Cowden disaster 30th anniversary......

[satisnek]

One thing I've never understood about this accident: was there no 'bang' when the train burst the point lock?

 

[bramling]

There's some odd things in the report, as summarised by Taunton. However, I'm also a little puzzled about why so much importance is attached to whether the A.W.S. was working. It's not like driving through Rugby on the down fast to the down Trent Valley, where the signals for two other movements (Plat 1 to down Birmingham, and freight from Down Northampton to Down T.V. slow) could also be clear as well as your own. The signal spacing the branch is quite wide, and the one passed at danger is important and un-ambiguous; it's where two tracks merge into the single line. It's not just another signal in a series. As well, the guard was said in the report to swap turns so he could work on the branch., so you would think he would be as familiar with it as a driver with route knowledge. It doesn't seem a difficult section to understand and memorise.

Regarding the report's criticism of the investigations being made immediately; in the defence of the staff, my experience in B.R. days (and it wad direct, for a period) was that people who arrived at an accident scene primarily wanted to find out what went wrong and why; the aim was to do this as quickly as possible (for instance, but not in this case, brake shoes cool down and air leaks into vac,. systems). If that showed people at fault then that was the result, but it was primarily to find out why, not how blame could be apportioned. Of course, in those days it would always be B.R.'s fault, unlike today when there's so many organisations involved. Not saying it's better or worse, just a different emphasis.

The significance of the AWS is that the weather was foggy and drivers place a greater reliance on AWS in such conditions.

It won’t have helped that the repeater signal was located in the rear of (before) Ashurst station, and furthermore will have been one almost always encountered at yellow. Perfect stage set for it to be essentially irrelevant to drivers of up trains. All that was then required was to forget about the stop signal, and what better conditions to do that than fog, a distraction in the cab, and perhaps no AWS, and a poorly lit aspect as well.

 

[Peter Mugridge]

One thing I've never understood about this accident: was there no 'bang' when the train burst the point lock?

Was it a locked point or a passive point, though?

 

[Taunton]

The points were main line facing to Down trains, which was the route set and locked, and indeed the noise and jolt of the Up train bursting through them should surely have been felt by the two crew members in the cab - if not seen approaching them.

The lack of alertness by the proper driver does surprise - didn't notice the absence of the train being crossed (which even a regular passenger did), didn't see the red signal, didn't see the misset points, didn't respond to the bang of bursting them. If you take a learner driver out in the car, are you not double-alert through the windscreen to all the road conditions ahead?

 

[Bikeman78]

The points were main line facing to Down trains, which was the route set and locked, and indeed the noise and jolt of the Up train bursting through them should surely have been felt by the two crew members in the cab - if not seen approaching them.

The lack of alertness by the proper driver does surprise - didn't notice the absence of the train being crossed (which even a regular passenger did), didn't see the red signal, didn't see the misset points, didn't respond to the bang of bursting them. If you take a learner driver out in the car, are you not double-alert through the windscreen to all the road conditions ahead?

Another notable point is that the driver of the down train made a heavy brake application before impact. No mention of the driver on the up train throwing in the brakes. Clearly the driver on the down train was paying attention to the line ahead.

I feel sorry for the guy at Cowden. He must have heard everything. I've been on that platform on a still night. I could hear the down train until it shut off power. Moments later I could hear the up pulling out of the loop.

 

[Towers]

The points were main line facing to Down trains, which was the route set and locked, and indeed the noise and jolt of the Up train bursting through them should surely have been felt by the two crew members in the cab - if not seen approaching them.

The lack of alertness by the proper driver does surprise - didn't notice the absence of the train being crossed (which even a regular passenger did), didn't see the red signal, didn't see the misset points, didn't respond to the bang of bursting them. If you take a learner driver out in the car, are you not double-alert through the windscreen to all the road conditions ahead?

Was the driver’s fitness for duty ever fully established post-incident, or was this simply not possibly owing to the aftermath? Apologies if this is clear in the report, I haven’t read it all.

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

To the earlier points about irregular persons in the cab and potentially driving. In about 1995 I travelled as a passenger on the Blaenau Ffestiniog branch on one of the two 3-car 101 DMUs that commonly worked the line in the summer months. Sitting behind the driver’s cab (blinds up) on the return trip I distinctly recall the departure from Llanrwst North - the crossing point where the signal box is about 200yds off the platform end, where a token change would take place. The guard had come to the front cab presumably to inform the driver of which request stops were required before Llandudno Junction. The driver placed the unit in gear, stood at his window with the token and (audibly from our seats) told the guard to apply power and then stop on the vacuum brake adjacent to the signal box. I remember my Dad nudging me and saying something about it being a rule breach, and also how uncomfortable the guard looked after doing so!

 

[JammyJames08]

As a driver I’ve read this report and as sad as it is, we will never know who was driving.

Here’s my thoughts…

Most of the report findings I agree with but in the absence of a data recorder we will never know…

I agree with the report that if the AWS was isolated the driver was expected to report this and nothing came through, so I agree that on the balance of probability the AWS was working correctly, there is a mention of the warning horn being a quieter version so maybe whoever was driving didn’t really register it fully (sub consciously cancelling the aws is mentioned within the report or due to the distraction)

No driver would drive a train with the aws isolated without reporting it or being reported already (but then this is 30 years ago maybe there was less urgency back then?) but no punters complained of any delays on the way up.

in the absence of anything to remind the driver of the red aspect up ahead at ashurst, the distant signal being on, the station in between then OD58, I think the layout here is a contributing factor. (No DRA back then)

There is a possibility that the driver drove the train to ashurst and then they swapped over, the guard then took over the controls, and both engaged in conversation missed the quieter aws warning at OD58, what with the fog as well, poor red aspect quality and the crew forgot the distant was on.

Possibly the guard drove on and he was driving when the crash occurred, it’s just my opinion and I base that on the fact there was no overshoot anywhere and nothing untoward happened until the crash itself.

A senior manager suspected the guard on occasion of actually driving trains.

But sadly we will never know what happened that morning.

And I echo peoples sentiments into this sad accident, RIP.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 20 Oct 2024 ==

Was the driver’s fitness for duty ever fully established post-incident, or was this simply not possibly owing to the aftermath? Apologies if this is clear in the report, I haven’t read it all.

All the report mentions is that the driver and guard weren’t suffering from any under lying conditions via the coroner.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

In the 2000 book "Tracks to Disaster" penned by Adrian Vaughan (Ian Allan Publishing), why is the author seemingly so keen to propound the theory that there *may* have been some problem with the AWS isolating switch on the 2E27 Uckfield to Oxted train, the electrical contacts for which were supposedly "contaminated"?

 

[Taunton]

I am surprised at the negative comments, including by professionals in the accident report, about Ashurst station being inappropriately between the distant signal and the starter for the single line ahead. This is exactly how traditional block signalling has always been done, with the distant, approaching the block post/station, being before the station, and the starter (and possibly an advanced starter) being after it.

More likely is that, because trains were generally timetabled to pass at Ashurst, the distant was usually at caution whenever approaching, so was just regarded as normal.

 

[Surreytraveller]

I am surprised at the negative comments, including by professionals in the accident report, about Ashurst station being inappropriately between the distant signal and the starter for the single line ahead. This is exactly how traditional block signalling has always been done, with the distant, approaching the block post/station, being before the station, and the starter (and possibly an advanced starter) being after it.

More likely is that, because trains were generally timetabled to pass at Ashurst, the distant was usually at caution whenever approaching, so was just regarded as normal.

The difference is, there is no signal at Ashurst station. You have to accelerate away from the station to get to the signal.
Perhaps the driver/guard has mistakingly thought the down train had passed them, one persuading the other it had, hence going through onto the single track

 

[Rescars]

I am surprised at the negative comments, including by professionals in the accident report, about Ashurst station being inappropriately between the distant signal and the starter for the single line ahead. This is exactly how traditional block signalling has always been done, with the distant, approaching the block post/station, being before the station, and the starter (and possibly an advanced starter) being after it.

More likely is that, because trains were generally timetabled to pass at Ashurst, the distant was usually at caution whenever approaching, so was just regarded as normal.

In traditional block signalling, wouldn't the distant have related to a home signal before the station, with a starter immediately after it?

 

[Taunton]

In traditional block signalling, wouldn't the distant have related to a home signal before the station, with a starter immediately after it?

It relates to all of them. If the Home and the Starter are clear, but the Advance Starter is on, the distant will still be on, of course.

 

[Surreytraveller]

It relates to all of them. If the Home and the Starter are clear, but the Advance Starter is on, the distant will still be on, of course.

If you're comparing Ashurst to absolute block, there is no Home or Starter signal. Only a Distant and Advance Starter

 

[778]

If anyone can make sense of paragraph 28, where the guard of the Down train, the sole traincrew survivor, appears to state they walked right past the enormous wreckage twice, to the rear of the Up train, 12 cars away, thought it was the front of his own train, walked back, and only later had to be told it had been involved in a collision, I would like an explanation.

It does seem hard to believe that he could have not noticed any wreckage. Maybe it was all on the other side of the track? What makes it more puzzling is that he went ahead of the tran and put detonators down. Surely he must have noticed the wreckage then?

Would a collision at the same speed involving 2 171s cause less casualties and less damage?

 

[Surreytraveller]

Would a collision at the same speed involving 2 171s cause less casualties and less damage?

They're built to more modern crash worthiness, so yes, fewer casualties and less damage

 

[stuving]

If anyone can make sense of paragraph 28, where the guard of the Down train, the sole traincrew survivor, appears to state they walked right past the enormous wreckage twice, to the rear of the Up train, 12 cars away, thought it was the front of his own train, walked back, and only later had to be told it had been involved in a collision, I would like an explanation.

I can offer a partial explanation, and note that at the inquiry his evidence was accepted without serious challenge. There are newspaper reports of the inquiry that quote Guard Boyd's words more closely, making clear he knew there was serious damage but attributed it all to the derailment. For example:

Aberdeen Press and Journal 07 December 1994 / BNA

He must have been in the middle DMBSO, car 4 of the Down train (2E24). When he looked out and forward on whichever side it was, he saw derailed coaches pushed off the track. His initial assumption was that the train had struck something other than another train, and his brain would have invented a model of what he couldn't see to fit with what he could based on that assumption (as we all do automatically). That underlying mental model of the situation didn't change until much later (see below for a possible reason).

His evidence was that he walked up one side and down the other, and was well aware of the extent of the damage. Clearly Guard Boyd walked past a longer train than 2E24 was without realising that this was not consistent with his mental picture of what had happened. And he did it twice, with the second time being harder to explain. But he didn't go past all the coaches, and may well have been unable to see the worst damage if he was off the embankment, among trees and bushes. Of course if three (or more) out of 6 cars are wrecked, you'd only see no more than three on their wheels ...

The news reports talk about coaches hanging over a steep embankment, though perhaps they exaggerate a bit. The line here is on an embankment, though not a really high one, but enough to mean he had to scramble down to get round this wreckage. The pictures show more trees and bushes than you might expect for the period; not unlike you'd see now.

Looking at the diagram at the end of the report, you can see that if he did move away to get round the derailed coaches, and then climbed back up, he would already have bypassed other coaches off the track on the other side. So I reckon he passed six or seven coaches, rather than three which he should have expected.

I would also expect that Boyd was frantically trying to make sure he remembered all the important things he had to do, and on the way back kept being distracted by passengers asking ... well, anything. His answers would have been more about reassurance and "don't worry help will arrive soon" than trying to explain what had really happened (which he knew he didn't know anyway). But he was kept busy enough by those two tasks that he never got on to thinking analytically about what he had seen and whether it all made sense to him.

 

[bramling]

I am surprised at the negative comments, including by professionals in the accident report, about Ashurst station being inappropriately between the distant signal and the starter for the single line ahead. This is exactly how traditional block signalling has always been done, with the distant, approaching the block post/station, being before the station, and the starter (and possibly an advanced starter) being after it.

More likely is that, because trains were generally timetabled to pass at Ashurst, the distant was usually at caution whenever approaching, so was just regarded as normal.

The setup isn’t ideal, both because it allows the repeater signal to be forgotten, but it also allows it to be disregarded because - as you say - it was (and is) almost always seen at yellow.

This in turn means that a caution on the AWS, assuming it was working, wouldn’t have been something to worry about either.

So there was a total reliance on the red aspect, which to be fair has good sighting from the station - in normal visibility, and when the signal aspect is functioning correctly.

Bring in thick fog, and suddenly the arrangement placed total reliance on the driver (whether or not he was actually driving) sighting and reacting to the red aspect. Have a driver distracted, forget his location, or just miss it for whatever reason, and there was nothing to stop a disaster, which was what happened.

The setup is rather safer now because of TPWS, but I think it’s fair to say that the situation as it existed in 1994 was not ideal by any means. Whilst one could argue that a potentially distracted driver isn’t something to be legislated for, the risk of poor visibility through fog doesn’t seem to have been identified as a potential risk.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 20 Oct 2024 ==

In the 2000 book "Tracks to Disaster" penned by Adrian Vaughan (Ian Allan Publishing), why is the author seemingly so keen to propound the theory that there *may* have been some problem with the AWS isolating switch on the 2E27 Uckfield to Oxted train, the electrical contacts for which were supposedly "contaminated"?

Vaughan is very keen to paint a picture of standards having slipped since the “good old days” (whatever they were), and to be fair if you read some of his stuff he does sometimes have a point - his analysis of the Severn Tunnel accident certainly paints a picture of a complete shambles in terms of the infrastructure and its functionality.

In my view he is perfectly reasonable to raise questions about the AWS, as one of the many questions about Cowden is why the train continued onwards despite the fact that it should have received a caution on the AWS at OD58. It’s a case of whether we want to believe that either the AWS wasn’t working, or that someone subconsciously acknowledged it, or that someone acknowledged it but decided to disregard the warning and carry on driving. Any of those three possibility may have been the case, we shall never know.

Certainly in those days there was more slackness in terms of safety systems such as AWS - look at Southall as an example, where at one point another member of staff remarked to the driver about the AWS being isolated and he just shrugged his shoulders. But I tend to agree with the Cowden report that on balance one would still expect any issue to have been reported. But equally one can also argue that as the Cowden driver wasn’t following rules in having the guard in the cab, he could just as easily have been not following rules in not reporting a defective AWS. Again, no one is ever going to know.

 

[Towers]

I can offer a partial explanation, and note that at the inquiry his evidence was accepted without serious challenge. There are newspaper reports of the inquiry that quote Guard Boyd's words more closely, making clear he knew there was serious damage but attributed it all to the derailment. For example:
View attachment 167649
Aberdeen Press and Journal 07 December 1994 / BNA

He must have been in the middle DMBSO, car 4 of the Down train (2E24). When he looked out and forward on whichever side it was, he saw derailed coaches pushed off the track. His initial assumption was that the train had struck something other than another train, and his brain would have invented a model of what he couldn't see to fit with what he could based on that assumption (as we all do automatically). That underlying mental model of the situation didn't change until much later (see below for a possible reason).

His evidence was that he walked up one side and down the other, and was well aware of the extent of the damage. Clearly Guard Boyd walked past a longer train than 2E24 was without realising that this was not consistent with his mental picture of what had happened. And he did it twice, with the second time being harder to explain. But he didn't go past all the coaches, and may well have been unable to see the worst damage if he was off the embankment, among trees and bushes. Of course if three (or more) out of 6 cars are wrecked, you'd only see no more than three on their wheels ...

The news reports talk about coaches hanging over a steep embankment, though perhaps they exaggerate a bit. The line here is on an embankment, though not a really high one, but enough to mean he had to scramble down to get round this wreckage. The pictures show more trees and bushes than you might expect for the period; not unlike you'd see now.

Looking at the diagram at the end of the report, you can see that if he did move away to get round the derailed coaches, and then climbed back up, he would already have bypassed other coaches off the track on the other side. So I reckon he passed six or seven coaches, rather than three which he should have expected.
View attachment 167650
I would also expect that Boyd was frantically trying to make sure he remembered all the important things he had to do, and on the way back kept being distracted by passengers asking ... well, anything. His answers would have been more about reassurance and "don't worry help will arrive soon" than trying to explain what had really happened (which he knew he didn't know anyway). But he was kept busy enough by those two tasks that he never got on to thinking analytically about what he had seen and whether it all made sense to him.

That seems a very reasonable analysis to me. And to add into the mix, as well as the brain painting its own picture as you’ve said, there may also have been a factor of not considering the obvious possibility - that what his train had hit was in fact the other train - because such an event would seem nigh on impossible to a railway worker who had worked the line frequently and had confidence in things to operate in the manner that they were intended to.

It may seem glaringly obvious when weighing it up afterwards, but in the chaos of the immediate aftermath of the accident the idea that a head-on collision had occured could very easily be filtered into the ‘impossible’ pile by the brain.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 21 Oct 2024 ==

Certainly in those days there was more slackness in terms of safety systems such as AWS - look at Southall as an example, where at one point another member of staff remarked to the driver about the AWS being isolated and he just shrugged his shoulders. But I tend to agree with the Cowden report that on balance one would still expect any issue to have been reported. But equally one can also argue that as the Cowden driver wasn’t following rules in having the guard in the cab, he could just as easily have been not following rules in not reporting a defective AWS. Again, no one is ever going to know.

We also don’t know how frequently drivers would have been dealing with AWS faults & failures, this was ageing rolling stock and it may well be that the equipment was failing frequently and drivers had reached the point of getting beyond reporting it as a matter of priority.

 

[Merle Haggard]

What I've noticed in older (pre RAIB) Accident Reports is that quite often the report will make a point without further comment, phrased perhaps in a way to suggest to the reader to 'join the dots'.
In this report there's an example in the statement that there were unsubstantiated reports that the guard failed his driver assessment because he didn't react to signal aspects. It's left hanging, but perhaps the intention is for the reader to decide whether to regard this as significant.

snip

It may seem glaringly obvious when weighing it up afterwards, but in the chaos of the immediate aftermath of the accident the idea that a head-on collision had occured could very easily be filtered into the ‘impossible’ pile by the brain.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 21 Oct 2024 ==

I think that's exactly right, too; interestingly he regarded it as important to put down protection beyond his train suggesting he was concerned about an approaching train. Perhaps because he had noticed that they had not passed one and therefore was expecting one was to be on its way.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

I think that's exactly right, too; interestingly he regarded it as important to put down protection beyond his train suggesting he was concerned about an approaching train. Perhaps because he had noticed that they had not passed one and therefore was expecting one was to be on its way.

Wasn't guard Boyd (on the 2E24 Oxted to Uckfield train, which had just called at Cowden) putting down track protection behind the train, believing that the train had merely de-railed, and erroneously assuming that (fatally-injured) driver Rees was out of his cab and putting down protection in front of the train, to prevent a front end collision (which, of course, was what had just happened), before Boyd then made his way the 300 metres or so back to Cowden station in order to raise the alarm?

 

[Merle Haggard]

Wasn't guard Boyd (on the 2E24 Oxted to Uckfield train, which had just called at Cowden) putting down track protection behind the train, believing that the train had merely de-railed, and erroneously assuming that (fatally-injured) driver Rees was out of his cab and putting down protection in front of the train, to prevent a front end collision (which, of course, was what had just happened), before Boyd then made his way the 300 metres or so back to Cowden station in order to raise the alarm?

Thanks, but my reading of the report (and because of its length and construction I find it time consuming to revisit a point I thought it made) was that the guard returned to his van to get protection and then went forward, past the wrecked train again, to place protection in front* of it. But I may well be wrong, I'll have to re-read it.

*front being with reference to the direction his train had been moving before the collision, and of both (as it turned out) trains.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Thanks, but my reading of the report (and because of its length and construction I find it time consuming to revisit a point I thought it made) was that the guard returned to his van to get protection and then went forward, past the wrecked train again, to place protection in front* of it. But I may well be wrong, I'll have to re-read it.

I think your interpretation may be right. In which case, why wouldn't guard Boyd have realised that the suddenly halted train was now somewhat longer than normal (notwithstanding any 'concertinaing' in the middle, the Cowden collision was between 2 x 6 car units, wasn't it?)

 

[stuving]

This is the relevant part of the report.

So how far ahead did the rule book say protection should be placed? From his actions Boyd thought this was far enough for the driver (Rees) to be out of sight (remember it was foggy). He may well have seen no point is calling out, in case Rees was in earshot, as he saw his priority task as going to Cowden to report the (or at least an) accident, and did not want any delay to that.

I assumed (pending hearing from someone who knows) that Boyd still considered it was worth taking time to put protection a short way in front of the train, additional to whatever the rule book called for. So was that any kind of standard practice, at least in poor visibility?

 

[Surreytraveller]

I think your interpretation may be right. In which case, why wouldn't guard Boyd have realised that the suddenly halted train was now somewhat longer than normal (notwithstanding any 'concertinaing' in the middle, the Cowden collision was between 2 x 6 car units, wasn't it?)

Perhaps the impact didn't feel that severe from the rear unit. Added to a little bit of disorientation and confusion.
What seems obvious when looking at the obvious, things escape your mind in the moment

 

[Taunton]

We can discuss the inconsistencies and omissions for a long time. To recollect an account of how these reports were compiled, they did not always stem from direct interviews by the Inspecting Officer with all concerned, but were commonly assembled by them from accounts provided by railway management, and/or the BTP, in conjunction with their own investigations, and were apparently commonly collated by the Inspector in a hotel room near the scene in evenings, in the time after the incident. It may have been the railway's own middle manager writing it down, who was just concerned with showing compliance with their area of operations.

That said, I suspect the guard would have more to say to a different investigator. Looking at the photographs the right of way appears completely blocked side to side by the wreckage, the circumnavigation of which is not mentioned, nor how he even managed to get past it twice, only the pernickety detail of putting down detonators, which is a task in the guard's responsibilities, along with enquiring on the welfare of passengers, all of which their own traincrew inspector might want to prove the point had been complied with.

 

[Merle Haggard]

We can discuss the inconsistencies and omissions for a long time. To recollect an account of how these reports were compiled, they did not always stem from direct interviews by the Inspecting Officer with all concerned, but were commonly assembled by them from accounts provided by railway management, and/or the BTP, in conjunction with their own investigations, and were apparently commonly collated by the Inspector in a hotel room near the scene in evenings, in the time after the incident. It may have been the railway's own middle manager writing it down, who was just concerned with showing compliance with their area of operations.

That said, I suspect the guard would have more to say to a different investigator. Looking at the photographs the right of way appears completely blocked side to side by the wreckage, the circumnavigation of which is not mentioned, nor how he even managed to get past it twice, only the pernickety detail of putting down detonators, which is a task in the guard's responsibilities, along with enquiring on the welfare of passengers, all of which their own traincrew inspector might want to prove the point had been complied with.

Spot on. I worked in a Divisional Accidents Section around 1970 and, in the event of mishaps, we obtained reports, via the A.M.s, from staff involved and summarised the salient points. These were then passed up through the B.R. organisation - how far depended upon the severity/importance. Some accidents were 'reportable' which meant that the Ministry had to be advised. The latter did not automatically choose to 'investigate' every case. When they did do so, they asked for our report as the basis for theirs.
My previous impression, before I worked there, that the Inspecting Office raced down to the scene and interviewed everyone first hand (a railway Sherlock Holmes) was therefore shattered when I realised that the conclusion drawn in the office were pretty much the basis for what eventually emerged as the Accident report. As I said above, however, in those days because the emphasis was on 'learning lessons for the future'* there was never any attempt to suppress information even if it showed B.R. in a bad light.
It was all done in the form of handwritten memos and repeatedly writing the words "I shall be pleased if you will let me have the report of your driver turn nnn with regard to the above incident' and its variants certainly ploughed a furrow in ones brain!

*before that expression became an insincere excuse for avoiding censure.

 

[Efini92]

As a driver I’ve read this report and as sad as it is, we will never know who was driving.

Here’s my thoughts…

Most of the report findings I agree with but in the absence of a data recorder we will never know…

I agree with the report that if the AWS was isolated the driver was expected to report this and nothing came through, so I agree that on the balance of probability the AWS was working correctly, there is a mention of the warning horn being a quieter version so maybe whoever was driving didn’t really register it fully (sub consciously cancelling the aws is mentioned within the report or due to the distraction)

No driver would drive a train with the aws isolated without reporting it or being reported already (but then this is 30 years ago maybe there was less urgency back then?) but no punters complained of any delays on the way up.

in the absence of anything to remind the driver of the red aspect up ahead at ashurst, the distant signal being on, the station in between then OD58, I think the layout here is a contributing factor. (No DRA back then)

There is a possibility that the driver drove the train to ashurst and then they swapped over, the guard then took over the controls, and both engaged in conversation missed the quieter aws warning at OD58, what with the fog as well, poor red aspect quality and the crew forgot the distant was on.

Possibly the guard drove on and he was driving when the crash occurred, it’s just my opinion and I base that on the fact there was no overshoot anywhere and nothing untoward happened until the crash itself.

A senior manager suspected the guard on occasion of actually driving trains.

But sadly we will never know what happened that morning.

And I echo peoples sentiments into this sad accident, RIP.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 20 Oct 2024 ==


All the report mentions is that the driver and guard weren’t suffering from any under lying conditions via the coroner.

I don’t think the aws being isolated was taken very seriously before southall.
I too think it was likely the guard was driving, it was still fairly common place to let guards drive in the early 90’s.
If it was the case, given the time, it wouldn’t surprise me if the driver was asleep.
All hypothetical obviously as we’ll never know for certain.

 

[Surreytraveller]

I don’t think the aws being isolated was taken very seriously before southall.
I too think it was likely the guard was driving, it was still fairly common place to let guards drive in the early 90’s.
If it was the case, given the time, it wouldn’t surprise me if the driver was asleep.
All hypothetical obviously as we’ll never know for certain.

Operational incidents weren't given the scrutiny back in those days that they're given now. SPaDs would go unreported, fail to calls too. Drinking culture was still being stamped out.
Staff of today would think it was a different world thirty and more years ago, which it was.
If no one was killed, blind eyes were turned

 

[DM352]

Just saw this thread and hard to believe just over 30 years ago.

Was on a northbound 423 the morning of 15th Oct and stopped at Hurst Green same time as the Uckfield southbound train with the green unit in formation stopped on the other platform.

Was a bit of a shock later in the day to see the Cowdon accident on the front page of the early Sunday papers which happened a few minutes after passing the service.