Did Beeching affect Britain’s productivity?

[Bald Rick]

When did new motor vehicles in the UK routinely start to have seat belts fitted? I'm aware that their use (where fitted) wasn't, initially, compulsory, that came a bit later.

They became a legal requirement on new cars is 1965, so contemporaneous with the introduction of breathalysers mentioned earlier and the 70mph speed limit (until then there was no speed limit on motorways).

Strictly speaking:

1965 - new cars required to have the anchor points fitted for front seat belts
1968 - new cars required to have front seat belts fitted
1983 - wearing of front seat belts made compulsory
1986 - new cars required to have rear sear belts fitted
1991 - wearing of rear seat belts made compulsory

 

[gg1]

Strictly speaking:

1965 - new cars required to have the anchor points fitted for front seat belts
1968 - new cars required to have front seat belts fitted
1983 - wearing of front seat belts made compulsory
1986 - new cars required to have rear sear belts fitted
1991 - wearing of rear seat belts made compulsory

Ah okay, I was referring to when it was a requirement for them to be fitted (in the front) rather than used, I wasn't aware there were separate dates for fitting of anchor points and the belts themselves.

 

[ac6000cw]

Seat belts are one (very important) item in a long list of safety improvements - both primary and secondary - to cars since the early 1960s (which pretty much spans the time period I've been a passenger or driver in them!) - e.g. energy absorbing steering wheels/columns/dashboards, laminated windscreens, all-round safety glass, air bags, energy absorbing bumpers, rear screen heaters, door mirrors, much better brakes/tyres/handling, power steering, anti-lock braking, parking/reversing cameras and sensors, traction control, better headlights, rear fog lights etc. (and more recently adding electronics to provide 'radar' braking/collision avoidance, lane wander warnings, speed limit warnings etc.).

 

[Taunton]

From what I remember at the time, (nationalised) British Steel paid for the large fleet (around 450) of new rotary-tippler compatible rolling stock and the terminal equipment, so how much did BR itself invest?

It appeared to be basically a hook-and-haul operation for BR, originally using existing cl. 37s in pairs and triples.

There was long a difference of opinion between the separate (all nationalised) industries over such initiatives. It was even more pronounced with Beeching's (actually Gerry Fiennes') coal merry-go-round, which involved the NCB (coal mines), BR (rail), and the CEGB (power stations). Each argued the benefits accrued to the other, who should therefore pay for it all, and it didn't help that the three were controlled by three different Whitehall departments. Eventually the Prime Minister had to get involved to arbitrate between them.

 

[LickeyIncliner]

One effect that doesn't seem to have been mentioned is that through the labour force. I can't immediately find any statistics for the numbers employed on the railways, but the closure of under-used rail services (previously subsidised by more profitable services) should have released a lot of workers to take up jobs in more productive, profitable parts of the economy. That possibly turned out better for pre-Beeching cuts in the 1950s when the economy is generally growing fairly strongly than post-Beeching when economic problems became more apparent and unemployment more of an issue. None of which is to disregard the financial and psychological impact of redundancy on the individuals effected.

As regards the longer-term outcome I'd strongly agree with the suggestion that the railway land corridors (and bridges/viaducts) should have been more systematically retained and protected for future transport use - of whatever kind, so including pipelines and cycleways. For example, planning for the "central" section of "East-West Rail" would be a lot easier if the original alignment was still available between Bedford and Cambridge (though I'm not saying that simply reopening it in its entirety would necessarily be the best plan).

 

[Magdalia]

For example, planning for the "central" section of "East-West Rail" would be a lot easier if the original alignment was still available between Bedford and Cambridge (though I'm not saying that simply reopening it in its entirety would necessarily be the best plan).

In the case of Cambridge-Bedford, that was never going to happen.

The Mullard Radio Astronomy Observatory was already established on a former Royal Army Ordnance Corps site at Harlton, and about three miles of trackbed, either side of Lords Bridge, were taken over immediately after the line closed for the travelling radio telescopes.

In the 1970s four tracking of the ECML through Sandy took the trackbed of the Cambridge-Bedford route. The current up platform at Sandy is where the Cambridge platform used to be.

And when the M11 was built, would you have been advocating building a bridge over the trackbed, just in case it might have been needed later?

 

[Mr. SW]

I was too young to appreciate what was going on but on reflection, there probably would have been an attitude change towards travelling by train, particularly in rural/holiday areas. E.g.
"The line to [Resort on Sea] has closed. Where are we going to take the family next year?"
"They are closing the line to [Rural Settlement]. Will our line be next?"
"Look what they are doing in [Shire County]. We'll have to buy a car."
"Are they going to cut the buses next?"
"They've opened a new motorway to [Large City]. I think I can buy a new car on Hire Purchase. It'll be quicker than the dirty old train."
etc., etc.
Also comparisons with other nations.
"Look what they're doing in America!" [Forgetting what the USA was in terms of size, economy, social structure etc.]
"Look what they're doing in Germany!" [Forgetting the random and unplanned urban improvement meted out by the British and US air forces of 20-odd years earlier.]
The situation for many people at the time was the train started of with [dirty] red carriage, both inside and out, hauled by a smut-producing and frequently dirty old steam engine (even if actually new). This was replaced by a green DMU, that started off clean, and then got progressively dirty. And broke down. Then it turned blue, if you were lucky. And broke down. The station buildings were demolished, and/or boarded up. And then it finally disappeared entirely.
And Motorways were more American! And Shiny! Look at them! You can see it on the television! Touch the wings on my Ford Corsair! Gaze in awe at my new Rover! Mm! Leather seats!
This all would have fed through into people's general impressions and morale.
Comparison with the grim and shabby post-war, post-empire Britain was probably the greatest hindrance to productivity.
So, getting rid of something that was perceived as old-fashioned and dirty, may have actually, in many circumstances, boosted productivity.
Not Beeching. He just fed into it, and in many cases confirming what people thought.

 

[coppercapped]

I was too young to appreciate what was going on but on reflection, there probably would have been an attitude change towards travelling by train, particularly in rural/holiday areas. E.g.
"The line to [Resort on Sea] has closed. Where are we going to take the family next year?"
"They are closing the line to [Rural Settlement]. Will our line be next?"
"Look what they are doing in [Shire County]. We'll have to buy a car."

Er, no. And yes, but you have cause and effect the wrong way round!

As a War Baby I was already well aware of what was going on by the end of the 1950s and the first of Dr. Beeching's reports was published when I was at University so I well remember the debates at the time.

The rail traffic to seaside resorts died because of the growth in package holidays to Corsica, Majorca and mainland Spain during the 1950s offering the holidaymaker the promise of good weather in exotic surroundings rather then the chance of southwesterly rains and storms during their week in Paignton, Bexhill or Blackpool staying with a grumpy landlady.

Statistics show that car ownership per head of the population was always higher in rural areas than in the towns and the cities. Think of the doctor in rural England driving around in his de Dion-Bouton before the First World War. To give a feel of how car ownership grew this is an extract from some DfT statistics:

Year	No. cars (thousands)
1909	53
1920	187
1930	1056
1939	2034
1946	1770
1950	1979
1955	3109
1960	4900
1965	7732

It can be seen that the number of cars increased 5 times during the 1920s and doubled again in the 1930s. The doubling was repeated between 1950 and 1960. Car growth preceded the cut-backs in railway mileage, not the other way around.

"Are they going to cut the buses next?"
"They've opened a new motorway to [Large City]. I think I can buy a new car on Hire Purchase. It'll be quicker than the dirty old train."
etc., etc.

The first motor roads in the UK were built in the 1920s, think of the Great West Road being carved through the west London suburbs, parts of the Brighton Road or the East Lancs Road which opened in 1934. The postwar motorway construction was simply a continuation of what had gone before.

Also comparisons with other nations.
"Look what they're doing in America!" [Forgetting what the USA was in terms of size, economy, social structure etc.]
"Look what they're doing in Germany!" [Forgetting the random and unplanned urban improvement meted out by the British and US air forces of 20-odd years earlier.]

Even then there was an appreciation that things were different in other countries.

The situation for many people at the time was the train started of with [dirty] red carriage, both inside and out, hauled by a smut-producing and frequently dirty old steam engine (even if actually new). This was replaced by a green DMU, that started off clean, and then got progressively dirty. And broke down. Then it turned blue, if you were lucky. And broke down. The station buildings were demolished, and/or boarded up. And then it finally disappeared entirely.
And Motorways were more American! And Shiny! Look at them! You can see it on the television! Touch the wings on my Ford Corsair! Gaze in awe at my new Rover! Mm! Leather seats!
This all would have fed through into people's general impressions and morale.
Comparison with the grim and shabby post-war, post-empire Britain was probably the greatest hindrance to productivity.

It would seem that different people have different understandings about the meaning of 'productivity'. The definition that I adhere to is the how much output (in monetary terms) is produced using a unit of 'input'. The 'input' can be a manhour or a quantity of capital or other appropriate parameter. 'Feel good' factors do not affect 'Productivity' in the middle or long term: most significant are general levels of education and training and the capital invested in the process being studied whether it is manufacturing, agricultural or any of the service industries.

Part of the reason for the issues that the UK is currently facing is that its manufacturing and service industries are not as profitable as they could be for a variety of reasons or causes.

So, getting rid of something that was perceived as old-fashioned and dirty, may have actually, in many circumstances, boosted productivity.

Not having to spend money on train services with a very low social or economic need would certainly have boosted the nation's bank balance!

Not Beeching. He just fed into it, and in many cases confirming what people thought.

Beeching's crime was that he forced some parts of the British public to realise that the past had gone. The people living in the countryside, villages and small towns had already voted with their feet - or rather accelerator pedals! Don't forget that most hamlets, villages and many small towns had never had a train service in the first place so the implementation of the first Beeching report didn't deprive them of anything.

 

[Taunton]

Beeching's crime was that he forced some parts of the British public to realise that the past had gone.

Something which, extraordinarily, still remains to this day. On this forum and elsewhere.

Bear in mind Beeching produced several mainstream reports. Only one was about the closure of passenger services which had become useless. The other reports were about forward thinking, investment, bulk freight, express passenger, high speed, etc. The whole lot were about productivity.

 

[yorksrob]

Something which, extraordinarily, still remains to this day. On this forum and elsewhere.

Bear in mind Beeching produced several mainstream reports. Only one was about the closure of passenger services which had become useless. The other reports were about forward thinking, investment, bulk freight, express passenger, high speed, etc. The whole lot were about productivity.

Although if his report on trunk routes had been carried out, the railway and country would be in a sorry(er) state today.

One can be forward thinking and also wrong.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Something which, extraordinarily, still remains to this day. On this forum and elsewhere.

Bear in mind Beeching produced several mainstream reports. Only one was about the closure of passenger services which had become useless. The other reports were about forward thinking, investment, bulk freight, express passenger, high speed, etc. The whole lot were about productivity.

Quite. One of the more interesting was A Study of the Relative True Costs of Rail and Road Freight Transport over Trunk Routes, published in June 1964. This exposed and made clear that heavy lorries didn't 'pay their way'. This paved the way for the Trunk Routes report, published in February 1965, which was predicated on a number of factors including rising population over the coming 20 years and economic growth of 4% p.a. compound as expounded by the National Economic Development Council (NEDC). The NEDC was very much in tune with the incoming administration's technocratic approach to growing the British Economy.

Assuming both the growth and significant transfer of traffic from road, largely but not entirely with containerisation/liner trains, the amount of trunk rail freight could double. It has always struck me as significant that the Trunk Routes report went as far as putting its key conclusions in bold type! (I know that it is regarded as slightly rude to 'shout' on these Forums.)

(Presuming that the recommendations were accepted) "It will also be possible to concentrate railway investment upon the selected routes in the confidence that, on this railway of the future, the essential dense flows of traffic will be maintained."

Although if his report on trunk routes had been carried out, the railway and country would be in a sorry(er) state today.

One can be forward thinking and also wrong.

Sorry, Rob, you're going to have to justify this. Why was investing in some key routes, such as the WCML, GWML, Southampton-Birmingham and so on, but not the Great Central London Extension, Stratford-upon-Avon - Cheltenham, the Waverley Route, Exeter-Plymouth via Okehampton, etc. "wrong"?

 

[yorksrob]

Sorry, Rob, you're going to have to justify this. Why was investing in some key routes, such as the WCML, GWML, Southampton-Birmingham and so on, but not the Great Central London Extension, Stratford-upon-Avon - Cheltenham, the Waverley Route, Exeter-Plymouth via Okehampton, etc. "wrong"?

You're quite right. It does depend on whether one trusts that a route "not selected for development" wasn't a euphemism for closure some time down the line.

I think the cat was out of the bag when Dr Beeching was interviewed in the early 1980's and when asked whether there were still lines that should close, he mentioned the Marylebone - Banbury line and I think Newcastle - Edinburgh

I posted this clip on youtube a couple of years ago, but doubtless could dig it up if required

This is the one I think.

Dr B deserves credit for being open and honest about his plans and workings. Current Government machinations are far more opaque.

 

[Dr Hoo]

I had seen the interview before. It's well worth watching throughout. I don't think that anybody can be in any doubt that Beeching always took a carefully analytical approach to any subject that he encountered.

It may be hard to recognise now, but when the Trunk Route document was written the freight analysis showed practically no major freight flows (or prospects) over the Newcastle-Edinburgh line. (Local traffic like coal to Cockenzie Power Station within Scotland and within Northumberland was not a 'trunk' issue.)

As for passenger traffic (besides sleepers) it is hard to recall that there were only about seven through/'inter city' passenger trains per day for most of the time. (I know there there were some dated or Saturday variations.) That part of the ECML did not deserve to be treated as a trunk route in 1965 when other lines were being thought of as needing to cater for up to 200 trains each way per day. And it was well known (and stated) that air travel was making serious inroads into even the limited numbers being carried to/from Edinburgh at the time.

And once the WCML electrification was completed, Paddington or Marylebone-Banbury via High Wycombe was another backwater. Even by 1984 there were still fewer than a dozen (subsidised) DMUs each way per day over a single line north of Princes Risborough.

Although the Hindsight interviewer might have been pleased that he managed to manoeuvre Beeching into a 'gotcha' observation almost 20 years after he had last had any access to up-to-date figures and analysis about the lines mentioned you can be sure that had the Good Doctor actually been taking any fresh decisions in the 1980s he would certainly have studied current data.

 

[yorksrob]

I had seen the interview before. It's well worth watching throughout. I don't think that anybody can be in any doubt that Beeching always took a carefully analytical approach to any subject that he encountered.

It may be hard to recognise now, but then the Trunk Route document was written the freight analysis showed practically no major freight flows (or prospects) over the Newcastle-Edinburgh line. (Local traffic like coal to Cockenzie Power Station within Scotland and within Northumberland was not a 'trunk' issue.)

As for passenger traffic (besides sleepers) it is hard to recall that there were only about seven through/'inter city' passenger trains per day for most of the time. (I know there there were some dated or Saturday variations.) That part of the ECML did not deserve to be treated as a trunk route in 1965 when other lines were being thought of as needing to cater for up to 200 trains each way per day. And it was well known (and stated) that air travel was making serious inroads into even the limited numbers being carried to/from Edinburgh at the time.

And once the WCML electrification was completed, Paddington or Marylebone-Banbury via High Wycombe was another backwater. Even by 1984 there were still fewer than a dozen (subsidised) DMUs each way per day over a single line north of Princes Risborough.

Although the Hindsight interviewer might have been pleased that he managed to manoeuvre Beeching into a 'gotcha' observation almost 20 years after he had last had any access to up-to-date figures and analysis about the lines mentioned you can be sure that had the Good Doctor actually been taking any fresh decisions in the 1980s he would certainly have studied current data.

And he would still probably have come to the wrong conclusion.

Dr B never appreciated the value or use of the regional passenger railway. Freight and InterCity yes, but not the web of passenger lines thousands of people relied on then and now. No amount of data would have changed that.

 

[coppercapped]

And he would still probably have come to the wrong conclusion.

Dr B never appreciated the value or use of the regional passenger railway.

Ah, but he did. It was just that he showed that the value was negative.

Freight and InterCity yes, but not the web of passenger lines thousands of people relied on then and now. No amount of data would have changed that.

These services required a great deal of financial support as they did not cover anything like their full costs, in some cases not even their movement costs.

You have been told this on many, many occasions.

 

[yorksrob]

Ah, but he did. It was just that he showed that the value was negative.

These services required a great deal of financial support as they did not cover anything like their full costs, in some cases not even their movement costs.

You have been told this on many, many occasions.

And here we're in agreement

The value in a farebox/cost sense was negative.

That's different from the transport need of the country just as much now as it was then.

Dr B was destined to come up with the wrong answer because he neither believed in, nor was tasked to consider the social need for the passenger railway

 

[Dr Hoo]

Dr B was destined to come up with the wrong answer because he neither believed in, nor was tasked to consider the social need for the passenger railway

He quite explicitly mentioned the possibility of using a cost-benefit/social analysis approach for 'suburban services outside London' [page 22 of the Reshaping Report] and noted that joint work was in hand between BR and the Ministry of Transport on this very point. (Ernest Marples was an early adopter of cost-benefit analysis and had used it prior authorising construction of the Victoria Line.) This sort of thing was still very novel 60 years ago.

What you describe as "the social need for the passenger railway" (wider than specific 'hardship') was hardly recognised at the time. Please bear in mind that in 1965, in rural areas, only 1% of journeys to and from work were by rail. (23% were by bus, 56% by car/van/motorcycle, 13% by push bike and 7% by walking >1 mile, with an odd few by taxi or ferries.) The figures for all trips, not just work, were very similar, with rail stuck on 1%. Even within larger towns and conurbation rail averaged less than 2%. [Figures taken from GB Transport Statistics 1965-1975.]

 

[yorksrob]

He quite explicitly mentioned the possibility of using a cost-benefit/social analysis approach for 'suburban services outside London' [page 22 of the Reshaping Report] and noted that joint work was in hand between BR and the Ministry of Transport on this very point. (Ernest Marples was an early adopter of cost-benefit analysis and had used it prior authorising construction of the Victoria Line.) This sort of thing was still very novel 60 years ago.

What you describe as "the social need for the passenger railway" (wider than specific 'hardship') was hardly recognised at the time. Please bear in mind that in 1965, in rural areas, only 1% of journeys to and from work were by rail. (23% were by bus, 56% by car/van/motorcycle, 13% by push bike and 7% by walking >1 mile, with an odd few by taxi or ferries.) The figures for all trips, not just work, were very similar, with rail stuck on 1%. Even within larger towns and conurbation rail averaged less than 2%. [Figures taken from GB Transport Statistics 1965-1975.]

But Dr Beeching was saying the same things in the early 1980's.

It is a case of mistaken ideology.

 

[Dr Hoo]

But Dr Beeching was saying the same things in the early 1980's.

It is a case of mistaken ideology.

We will get into trouble for drifting off the thread topic about national productivity but I find it difficult to recognise an acceptance of basic financial discipline in the provision of public services as a "mistaken ideology". I don't feel that Dr Beeching really pushed back against a bi-partisan approach that accepted the desirability of some passenger subsidies by the time of the 1980s if that's what the country wanted.

There is a certain irony that passenger travel by road and air had continued to grow while rail passenger traffic (pass km) had stagnated overall between (say) 1963 and 1983, broadly in line with what Dr B had anticipated. A smaller share of a larger cake remained with rail.

 

[yorksrob]

We will get into trouble for drifting off the thread topic about national productivity but I find it difficult to recognise an acceptance of basic financial discipline in the provision of public services as a "mistaken ideology". I don't feel that Dr Beeching really pushed back against a bi-partisan approach that accepted the desirability of some passenger subsidies by the time of the 1980s if that's what the country wanted.

There is a certain irony that passenger travel by road and air had continued to grow while rail passenger traffic (pass km) had stagnated overall between (say) 1963 and 1983, broadly in line with what Dr B had anticipated. A smaller share of a larger cake remained with rail.

Taking things back to productivity, it is only one economic measure. Undoubtedly the productivity of railway staff was indeed improving since the 1960's and ever since as line for line, fewer staff have been employed. Conversely, the productivity of workers in a seaside town probably dropped when a big chunk of its visitors who arrived by rail, ceased to turn up because the railway had gone.

Financial discipline might not be mistaken ideology, but expecting the passenger railway to cover its costs certainly is. Is it any surprise that passenger traffic stagnated after the 1960's when the product was being so aggressively reduced ? Passengers at Henfield, Hailsham, Padstow etc probably were less inclined to use the train after the service dissappeared. It's not really much of a surprise.

 

[Bald Rick]

Conversely, the productivity of workers in a seaside town probably dropped when a big chunk of its visitors who arrived by rail, ceased to turn up because the railway had gone.

I genuinely dont know, but is ther evidence that visitors to seaside towns reduced because of their railway closed?

I thought it was the csse that visitors to seaside towns reduced because they were heading to the Med instead; added to the travelling public tending to prefer to travel by car (especially for family holidays) this led to the reduction in rail use which in turn led to the (relatively few) route closures to seaside resorts.

 

[yorksrob]

I genuinely dont know, but is ther evidence that visitors to seaside towns reduced because of their railway closed?

I thought it was the csse that visitors to seaside towns reduced because they were heading to the Med instead; added to the travelling public tending to prefer to travel by car (especially for family holidays) this led to the reduction in rail use which in turn led to the (relatively few) route closures to seaside resorts.

If there is, I don't know about it. However, it's not hard to imagine that someone who'd been going to Padstow (as an example) by train might be put off going there.

People might have been heading to the Med for their hols, however there was still a market for day trips etc.

 

[Taunton]

This is the one I think.

Thank you for that, as it contains (starting 6:40) the quips about Beeching from the satire television programme 'That Was The Week That Was' (TW3), a sort-of 'Have I Got News For You' predecessor. The deep-voiced poem about closures was written by none other than one of the programme's backroom contributors who was also a semi-regular BBC presenter of bits and pieces at the time, and who later came to even more prominence - John Betjeman. I 'wasn't allowed' to stay up late to see the programmes, but heard about it the next morning.

These TW3 moments about Beeching got into various railway books in the following years. There were also two books that featured Beeching extensively and positively, Gerry Fiennes' "I Tried to Run a Railway", and Stewart Joy (Beeching's Chief Economist) with "The Train that Ran Away", the former to quite an extent, and the latter almost entirely. I somehow bought both with my own pocket money, probably the first 'management' books I ever bought, even well before starting Economics at school. Still have them.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 29 Oct 2023 ==

I genuinely don't know, but is there evidence that visitors to seaside towns reduced because their railway closed?

The best examples are to look at comparable seaside towns (so not the big Blackpools) that kept their train service. Take Southport for example, which still has trains from Liverpool and Manchester. Is there any evidence that the economy there still has dependence on rail visitors? Seems day trippers come by car, and weekly stayers have gone completely.

 

[yorksrob]

Thank you for that, as it contains (starting 6:40) the quips about Beeching from the satire television programme 'That Was The Week That Was' (TW3), a sort-of 'Have I Got News For You' predecessor. The deep-voiced poem about closures was written by none other than one of the programme's backroom contributors who was also a semi-regular BBC presenter of bits and pieces at the time, and who later came to even more prominence - John Betjeman. I 'wasn't allowed' to stay up late to see the programmes, but heard about it the next morning.

These TW3 moments about Beeching got into various railway books in the following years. There were also two books that featured Beeching extensively and positively, Gerry Fiennes' "I Tried to Run a Railway", and Stewart Joy (Beeching's Chief Economist) with "The Train that Ran Away", the former to quite an extent, and the latter almost entirely. I somehow bought both with my own pocket money, probably the first 'management' books I ever bought, even well before starting Economics at school. Still have them.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 29 Oct 2023 ==


The best examples are to look at comparable seaside towns (so not the big Blackpools) that kept their train service. Take Southport for example, which still has trains from Liverpool and Manchester. Is there any evidence that the economy there still has dependence on rail visitors? Seems day trippers come by car, and weekly stayers have gone completely.

Dr Beeching and John Betjamin both had very different visions of the railway and what it was for. I can't help thinking that Betjamin's vision of a people centred railway taking leisure travellers to the seaside is a lot closer to the reality of the railway now (particularly after covid) than Beeching's "futuristic" vision.

Southport's an interesting case. It has good railway service from Wigan and a very good service from Liverpool. Ideal distance for day trips.

There are plenty of people getting off of the trains there from both directions and a lot seem to be going there for leisure. Can we really assume that they'd all still be taking those trips if the railway's weren't there ?

 

[randyrippley]

You also have to look at the effects the Beeching cuts had on British industry.
The wholesale scrappings of stock and track vastly distorted the UK price of steel and may well have precipitated the beginning of the collapse of the UK steel industry. Similarly the reduction in coal use affecting mining, though obviously that's also due to the modernisation plan.
But also the effect on UK engineering, in the sense that the lack of demand for rolling stock post-Beeching led to amalgamations, takeovers and closures of numerous engineering companies (prodded along by Tony Benn's desire to restructure British Engineering).
The GEC takeovers and closures of EE/AEI/BTH/Napier and more are a case in point, once they'd got into the mindset of asset stripping there was no stopping them. They destroyed their railway engineering base, then proceeded to do the same with electronics and military systems, with much heading overseas. Hawker Siddeley another example - from the 1960s Brush went into a long slow lingering decline.
It's my belief that industries reaction to Beeching was to close and asset-strip, creating a mindset of short-term investment which still hamstrings our productivity

 

[deltic]

There is an academic paper that looks at the OP's question - "CEP Discussion Paper No 1563 August 2018 The Spatial Impacts of a Massive Rail Disinvestment Program: The Beeching Axe Stephen Gibbons Stephan Heblich Ted Pinchbeck" which can be seen here https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1563.pdf

Its finding is

a net productivity loss from the rail cuts of around 1.8%.

also

The broad finding is that the cuts in rail infrastructure caused falls in population in affected areas relative to less affected areas, loss of educated and skilled workers, and an ageing population. A 10% reduction in rail access over the 1950-1980 period (measured by a network centrality index) was associated with a 3% fall in population by 1981 (relative to unaffected areas). Put another way, the 1 in 5 places in Britain that were most exposed to the rail network cuts saw 24 percentage points less growth in population than the 1 in 5 places that were least exposed. Populations did not recover in subsequent decades.

 

[Clarence Yard]

The process you describe had been going on long before Beeching, as British Industry struggled in the post war competitive environment in international trade. Engineering was but one problem area and our domestic producers were starting to struggle against corporate giants from elsewhere, hence the drive to “bulk up” our producers through mergers.

The British Steel industry also found it hard going and the reduction in coal use in this country wasn’t mainly due to not supplying BR for use in locomotives - there was a huge move away for industrial and domestic use which also affected the amount BR carried. People always go on about Maggie closing the pits but you should see how many were closed in the 1955-69 period, thanks to that move away for industrial and domestic use.

From the mid fifties onwards you can see the coalescing of industrial capacity starting to take effect, even to the extent of a flour mill here, a paper works there and by the mid sixties it was in full flood. BR and the nationalised industries were slow to cope with the change but once they did, the productivity gains through such initiatives as MGR, bigger bulk carrying wagons and Freightliner, were massive.

What this coalescing of industrial capacity did was encourage populations to move. When you had the housing in place for people to move to, it worked but it did lead to some areas losing the growth that those attractive areas now achieved. Some of that has been laid at Beeching door but there was a wider industrial and social policy at work here.

 

[Magdalia]

I genuinely dont know, but is ther evidence that visitors to seaside towns reduced because of their railway closed?

I thought it was the csse that visitors to seaside towns reduced because they were heading to the Med instead; added to the travelling public tending to prefer to travel by car (especially for family holidays) this led to the reduction in rail use which in turn led to the (relatively few) route closures to seaside resorts.

Tourism is a notoriously low productivity industry, even more so in the Beeching era, when there was no minimum wage. In an era of near full employment, redeploying people from tourism to other, more productive, industries, would have improved productivity.

And on the demand side, the tourism didn't vanish, it went to different places and by different modes of transport. Some places definitely lost out: in East Anglia the best example of this is Hunstanton, which had thousands of day trippers arriving by train, but inadequate road transport that couldn't support that number of day trippers coming by car. In contrast, other places, not accessible by rail, got the benefit as car ownership increased and the road network improved: in East Anglia the classic example of this is Southwold.

Similarly the reduction in coal use affecting mining, though obviously that's also due to the modernisation plan.

Rail use was only about 5% of coal consumption. Beeching's impact on coal mining was insignificant compared to the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea. The direct effect on coal consumption of closing town gas works was more than twice as big as the ending of steam traction on the railway, and there was a huge indirect effect too as domestic and industrial consumers switched from coal to gas. Use of coal in electricity generation increased with higher demand met by the construction of the big baseload power stations in the Trent and Aire valleys.

There is an academic paper that looks at the OP's question - "CEP Discussion Paper No 1563 August 2018 The Spatial Impacts of a Massive Rail Disinvestment Program: The Beeching Axe Stephen Gibbons Stephan Heblich Ted Pinchbeck" which can be seen here https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1563.pdf

Thanks for this link. It is a long document, and I haven't had time to read it yet, but it is on my reading list!

 

[eldomtom2]

I think at some point we need to accept that the changes to the railway were likely considered logical and sensible at the time, given the motor car was giving people more freedom (despite the impact of subsequent developments making people totally car dependent) and transport operators would have thought that more buses and coaches meant being able to run anywhere with ease (ignoring traffic congestion issues and the ongoing cost of trying to run buses over trains).

Let us not pretend the Beeching cuts were uncontroversial in their day.

I had seen the interview before. It's well worth watching throughout. I don't think that anybody can be in any doubt that Beeching always took a carefully analytical approach to any subject that he encountered.

It may be hard to recognise now, but when the Trunk Route document was written the freight analysis showed practically no major freight flows (or prospects) over the Newcastle-Edinburgh line. (Local traffic like coal to Cockenzie Power Station within Scotland and within Northumberland was not a 'trunk' issue.)

As for passenger traffic (besides sleepers) it is hard to recall that there were only about seven through/'inter city' passenger trains per day for most of the time. (I know there there were some dated or Saturday variations.) That part of the ECML did not deserve to be treated as a trunk route in 1965 when other lines were being thought of as needing to cater for up to 200 trains each way per day. And it was well known (and stated) that air travel was making serious inroads into even the limited numbers being carried to/from Edinburgh at the time.

Can you honestly claim that even in the 1960s the railways and the country would be better off without these lines, to name a few of those "not selected for development"?

• Newcastle-Berwick-Edinburgh
• Chester-Holyhead
• Plymouth-Penzance
• London-Bedford-Leicester

These TW3 moments about Beeching got into various railway books in the following years. There were also two books that featured Beeching extensively and positively, Gerry Fiennes' "I Tried to Run a Railway", and Stewart Joy (Beeching's Chief Economist) with "The Train that Ran Away", the former to quite an extent, and the latter almost entirely.

Fiennes was absolutely not pro-Beeching - indeed he claims that the Trunk Routes report originally lacked the "not selected for development" euphemism and outright stated such routes would be closed.

 

[Taunton]

Fiennes was absolutely not pro-Beeching - indeed he claims that the Trunk Routes report originally lacked the "not selected for development" euphemism and outright stated such routes would be closed.

Bit difficult to go along with, when Fiennes regularly refers to him as the "Great and Good Doctor". They were both bought in to the positive futures.

I've sometimes wondered if Beeching saw Fiennes as a future Chairman.