existing leasehold agreement.

This peculiar status had consequences: for example it is why the class 365s remained in NSE livery for such a long time after privatisation.

I don't know what was the legal status of the class 365s by 2018, but it could have been a factor.

Yes this is correct.

 

[InTheEastMids]

Of course this had to be quick, because this was a temporary stop gap that ultimately lasted 9 months. But had someone tried to do this in the same way 175/377/379/387 cascades have gone, and the 350/2 cascade is set to go, they wouldn't have bothered as the passage of time would have seen the 385s fully fixed.

I don't know anything about the details of this particular contract but certainly the public sector clients I work with will have routes that allow them to bypass normal procurement rules in case of "emergency". That obviously needs to meet some threshold to be legal, but I would imagine the complete collapse of a critical service ought to tick the box.

I don't know the details, but my understanding is that, at privatisation, the class 365s were treated differently from most other existing BR rolling stock. This was because BR did not own the class 365s, they were already being leased under an existing leasehold agreement.

Apologies if I am hallucinating this memory - but something sticks in my mind that there was a "put" option in the lease for these trains that, when exercised by the original owners, would have compelled BR to buy them. So when the lease ended, DfT was forced to buy them (as it assumed the liability after privatisation). If it's true, I probably got that from a Roger Ford column (or the preview email he used to send out).

 

[Bletchleyite]

Much of the delays with the /2s were people dithering about funding and whether they were suitable or not.

That they're going to be a couple of years out is more I guess down to the whole "fast, good, cheap - pick any two" thing. The 323s work but are getting old, but there's no need to replace them now, two years down the line is fine, so that gives plenty of time to make sure everything works, give them a decent tarting up (they are quite scruffy) and get all the training etc in place.