Round figure economic deprivation estimates based on Marmot review (e.g. figures 2.3 and 2.5). The figure for post 2008 increase is right at the lower end of what is implied by Marmot. Round figure Covid estimates based on ONS lifetable and covid death by age data, a 0.6% IFR, 80% herd immunity fraction and 1 life year co-morbidity adjustment, and the assumption of minimal mitigation only to avoid complete health system collapse: since the latter assumes less mitigation than anyone is proposing the figure is an upper bound. (See first image below)
Here is one reason why the above could be worrying: a comparison with the economic shock of the 2008 crisis, based on ONS data... (see second image below)
So, in words, we require the current economic shock, which is much larger than 2008, to result in much smaller life loss than was associated with 2008. Otherwise we will lose more life to the economic effects of Covid-19 suppression efforts than were ever likely to have been lost to Covid-19 itself. Of course the consequences of the 2008 crisis were amplified by the policies adopted thereafter, and perhaps those consequences could have been substantially alleviated by a more enlightened approach. But the historical record from the UK does not suggest a willingness to vote for such an approach, even if any sort of credible plan for avoiding the economic life loss were actually to be proposed. The 1945 election was perhaps the exception, but it's unclear that several months stuck at home on your sofa really leads to the same sort of cathartic re-evaluation of life's priorities as storming the beaches of Normandy.
Given that COVID-19 presents a rather low risk to most people in economically active age groups, and is generally a higher risk in retired age groups, it is questionable that one-size-fits-all measures requiring substantial economic contraction are a sensible policy response. Targetted measures based on people's vulnerability would give a better chance of saving the old from SARS-CoV-2 and the young from the very large health effects likely to be caused by historically large economic shocks: that is of minimising the covid crisis related life loss from all causes, in the long run.
From the data on life loss associated with economic hardship and economic shocks in the past, it is hard to see that a more balanced targetted approach would not save substantially more life than lockdowns (nuking your house will put an end to your rat infestation, no question, but a more nuanced approach might cause you fewer long term problems). If it is 'impossible' to differentially protect the old, in particular, then the age specific infection rates reported in the ONS infection survey data take some explaining (this is not cherry picking: the ONS data are the main source of direct measurement of infection). Similarly a scientific case that very stringent restrictions are the only way forward does need to also explain the Swedish data, rather than treating Sweden as some sort of discardable outlier (it needs a bit more than a lazy argument about population density, given the densities in Swedish cities).
It also seems that we are willing to pay much more to save a life from COVID-19 than from other causes. The usual NICE affordability threshold is around £30,000 per life year saved. OBR projected peak extra borrowing of £660B suggests at least 7 times that for COVID-19 ( here is an atempt to discuss this issue in more detail). Finally, there has been quite alot of slightly odd comparison with previous pandemics in the media. Here is a visualization comparing the severity of three pandemics.
I can't comment on the newly emerging concerns about `long covid' due to a lack of data on this. However it seems clear that these concerns should be weighed carefully against the effects of economic deprivation, insecurity and unemployment on health. There are data on these effects: they are very substantial.
