ECML Significant Disruption

[MCR247]

I think he either means:

A) It would be expensive to repay the passengers because of the hardware failure

B) It would be expensive to repair the hardware

Probably A. Don't quote me on it!

Thats what I thought, but I fail to see why it would cost the taxpayed

 

[HST Power]

Thats what I thought, but I fail to see why it would cost the taxpayed

Neither do I!

 

[Anon Mouse]

On this occasion EC were pants, but at least something was sorted. I'm still annoyed at being fobbed off and the fact that I only had an idea what was happening by calling my companies control.

 

[networkrail1]

Just after 1pm on saturday 26th march York North w/stn reported a complete loss of signalling between York and Northallerton. S&T were summoned, whilst Temporary Block Working (TBW) was being setup. At 1.40 S&T reported the cause to be a defective power supply on the B system signalling processors within York IECC. The component was changed restoring the signalling at 2.25, which promptly failed again. Further investigations found that system ‘A’ system PSU had then failed and the system switched to the B system as its supposed to switched to the ‘B’ system for reasons unknown again crapped out.

As a result of the above two panel processor modules on interlocking areas 1 & 5 blew. At 3.45 the ‘B’ system was restored with a number of components borrowed from Tyneside although just after 4pm it died again. A full rebuild (thats computertech speak for reinstalling the software, not physically rebuilding the 'puter) of the ‘B’ system computer was carried out and an attempt made to restore the signalling undertaken at by 6pm. It didnt work. .

Computer Specialists were requested (no doubt screamed at) to attend to assist in the fault finding. The ‘A’ system was rebuilt restoring the signalling at 6.30.

Trapped trains were released and routes unclamped from 7pm

Hope that helps.

All the best.

Simon

 

[Old Timer]

Best illustration of going back to geographical that I can use.

Of course nowadays Balfour Beatty have developed a PCB based geographical system, that does not have the weaknesses of the SSI system.

 

[moggie]

OT are you on commission for BB?

As I am sure you know the IECC system is an entirely separate system from the SSI and clearly if the panel processor within the interlocking is being sent garbled data from the Control System processors eminating from the IECC then I would expect any receiving interlocking system would shut down if that is what happened.

How many units of the BB super system are in use on the NR network compared with SSI?

Networkrail1 - thanks for an informed and concise update. Explains a lot and in the circumstances the techs sound like they did pretty well considering.

 

[talltim]

Why would you need to re-install the software after a PSU failure? I have to say that it sounds like the hardware is too specialist, you should be able to go and buy a replacment PSU at PCWorld if really pushed. (i'm aware that the interface of the computer system with the the hardware of the signalling system needs to be more specialist)

 

[CliveJones]

Why would you need to re-install the software after a PSU failure?

A blown PSU can take out other components with it. Interruption of power can on a normal PC cause loss of data or inconstancies. On a dedicated signalling system I would not like to hazard a guess but it sounds perfectly plausible.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

Why would you need to re-install the software after a PSU failure? I have to say that it sounds like the hardware is too specialist, you should be able to go and buy a replacment PSU at PCWorld if really pushed. (i'm aware that the interface of the computer system with the the hardware of the signalling system needs to be more specialist)

Each component would have to be a lot higher quality than its PC World equivalent. It's doing a safety critical job.

 

[DaveNewcastle]

Which is partly why process control equipment of military, medical and aeronautic specification costs many times more than the equivalent consumer products. Of course you would never use consumer goods in safety critical applications. Never.

 

[island]

Hopefully they'll process my delay claim from the Leeds train a fortnight ago before the mound of claims they get for this one!

And they did. £65.75 of rail travel vouchers for me to annoy some ticket clerk with next time I want to book advances

 

[junglejames]

Thanks Sonic...but hey, Scotland is still Europe, and may even be more Europe after England pulls the plug care of UKIP!!...not that I want to open up a can of worms...I just wonder why, when the Scots are passionate about football, and to watch Brazil...why the hell is the damn game in London? I'm sure I am not the first person to ask the question though!!!

Well because its not a Scotland home game, thats why its not in Scotland. Its a Brazil home game, and their preference is for their home friendlies to be played at Ashburton Grove, for reasons already explained.
To be honest, its better to ship these Scots to London, than it is to get them over to Brazil.
It is an altogether very good idea.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

Which is partly why process control equipment of military, medical and aeronautic specification costs many times more than the equivalent consumer products. Of course you would never use consumer goods in safety critical applications. Never.

Quite. For example you can buy a bog standard relay for about 2 quid. A railway safety critical relay can cost anything between £200 and £2000 depending on its purpose. The quality is vastly improved, there are much smaller tolerances and they have been rigorously tested during building and acceptance.

 

[Blindtraveler]

signaling aside, how do people feel about level crossings on busy line such as the ecml? i think its a no no, a point proved today by the fatalitty in east lothian.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

signaling aside, how do people feel about level crossings on busy line such as the ecml? i think its a no no, a point proved today by the fatalitty in east lothian.

Personally, I think that's a completely different thread! Anyway, my opinion is that if crossings are used safely then they are perfectly safe.

 

[The Planner]

The fatality at Markle was another unfortunate suicide, if someone is set on doing that then they will find a way regardless of it being a LC.

 

[Tomnick]

Not sure what type of crossing was involved in the fatality you speak of, but I can't see much wrong with MCB crossings (CCTV or locally supervised) on quiet or busy lines - indeed, there are plenty on the ECML. AHBs aren't allowed above 100mph, and I'm not sure whether there's any restrictions on rail traffic levels (I suspect not?), but they're safe if used correctly anyway. Obviously any locally-monitored crossings (AOCL/ABCL) are ruled out, so that just leaves user-worked crossings. They're probably the biggest concern, and widely misused - but is there a reasonable alternative in many cases?

 

[Mainliner]

Just after 1pm on saturday 26th march York North w/stn reported a complete loss of signalling between York and Northallerton. S&T were summoned, whilst Temporary Block Working (TBW) was being setup. At 1.40 S&T reported the cause to be a defective power supply on the B system signalling processors within York IECC. The component was changed restoring the signalling at 2.25, which promptly failed again. Further investigations found that system ‘A’ system PSU had then failed and the system switched to the B system as its supposed to switched to the ‘B’ system for reasons unknown again crapped out.

As a result of the above two panel processor modules on interlocking areas 1 & 5 blew. At 3.45 the ‘B’ system was restored with a number of components borrowed from Tyneside although just after 4pm it died again. A full rebuild (thats computertech speak for reinstalling the software, not physically rebuilding the 'puter) of the ‘B’ system computer was carried out and an attempt made to restore the signalling undertaken at by 6pm. It didnt work. .

Computer Specialists were requested (no doubt screamed at) to attend to assist in the fault finding. The ‘A’ system was rebuilt restoring the signalling at 6.30.

Trapped trains were released and routes unclamped from 7pm

Hope that helps.

All the best.

Simon

Thanks for that info - interesting.

I must admit I smiled at the thought of a guard making a delay announcement to passengers, saying "...this was due to..." and then launching into your explanation.

 

[talltim]

Each component would have to be a lot higher quality than its PC World equivalent. It's doing a safety critical job.

yeah, it sounds like they are lot higher quality:roll:
I'm sorry, but that is rubbish. You build in resiliance in computing though redundancy, not higher spec. The safety critical-ness comes though the stopping of trains on failure, which is what happened, but a cheaper PSU would have exactly the same effect if it failed,
With regards to rebuilding software, for such a critical workstation why wasn't an image taken when it was working, which can then be put back on the workstation (or another in case of complete hardware failure) within the space of about 20 minutes?

 

[ralphchadkirk]

Looks like you're right talltim. Of course safety critical systems can use components you get from PC World. I'll inform my S&T Manager of that - we'll be able to get much cheaper stuff. We'll save a few bob through that.

Of course not. HMRI would have a fit. With respect, what's really rubbish is you suggesting consumer components in a safety critical area.

 

[DarloRich]

yeah, it sounds like they are lot higher quality:roll:
I'm sorry, but that is rubbish. You build in resiliance in computing though redundancy, not higher spec. The safety critical-ness comes though the stopping of trains on failure, which is what happened, but a cheaper PSU would have exactly the same effect if it failed,
With regards to rebuilding software, for such a critical workstation why wasn't an image taken when it was working, which can then be put back on the workstation (or another in case of complete hardware failure) within the space of about 20 minutes?

Sounds like they had redundancy and BOTH the primary and the back up went u/s !

 

[GB]

yeah, it sounds like they are lot higher quality:roll:
I'm sorry, but that is rubbish. You build in resiliance in computing though redundancy, not higher spec. The safety critical-ness comes though the stopping of trains on failure, which is what happened, but a cheaper PSU would have exactly the same effect if it failed,
With regards to rebuilding software, for such a critical workstation why wasn't an image taken when it was working, which can then be put back on the workstation (or another in case of complete hardware failure) within the space of about 20 minutes?

First of all they have redudancy, as already pointed out. Secondly there is only so much redundancy you can have before costs become even more astronomical then they are now for no real benifit. Thirdly, given the nature of the tasks required, how long do you think the tat for PCworld et al will last?

We are not exactly talking about a simple home computer or home server are we?

 

[Max]

Surprised nobody has mentioned the fatality at Grantham this afternoon which has once again brought the ECML to a stand. Absolute chaos at Doncaster, passengers were detrained off a HST and sent to a pacer which was heading to Sheffield, with crazy effects as you can imagine. 5 minutes after it left the mainline was reopened! Really poor management by East Coast, nobody seemed in control to be honest. I ended up advising passengers.

 

[amcluesent]

Chaos at PBO again this evening, from person under train at Grantham. Major delays coming down, no EC northbound departures and delays/cancellation leaving KGX (probably no rolling stock). I observed a squabble over taxis with 6 businessman booking a taxi people-carrier to Leeds after having come up on FCC. The few EC staff willing to be seen in public seemed to be at a loss.

 

[sonic2009]

Surprised nobody has mentioned the fatality at Grantham this afternoon which has once again brought the ECML to a stand. Absolute chaos at Doncaster, passengers were detrained off a HST and sent to a pacer which was heading to Sheffield, with crazy effects as you can imagine. 5 minutes after it left the mainline was reopened! Really poor management by East Coast, nobody seemed in control to be honest. I ended up advising passengers.

I mentioned it at 1630 on my thread!!!!

 

[HST Power]

Chaos at PBO again this evening, from person under train at Grantham. Major delays coming down, no EC northbound departures and delays/cancellation leaving KGX (probably no rolling stock). I observed a squabble over taxis with 6 businessman booking a taxi people-carrier to Leeds after having come up on FCC. The few EC staff willing to be seen in public seemed to be at a loss.

My friend was stuck there too. He said it was a madhouse. Heading home via taxi now. And God knows how much it'll cost him!

 

[DaveNewcastle]

The above led to severe lack of Up trains into Kings Cross in the afternoon so only a 18:30 to Leeds and a 19:00 to Newcastle (both packed and I couldn't get seat in restaurant!) untill trains started rolling in around 20:00.
Overtime boys and girls?

 

[87015]

1655 ex Newcastle held at Darlington for 70 mins, not sure why we couldn't at least have gone fwd to York... Still storming south now, shame it's free though as I'm low on vouchers...!

EC Control certainly didn't seem like they were very helpful, traincrew was mystified at them - "always useless"

 

[trainfanatic]

We need a physical barrier between the platform and platform edge to prevent the needless killing of people on our national rail network. It never ceases to amaze me the lengths the rail authorities go to to stop trespassing when at stations like Grantham (and many more I suspect) have the main through line that doubles as a platform line. I don't know where exactly this fatality occurred, but there is a nasty bend entering the station on the up side.

I don't know any more details of this particular accident, but how many people do you see with iPods and cell phones stuck in their ears thus preventing them hearing the announcements that 'please stand clear of Platform X - fast train approaching.

Maybe some sort of flashing lights might work, but please, lets keep the travelling public and railway staff safe!

 

[Aictos]

I disagree with having to have barriers on the grounds of cost and that it would just divert the problem elsewhere, take St Neots for example where East Coast services pass at 125mph on the Up and Down Fast lines, if anyone really wanted to end their life then they would then just use one of the many user worked crossings in the area and just wait for a train.

What Network Rail and ATOC could do is produce a campaign along the lines of the level crossings one advising passengers to take care while at stations although you will still get the odd ****ing idiot who's stuck in their own little world!