The oil foreign exchange issue is sometimes misrepresented. Almost all the UK oil in the 1940s-50s came from places which were in the "Sterling Area", where it could be paid for with pounds. Bahrain, then the Gulf centre; Kuwait; even non-colonial countries like Iraq (left the Sterling area in 1959). So it wasn't foreign exchange which was wanted to buy the oil, because UK pounds were accepted there.
What was the government issue was they wanted the oil to be sold elsewhere instead, to the USA and others, to get foreign exchange for it, and to support the value of the pound (then 4 to the US dollar!). Oil production was not huge then and for it to be used in the UK meant it could not be a dollar export. It was difficult to tell members of the public not to buy cars, although there were attempts, but the newly-nationalised railways provided an opportune and easy single point to say "no more oil for you" to. Elsewhere, oil conversion carried on, notably with shipping where the remaining coal fired ships changed very quickly to oil, it was a major workstream for postwar shipyards with new boilers. Ironically this included the new BR's shipping fleet.
This is what did in the late 1940s steam loco oil firing programme. That had been driven by separate supply difficulties from the coal industry arising from complete lack of long-term investment during the war, coal seams were worked out, as they do, but no new ones had been developed. Once told to stop using oil and go back to coal, there would obviously be no chance of a diesel programme straight away. In government, Bevan, effectively the deputy to the prime minister, was an ex-miner from South Wales, and did not want to see any reduction in coal mining opportunities at the expense of oil from overseas. So just tell the railways what to do.
What was the government issue was they wanted the oil to be sold elsewhere instead, to the USA and others, to get foreign exchange for it, and to support the value of the pound (then 4 to the US dollar!). Oil production was not huge then and for it to be used in the UK meant it could not be a dollar export. It was difficult to tell members of the public not to buy cars, although there were attempts, but the newly-nationalised railways provided an opportune and easy single point to say "no more oil for you" to. Elsewhere, oil conversion carried on, notably with shipping where the remaining coal fired ships changed very quickly to oil, it was a major workstream for postwar shipyards with new boilers. Ironically this included the new BR's shipping fleet.
This is what did in the late 1940s steam loco oil firing programme. That had been driven by separate supply difficulties from the coal industry arising from complete lack of long-term investment during the war, coal seams were worked out, as they do, but no new ones had been developed. Once told to stop using oil and go back to coal, there would obviously be no chance of a diesel programme straight away. In government, Bevan, effectively the deputy to the prime minister, was an ex-miner from South Wales, and did not want to see any reduction in coal mining opportunities at the expense of oil from overseas. So just tell the railways what to do.
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