This incident is one of the most incompetently managed safety issues ever to have been reported on the railway.
In any other organisation the Chief Executive and relevant directors would have lost their positions as a result of the court case, but instead we just get a Hey ho, weve changed procedures now so nothing more to say, on we go
.. type attitude from the FCC management and their ultimate owner.
The whole issue comes over as Dunderheads managing Dunderheads (which is of course what the judge said) and it would be good to know how many of those involved have been removed from any future position of responsibility.
Who was the genius who devised the primary approach to handle disabled trains in the tunnel was to move them out with another train from ahead/behind, then specified a fleet with two types of train (319 and 377) with incompatible couplings, and to cap it all then did a timetable with alternate trains formed of the alternate types, so effectively no train is capable of easily being assisted by the one behind. You dont even find that level of stupidity in Thomas the Tank Engine stories.
The Kentish Town fitter sent to assist took 35 minutes to get to St Pancras (the next station) because, as the RAIB states, with irony, they were travelling by public transport. Its around 10 minutes by taxi for that journey even at this time. Of course, it saves FCC a few pence to go by public transport instead.
The control staff really seemed to be making it up as they were going along, there was no worked-through strategy for a major peak hour failure on the key Thameslink section. This is not some branch line in Cornwall, it is a key cross-London trunk route handling tens of thousands of passengers per hour. You have to wonder what the incident planning team have been doing with their lives in the past.
In bad old BR days, of course, a diesel locomotive, driven by a crew who actually knew how couplings work, would have been sent down from Cricklewood and the whole lot dragged out within the hour.
It is a failing of the whole RAIB process that they are unable, by their self-imposed terms of reference, to write in their report that FCC showed incompetence, a couldnt-care-less attitude, and posed danger to passengers, where quite obviously this had happened, and it takes a judge from outside the industry to state the blindingly obvious. For example, the report states the conditions on train 1W95, which were uncomfortable because of crowding, lack of airflow and the heat
. . What this means in plain language is that passengers inside the train had collapsed through muscle fatigue after standing in crush conditions for hours with no seats available, fainted from lack of adequate air because of failed ventilation with no openable windows, and had soiled their clothes as the toilets had gone out of service.
Those who write here about passenger action being inappropriate clearly seem to think that expecting many passengers to stand up for hours in crush-loaded conditions with failed ventilation, lights and toilets is just something that a trainload of passengers are merrily expected to do. If they are professional railway staff with this attitude they really should consider whether they are in the right job.