GRALISTAIR
Established Member
Straw poll - is Post #4 on this thread useful? If so I will keep adding to it by edits etc.
Last edited:
Straw poll - is Post #4 on this thread useful? If so I will keep adding to it by edits etc.
if you can load or unload custainsiders you can load or unload containers ...
it's just rather easier if a fully compliant docking solution is too expensive / space limited to rely on unloading by counterbalance flt in open space ...
and of course loose loads regardless of what they are loaded into have to be unloaded manually / semi automated
I think you have touched on most of the excuses used against loading containers there in my experience but there are a lot more, so making the HGV king, but we are getting of subject.
to load rigid sided vehicles in a timely manner without doubling the staffing requirement requires a loading dock which allows the pallets to be driven into the rigid sided vehicle / container by a powered pallet truck / short LLOP - using the same one person and one machine equation as curtainsiders and a counterbalance FLT ... however a dock requires the space to have the dock and to to allow trucks to manouver onto the dock , plus the cost and maintaince associated with the docking system - whicvh can be quite costly if you have a powered system that can cope with double deckers, low datum, step frame 1250, 'coffin' 1250 1 and a half decker and UK standard 1250mm fifth wheel flat floor trailers
yes you can load a rigid sided vehicle with a counterbalalnce flt or a tailift but you need 2 operatives to do so in a timely manner ( one in and one out )
we'll ignore the issue that standard sized ISO containers and standard Pallet sizes are not entirely compatible, where as LGV trailers can be built to allow 2.4 m + clearance allowing 2 lines of pallets and minimal wasted space
Only within other engineering industries.
If your reference to a new marshalling yard that is being built in Germany refers to the one at Halle, it should be noted that this will replace the one at Engelsdorf near Leipzig which will be closed so this will not be an additional yard.
The lifetime of infrastructure being constructed, and rolling stock being purchased, now will probably extend into what may very well be quite a different transport landscape.
For example, driver-less vehicles may well be the norm, with vehicles users telling the car(?) where they want to go, and then being whisked off down guided roads and what were motorways, using, possibly, hydrogen power or some other form of power still to be developed, all being controlled by super computers, possibly at quite high speeds, with the passengers reading, working, watching media, sleeping etc during the journey. Indeed, people might no longer own their own vehicle and simply rent one for the specific journey they wish to make. Vehicles themselves might well be travelling in "trains" down the main routes, at a uniform high speed, effectively locked to the vehicle in front and behind until they leave the "main line" and head of towards their destination. Trucks may well be operated in a similar fashion, but perhaps on separate "roads". Imagine how many vehicles could travel down the M6 if they were all travelling coupled together at high speed, with computers constantly checking for problems with the vehicles themselves and the condition of the infrastructure.
Railways, as we know them, could be completely redundant, or might have been converted as additional routes for such vehicles.
Why install all the infrastructure for electrification with its massive costs when it within it's useful lifetime it may well become unnecessary.
With Google, Apple and others all throwing vast amounts of money at such projects, such a scenario might not be so far fetched.
The lifetime of infrastructure being constructed, and rolling stock being purchased, now will probably extend into what may very well be quite a different transport landscape.
Even now, without the foresight and clairvoyance of people like 'Dixie' they're still making the same mistakes!
However, the fact is that we are in a time of change that is moving very fast relative to the life of the infrastructure we are building and might mean, for example, within 20 years the concept of transmitting electricity through OLE is redundant.
How else do you propose to power trains electrically without electrification? Wireless power is very lossy even compared to the existing 750V DC systems, and batteries are still nowhere near enough for fast/heavy trains over any significant distances.Please don't get the idea that I am against electrification, as quite the opposite is true. I would like to see the entire network electrified. However, the fact is that we are in a time of change that is moving very fast relative to the life of the infrastructure we are building and might mean, for example, within 20 years the concept of transmitting electricity through OLE is redundant.
Please don't get the idea that I am against electrification, as quite the opposite is true. I would like to see the entire network electrified. However, the fact is that we are in a time of change that is moving very fast relative to the life of the infrastructure we are building and might mean, for example, within 20 years the concept of transmitting electricity through OLE is redundant.
Regardless, if it was down to me, I would still be 100% behind network electrification, including freight.
What I don't want to see, though, is the likes of the Government and Network Rail getting it so wrong in so many ways, e.g. OLE equipment which is vastly over engineered for its particular purpose. Was it necessary to do the whole of GWR in series 1? Couldn't anything where the speed was going 100 mph or less have been built using the same equipment as is being used now in the North West and Scotland, or even that used on the recent sections of the WCML which is good for 125 mph, e.g. parts of the branch to Oxford, the line through Bath to Bristol, perhaps, or Filton Bank? Why wasn't the GWR equipment despec'd when it was decided trains wouldn't run at 140 mph, etc., etc.
The Public accounts Committee report on the whole fiasco of the GW project comes to the conclusion that no line should be electrified if alternative ways of providing the same service could be applied.
In my judgement this will put a full stop to any further schemes.
The conclusion they should have reached is that the fault lies with Network Rail and the DfT, and not with electrification per se.
Therefore get someone else to do it!
Study how they manage to do it abroad.
Be far more aggressive when facing ludicrous new regulations which increase costs to taxpayer and passenger.
Consider environmental factors and not just upfront costs.
But, of course, being British we just say, too expensive, abandon the idea!
Mark Carne has said in future each mile is going to be subject to assessment to see if it's value for money.
Can you imagine the same rule being applied to motorways. Build a couple of miles and then say 'sorry chaps' the next couple of miles is too expensive, so abandon the whole project.
It is senseless, but that's how things are done here for railway infrastructure.
And still, nobody has accepted responsibility for this whole sorry mess.
Mr. Putnam still comes to the Transport committee and gets away with murder, because the members of that committee don't really have a clue about asking the right questions.
For what the DfT has cost the British taxpayer because of epic failures on their part, some heads should roll.
Philip Rutnam joined the Department for Transport (DfT) as Permanent Secretary in April 2012
Career
Before joining DfT, Philip was the Director General, Business and Skills, at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). He was responsible for policy on industry and enterprise, including regional economic development and support for small business. Before joining BIS, Philip helped to establish Ofcom and then led its work on competition, economic regulation and use of the radio spectrum.
Responsible for the overall management of the department. The Permanent Secretary sits on the departments board
The role of the departments board is to:
ensure effective governance and properly manage risks
shape and direct a shared agenda for the department as a whole, both to deliver ministers priorities and to build capability
monitor performance and risk, making choices (or recommendations to ministers) on priorities/risk appetite
Modernising the Great Western Railway
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmpubacc/776/77605.htm
________________________________________
Conclusions and recommendations
.It is not clear whether the Great Western electrification project can be delivered to the revised target of December 2018 and budget of £2.8 billion. The estimated cost of electrification increased by £1.2 billion to £2.8 billion by the end of 2015 following Network Rails replanning of the project, which also identified delays to parts of the project of 18 to 36 months. The Department and Network Rail are confident that the project is now on track as important milestones have been met. But Network Rail admitted that there are still very significant risks to be managed and noted that every single part of the programme is absolutely on the limit.1 The most recent risk analysis indicates a financial exposure of £274 million, £49 million more than the £225 million of contingency currently available and risks still remain that costs could increase further.
Recommendation: Network Rail must ensure that all risks to the project are identified, monitored and controlled and use this information to identify with the Department the critical path for the whole modernisation programme, setting out how the infrastructure, new trains and planned services will interact with each other by March 2017.
2.Network Rail failed to plan the infrastructure work properly. Network Rail admits that the early stages of the project were not carried out in an appropriate way. The initial design was incomplete. The cost estimating was not good enough and it started construction before it had the necessary permits and consents in order to try to meet the schedule. Network Rails failure to put in place an adequate plan to obtain the more than 1,800 separate consents it needed from local authorities, such as permission for works that could affect protected species or listed buildings, led to higher costs. Network Rail could not explain why it had not sought to avoid these problems by obtaining an Order under the Transport and Works Act enabling the Secretary of State to have granted planning permission for the whole scheme.
Recommendation: Network Rail must improve its ability to produce realistic cost estimates, including making greater use of data from completed projects. Network Rail must make sure that robust and detailed plans, including a critical path, are in place for infrastructure projects before starting construction works and consider whether an Order under the Transport and Works Act would be preferable to multiple individual planning consents and other approvals.
3.The Department failed to challenge Network Rails plans effectively despite the very significant sums of public money at risk. Depite being liable to pay £400,000 per day to lease new trains that could not be used until the overhead electrification was complete, the Department did not adequately challenge Network Rails plans to carry out the infrastructure work. Instead, it left the role of scrutinising Network Rails plans to ensure they were both deliverable and the most efficient way of carrying out the work to the Office of Rail and Road. The Department accepts that this system was too complex, much weaker and less reliable than [it] thought, though it believes that it has since put in place a very clear structure of accountability.
Recommendation: The Department must ensure that it has obtained suitable assurance over cost and deliverability before taking decisions on infrastructure investment and other major decisions which depend on infrastructure being available. It must set out how it will continue to develop its own programme management expertise, and how it will use this to monitor Network Rails delivery.
4.The Department failed to integrate all the elements needed to deliver benefits for passengers successfully at the planning stage, and did not manage the programme in a joined-up way. Until 2015, the Department managed the different elements as separate but related projects, rather than as one single integrated project, even though improving services for passengers required all the elements to be completed on time. The Department should have had an integrated business case for the programme sooner than March 2015, bringing together the new infrastructure, new trains and service patterns. This would have allowed the Department to manage the interdependencies between the elements and the risks the programme faced. The Department built an 18-month buffer into the programme to allow for the infrastructure to be ready for new trains in advance but this was not based on the actual risks facing the programme. The Departments new approach to infrastructure planning involves it specifying outputs and Network Rail providing options to meet them. These options will be reviewed by the Department, who will then make a decision based on costs, benefits and risks to delivery. The Department is also trying to align decisions about infrastructure improvements with franchise timetables, such as future improvements to the Midland Main Line. We are concerned that serious failings in planning and delivering this programme will affect the case for future investment in rail programmes.
Recommendation: The Department and Network Rail need to ensure that they plan major developments to rail services in a way which brings together trains, infrastructure work and the operation of services. As part of this, they should obtain independent assurance on the deliverability of their plans. We will expect to see this approach on forthcoming major programmes including the Midland Main Line and TransPennine upgrades.
5.The Departments claim that nearly all the benefits for passengers can be achieved without full electrification of the route casts doubt on the value for money of this and other electrification schemes. The Department maintains that the decision to defer the electrification of sections of the route will have little, if any, impact on the benefits of this programme to passengers as many of the benefits, including more trains per hour, journey time savings and more seats, do not depend on electrification. The Department also considers that wider benefits, such as reduced operating costs and environmental benefits, will only be marginally impacted by the decision. However, the planned reallocation of diesel trains to increase capacity elsewhere on the network will be delayed. Some £130 million has been spent on infrastructure work to deliver electrification on the deferred sections, although Network Rail maintain that these costs will largely be recovered should electrification go ahead.
Recommendation: The Department needs to reassess the case for electrification on a section by section basis and fund schemes only where worthwhile benefits for passengers could not be achieved otherwise at lower cost. In its new business case for the Great Western programme, which it expects to complete by the end of March 2017, it should reassess the extent of electrification, and it should also look again at its plans for the Midland Main Line and TransPennine routes.
The Permanent Secretary at the DfT is Philip Rutnam. Philip Pullman is a famous children's writer. The film director is David Puttnam.I think you are referring to Mr Rutman and not Mr Putnam who IIRC is a film director.
Yes.This would seem to support the hypothesis that building new lines is intrinsically less difficult than trying to resuscitate old ones.
Very unlikely, I'd say. HS3/NPR is about 10 years behind HS2 Phase 1.On this basis we could then see the NPR before Trans- Pennine electrification.
From the point of view of franchise competitions, on an electric railway the prospective operator seems willing to bid to run services knowing that it can find the required trains on the open market. On the diesel lines the bid is more about how to shuffle the finite number of existing units. The new SWT is an essay on both these outcomes on one franchise.
Electrification is expensive but opens up much more competitive market for units and frees up the operator to be marketing led rather than resource led.
This situation exists because no-one is willing to order new diesels. I think this is down to a combination of government unwillingness to buy trains for routes receiving lots of subsidies, and uncertainty over future demand for diesels caused by the enthusiasm for electrification and potential for battery powered trains. The surplus of EMUs will last only until the 317s,319s,321s are scrapped, which will now inevitably be long before the DMUs of the same age.
However at current prices I'd expect new fleets of diesels to be far cheaper than electrification. The day the government finally gives up on electrification may actually be a good one for passengers on unelectrified routes, if it allows operators more certainty in planning for the future. Someone will have to bite the bullet in the not too distant future - the Sprinters won't last forever.
Do you really think the government will publicly retract its encyclical electrification? Its either electrification or - to continue to the religious theme - continued purgatory.
So the binary choice before us is either that the Dft gets its hand dirty specifying, ordering and leasing diesels, or it can put money into electrification that will unleash the dynamic leasing market that already exists for electric stock onto more routes. Which do you think is better for the railway: The DfT investing in infrastructure to make the industry more competitive, or spending our taxpayer money to play at diesel RoSCO?
Do you really think the government will publicly retract its encyclical electrification? Its either electrification or - to continue to the religious theme - continued purgatory.
As far as I know there is no commitment to electrification beyond 2019, and it would be foolish not to re-examine the business case now we know how much it actually costs. The government are already making noises about achieving the same benefits (ie journey times, new trains) without electrification.
Personally I still think most or all former CP5 proposals will be completed in CP6 but I could be wrong.
Indeed, lots of people on here have been commenting in recent months on these "noises" as amounting to a big withdrawal by government from electrification, with some suggesting that there will be little done after the end of CP5, and for example that both approaches to Bristol will remain unwired! So squizzler is very much out on a limb here compared to the general drift of opinion on this forum.
Personally I still think most or all former CP5 proposals will be completed in CP6 but I could be wrong.