ECML disruption (08/07) inc. points failure at Doncaster & failed train near Huntingdon

[The North Briton]

I was both amused and dismayed to see LNER’s disruption webpage refer to disruption ‘caused by a broken down train around Huntington’, a lack of attention to detail which is all too common recently.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Historically LNER and David Horne twitter feeds have put out apologies over major incident both somewhat silent given the chaos. Its also disappointing to see that communication from our "so called premier operator" still needs improvement. Although perhaps underlying all of this is the fragility with crewing these days along with the ability of the industry to put in place SLW. So if our new politicians really want to see improvements in performance it needs to start with ensuring there is enough resilience in place to deal with such events. Yes that costs but so does paying out delay repay to thousands of passengers.

 

[railfleet]

Perhaps typically for 'the railway' those who would most like to know why what happened did happen (i.e. those most impacted - those on the trains concerned, especially those on 1A66) of course still don't know - and probably never will.

Passengers on those trains will make their own conclusions (perhaps 'bad management' - possibly much worse). And maybe consider the treatment they received in a less than positive light when considering which travel modes to use next time. Even just an apology on the appropriate website(s) would be start, but, looking at them this morning, not a mention about yesterday's disruption. Trying to pretend nothing happened when several thousand people know otherwise is not good PR. Its how companies cope when stuff happens (which it will from time to time) that determines their public image.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Perhaps typically for 'the railway' those who would most like to know why what happened did happen (i.e. those most impacted - those on the trains concerned, especially those on 1A66) of course still don't know - and probably never will.

Passengers on those trains will make their own conclusions (perhaps 'bad management' - possibly much worse). And maybe consider the treatment they received in a less than positive light when considering which travel modes to use next time. Even just an apology on the appropriate website(s) would be start, but, looking at them this morning, not a mention about yesterday's disruption. Trying to pretend nothing happened when several thousand people know otherwise is not good PR. Its how companies cope when stuff happens (which it will from time to time) that determines their public image.

Exactly and i say historically LNER/Horne have done this so odd behaviour. Mind you my experience of LNER is its dropped away and ive had better passenger experience trips on AWC recently and their trains are certainly a lot more comfortable.

 

[Falcon1200]

Incidents like the Huntingdon one being discussed here are constantly changing as things develop, and the timing of the eventual resolution, in this case getting the defective train firstly moving and secondly clear to let other trains by, is known to no-one until it actually happens. It is quite possible that estimates for achieving this came and went, and that matters took longer to arrange than expected, leading to earlier decisions having to be revised.

 

[railfleet]

Incidents like the Huntingdon one being discussed here are constantly changing as things develop, and the timing of the eventual resolution, in this case getting the defective train firstly moving and secondly clear to let other trains by, is known to no-one until it actually happens. It is quite possible that estimates for achieving this came and went, and that matters took longer to arrange than expected, leading to earlier decisions having to be revised.

This is understood and appreciated in a general sense - having worked in a role involving real-time, safety-related, operations myself.

However, for the specifics of what happened to the passengers on 1A66, the defective train was moved and line block removed before 1A66 arrived at Peterborough - having been delayed north of the station for some time and then moving forward signal by signal as trains in front were able to move. By reference to OpenTraintimes website, when 1A66 joined the queue, there was something like 9 or 10 trains queuing between the defective train and 1A66.

From joining the queue of trains to arriving at Peterborough was somewhere between 40 mins and 1 hour. So there was, in fact, time (at least in theory, of course practice and theory may not agree!) to plan what to do with the passengers on this train. That plan, whatever it was, patently failed. Should whichever organisation(s) responsible for real-time operation planning not have enough staff on duty, or short notice call-out, to cope, then that organisation has simply 'planned to fail' in such circumstances - after all, trains and infrastructure such as signals are not 100% reliable/available, and therefore it is entirely forseeable that, from time to time, one will fail away from a station and cause, on a busy route, a large backlog to be sorted out.

All I'm after is knowing why passengers on 1A66 had to change trains 3 times before onwards movement from Peterborough was possible.The reasons can hardly be regarded as a state secret, so its not an unreasonable aspiration - I'm certainly not intending to ask for action to be taken against individuals once I do know. As result of what passengers on 1A66 had to do, my travelling partner (they hold a disabled railcard) was in significant physical distress - not that any rail staff dealing with passengers from 1A66/1E20/1E21 seemed to have any consideration for anyone who might have a disability and the impact changing trains 3 times might have on them.

I'm not expecting anyone on here to disclose it if they think their job could be at risk. Maybe those on here who say, in effect 'I know, but I'm not telling you' (for whatever reason) might like to reflect on the reaction of someone receiving that information - will it pacify them or raise suspicions?. If the latter, then perhaps it might be better to stay silent -if only because such a response adds nothing to what is publically available.

I'll get to the bottom of it somehow - FOI requests to Network Rail and LNER (operator of Peterborough station) about it (especially as my travelling parner has a disability and was in some physical distress as a result of having to do 3 changes of train) will be filed before long.

 

[Frodingham]

After having to stand all the way from Donny to Edinburgh on Monday due to our train not calling at Doncaster, we have arrived at Waverley to find the 1530 to KX cancelled due to "a train crew" issue.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

This is understood and appreciated in a general sense - having worked in a role involving real-time, safety-related, operations myself.

However, for the specifics of what happened to the passengers on 1A66, the defective train was moved and line block removed before 1A66 arrived at Peterborough - having been delayed north of the station for some time and then moving forward signal by signal as trains in front were able to move. By reference to OpenTraintimes website, when 1A66 joined the queue, there was something like 9 or 10 trains queuing between the defective train and 1A66.

From joining the queue of trains to arriving at Peterborough was somewhere between 40 mins and 1 hour. So there was, in fact, time (at least in theory, of course practice and theory may not agree!) to plan what to do with the passengers on this train. That plan, whatever it was, patently failed. Should whichever organisation(s) responsible for real-time operation planning not have enough staff on duty, or short notice call-out, to cope, then that organisation has simply 'planned to fail' in such circumstances - after all, trains and infrastructure such as signals are not 100% reliable/available, and therefore it is entirely forseeable that, from time to time, one will fail away from a station and cause, on a busy route, a large backlog to be sorted out.

All I'm after is knowing why passengers on 1A66 had to change trains 3 times before onwards movement from Peterborough was possible.The reasons can hardly be regarded as a state secret, so its not an unreasonable aspiration - I'm certainly not intending to ask for action to be taken against individuals once I do know. As result of what passengers on 1A66 had to do, my travelling partner (they hold a disabled railcard) was in significant physical distress - not that any rail staff dealing with passengers from 1A66/1E20/1E21 seemed to have any consideration for anyone who might have a disability and the impact changing trains 3 times might have on them.

I'm not expecting anyone on here to disclose it if they think their job could be at risk. Maybe those on here who say, in effect 'I know, but I'm not telling you' (for whatever reason) might like to reflect on the reaction of someone receiving that information - will it pacify them or raise suspicions?. If the latter, then perhaps it might be better to stay silent -if only because such a response adds nothing to what is publically available.

I'll get to the bottom of it somehow - FOI requests to Network Rail and LNER (operator of Peterborough station) about it (especially as my travelling parner has a disability and was in some physical distress as a result of having to do 3 changes of train) will be filed before long.

I would also suggest you approach your MP as well especially if they are newbie looking to cut their teeth on something.

Separately i totally empathise with your experience and it remains extremely frustrating that in todays highly communicative world the ability to communicate the plan to passengers remains very variable. Part of the problem is todays railway has tied itself up in so many policies and procedures over what you can and can't do that controls hands are tied behind their back. That said the industry certainly comes up short now when these big disruptive incidents happen and the ability to put in degraded working (single line working over Dn Fast could have been used here with Dn Slow available for Down traffic) is nigh on impossible with the limited resources on the ground these days and the few that are there don't have the competency or its lapsed.

After the debacle outside Paddington I was expecting to see an industry response about incident mgt and passenger communication but that never materialised in the public domain. So I do hope that with the industry at one of generational changes it uses the opportunity to look at how well its managing incidents like this and builds in appropriate solutions to the new organisational structures.