Harrow and Wealdstone collision anniversary

[Jimbob52]

A reminder that tomorrow, 8th October, is the 70th anniversary of the tragic double collision at Harrow and Wealdstone, the worst peacetime accident on British railways.

Thoughts and prayers to any families still affected.

 

[Strathclyder]

A disaster in the realm of Harrow & Wealdstone is one I hope never reoccurs. Honestly goes without saying, but looking at the pictures of the aftermath - to say nothing of the mental image of Princess Anne & Windward Isles being deflected up onto and across Platform 4 immediately after the second collision - always sends a sharp chill up my back. There will never be a time when it won't, despite the significant advances in railway safety in the 7 decades that have passed.

My thoughts are also with those still affected.

 

[GS250]

There's a decent book written about the subject. One of the luckiest people on the platform was the paper seller who went to retrieve a paper blown out of his stall by the wind. On bending down to retrieve it he saw exactly what was coming and managed to dive out of the way. His paper booth was completely obliterated by the carnage.

Also, being my local station, I know quite a few now elderly types who also dodged a bullet that day. A bus taking them to the station was held up by a broken down milk float for just a few minutes. They were all heading for the fateful commuter train to London. They arrived at the same moment the first collision occurred.

 

[Dr_Paul]

There's a decent book written about the subject. One of the luckiest people on the platform was the paper seller who went to retrieve a paper blown out of his stall by the wind. On bending down to retrieve it he saw exactly what was coming and managed to dive out of the way. His paper booth was completely obliterated by the carnage.

Also, being my local station, I know quite a few now elderly types who also dodged a bullet that day. A bus taking them to the station was held up by a broken down milk float for just a few minutes. They were all heading for the fateful commuter train to London. They arrived at the same moment the first collision occurred.

One of my father's work colleagues was on the Tring to Euston service when the accident occurred. He was towards the front of the train. I don't know what route he took, as all the lines into Euston were blocked and all service stopped, but he nonetheless went into work that day.

Another of my dad's work colleagues was involved in the Lewisham accident a few years later. He was not so lucky, and he was thrown through a window, but his feet stayed inside the carriage and he was hanging upside-down until he could be rescued.

 

[DerekC]

I agree with @Strathclyder - the pictures remain horrifying even now. What is very sad is that it even after that, it took the railway industry fifty years and a large number of preventable accidents to adopt an effective train protection system. AWS should never have been regarded as more than a stopgap. But some good did come out of it. The much higher survival rate of critically injured people treated on site by the US Army medical team which happened to be nearby, compared with the "scoop and run" tactics adopted by the British ambulance service, started the changes which gave us the highly capable paramedics and equipment we have now.

 

[Gloster]

I have a feeling that I read somewhere that the first public demonstration of the new BR AWS was to have taken place at Marylebone that day. Or maybe it was the next.

 

[Taunton]

I have a feeling that I read somewhere that the first public demonstration of the new BR AWS was to have taken place at Marylebone that day. Or maybe it was the next.

I think you are correct, though I somehow thought it was with an A4 out on the open line somewhere. It was a press presentation so had presumably been arranged well beforehand. And of course it would not be particularly known by the next day the detail of the accident cause.

I think there was great emphasis on the AWS sunflower, which was about the only part of the equipment they could find not on the GWR ATC system available for the previous 50 years. I don't think the presence of the latter was mentioned at all, so the news reports all presented as if there was no such system in place at the time. Nor would they have mentioned that the GWR system did separate hoots for single yellow and double yellow, which AWS never managed.

it took the railway industry fifty years and a large number of preventable accidents to adopt an effective train protection system.

It continued. The promising Signal Repeating AWS devised by the Southern Region in the early 1970s, a variant of AWS and compatible with it, which repeated all aspects in the cab, and restrictive ones had to be acknowledged individually, was squelched by BR HQ after a substantial demonstration had been installed on trains and track between Bournemouth and Southampton, on yet further "not invented here" grounds. The GWR were fortunate that ATC had been a particular pet project of Churchward, who was bullet-proof to other management.

 

[Gloster]

It continued. The promising Signal Repeating AWS devised by the Southern Region in the early 1970s, a variant of AWS and compatible with it, which repeated all aspects in the cab, and restrictive ones had to be acknowledged individually, was squelched by BR HQ after a substantial demonstration had been installed on trains and track between Bournemouth and Southampton, on yet further "not invented here" grounds. The GWR were fortunate that ATC had been a particular pet project of Churchward, who was bullet-proof to other management.

I have a feeling that it was felt that the SR system was too complicated and that driver might be distracted by having to pay too much attention to making sure they acknowledged the correct the aspect, rather than keeping a lookout. This was still the era where the onus for driving the train was still very much on the driver.

 

[Taunton]

I have a feeling that it was felt that the SR system was too complicated and that driver might be distracted by having to pay too much attention to making sure they acknowledged the correct the aspect, rather than keeping a lookout. This was still the era where the onus for driving the train was still very much on the driver.

Gosh, three buttons to choose from (green was not acknowledged, like AWS). One wonders how at the end of the shift such drivers managed to get their car home, with four gears, coordinated with three foot pedals, the steering wheel, direction indicators, hazards coming up far quicker than on the railway, and all ...

 

[zwk500]

Gosh, three buttons to choose from (green was not acknowledged, like AWS). One wonders how at the end of the shift such drivers managed to get their car home, with four gears, coordinated with three foot pedals, the steering wheel, direction indicators, hazards coming up far quicker than on the railway, and all ...

But able to stop the car within visual range of nearly all hazards. I suspect that the reason anything but the most basic systems were quietly dropped will have been the same as it is today: cost. 'Not invented here' possibly played a part, but I suspect a minor one compared to the additional cost vs expected benefits over the simpler system. A curse on Accountants!

 

[Graham H]

What always amazes me is that after the horrendous scenes at Harrow, some semblance of service was back in place within 24 hours whereas my most recent fatal local rail crash was at Ufton Nervet in 2004 and despite an obvious cause and pretty simple layout, the route remained closed for 10 days. Likewise, the non-fatal Salisbury crash last year resulted in closure for more than two weeks.

 

[Tracked]

I have a feeling that I read somewhere that the first public demonstration of the new BR AWS was to have taken place at Marylebone that day. Or maybe it was the next.

from OS Nocks' Historic Railway Disasters book:

At that time the developments in hand were not generally known; but news of the experimental installation on the East Coast main line spread like wildfire, and J H Currey, the engineer in charge of the work, has told how he arrived at Kings Cross after lunch on the very day of the Harrow accident to ride the locomotive on its second trial run, and 'was flabbergasted to find most of London's press photographers on the platform'.

 

[Dr_Paul]

What always amazes me is that after the horrendous scenes at Harrow, some semblance of service was back in place within 24 hours whereas my most recent fatal local rail crash was at Ufton Nervet in 2004 and despite an obvious cause and pretty simple layout, the route remained closed for 10 days. Likewise, the non-fatal Salisbury crash last year resulted in closure for more than two weeks.

That's something that struck me as well when reading a book about the Harrow accident. Can anyone outline what is done today after an accident that was not done in the past?

 

[Gloster]

A certain amount would be due to a change in people’s’ attitudes. Even up to recent years, say the 1980s, people accepted that these things happen and we should get back to normal as quickly as possible for the sake of the living. Nowadays, we must find out exactly what happened and see if someone is to blame, so everything must be held up while the incident is minutely examined.

 

[181]

At Clapham Junction in 1988, the accident happened in the Monday morning peak. I think two of the four tracks were reopened on the Tuesday evening, and the line was fully open for the Wednesday morning peak. I'm not aware of this causing any problems with finding out what went wrong (although this may have been helped by the fact that the cause was in a signalbox some distance away and not at the scene).

Things had changed by the time of the Paddington accident in 1999, when if I remember rightly, the line was closed for about a fortnight, and concerns were expressed about the safety risks of the resulting overcrowding at Ealing Broadway.

 

[MadMac]

There’s a very comprehensive set of documents, not just the usual official report, at Railways Archive: https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/w...ow&sortKey=score&sortDirection=DESC&submit=go

 

[ChiefPlanner]

There’s a very comprehensive set of documents, not just the usual official report, at Railways Archive: https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/w...ow&sortKey=score&sortDirection=DESC&submit=go

Saved from the Divisional Office at Euston and thence by Watford area , and the originals are in the local history collection at Harrow Library.

 

[Ken H]

At Clapham Junction in 1988, the accident happened in the Monday morning peak. I think two of the four tracks were reopened on the Tuesday evening, and the line was fully open for the Wednesday morning peak. I'm not aware of this causing any problems with finding out what went wrong (although this may have been helped by the fact that the cause was in a signalbox some distance away and not at the scene).

Things had changed by the time of the Paddington accident in 1999, when if I remember rightly, the line was closed for about a fortnight, and concerns were expressed about the safety risks of the resulting overcrowding at Ealing Broadway.

Up until relatively recently the Railway Inspectorate took the lead in accident investigation. The attitude was to find out why so things could be put in place to stop a recurrence
That all changed. Accidents became crime scenes and that held things up. But the investigators were prevented by the police from looking for evidence while the scene was still fresh. Things that were hot will have cooled before the engineers got a look in.
All so we can blame someone who made a terrible error.
Engineers should lead investigations, not law enforcement.

 

[Gloster]

It used to be: ‘Discover the causes of an accident and make recommendations to prevent it recurring.’ There was a general acceptance that humans make errors and the system should be designed to prevent them doing so. There was an unofficial acceptance that nobody would face prosecution for a failing, although this could happen for a deliberate or grossly reckless act. This helped the Inspectors as staff would often admit to errors, so allowing the causes to be ascertained more quickly or with more certainty than would otherwise be the case; staff might still face internal disciplinary action.

 

[DerekC]

Up until relatively recently the Railway Inspectorate took the lead in accident investigation. The attitude was to find out why so things could be put in place to stop a recurrence
That all changed. Accidents became crime scenes and that held things up. But the investigators were prevented by the police from looking for evidence while the scene was still fresh. Things that were hot will have cooled before the engineers got a look in.
All so we can blame someone who made a terrible error.
Engineers should lead investigations, not law enforcement.

That's quite right but is exactly what the Railway Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) is for - executing the same role as the old Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) used to do. In 1990 HMRI was made part of the Health & Safety Executive, which tended to pursue prosecutions in parallel with the investigation, delaying the whole process. RAIB was created by the Railways Act of 2004 and has first dibs on the investigation, specifically tasked with finding causes and making recommendations for risk mitigation. Police prosecution comes later, but I think still delays the clearing up process by requiring very detailed evidence to be collected "just in case".

 

[4069]

The time that it now takes to reinstate services is hardly affected by the investigation. RAIB will examine the scene, and while that is going on preparations will be made to revover the damaged vehicles. In the case of the Carlisle derailment, the investigators released the whole site within 48 hours of the accident occurring. The much longer periods now required for reinstatement reflect the reduction in the number of serious accidents and the current structure of the industry, so that there are no longer heavy engineering resources sitting around at every depot waiting to be called into action. Each recovery requires contractors to be mobilised and equipment brought in, probably from many miles away, and more planning goes into ensuring that the work is done safely.

The bottom line is that the railway is no longer anywhere near as important to the national economy as it used to be, so there is much less priority attached to reinstating services.

 

[Dave W]

The time that it now takes to reinstate services is hardly affected by the investigation. RAIB will examine the scene, and while that is going on preparations will be made to revover the damaged vehicles. In the case of the Carlisle derailment, the investigators released the whole site within 48 hours of the accident occurring. The much longer periods now required for reinstatement reflect the reduction in the number of serious accidents and the current structure of the industry, so that there are no longer heavy engineering resources sitting around at every depot waiting to be called into action. Each recovery requires contractors to be mobilised and equipment brought in, probably from many miles away, and more planning goes into ensuring that the work is done safely.

The bottom line is that the railway is no longer anywhere near as important to the national economy as it used to be, so there is much less priority attached to reinstating services.

Quite - one only has to refer to older accident reports to see examples of this - it comes across that "dislocation of service" is considered as important a consequence as fatalities and injuries in some of them.

Equally, any given report on a serious incident will refer to breakdown gangs converging on the site of the incident from all directions - I suspect the equipment - and the associated men - are long in the history books now, aside from maybe one or two.

EDIT: An example picked at random - the derailment of an EMU at Elm Park (LTS) in 1965 refers to breakdown cranes ordered from Ripple Lane, Stratford and - perhaps less obviously - from Cambridge. Ironically, since I picked it at random, that was an incident that actually took 36 hours to recover any sort of service from - far longer than usual in those days - on account of the severe damage the derailment caused (including to an underline bridge)

 

[AVK17]

The much longer periods now required for reinstatement reflect the reduction in the number of serious accidents and the current structure of the industry, so that there are no longer heavy engineering resources sitting around at every depot waiting to be called into action. Each recovery requires contractors to be mobilised and equipment brought in, probably from many miles away, and more planning goes into ensuring that the work is done safely.

Well illustrated by the sorry tale of the breakdown crane that toppled over during the recovery of the Hixon accident. There were a number of similar incidents with cranes over the years, hitting bridges, dropping loads, falling over etc...

These days it's rightly not considered acceptable to compromise the safety of those working to recover after an accident in favour of getting the line open quickly. The Health & Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and LOLER regulations 1998 mean you can't just rock up with a Victorian breakdown crane, dubious slings and packing and a gang of drunk fitters you've rustled up from the local BRSA club. The world has moved on.

 

[D6968]

Well illustrated by the sorry tale of the breakdown crane that toppled over during the recovery of the Hixon accident. There were a number of similar incidents with cranes over the years, hitting bridges, dropping loads, falling over etc...

These days it's rightly not considered acceptable to compromise the safety of those working to recover after an accident in favour of getting the line open quickly. The Health & Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and LOLER regulations 1998 mean you can't just rock up with a Victorian breakdown crane, dubious slings and packing and a gang of drunk fitters you've rustled up from the local BRSA club. The world has moved on.

Absolutely, but there’s still those who’ll hark back to the so called ‘good old days’ and say ‘your doing it all wrong’
Usually those with no knowledge.

 

[DerekC]

Absolutely, but there’s still those who’ll hark back to the so called ‘good old days’ and say ‘your doing it all wrong’
Usually those with no knowledge.

Quite agree. And those who mock "'Elf an' Safety" have never had to help sort out the consequences of an accident (whether moving train or industrial).

 

[Ken H]

Quite agree. And those who mock "'Elf an' Safety" have never had to help sort out the consequences of an accident (whether moving train or industrial).

IMHO H&W hastened the widescale use of AWS. A relatively simple feature that has saved many lives, I believe.
Such a pity the roll-out was so slow. And that a version that worked with 3rd rail DC wasnt developed quicker leaving the Southern unprotected for so long.

 

[CarltonA]

Remembering the victims of the 8th of October 1952. It is now 73 years since this tragedy.

 

[Mr. SW]

Some years ago I used H&W on a daily basis and I always used to think about the disaster every time I changed there.

 

[Bertone]

As a 10 year old and living in Harrow, I recall passing through H &W on a Bakerloo train with my father on the following Saturday and seeing one of the less damaged locos involved standing in a siding covered in tarpaulin.
Strange what you remember after all these years.

 

[CW2]

The anniversary was remembered today on board the members' trip behind 71000 Duke of Gloucester. (The Duke was built as a direct replacement for 46202 which was destroyed in the Harrow disaster).