I didn't say they were ignorant to the rules. Looking at the driver specifically for example, he should stop if any part of the train is still in the platform. How many coach lengths out of the platform is gasworks tunnel? Where he was when the pc was pulled how obvious would it be if the back is in or out the platforms? It's incredibly difficult to judge from the front of a train and he couldn't have looked out the window as the curve goes the wrong way for him to see. Plus the incident was on the other side to him. You don't learn exactly how far out a platform you are as part of route knowledge, you learn approximately when the back of a train is over a raise in speed limit but that is normally an approximation. So very easy to assume you are clear of a platform when you are not or vice versa. Plus as I said earlier, if you have interlock then the last thing you would suspect the pass comm to be for would be someone trapped in the doors as the interlock circuit is designed to protect against that.
If he believed that the back was clear of the platform, and being that nothing is placed at stations to aide drivers to this, then he was In the right to keep going as this is what the rule book states you should do, continue to a suitable location and no location is more suitable for a pass comm operation than a station.
Why not read the report and these questions will be answered?
41 A passenger near the incident door pulled the PCA about 9 seconds after the train had started moving, when it had travelled about 17 metres. The driver operated an override control 3.5 seconds later and this prevented the PCA causing an emergency brake application. The train continued for about four minutes, until it reached the next station.
42 The drivers decision to override the PCA had no effect on this incident because passenger As fingers were released from the doors shortly before he operated the PCA override. However, overriding the PCA could have resulted in passenger A sustaining more serious injuries if she had remained trapped in the doors, as occurred at Huntingdon (paragraph 34).
43 Override controls are fitted to some trains so that, in appropriate circumstances, the driver can prevent the train stopping at an unsuitable location, such as in a tunnel where it will be difficult to provide assistance to passengers.
44 The railway Rule Book8, and the FCC training notes given to the incident driver during his training9, both instruct drivers that:
l if the PCA is operated, you must, if possible, avoid stopping the train in a place where it might be difficult to deal with the emergency; and
l you must stop the train immediately if the PCA is operated as the train is leaving the station.
45 The Rule Book makes clear that, if a train is leaving a station, the requirement
to stop the train takes precedence over any consideration of unsuitable places
to stop. The training material does not explain this and the incident driver, who had completed his training three months before the incident, believed that he was required to make a rapid judgement call. He had no indication inside his cab of where in the train the PCA had been operated. He decided to continue to Finsbury Park station; this was not a scheduled stopping place for this train, but was the first location at which assistance could be provided relatively easily. He made a general announcement to the passengers, saying that he was aware that the PCA had been operated and that the train would continue to the next station.
