But offering such a capability will make it impossible to use very secure closed encryption to protect the card. Basically if you can read it so an a criminal who can write the details read onto a blank card.
As a general rule security and convenience are mutually exclusive, most real world applications require an appropriate trade off between security and convenience.
It doesn't work like that. Read a chip and you'll see lots of different banks of data, some encrypted and some public.
I can read my passport. I can see all the details on the photo page - including the photo. But the majority of information, like my fingerprints, is encrypted.
Your passport contains that data too!
You can already read many smartcards to see what the balance is, or tickets loaded (not necessarily here, but abroad) as there's certain data that doesn't need to be encrypted. But there would be other data that you'd not see, but the TOC would when validating it.
Like a passport, there's nothing to stop your photo ID being included and a RPI being able to see a photo of you when you present the card. That same data could even be used, in theory, to validate passing a gateline with a camera - rather like the system being introduced at airports. For now it's too slow, but that will change in time.